KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO HUNGARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900080010-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 13, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2000/08/29
? T
hchev wished to show the Hungartana
full backing. In so doing, he made a mockery of allgod Soviet
1.
terference in satellite internal affairs.
d of dar and his associates that "these are loyal
Communists .... They do not grovel for
like to throw them ease of the,
ngsrians that kosi 'w$C not
,o*tng back, although he categorically branded Nagy
as a traitor.
D. Secondly he wanted to emphasize that the status of th
Satellites is not a subject for consideration at the
by the UK--by demonstrating that the Hungarian people
Kadar and that Hungary is a normal Satellite.
C. Finally, ghrushchev apparently hoped that his rs
am would improve Hungarian--Soviet relations.
. Khrushchev's initial remarks were therefore pitched in a firs
conciliatory tone.
J;E. Just prior to the visit, he told No
confident the trip would show that
in Hungary.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-
and the Poles.
2. Khrushchev also assured
goods in order to now discord between then and the
Soviet Union."--An obvious reference to the Yugoslava
at he felt
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his speeches he went to great lengths to justify Sowitt
cation in the uprising and emphasized then alleged sgcuy
the Soviet leaders had suffered before
9 dccisles
end in troops.
opinion of Ambassador Thompson in scow
shchev's statements reflected,
ace, the realization that the etasdard bloc Ilse
on the Marian revolution was not very convincing.
The icy tndifferonce of the Hungarians aunt have shattered his
A. The Wd Legation in Budapest notes that Western observers have
sad by the coldness of the reception given his
ordinary Hungarians.
example, during one speech, the and ence melted stay
whenever they were not prevented by the guards.
8. Nis first reaction to this treatment, as the IS Legation voted
few days later, was resort to a pleading, almost spooga
described., for example, how he and his colleagues
had "spent sleepless days and sights" trying to make
decision to Intervene, because "we saw that there were
among the counterrevolutionaries."
2. And in another impromptu speech he said. - -rianss could
not depend on Soviet assistance If another atte Pi soh
oeoured in future, implying_-p ps unintentionally---
the WH would not intervene In another crisis.
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god his approach, however, a low days
violent attack on the Western
for di
previous remarks and belligerently affirmed t
would intervene in the
of another uprising.
1. The 95 legation believes that since the Hungarian people
had learned of his earlier off.the-cuff remarks, althea
they were not publicized, by Moscow or biaidapest, shchev
obliged to sake such an explanation.
2.
d correcting speech Khrsshchev
forces of the entire socialist camp would be a
to quell another uprising; he further warned the We
b]e
ac Stalin's own words--"not to stick your pig's aseut
.into our socialist garden."
He made his final speech to the wor
were among the leaders in the rewolut
at Coopel island-
Khrushche v again adopted a tough approach; he did not p
however, permit Iest?rn reporters to attend.
1. No, ordered the party to use "merciless bard, quick au
they
a quote stolen from Lenin's ardor* in 191$ tt the
Hungarian communist revolutionaries.
Khrushchev's conduct will sot change the basic situation in ft
it may, howevisr, have certain consequences for bbd
leaders.
A. Krushchev's vigorous endorsement of
will
strengthen the latter's position within the par
context of ghrushchev's other remarks, it will et
detract from Hater's
ag a moderate; it
Approved F#g jleg;j@jQ0( 2$tgW?rRI (iAi3fl QW04ll '#haliaa.
ly
also
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Khrushch shored signs of wear and
in a speech giv*n
urn to Moscow; it was one of his
and disconnected performances.
Clearly he was not in a happy frs*e
that he trust feel, as we do, that for all hia fray
efforts the trip was something
fuse,
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