SNIE 100-6-54: WORLD REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000400040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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100-6-54: WORLD REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
US COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA
I. Following is summary of SNIE 100-6-54, of 28 November 1954,
entitled "World Reactions to Certain U. S. Courses of Action
Against Communist China."
A. Problem: to estimate Communist and non-Communist
reactions to offshore and/or inshore blockade of
Communist China imposed by US in retaliation for
recent sentencing of 13 US nationals to prison
terms as "spies."
Assumption: imposition of US blockade would be
announced and scope defined, and would be accom-
panied by formal US statement of "bill of partic-
ulars" and expression of support by US Congress.
C. Note: this special estimate is made in context of
NIE 10-7-54, "Communist Courses of Action in Asia
Through 1957."
II. Economic effects of blockade would be substantial.
A. Blockade which included port Arthur, Dairen,
Hong Kong and Macao would cut off Communist
China's seaborne foreign trade, estimated for
1953 as at least 1.5 million tons of imports
and three million tons of exports. Blockade
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extended to coastal waters would virtually
eliminate ocean-going coastal traffic,
estimated for 1953 at about 4 million tons
per year.
B. Communist China's economic adjustments to blockade
would take considerable time and in short run
blockade would impose serious economic problems.
Additional strains would be placed on inadequate
internal transportation system and trade would be
reduced. Bloc would be unable to fill entirely
Chinese requirements for critical items.
C. Sum of these adverse effects would retard Peiping's
economic growth, but would be small in relation
to gross national product or budgetary expendi-
tures. Moreover, adverse economic effects would
decline over extended period as Peiping expanded
own production of critical goods and with expected
growth of Soviet ability to export capital goods.
III. Chinese Communists would be seriously concerned over economic
effects of blockade, but their reactions as regards both
blockade and issue of US prisoners would be determined to
much greater extent by political and military considerations
and counsel of USSR.
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A. Peiping would probably estimate that blockade
offered possibility of isolating US on this
issue, but also that US willing to proceed
without its allies. Peiping would be concerned
lest US action signified intention to take still
more aggressive action, and would probably
believe that US psychologically prepared to
attack mainland in reaction to attack against
blockading forces.
B. As regards offshore blockade, we believe initial
Chinese Communist reaction would not include
either military force against it or conciliatory
line on US prisoners. We believe Peiping would
attempt to exploit fear of war, would produce
evidence designed to refute US denials of spy
charges, and would mark time while assessing
effect on US of non-Communist reactions.
C. If blockade were extended to coastal waters
(inshore blockade), we believe Peiping would
almost certainly use its air capabilities and
limited naval capabilities in raids against
blockading forces. Inshore blockade might
make Peiping more disposed to seek face-saving
solution, but even this would be unlikely to
effect early release of US prisoners.
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D. In case of either offshore or inshore blockade,
USSR would counsel Peiping to caution and would
attempt to localize incidents arising from US-
Chinese encounters. However, Moscow would afford
Peiping necessary support for course decided on
and would employ political means of exploiting
issue. USSR might also attempt to bring ships
into Port Arthur and Dairen, or attempt to breach
blockade at other points, or increase Peiping's
capability to wage mine and submarine warfare.
While USSR unlikely to initiate general war on
this issue, would not be deterred from attempts
at counteraction by risk of general war.
IV. As for non-Communist reaction, South Korea, Nationalist
China and probably Manila Pact nations would approve US
blockade of Communist China.
A. Opinion in most other non-Communist countries
would vary from indifference to strong criticism.
B. India would almost certainly condemn US action
and would attempt to bring about solution favor-
ing Peiping.
C. Certain non-Communist nations would critically
reappraise confidence in US leadership, and
there would almost certainly be sharp rise in
neutralist sentiment among states now allied
with US.
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UK would probably acquiesce in blockade but
would attempt to dissuade US from continuing
it.
E. However, as time went on and if no large-scale
warfare developed, we believe that free-world
nations would in varying degrees adapt them-
selves to US action while continuing to attempt
mediation.
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