VENEZUELA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900050018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 22, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2002: CIA-RDP79R00890A000900050018-4
ING
VINUUU
22 January 1S
A general strike which began in Caracas on 21 January seriously
threatens the position of Venezuelan President Perez.
A. Street rioting resulted in over 50 deaths, several hundred
injured, about 1,000 arrests, and considerable property - g
1. Troops were Balled up to reinforce police and national
guards who apparently were unable to control the vbleeeee;
some, widespread, indiscriminate shooting in clashes
between authorities and people.
.g. The government imposed a curfew from 8:00 pm. to 5:00 a.m,,
and has possibly decreed a state of siege.
An increasingly effective clandestine organization composed of
various civilian elements in opposition to Peres (the "Junta
Patriotica") appears to be the primary sponsor of the
but the leaders have not yet been determined.
A. Press, radio, and TV workers, students, and some labor groips
C .
are backing the movement,
The Junta Patriotica has reportedly contacted dissident military
groups and oil workers to win their cooperation.
reportedly prepared to revolt if the strike appears to be
successful,
Shops and banks are closed; oil company empleyees; gigot repe? xfing
into of varying size in all armed forces components or.-*
for work.
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79R0089OA0
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/09/0 DP79R00890A000900050018-4
Perez' present military supporters may decide to oust his, if the
strike and violence continue, in order to conciliate the mounting
opposition,
A. Peres moved decisively to realign his military support after
the 1-2 January revolt and the cabinet shake-up of 10 January
which was dictated by the armed forces,
1, But most of the forger commanders who built the myth
erab-le armed forces loyalty to Peres are in exile,
under detention, or out of favor.
And the rapid changes in top government and military
co eds have apparently confused all ranks of officers,
many of whom are probably watching the power struggle
within the divided military and the strength of the
civilian opposition before committing their support.
The prolonged use of brutal repressive methods, is
apparently necessary for Perez to crush the growing
opposition and to retain power, may further erode his
military support,
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIS ,~ 00890A000900050018-4