RHEE'S PROPOSED ASIAN ANTI- COMMUNIST FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000200040015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 11, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2002#*I OA0.00200040015-5
11 February 1954
RHEE'S PROPOSED ASIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT
1. Rhee's renewed threat on 9 February to reopen the war, and
the departure of a second South Korean mission on 10 February
to SEA, highlights his determined efforts to promote a mili-
tant anti-Communist program in the Far East.
A. Following Rhee's visit to Taipei, a joint Rhee-Chiang
25X1
spokesman.
statement on 29 November called for free Asian "govern-
ments and peoples" to organize a regional, anti-
Communist front,- with US logistical support.
B. In December Rhee sent a four-man good-will mission,
under George Paik, to visit various SEA nations to
sound out reactions to a proposed conference leading
to a pact.
C. Although the Paik mission, on its return, told Rhee
the Philippines and Thailand were ready to support
a pact, most countries visited showed little enthu-
siasm for it or a willingness to accept Rhee as their
A. He has already ordered American-made transmitters'
capable of covering the entire Far East with a
propaganda program, which is likely to attack
Japan, India, and even the U.S. in addition to
the Communists.
25X1
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III. He plans to invite all Far East and SEA nations to a
spring conference, as part of the campaign, and has
commissioned two US advisers to plan and propagandize it.
A. Rhee has made strong efforts to get Magsaysay
to assume leadership of an Asian anti-Communist
front, although Rhee desires covertly to dominate
it.
1. Rhee firmly believes American intervention
won Magsaysay the election and probably
feels greater US support would be forth-
coming if Magsaysay assumed leadership.
2. Foreign Minister Pyun told an American embassy
official on 9 February that "as everyone knows,"
Magsaysay would do nothing without US approval.
B. On 28 January, Rhee proposed to send one ROK
division to aid in the defense of Laos; subsequently,
he told US officials he contemplated making the
announcement public to buttress his plans for
Asian unity.
C. On 10 February a second good-will mission under
Maj. Gen. Choi Duk-sin left to visit 6 SEA nations;
Choi said Asians must work out an effective alliance
before asking US for further aid.
1. One SK newspaper stated purpose of second
mission was to sell the idea of keeping
Japan out of the conference.
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IV. Reactions to the proposed conference.
A. Chinese Nationalists share Rhee's desire for
Magsaysay leadership, but fear Rhee is pushing
the Philippine leader too hard.
1. ChiNat amb to Manila wants Magsaysay to
call conference at Baguio, inviting chiefs
of SEA nations, Chiang, Rhec, and Japan.
B. Burma not likely to participate in Rhee's proposed
conference which might appear directed at Communist
China.
1. Burma's long frontier with China makes it
wary of any action that antagonistic to
Peiping.
Burma does not recognize Chiang's government
and has not regularized relations with South
Korea and the Philippines.
C. Indonesia, in keeping with its present independent
policy, will not respond to any lead from Rhee,
Chiang, or any other Asian leaders associated with
the US.
1. The first ROK mission to SEA apparently
could not get visas to enter Indonesia.
D. Throughout most of SEA, too close association with
Rhee and Chiang would destroy favorable attitude
now developing toward Magsaysay.
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E. Japan's attitude is also important.
1. As Vice President Nixon pointed out,
"if Japan falls, all SEA goes, and if
SEA succumbs, Japan will also fall,
2. Because of SEA's economic importance to
Japan, Magsaysay's influence in Japan
will be directly related to his influence
in SEA.
3. Ambassador Allison believes that while
Japan would attend an economic-cultural
conference, Chiang-Rhee sponsorship
would increase Japanese suspicions.
there 25X6
is no real prospect of a regional arrangement
including Japan OW Korea even in the economic
and cultural fields.,
5. Japan's sensitivity over rearmament precludes
its participation in any regional military
arrangement.
V. Magsaysay's role in the proposed front.
A. Magsaysay has had little experience in international
affairs and is reportedly opposed to championing
any anti-Communist crusade now.
B. Many of his Nacionalista Party colleagues would
oppose his branching into international fields
until he has proved himself at home.
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C. He has many domestic problems which are sufficient
to occupy him fully for the next six months.
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 BR,1tT NG 11 February 1954
RHEE `:S PROPOSED ASIAN
ANTI.-COMMUNIST FRONT
Ree4t,hreat renew war; departure
second mission hi lites program.
Joint Rhee-Chiang statement.
In December, good-will mission.
Little enthusiasm in SEA.
Rh e's prop Banda program.
American. transmitters.
III. Wants FE Conference this spring.
Rhee.wants Magsaysay to lead.
Second good-will mission 10 Feb.
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Thinks US would support
Magsaysay
Pyun says Magsaysay not
move without US approval.
9 , division to Laos.
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Chinats want Magsaysay; fear Rhee
pushing too hard.
A. Chinat Amb. want% conf. at Baguio;:
discuss economic, cultural matters.
B. Burma not likely participate.
1. Long frontier Commie China..
2. Don't recognize Chiang;
relations SK and Phil. not
regularized.
C. Indonesia independent policy;
not respond to Rhee.
Throughout all Asia same.
V. Japan's attitude important.
25X6
B. Would attend economic-cultural
conf; suspicious.
D. Sensitivity over rearmament.
VT. Magsaysay little experience inter-
nation?? affair=
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