INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900040014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 4, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 4 December 1957
1. Indonesia.'s failure to win United Nation endorsement of its
resolution on Netherlands New Guinea (vote was 41-29 for, but
two-thirds majority was required) touched off a government
sponsored campaign of retaliation.aga.inst the Dutch, particularly
in Java, which could rapidly lead to chaotic political and
economic conditions.
A. Campaign against the 50-60,000 Dutch residents and investments
(about $1.5 billion) commenced with 24 hour strike on
2 December involving 150,000 Indonesian workers in Dutch
enterprises.
B. This was followed by official bans on all Dutch-language
publications, KLM flights into Djakarta, entry of Dutch
citizens into Indonesia as well as unofficial harassment
of individuals.
C. There is also evidence that a break in diplomatic relations
may be expected soon.
II. Communists have been quick to exploit situation.
A. "Workers" belonging to the Communist-led labor federation,
SOBSI, have occupied premises of at least seven leading
Dutch firms, and hoisted red flags over them.
1. Included are banks, import-export firms, and PPM--the
large ship company which handles 70 percent of inter-
island shipping.
NSA review completed
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B. "Workers" have proposed that the government assume ownership
of these companies with proviso that they have a voice in
their future management.
C. Although Indonesian government is trying to keep lid on
movement which it has launched, it is questionable whether
moderates can prevent continued freewheeling by Communists
or increase of excesses to point of physical violence against
Dutch personnel, and possibly other Westerners.
1. Indonesian government, for instance, claims that Communist
seizures of Dutch property were not officially sanctioned,
but no effective counteraction has been taken and cabinet
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has agreed to consider the SOBSI proposals.
We believe that the chances are still better than even that
the Communists will not attempt forcefully to seize control
of the government in the next few weeks.
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III. Further complication was attempted assassination of Sukarno on
30 November.
be proved that Communists were responsible
increase Sukarnots messianic
ffect is likely to
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complex and tighten his relations
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B. It is widespread concern (including premier Djuanda's) that
Sukarno is likely to retaliate harshly against those opposed
to his policies. This would virtually eliminate any
prospects for peaceful settlement; of Indonesia's internal
political strife.
C. In any event, breach between Sukarno and dissident colonels
has widened still more.
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1. In this connection, the National Reconstruction Conference
which convened in Djakarta on 25 November appears to have
been a complete failure.
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900040014-9
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900040014-9