INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING OF MR. TRUMAN BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WEDNESDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER, IN THE HOTEL CARLYLE, NEW YORK CITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001000050019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: September 20, 1958
• Content Type: MFR

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20 September 1958
MII4ORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
of
SUBJECT: Intelligence ligence, Wednesday,m 17 September, in D the Hotel
Central Intel
Carlyle, New York City
1. The Acting Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell,
briefed Mr. Truman in the latter's suite in the Hotel Carlyle, New York
City, for one hour beginning shortly after 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, 17
September. General Cabell was accompanied by No other
persons were present. This was the third intelligence briefing of Mr.
Truman, the first having been given on 30 July and the second on 12
August.
2. Following General Cabell's explanation of the prepared brief-
ing's organization, Mr. Truman elected to read the text aloud (copy
attached) and did read aloud almost all of the briefing on the Taiwan
Straits before asking General Cabell to take over. Mr. Truman stopped
his reading again and again to consult the maps and engage in discussion
of points raised in the text. He expressed his pleasure with the maps
and showed his own particular interest in artillery. He made many
brief and colorful comments. On Chinese Nationalist mismanagement of
the first convoy unloading, he observed "they would"; on Chinese
Nationalists' success in an air engagement, "good"; on the danger of
State Dept., NAVY, PACOM reviews completed
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unilateral action by the Chinese Nationalists against the mainland, "of
course they want to get us into war." Mr. Truman exclaimed several
times on the serious and dreadful nature of the situation as a whole,
adding on one occasion that he did not know what the answer was.
3. During General Cabell's reading of the text on the Near East
Mr. Truman commented on Nasir's untrustworthiness
The briefing's reference to the danger of warfare be-
tween the Moslems and Christians in Lebanon led Mr. Truman to remark
that the communal warfare in India was one of the worst things that had
happened in his lifetime.
4. As on the earlier occasions, Mr. Truman expressed warm appre-
ciation for the briefing. He described the briefing text as not only
an important document but one well done.
Acting Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
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PREPARED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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INTELLIGENCE
17 SEPTEMBER 1958
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE CURRENT WORLD SITUATION
Table of Contents
s I
7
I. The Taiwan Straits
Page
A.
The Local Military Situation
1
B.
'Chinese Communist Intentions
6
C.
Political Moves
15
D.
The Soviet Position
18
II.
The Middle East
E.
Lebanon
25
F.
Jordan-UAR
26
rt
G.
Iraq
28
H.
Saudi Arabia
30
I.
Israel
30
J.
Cyprus
31
K.
Morocco
32
L.
Tunisia
33
M.
Algeria
33
N.
Iran
34
III. South Asia
0. Afghanistan 35
IV. Southeast Asia
P. Indonesia 36
Q. Laos 36
00, R. Cambodia 36
I
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I. THE TAIWAN STRAITS
0890A001000050019-1
A. The Local Military Situation
1. Since Communist China began on 27 July to
deploy jet fighters to the coastal Areas opposite
Taiwan, there has been a steady buildup there of air,
naval and ground forces.
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Shuitou
oN
Shuitou
KINMEN
No.
20
--- 24
96
----120
LIEH HSU
---- 12
KU LANG HSU "i
,,FERNY DOCK
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COMMAND
Max
Range
.
Type (Yds.)
155 Gun M-2
25,000
155 How.,M1Al
16,000
105 How.
12,000
75 How.
9,600
155 How., M1A1
16,000
105 How M-2
12,000
75 How.
9,600
MAXIMUM RANGE CHINESE
COMMUNIST FIELD ARTILLERY
PIECES
76.2 mm. Gun M1936 --------
152 mm. Gun-Howitzer M1937 --
122 mm. Corps Gun M1931/37
~2IEH $
iCti Que
ARTILLERY OF KINMEN DEFENSE
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 2. With these moves the Chinese Communists
achieved the capability to launch major attacks
against the Chinmens, the Matsus, and smaller off-
shore islands with little or no warning. So far,
the Communists do not appear prepared for a major or
military action against Taiwan and the Penghus ~01
Pescadores) but they now possess a capability for
(
/~" major air attacks against them.
3. On 23 August, the Chinese Communists began
interdiction operations against the Chinmens. The
/
/~'~ airstrip and landing beaches on Big Chinmen were
brought under artillery fire. Motor torpedo boats
and larger gun boats were used at night against
/
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There have been no attacks against US convoy escorts;
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these have stayed outside the three-mile limit.
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Communist artillery interdiction of Chinmen
s ,
has been effective. The first US-escorted resupply
ships, which went in on 7 September, were unmolested
but the Nationalists mismanaged the unloading.
Since then, four more attempts have been driven off
by accurate artillery fire. The last two attempts
on 13 and 14 September succeeded in landing some
supplies and another on 16 September may also have
done so. The Nationalists have been making limited
air drops, mostly at night, but the total amount of
supplies getting through by any means is very small.
No US-escorted convoys have attempted night landings.
Altogether since 23 August the Nationalists have
landed less than 200 tons. The Chinese Nationalists'
estimate of daily requirements of supplies of all
categories is about 700 tons; we estimate that this
requirement is 300 tons a day.
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5. The Chinmen garrison's position will become
critical in less than a month if the blockade is not
broken. Chiang Kai-shek told Admiral Smoot on
12 September that if the US-Nationalist capability
to land supplies on Chinmen did not show marked
improvement in five days, "drastic steps would have
to be taken." US ,military officials in Taipei`,
however, say that it is uncertain whether more
aggressive Nationalist resupply operations could
be successful over a long period. They doubt the
ability of Nationalist artillery to silence the
Communist guns, even with the use of 8-inch
howitzers soon to be delivered to Chinmen.
6. In contrast to the performance of the
Nationalist navy, the Nationalist air force has
done well during encounters with the Communists.
/
A Nationalist
/
resulted
in an
00
5 MIGS,
plus 2
reconnaissance mission on 8 September
air battle in which they shot down
probables, without any losses. The
Communist pilots performed poorly and the Nationalists
are confident of their superior training. They will
probably do even better when they start using F-100
planes and Sidewinder missiles now being turned
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 Maximum Range of Chinese Communist
Field Artillery Pieces
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SANTO INLET CHIHCHU ISLAND
------76.2-mm Gun M1936
(SPIDER ISLAND)
------152-mm Gun-Howitzer M1937
-122-mm Corps Gun M1931 37
LOYUAN BAY
Oe PEICHIAO
YENCRI
PEILING
PENINSULA V
LANGTAO
(LARNE ISLAND)
6~
O
A 6CHI
KAOTENG
KUA LING.
PANTANG ?
PEH
LIENCHIANG WEITOW
LSLAND
TSU
KUANTOU CHUANSHIH
ISLAND
FOOCHOW HWANCKI
ISLAND
T C II I N A S E A
NA TAI
Airfield
MATSU AREA
O MEIHUA
PA HUAN ISLANDS
#4
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Under Construction C.
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Nyulicel Miles
?-------- --
------------
CHIHCHU ISLAND
(SPIDER ISLAND)
PEICHIAO
~.,a
LANGTAO
)LARNE ISLAND
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Airfield
Selected Roads
Under Construction 5 10
Statul5 Mily 10
PEIKANTANG
(4)
155 Gun M-2
25,000
(12)
105 How M-2
12,000
(12)
105 How M-3
MATSU
8,200
(4)
155 Gun M-2
25,000
(12)
105 How M-2
12,000
(12)
105 How M-3
8,200
PAICHUAN ISLANDS
(12)
105 How
12,000
(8)
75 How
9,600
YENCH
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7. However, the present atmosphere in Taipei
is disturbing. There is a danger that the Chinese
Nationalists will initiate action against the
Communists as a desperation measure. They may take
steps designed to provoke hostilities between the
United States and Communist China. Nationalist
leaders are "dismayed" over the prospect of
negotiations between the United States and Com-
munist China. Chiang Kai-shek still asserts,
Alft
however, that he will live up to his commitment
not to attack the mainland without prior consulta-
tion with the US.
8. While the Communists have kept a tight
artillery stranglehold on the Chinmens, they have
0 refrained from interfering with Nationalist re-
/ supply of the Matsus, which has been done without
i
US escort. The Communists have increased their
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The Matsus can also just be reached
by the heaviest guns on a nearby peninsula, although
the ocean approaches are in defilade.
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2
Communist military moves in the Straits
area have been accompanied by propaganda of
mounting intensity. In late August, Chinese Com-
munist officials began to intimate that Peiping
intends to take the offshore islands. Foreign
Minister Chen Yi on 22 August stated that the US has
"challenged us....We will take the offshore islands."
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Premier Chou En-lai said "we must not give in to
the US or show fear." On 29 August, Peiping Radio
said the Chinese people are "determined" to take
Taiwan and the offshore islands. At the biggest
mass rally ever held in Peiping, Politburo Member
Peng Chen reaffirmed this statement.
11. Chou En-lai, in agreeing on 6 September to
a resumption of talks with the US on the ambassadorial
level, reaffirmed Communist China's "absolute right"
to take the "necessary military action" against
Chinese Nationalist forces on the islands.
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12. The Chinese Communist leaders are using
the current situation to expand the regime's militia
organizations. They are integrating them with the
new "communes," which are communities containing
as many as 40,000 persons and which combine
industrial, agricultural, military and cultural
functions. Militia organizations in the communes
are designed to strengthen control over the peasants
and provide a large organized labor pool for
achieving the regime's ambitious production goals.
The campaign to make "every man a soldier" was
kicked off on a national scale on about 11 September.
It is characterized by pledges from militiamen that
they will fight the US "with arms in one hand and
tools in the other."
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14. In Peiping's demonstrated mood of con-
fidence and aggressiveness we do not see Chinese
willingness to resume ambassadorial talks as a
sign of weakness. Rather it is an indication that
Peiping believes it can achieve its immediate
objective through negotiations. They will very
probably maintain their military harassment of
Chinmen and their interdiction of its supply
lines while the talks are underway. Thus the US
will be negotiating under a very considerable
disadvantage. Their present blockade of Chinmen,
if allowed to continue, will make the island
untenable. This puts the next move up to the US.
15. The US has a limited range of choices:
it can allow the island to fall by attrition; it
can assist the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw
from the island; it can agree to Chinese Nationalist
attacks on the mainland; it can undertake to main-
tain resupply of Chinmen by all-American convoys;
or it can itself take the military action necessary
to assure resupply of the island by the Chinese
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Nationalists. The first two choices might have
00
serious consequences for the Chiang regime and
001 would shake the confidence of other nations whose
0 -
security has been guaranteed by the US. Any of
Oro 0
the latter three courses of action eventually would
/ 11 probably involve US attacks on the mainland, and
0/ the US could be charged before world opinion with
00
expanding the scope of armed conflict.
0016. In pursuing this course, it is likely
700
/ d that the Chinese Communists are willing to take
actions involving considerable risk of major armed
/ 11 conflict with the US. If US ships move close in-
shore in the course of escorting Nationalist supply
/ I
convoys, the Communists will probably not desist
4~1
/
from their artillery barrages against unloading
O OF" operations. If the US attempts to prevent by
000
force the interdiction of supply, US forces so
engaged will almost certainly be attacked within
the limits of Chinese Communist capabilities. If
/
74 the US were to announce that it would resupply
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Chinmen with all-American convoys (supported by
appropriate combat strength ready to defend against
attack) we believe that the Chinese Communists would
probably attack the US force, although there is a
chance that they would not. In any event, the
Communists will demand that world opinion condemn
US aggression and force a political settlement
favorable to Communist China.
17. Their propaganda is already attempting to
establish justification for any shelling of US war-
ships which might venture within Communist artillery
range in the Chinmen area. In condemning US convoy
operations, a People's Daily editorial on 12 September
declared that Peiping cannot look on American logistic
support of Nationalist forces "without taking action."
The editorial warns that "artillery fire is not
merciful thing" and that the US must not blame
Communist China for not having issued warnings.
These warnings are publicly numbered by the Chinese
Communists; the fifth was issued 13 September.
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18. In addition to the continued interdiction
of Chinmen, the Chinese Communists might seize,
with little or no warning, one or more of the
smaller offshore islands. This would be
calculated to fall outside the scope of any US
commitments to the Nationalists and would serve
further the Communist objective of eroding the
Nationalist position. The effect would be
further calculated as not prejudicing the
Chinese Communist position of negotiation, but,
rather, as increasing the international sense of
urgency for a peaceful settlement and, at the
same time, placing added political pressure on
the US.
19. We do not believe, however, that they
would deliberately challenge the US military by
assaulting any of the major offshore islands in
the near future. They probably feel such a move
to be unnecessary because they believe the islands OF,
will fall or be ceded to them in any case.
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/ 20. At the first meeting in Warsaw on 15 Sep-
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tember negotiator Wang Ping-nan presented the Com-
munist position. The US is to withdraw its forces
from the Taiwan Straits area and agree that Chinmen,
Matsu, Taiwan and the Penghus are part of Communist
China. Chinmen and Matsu are to be "recovered",
with the proviso that the Nationalist garrison will
be permitted to evacuate unmolested. After gain-
ing possession of the offshore islands, Peiping
will strive to take Taiwan and the Penghus by
peaceful means, avoiding the use of force for "a
certain period of time."
21. The last point is a modification of the
previous Communist refusal even to discuss any
,renunciation-of-force declaration concerning mili-
tary operations against the Nationalists, However,
Peiping will. refuse to agree to any declaration or
commitment which would compromise its position
that the "liberation" of Taiwan, as well as the
offshore islands, is an "internal" problem. That
is, the Communist negotiator almost certainly has
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been instructed to refuse anything which smacks
of "two Chinas."
22. It is clear that the Chinese Communists
are in no mood for any negotiated settlement which
would restore the status c uo ante. If the negotia-
tions fail to make progress they propose that the
ambassadors confine their efforts to a preliminary
airing of views and the establishing of ground
rules. They will demand that substantive negotia-
ttons be transferred to the foreign minister level
or to a heads-of-government meeting with Chinese
Communist participation, and this may be their
eventual objective.
23. If the Communists felt they had a good
enough case against the US they might raise the is-
sue in the UN General Assembly. A factor which
would influence them against such a course would
be fear that it might solidify UN opinion in
favor of a "two Chinas" solution. The Chinese
Nationalists contend that any US move to bring
the Straits problem to the UN would be an accept-
ance of this concept. In any case, the USSR
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0 passed up its first opportunity to raise the issue %0
44
of Chinese representation when it did not interject
the issue into debate at the General Assembly open-
ing session on 16 September. Instead, the Soviet
delegation may press the question when India's
request to hold a substantive discussion of the
issue comes up for inscription on the assembly's
agenda, probably within the next two weeks.
Moreover, Sweden, with the support of Norway and
Denmark, is expected to "go all out" at that time
for admission of Communist China into the United
Nations. However, if the Straits situation does
not worsen, a narrow majority of UN members are
expected to uphold the moratorium on discussion of
representation at this time.
24. Previous attempts to seat Peiping have
met with little. response, largely because no formula
for the future of Taiwan has been presented which
is sufficiently attractive to weaken Western sup-
port for Taipei. Nationalist China's seat in
the UN has been upheld for the past six years by
the moratorium formula--a procedural device which
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postpones discussion of the issue and requires
only a simple majority vote. Most UN members,
lop however, believe Peiping must eventually be ad-
witted and have supported the moratorium largely
on grounds of expediency. Taipei's majorities
r have decreased steadily each year. Should the
moratorium fail to pass, Taipei would not be able
1
.00
to command the two-thirds majority necessary to re-
tain its seat. The West, however, can block Peiping
A~ from a two-thirds vote.
/ D.. The Soviet Position
/ 25. Whatever the forum, the USSR has com-
mitted itself heavily to support of its ally.
/ During the last two weeks the USSR has given
strong public support to the Chinese Communists.
/ This is in sharp contrast to the position which
the Kremlin adopted during the 1955 crisis over
the offshore islands. At that time, the equivocal /
/7 /
nature of Soviet pronouncements led us to believe /
/ that the USSR was restraining Peiping.
26. On 31 August the party newspaper Pravda /
/r
warned that the USSR will give Communist China
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the "necessary moral and material help in its
just struggle." On 3 September Izvestiya, the
government paper, made the first reference to
the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance asserting: "The
Soviet Union, tied to the Chinese People's Republic
by bonds of their inviolable fraternal alliance,
fully supports this just struggle." Two days later,
Pravda repeated its expressions of support: "The
/ 1 Soviet people will extend to its brother the Chinese
r/
people every kind of aid." It warned that no one--
~ /
including other Asian countries--could count on the
retaliatory blow being restricted to the offshore
islands and the Taiwan Straits.
0
27. These increasingly belligerent statements
/ '' led up to Premier Khrushchev's letter of 7 September
; "00
to President Eisenhower, which established the
present official Soviet position on the Straits
crisis. After pointedly warning against the
/~ danger of "miscalculation," Khrushchev declared:
/ "An attack on the Chinese Peoples' Republic... is
/ an attack on the Soviet Union." He said that the
T USSR, "true to its duty," will "do everything,"
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together with Peiping "to defend the security
of both states...." Soviet press and radio propa-
ganda have since repeated Khrushchev's warning
under such slogans as "Hands off China," and have
developed the theme that military action against
Communist China would start a "world conflagration."
Starting on 11 September, a number of "spontaneous"
mass meetings in the USSR to protest American
"provocations" have been also reported by Moscow.
28. In spite of the tone of these warnings
0
and the level of tension in the Straits area, we
have no evidence that the USSR has ordered any of
the military alerts and deployments which charact-
erized.its reaction to earlier crises in the
Middle East. Also, we have not seen the increase
in Soviet diplomatic activity, or in plants and
feelers through unofficial channels, that we might
have expected.
29. This lack of evidence of Soviet alarm
supports our estimate that the Soviet public com-
mitment--while intended to deter the US--was almost
certainly made on the basis of calculations that
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activities in the Taiwan Strait area would fall
short of provoking US intervention on such a scale
as to call for overt Soviet military participation.
We believe Moscow's view of the situation is based
upon substantial knowledge of Chinese Communist
plans and intentions. It is probable that the
Soviet leaders, at least since the Mao-Khrushchev
talks (30 July-l August), have not only been in-
formed, but have also concurred in Chinese Commu-
nist actions in the Strait area.
30. The Soviet leaders cannot be greatly con-
cerned with the fate of the offshore islands,
and,,having less directly at stake than the
Chinese Communists, may be inclined to favor a
more conservative course. Their principal ob-
jectives are political--to discredit the US, to
comply with the wishes'of their Chinese ally, and
to enhance the power and prestige of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. They believe that the opportunity
to put the US in the dock under accusations of
jeopardizing peace should be utilized to the maxi-
mum, and that support for the US would be far less
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than it was in the Middle East crisis. They
04 0 00,
also believe that if the US backs down from its /
position on the offshore islands or acts in de- /
fiance of world opinion, they will have inflicted
/~
0 a serious political defeat on the US.
31. While the Soviets probably do not wish to
0 see the scale of hostilities expanded and the /
00 0 risk of their involvement magnified, they will be 00 0
aware that the US may be led by Chinese Communist /
actions to engage Chinese Communist forces, If
/ ,
00 such hostilities are initiated, but limited to
conventional weapons and confined to the mainland /
00~ 40
area adjacent to the Taiwan Strait, the Soviets 4
00
/ would probably consider that the Chinese Communists J
did not
require directilitF
00
mary assistance and O would provide moral, political, and material
assistance. Thus, they would almost certainly
00
not intervene militaril00,
y, at least in an overt
manner risking a direct confrontation of Soviet
0
and US forces.
01
/
32. If hostilities continued for long, or
particularly if they were expanded in area and
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scale, at some point the Soviets would probably
feel that they would have to go further in sup-
port of Communist China. With respect to Soviet
reactions to the US use of nuclear weapons, much
would depend upon the scale of the US attacks, the
extent of territory over which they would be de-
livered, and the entire context of events. The
Soviets might conclude that more could be gained
at less cost and risk by exercising military
restraint and leading a political campaign to
condemn the US before world opinion. They would
have many supporters. On the other hand, the
Soviets might conclude that such a challenge could
not be passed by without nuclear retaliation.
Particularly if the US extended the area of
nuclear attack for a considerable distance into
mainland China, there would be a better than even
chance that the Soviets would provide the Chinese
Communists with capabilities for nuclear retalia-
tion under Soviet control. And, at some point
high on a scale of increasing damage and danger
to the Chinese regime, the Soviets might directly
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attack US forces engaged in China, including the
bases from which such forces were operating, in
the face of the attendant risk of general war.
33. Thus regardless of their calculations,
the Soviets have permitted Communist China to set
in motion a train of events which neither party can
bring under control without retreating from its
present position. At the same time they have
given Communist China what appears to be an un-
equivocal promise of military support.
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 Approved For
II. THE MIDDLE EAST
/
/
E. Lebanon
34. The internal security situation has eased
considerably asa result of an understanding between
the rebel leaders and President-elect Shihab.
35. The most critical period will occur after
Shihab's inauguration on 24 September when rebel
pressure on the general for key cabinet representa-
tation and other concessions will almost certainly
increase. Although Shihab has sent
repre-
sentatives to Nasir and to Damascus to secure
approval for proposed moves, the UAR has taken
out insurance against possible failure on the part
of Shihab to cooperate, by resuming shipments of
arms and funds to rebel groups in Lebanon.
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36. Forces supporting outgoing pro-Western
President Chamoun meanwhile are seeking more arms,
with the intention of preventing Shihab from yield-
ing too much to opposition pressure. Pro-Chamoun
extremists may attempt to prolong the crisis in
order to prevent the withdrawal of American troops.
By the recent formation of a new party, Chamoun
has created a personal political organization with
which he hopes to continue participation in Lebanese
affairs after he leaves the presidency. Should
fighting break out anew after Shihab's assumption
of the presidency, there is danger that the struggle
will turn into sectarian warfare between Moslems
and Christians.
F. Jordan-UAR
37. UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold's effort
to implement the 21 August UNGA resolution on the
Middle East apparently has failed in its major ob-
jective. Nasir has refused to give adequate assur-
ances of non-interference in Jordan. As a result
King Husayn would not agree to withdrawal at an
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.early date of British troops from his country.
Nasir has also taken the position that the Assem-
bly's resolution was intended primarily to expedite
the withdrawal of Western troops; he has warned
that severe tension would return to the area if
their evacuation were not speedily arranged.
7
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50r,
39, increased friction has been reported be-
tween King Husayn and Prime Minister Rifai. This
has led to speculation that the King may be in-
a less authoritarian premier.
duced to appoint
greater instability in
Husayn would risk even
however, unless he decided to
dismissing Rifai,
accommodation with Nasir.
seek some sort of
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41. The recent decision of the Moroccan and
Tunisian governments to join the Egyptian-dominated
Arab League gives Nasir another significant vic-
tory. Membership in the League will now include
all independent Arab states--including those which
in the past have opposed him. While an expanded
League might present certain restraints to Nasir,
the UAR president appears increasingly to be with-
out public challenge in the Arab world.
G. Iraq
42. Cairo is striving to increase its influ-
ence in the Iraqi armed forces
Increased Egyptian in
fluence in the armed forces would be used to
strengthen the position of the faction, led by
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Vice Premier Arif, which favors Iraqi membership
in the UAR. The Iraqi faction led by Prime Minister
Qassim which favors a more independent association
with the UAR is supported by the Communists who
would be outlawed in a union with the UAR.
43. What appears to be the first overt move
in the power struggle between the pro-Arif and the
pro-Qassim factions in the ruling clique was the
removal of pro-Nasir Vice Premier and Interior
Minister Arif from his concurrently held post of
deputy commander of the Iraqi armed forces on 12
September. Arif has thus been removed from the
chain of command of the armed forces, while
Premier and Defense Minister Qassim remains in
overall control of the armed forces, and appears
to be supported by the three-man Executive Council
headed by President Rubai.
44. The new Iraqi government has been pardon-
ing political prisoners and exiles of the old
regime. Hard-core Communists are now active in
various parts of Iraq. The government in a direct
bid for the support of some 800,000 Kurds who
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live in northern Iraq has also pardoned Mulla
Mustafa Barzani who led Kurdish revolts in Iraq
and Iran from 1943-46 and then fled to the Soviet
Union where he has been ever since. Mulla Mustafa
is expected back in Iraq by the and of September.
While Iraq hopes to use the Mulla, his return may
instead spark a new wave of Kurdish nationalism,
especially in Iran and Iraq.
H. Saudi Arabia
45. In Saudi Arabia no significant new develop-
ments have been noted. The situation, however, re-
mains dangerously unstable.
I. Israel
46. Concern over Nasir's growing influence is
leading to increasingly close military cooperation
between Israel and Turkey.
The Israelis
are striving to establish a new balance of power
in the,Middle East by promoting cooperation among
the non-Arab states in the area who fear encroach-
ment by the 50 million Arab nationalists.
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47. An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman
has informed the American Embassy in Tel Aviv
that there has been a steady increase in Egyptian
reconnaissance by both regular forces and terror-
ists in Israel since the Iraqi coup in mid-July.
In publicizing the new infiltration, Israel may
be building a case to support its current re-
quests for arms aid. In the past such reports
have often served as justification for Israeli
retaliatory action.
48. Foreign Minister Meir has indicated that
Israel may occupy Jordanian territory in the event
of chaos in Jordan or the impending presence of
the UAR in West Jordan. She has asserted that
Israel could not risk waiting for overt UAR ag-
gression and subsequent Western intervention.
Mrs. Meir said that "a beautiful funeral... would
do us no good."
J. Cyprus
49. Violence is expected to continue and
probably will increase in intensity as Britain
moves to put its new Cyprus plan into effect.
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The Greek Government and the Greeks on Cyprus re-
fuse to cooperate in implementing the plan, which
A
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they regard as a first step to partition. Athens
:~00
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negotiations would continue, but the Turkish and
go-
1 British Governments appear determined to push ahead
with implementing the present plan.
K. Morocco
50. A governmental crisis seems imminent in
Morocco. The left wing of the dominant Istigial
party is attempting to wrest control from the
moderates and to curb the powers and influence of
the King.
51. Moroccans are becoming increasingly diffi-
cult on a new agreement covering the five US air
bases. The Moroccan decision to join the Arab
League is a manifestation of the growth of Pan-
Arabism in North Africa, but the Moroccans prob-
ably will attempt to resist any extension of
Nas ir's influence .
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L. Tunisia
52. Pro-Western President Bourguiba is facing
mounting dissension within his government and his
Neo-Destour party for his dictatorial methods.
Last week he in effect suppressed an influential
weekly edited by a Neo-Destour "Young Turk" for 'criti-
cizing a judicial decision.
53. The forthcoming negotiations with France
over the status of Bizerte base will probably be
difficult, and will reflect the continuously hard-
ening North African nationalist position. This
hardening as well as Bourguiba's fear of being
isolated has induced him to follow Morocco's lead
in joining the Arab League.
54. Tunisia's economic situation continues
serious. Recent measures toward nationalization
of industry are likely to discourage badly needed
foreign investment.
M. Algeria
55. During August the Algerian rebels ex-
tended their sabotage campaign to petroleum
storage facilities in France itself. The rebels,
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demanding independence from France, are'now mak-
ing an all-out effort to enforce a boycott by
Moslems of the French constitutional referendum
(26-28 September). Regardless of the number of
Algerian votes cast in the French constitutional
referendum, the rebels will continue their fight
for independence.
N. Iran
56. The Shah has not put into effect prompt
and dramatic reforms which might alleviate wide-
spread dissatisfaction. Plotting and intrigue
continue among military officers, as well as among
urban intellectual and semi-literate elements.
Another potential source of instability is Iran's
Kurdish minority, 500,000 out of 19 million,
which is located near the Iraqi and Soviet fron-
tiers. I (Baghdad
has been attempting to incite Iranian Kurds to
revolt against the Shah.
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Po III. SOUTH ASIA
0. Afghanistan
00 57. The Soviet Union's effort to expand its
/'
1 influence in Afghanistan is continuing. In addi-
/
tion to previously publicized economic and military
aid
, Moscow apparently has offered to finance the
entire cost of a civil air development ProSram
in
00
7 Afghanistan. This offer
,/ reportedly includes low-
00,
cost modern aircraft with Soviet crews, airports
built at any location desired by Afghanistan, train-
ing of Afghan
personnel, and establishment of a
P
Kabul-Moscow air route. An agreement accepting at
least a part of the Soviet offer will probably
be signed during the mid-October visit to Moscow
of Afghan Foreign Minister Naim.
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IV. SOUTHEAST ASIA
00
58. While there has been no Southeast Asian
development of major significance during the past
month, three countries continue to give serious
concern.
P. Indonesia
59. The Indonesian army has taken some tenta-
tive steps to restrict Communist influence and is
considering the postponement of the critical na-
tional elections scheduled for next year. But the
army does not yet seem prepared to initiate the firm
action necessary to arrest the basic trend toward
Communist control of the republic.
Q. Laos
60. The disappointingly weak new government
seems incapable of building grass roots support
and thus undercutting the rapid growth of Communism
in the provinces.
R. Cambodia
61. Cambodian Premier Sihanouk remains bent
on pursuing his own brand of neutralism which is
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now leaning more and more toward Peiping.
Sihanouk's continuing quarrels with neighbor-
ing Thailand and South Vietnam aggravate this
trend.
,,0~777)12o
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