SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900010022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 21, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2001/03/0'4 : CIA-RDP79RO08
NSC BRIEFING 21 September 1957
SOVIET LEADERSHIP
I. Khrushchev's current position may be somewhat uncomfortable;
25X1 C
indications are that some resistance to
his leadership remains despite big victory in June and apparent
strong support in Central Committee,
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A. he wants to get rid of Bulganin,
Voroshilov, and Suslov but that he can't secure the necessary
majority in the presidium. 25X1C
25X1 C
states that Khrushchev is not popular in party
circles, where it is doubted that he will be able to keep
power for long. 25X1C
C. "Khrushchev isn't feared nor loved,
In the party apparatus he is still regarded with some contempt,'
25X1 C
Khrushchev has lost face
with the public as a. result of the June purges,
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the working people
there reacted angrily to the June purge and talked openly
about demonstrations. They are said to have booed Khrushchev
during his visit to Leningrad for its 250th anniversary
25X1 C
received information that
the people in Brest were openly critical of Khrushchev and
in favor of Malenkov. He claimed that similar reports hadI ?L
or..c? ^r.:rsr r:o.
been received from other Soviet cities.r
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25X1 C
many Soviet citizens are
depressed, cynical and distrustful of the present party leaders,
III. This changing climate may put Khrushchev under pressure to
tighten up.
A. One method would be to ty to create a. new wave of popular
indignation against the "opposition."
B. However, drastic action against Malenkov or other members
of the "anti-party group" would not appear to be in
Khrushchev's best interest,
1. It would knock the props from under Khrushchev's campaign
platform of de-Stalinization,
2. Old fashioned punitive measures could also touch off a
wave of terror that might be impossible to control.
3. His economic program would undoubtedly be severely
jeopardized,
IV. A Stalinist type purge, then, if it materialized, would probably
mean that Khrushchev is leading from weakness.
A. He may fear that Ma.lenkov, in particular, may become a
rallying point for new opponents in the future. (Recent
information tends to confirm Soviet claims that Malenkov
has been sent to Kazakhstan to head a. hydro-electric station,)
B. Yet if he attacks opposition for complicity in the purges
of the thirties, he will not be able to hide his own dirty
hands.
C. However, army may be pressuring him to set the record straight
on the purge era. A few purged army leaders have been
mentioned favorably recently (Tukha.chevsky, Bluecher).
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ON- ie
? V. These problems may be coming to a head.
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A. another Central Committee
plenum may convene soon.
B. Khrushchev is still on vacation, however, but is expected
to return to Moscow shortly.
1. Aneurin Bevanr,who saw him at Yalta. on 17 September,
claimed that Khrushchev appeared preoccupied with
internal affairs,
Bulganin
(who reportedly became linked with the opposition) is about
to be dropped as Premier and that Mikoyan is considered
the most likely candidate to take his place.
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