NSC BRIEFING KHRUSHCHEV VISIT TO INDIA AND BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200020014-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 17, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

Appproved For Release1999/09Tb 0$001200020014-7
NSC BRIEFING 17 February 1960
1. Communique issued at end of Khrushchev's visit to India (11-16
Feb) satisfies some of political aims of Khrushchev's goodwill
mission, but impact of visit appears considerably less than might
have been expected.
A. In communique, India noted,,Khrushchev's personal contributions
to lessening of world tensions,,,expressed appreciation of
Soviet disarmament proposals and military cutbacks, supported
cessation of nuclear tests and prohibition of thermonuclear
weapons, and commented on remarkable advances of Soviet science.
B. Thus, India again on record as approving a number of important
Soviet foreign policy positions.
II. Indian public reaction to visit, however, considerably less
enthusiastic than in 1955 and Khrushchev's use of neutral India
as cold-war battleground again deplored.
A. Crowds at Khrushchev functions relatively small, applause
perfunctory.
B. After much press speculation that Khrushchev would help break
Sino-Indian border dispute deadlock, Nehru announced he had
invited Chou to New Delhi prior to Khrushchev's arrival.
1. No evidence in communique that Khrushchev contributed to
any progress on problem. Khrushchev did not mention
China publicly until very moment of his departure for
Burma when, at prodding of newsmen, he said he hoped
India and China could solve dispute peaceably.
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C. Khrushchev's behavior, though more moderate than in 1955,
again antagonized Indians.
1. Some Parliament members apparently resented his preaching
Marxist ideology and his emphasis on one-party political
system.
2. Khrushchev's attacks on West, including criticism of US
aid as "dole" and description of US economic system as
"lame horse" did not go down well.
3. His boast that USSR is strongest military power in world
lessened the impact of his "mission of peace" and his
profession of willingness to disarm.
4. No significant new Soviet aid was announced during visit.
Only action was official signature of $375,000,000 aid
agreement, concluded last ,July and initialled in September.
III. Apparent throughout visit that ChiCom actions in Tibet and clashes
on Indian border have left residue of suspicion in India regarding
Bloc faith in principles of peace and coexistence.
A. Goodwill generated in India by Soviet neutrality on Tibetan
border issue and by Soviet expressions of hope for peaceful
solution apparently was not increased and may actually havc
been lessened by Khrushchev visit.
IV. Khrushchev's visit to Burma not desired by, Burmese govt and his
reception tsa -been kept to the minimum consonant with
protocol.
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A. Popular reception one of poorest ever accorded visiting
dignitary. Only a few thousand people, in city of 750,000,
turned out at airport and along 16-mile route to capital.
V. Khrushehev-eo-ted,hit stride in Indonesia where he assured of
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red-carpet treatment,, on extensive tours of islands during .10.-
day visit.
l'
A. Khrushchev's arrival-1-8 ary--marks his first visit to
country and host Sukarno anxious please.
B. Indonesian-Soviet relations already cordial.
C. Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), with estimated 11 millior.
members and broad popular support, will help make Khrushchev
feel at home.
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