INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000800080004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 19, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

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19 June 1957
Cabinet's meek acceptance of Sukarno's 45-member national advisory
council is another step toward "guided democracy" and defeat 1br
moderate political elements in the central government.
A. Although Sukarno appears to have made minor concessions to meet
objections from Prime Minister Djuanda, council is composed
chiefly of leftists and Sukarno yes-men,
25X1A1? t least 15 are known Commies
or strongly sympathetic.
B. Although council's role has not yet been defined, its vice
chairman (former foreign minister Abdulgani, recently convicted
for corruption) has said council would be only advisory, but
that advice would be so good that it would not be "flung to
the winds,"
1. It has been clear for several months, moreover, that Sukarno
himself intended to dominate governmental policy through
the Council.
II. Sukarno's high-handed method of ramming council through cabinet
will probably aggrevate regional unrest.
A. Nasution's "settlement" of East Indonesian problem appears to
be considerably less successful than advertised,
25X1 A 1. Nasution "deposed" and ordered
transfer of dissident Lt. Col. Sumual, Territory VII
commander (Hq: Makassar) and split his area into four
regional commands each directly responsible to Djakarta.
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B. Sumual, however, is still in Makassar claiming to be in charge
of a new inter-regional command, and all four regional
commanders are believed to be pro-Sumual officers,
25X1C C. Nasution is either unwilling or
unable to force Sumual to report to Djakarta for reassignment
and that anti-Djakarta sentiment in East Indonesia, is strong,
as ever,
III. Na,sution's strenuous efforts to achieve a quick settlement in East
Indonesia may have been motivated by desire to give more attention
to Sumatra, where fresh troubles seem to be in the offing,
A. Deposed rebel commander Colonel Simbolon is reported making plans
to regain control of Medan-Siantar area of North Sumatra, a
region of strong Communist influence and the only one which
central government still administers.
B. Simbolon believes that the local commanders in Central and South
Sumatra (Lt. Cols. Hussein and Barlian) are now sufficiently
entrenched to control their areas against Djakarta in almost
any eventuality.
C. He also thinks he will be able to pull off an "almost bloodless
coup" against government forces around Medan by late August
or early September.
1. He has reached an agreement with Laud Beureuh, leader of
Atchinese rebels - the fanatical Moslems in northernmost
part of Sumatra.
2. Beureuh reportedly will give Simbolon military support,
if necessary, to regain Medan.
IV. In Djakarta, first local elections for 45-seat city council to be
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A. National Party, which won 1955 national elections, predicts
it will win in Djakarta., but other political leaders reported
by press as believing Communists are almost certain to gain
majority of seats.
B. Communists, who did poorly in Djakarta in '55, have been
working hard and reportedly are using large sums of money
from "unknown sources."
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