INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900040016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 4, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 4 December 1957
I. Indonesia.4s failure to win United Nation endorsement of its
resolution on Netherlands New Guinea. (vote was 41-29 for, bu-(-:
two-thirds majority was required) touched off a. government-
sponsored campaign of retalia.tionaga.inst the Dutch, particularly
in Java, which could rapidly lead to chaotic political and
economic conditions.
A. Campaign against the 50-60,000 Dutch residents and investments
(about $1.5 billion) commenced with 24 hour strike on
2 December involving 150,000 Indonesian workers in Dutch
enterprises,
B. This was followed by official bans on all Dutch-language
publications, K LM flights into Djakarta, entry of Dutch
citizens into Indonesia as well as unofficial harassment
of individuals.
C. There is also evidence that a break in diplomatic relations
may be expected soon,
II, Communists have been quick to exploit situation,
A. "Workers" belonging to the Communist-led labor federation,
SOBSI, have occupied premises of at least seven leading
Dutch firms, and hoisted red flags over them.
1. Included are banks, import-export firms, and Y,-PM--the
large ship company which handles 70 percent of inter-
island shipping.
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B. "Workers" have proposed that the government assume ownership
of these companies with proviso that they have a voice in
their future management.
C. Although Indonesian government is trying to keep lid on
movement which it has launched, it is questionable whether
moderates can prevent continued freewheeling by Communists
or increase of excesses to point of physical violence against
Dutch personnel, and possibly other Westerners.
1. Indonesian government, for instance, claims that Communist
seizures of Dutch property were not officially sanctioned,
but no effective counteraction has been taken and cabinet
has agreed to consider the SOBSI proposals.
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D. We believe that the chances are still better than even that
the Communists will not attempt forcefully to seize control
of the government in the next few weeks.
III. Further complication was attempted assassination of Sukarno on
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30 November,
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A. Unless it can be proved that Communists were responsible
effect is likely to
increase Sukarno's messianic complex and tighten his relations
with reds.
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It is widespread concern (including Premier Djuandats) that
Sukarno is likely to retaliate harshly against those opposed
to his policies. This would virtually eliminate any
prospects for peaceful settlement of Indonesia's internal
political strife,
C. In any event, breach between Sukarno and dissident colonels
has widened still more,
1. In this connection, the National Reconstruction Conference
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which convened in Djakarta on 25 November appears to have
been a. complete failure.
the dissidents now plan to concentrate on local
development and to end any further political maneuvering
with Sukarno.
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Approved For Release 2013/10/01 : CIA-RDP79ROO890Ap00900040016-7
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900040016-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900040016-7