BACKGROUND FOR OCB SATELITE PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100010013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 27, 1959
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 27 January 1959
BACKGROUND FOR OCB SATELLITE PAPER
I. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania usually termed
"orthodox" satellites, all studiously avoided divergence
in 1955-56. These countries quickly suppressed scattered
demands in literary and party circles for increased freedom
and for the elimination of Stalinist practices.
A. In Albania, although a small flurry occurred within the
party, the "thaw" was permitted to make no inroads at
all in the country.
B. In Bulgaria, Vulko Chervenkov was forced out as party
leader--but fact that he was retained on politburo and
in high government position was illustrative of the
strength of Stalinism in that country.
C. In Czechoslovakia, there was some unrest in the party
in early 1956 and considerable student dissidence by
students in early summer, but the regime quickly stamped
it out and no further expression of "thaw" spirit was
tolerated.
D. In 1956 the Rumanian regime came down hard on intellectual
dissidence. During and after the Hungarian revolution,
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there were sympathetic rumblings in Hungarian and student
circles in Transylvania, but regime was alert to problem
and handled it effectively.
II. All four countries seized on change of atmosphere following
Hungarian revolution to justify their previous fealty to
Stalinist cause. All were quick to respond to Khrushchev's
call at 40th anniversary celebrations in November 1957 in
Moscow for a general tightening of discipline.
III. As a result of revolution Hungary's problems have been
unique.
A. Objective of Kadar regime has been to resurrect a
functioning economic-political unit from ashes of
revolution.
1. Despite impediments caused by exigencies of Soviet
intra-bloc policy--such as renewed dispute with
Yugoslavia and execution of Imre Nagy--and continued
world attention towards Hungarian issue, Kadar has had
some success in obtaining popular acceptance of
regime, in putting economy back on its feet, and in
rebuilding the party, which is still faction-ridden.
B. Kadar retains Khrushchev's endorsement despite uncertainties
caused by his former ties with Yugoslavs and with Nagy,
but he will probably be replaced when Moscow decides to
resume hard-line internal policies in order to speed up
building of "socialism."
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IV. There have bden some recent signs of instability in certain
of these countries.
A. In Rumania, an accelerated campaign of forced collectiviza-
tion in winter of 1957-58 caused sporadic peasant re-
sistance. Since then, regime has moderated its policy
in this sphere.
1. In response to the bloc campaign to tighten internal
discipline, however, it moved rather drastically not
only against "corrupt elements," as did other Satellite
regimes, but against various potential dissident
elements, (churches, managerial bureaucracy and
foreigners) as well.
Although there was no indication of any threat to
regime, excessive nature of campaign appeared to
reflect some uneasiness.
B. In Czechoslovakia, recent coercive measures by regime,
made necessary by Czechoslovakia's increased burder under
bloc economic programs and by aid it is giving to un-
derdeveloped nations, have caused rumblings of discontent,
especially among workers but also among rural population.
1. Regime appears alert, however to dari,
rs inherent
in situation, and will probably proceed with caution
in order not to provoke open displays of unrest.
V. Reports from Bulgaria, taken togithef,,vith evidence from
Poland and hints from Hungary, indicate that under surface
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commune question is playing a significant role in factional
fighting between Khrushchev-backed moderates and die-hard
Stalinists in Eastern Europe.
A. Official line in stallgtties has, for most part, been to
follow Soviet lead and deny applicability of commune
system in Eastern Europe.
In Bulgaria, the party leaders, influenced by spirit of
Chinese commune experiment, in October 1958 initiated a
drive to pre-fulfil their five year plan (1958-62), and
in November, revised the goals of their plan upwards by
launching a "great leap forward" of their own.
1. A. serious factional fight reportedly occurred, how-
ever, during a Bulgarian party central committee
meeting in December over a proposal for further
radical reorganization of Bulgaria's economic pro-
gram, to include features of Chinese communes.
2. Former Stalinist party boss Chervenkov may have used
Chinese example in bid for power against present
party chief Zhivkov who has Khrushchev's backing, and
whose radical programs since October have been
clearly based on Soviet example.
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