POLISH SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000800060018-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 15, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release-2t00108129, -RID P79R00890A000800060018-4
NSC BRIEFING 15 April 1957
POLISH SITUATION
I. Major task for Gomulka. today is unification of faction-ridden
Polish Communist Party in support of his program of "na.tiona.l
Communism". Gomulka.'s keynote (Oct 156 speech) remains sa.me:
"roa.ds of achieving goal /of socia.lism7 can be and are different...
the model of socialism ca.n also vary."
A. Gomulka program includes several deviations from Soviet
orthodoxy:
1. Invitation 'b peasants to a,ba.ndon unprofitable collectives;
2. grant of "large--scale control over work of government"
to Polish parliament.
3. Freedoms, unprecedented in Communist society, for Church.
II. Since "October Revolution", Party factionalism has deepened and
Gomulka. has made little hea.dwa.y in gaining broad support of Party.
A. Efforts to unify Party factions have been restricted by
stringent requirements of "moderate" course.
"Liberals" have been alienated by Gomulka's curb on their
outspoken press and by his inclusion of several orthodox
Na,tolin figures in Warsaw government.
1. High Polish official recently told US ambassador in Warsaw
that Gomulka's measures against journalists were necessary
because government could not permit "irresponsible
advancement of impractical ideas that would avert
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attention from main effort."
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C. Na.tolins, on other hand, oppose Gomulka, measures as too
liberal and long for return to Sta.linism.
III. Thus, present stability of Gomulka, regime rests not on Party
solidarity but instead on base of popular non-Communist support.
A. This support appears essentially unshaken in spite of Gov't
measures to restrict press, cancel back wage payments.
Popular support probably attributable to real improvements
in consumer goods supply.
1. Recent reports indicate more food in shops, thanks to
peasant response,to new free marketing conditions,
2. People generally feel freer to express selves,
3. Another factor in Gomulka.'s favor is weakening of Soviet
control, mainly due to removal of advisors from army,
security forces..
IV. Thus, Achilles heel of Gomulka regime is shakiness of Poland's
economy.
A. Inflationary trends are evident, as result of wage increases and
stepped-up issuance of currency.
U, Unemployment is rising.
C. Recent reports indicate workers agitation and demonstrations
for higher pay.
Serious economic setback for Poland would probably cause
public wave of anti-Gomulkaism.
As to Soviets, Gomulka.'s measures to curb liberals and appease
Na,tolins may have reduced any Sov feeling of urgent necessity to
oust Gomulka, although they still mistrust him..
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A. Present course of Polish experiment does not appear in Soviet
eyes as serious threat to Kremlin control of other Satellites.
13. Chinese Communist endorsement of Gomulka., implicit in joint
Peiping communique of 11 Apr, was probably made without
objections from Kremlin,
C. Thus, soviet intervention in Poland in near future a.ppea.rs
unlikely.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29.,,;: =R DP79R0089OA000800060018-4