DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100080014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 18, 1959
• Content Type: BRIEF

SEC
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : -RDP79R00890A001100080014-2
NSC BRIEFING 18 August 1959
I.
DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY INTENTIONS
While De Gaulle supports fully a firm Western stand vis-a-vis
the USSR, he envisages France as the eventual leader of a
Eurafrican grouping strong enough to face up to three other
major power blocs: US-UK, Soviet, Chinese.
A. De Gaulle is convinced that Chinese expansion will force
an "Americanized" Russia to cooperate with the West.
1. He considers Communism a transient phenomenon, and the
Soviet drive for power just another form of Russian
nationalism.
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3. Because of resentment lest the US be considered sole
spokesman for the West, Information Minister Frey has
stated De Gaulle and Eisenhower would discuss purely
French-US problems, and he assumed Eisenhower and
Khrushchev would limit their exchange of views to US-
USSR issues.
II. Meanwhile, Premier Debre is pressing more insistently in public
De Gaulle's demand for an equal voice with the US and the UK
in determining, Western policy anywhere on the globe
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A. In a speech on 16 August Debre stated that France is reacting
against alliances that were leading it into "bondage."
1. He insisted France must have a larger role in world affairs,
and be heard in order "to avoid being crushed by agree-
ments between very great powers."
III. Pressure for tripartite global policy determination will probably
intensify as the time approaches for the detonation of France's
first nuclear device (probably spring 1960).
A. Paris now seems to see prestige and bargaining advantages
in developing its first bomb without foreign assistance.
B. France apparently expects to have immediate access to nuclear-
weapon knowledge once a Franch device is exploded.
1. Pressure for a prior understanding on the scope of aid
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may precede tests.
C. Disappointment of French hopes in this respect will spark
a violent French reaction.
1. France's NATO commitments (forces and arms program) may
be further curtailed.
2. Paris might formally demand a reorganization of NATO,
with a greater voice for Europe.
3. Extremist nationalist elements in De Gaulle's entourage
will feel increasingly free to take steps inimical to US
interests.
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IV. As UNGA consideration of the Algerian problem draws near,
pressure on the US for more direct support of French policy in
North Africa will increase.
A. Paris maintains that a complete military victory in Algeria
could be quickly achieved.if the rebels were sealed off from
foreign aid.
B. The disappointing results of the current highly publicized
large-scale mop-up operations in the mountains east of
Algiers will probably strengthen France's diplomatic offensive.
C. Nevertheless, De Gaulle is unlikely to make any additional
cease-fire appeal which would imply recognition of the Algerian
Provisional Government as sole representatives of the Algerian
people.
1. The rebels' hope for strong support in the UN will probably
make them reluctant to accept anything less.
V. Debre's 16 August speech stressed the importance of Algeria in
France's dream of economic independence.
A. De Gaulle probably hopes to see the Sahara solidifying
French hegemony over the contiguous African areas.
B. The French see Saharan oil freeing them from the dollar-
trade-gap problem.
C. They look to the Sahara to assure France's pre-eminence
in a European "Third Force" capable of mediating between
the Soviet Bloc and the "Anglo Saxons."
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VI. Meanwhile, De Gaulle is still groping for a more specific
definition of his vague proposal for a joint international
aid program to underdeveloped areas.
A. He will probably push this proposal with increasing insistence
as the only realistic substitute for the cold war.
B. He seems sincere in presenting this idea as a means of
achieving a detente, but he also has referred to it as
a clever tactical move which would "embarrass" the Russians
because they would have to reject it.
He may present it in a way, however, the USSR can readily
turn to Soviet propaganda ends.
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