THE CURRENT VIET MINH OFFENSIVE IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000200020036-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: December 29, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 29 December 1953
THE CURRENT VIET MINH
OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
I Viet Minh forces involved in present
offensive in central Laos believed
to total about 9 battalions or 7,200 men,
A. These forces consist mainly of
six battalions of 325th Divisio
regarded as a second line unit and
always based in the Vinh area of
-northern Annam rather than Tonkin.
They also include one regiment from
first line 304th Division, the
bulk of which is located to west
of delta perimeter in Tonkin.
C. This regiment of the 304th Division
probably serves as the spine of
the present attacking units.
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II The Viet Minh reached Thakhek, on
the Mekong River, on 26 December,
after three French companies evacuated
that post.
Only one of these
is ible new Viet Minh moves in central
three reportedly
reached Savannakhet, 50 miles
,southward.
French had by that time grouped
about eight battalions (over 6,000
men) at Savannakhet.
e'`eent' of drench needs in northern
Liver valley, which supplied 20
They may try to remain in Thakhek
region, astride French road and
water communications along Mekong
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Thpy have been repor
S8yannakhet should be able to hold
d probing
southward, but French gaj'risc a
off a strike there,
C.'.Th y could also advance u,
to attack capital at Mien-
bu
protably without ,success
together with Ruch larger Viet
;atimh assault on Laos from north
eneXal Navarre has acted, ssi,
to
B enter eneoiy thrust in central Laos.
Ili, He has been flying JT4PL , battaliour
aratroops to Sao ~a' i+eld
near Sarannakbet to
reinforce
eiot batt$liq s rea4 ther .
a counter t ack to retake
areoch sOtl wits have
? rea '
y pe'0etr ~ ora?;
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C.
He is not worried by Lhe Viet
Minh incurs ion 'which he believes
diversionary but says it might
throw his offensive plans a
trifle off schedule..
He has also started action south-
east of Hanoi to forestall Viet
'tinh operations in that area,
The major Viet Minh military threat
is still posed by four enemy divisions
located in Tonkin
A. All or part of these could quickly
move into northern Laos and
eventually overrun large parts
h is area.
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icy could also be employed tea
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consolidate the enemy hold on
northwest Tonkin, or' to attack
the delta where French reserves
haves been reduced to 27
'(These are being further reduce-d
by the transfer of five battalions
to Savannakhet.)
French believe Viet Minh are
preparing a major assault on Dien
Bien Phu in northwest Tonkin.
frontal attack would
be a marked change in Viet Minh
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'il French counter-.,-movements to reinforce
threatened posts can be made only by
depleting their delta reserves or their
forces in south Vietnam.
A. They have already weakened delta
strength by transfer of 12 battalions
to Dien Bien Phu.
This move,in effect, more than
nullified the increase is strength
of nine battalions which arrived from
ar
France last fall.
C. French forces in south Vietnam,
numbering 171,500, cannot be
removed without a resurgence of
activity by 40,000 enemy troops
there.
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711 The: Immediate p
the Viet olitical advantages of
Y#ah attack
on
'saner than Laos seen
the military, Of the Military dispersion of Preach advantage
the
sievering of Yeh4 forces and
seen the most important
8, Yiuh Penetration of
iteonscider Laos gains
b
l?
eyes Prestige in the
of Indochinese
Bides of Pe?Ales on both
conflict
? rhi Political
Baf ehh-ttac~es Vie
Minh morale
t
and lessens
W#PP4rt of Vietnamese
t
he Preach ? r effort.
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ViII A major Viet Minh campaign now may be
connected with Ho Chi Minh's recent
peace feeler.
A. Such military pressure might be
designed to force France to negotiate
and simultaneously put Viet Minh in
better position for negotiations.
B. Thus, Ho Chi Minh's call on 27 December
"to destroy the enemy" does not
.+r
aecessarily mean he won't negotiate.
C. It was quite possibly intended to
Attack in Tonkin or northern Laos
to push Paris. and Saigon further
toward negotiations.
tmay be forerunner of a heavy
br
underscore to the French and
Fietaamese peoples the desirability
of peace.
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IX Prime Minister of Laos has appealed
to free world for support in resisting
aggression,
A, Laotian government, as well as
Thailand, was prepared to appeal
the Viet Minh's invasion of last
spring to the UN.
..But qbjections by the French fore-
sta.lled such action.
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of the two countries.
C. French objections to a UN appeal
Oe strongly resented by Laotians
and could embitter the relations
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Situation in central Laos.
reportedly has resigned at French
failure keep him informed of
Already Laotian foreign minister
Viet Minh forces have made no attempt
to eater Thailand and there is no
indication they will.
These backed by air force, including
a the nine border provinces.
police and over 12,000 army troops
They have 15,000 heavily armed
The Thais appear capable of
defending themselves.
125?f fighters and bombers, with a
fair efficiency.
riaforcements of one battalion
.df Wintry and two armored oompanies
been sent to the Laotian border.
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XI. State of emergency declardd by Bangkok
was a precautionary measure to screen
refugees crossing the Mekong.
A., Thai government sensitive over
this problem as there are 50,000
Vietnamese within its border.
1. These have strong sympathies
with Viet Minh and facilitate
Communist subversive activity.
XII. Simultaneous with the.:Viet Minh advance
last week Moscow radio attacked
Thailand as a base for American supplies
to Indochina. Chinese Communist radio
has now followed with similar charges.
A. Nothing new in these charges, which
probably intended to disrupt Thailand's
close cooperation with US.
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B. During Viet Minh invasion of Laos
last spring, Thailand permitted
limited French supplies through its
territory.
XIII. Threat from Communist China always..,hangs
over Indochina.
A. In four South China provinces
contiguous to Indochina there are
150,000 to 220,000 troops.
B. 60,900 more are on Hainan Island.
C. Troop strength in South China has
not changed appreciably since
Korean truce.
D. About 50,000 are stationed along
the Indochina border and could be
committed immediately.
E. Chinese are judged capable of
committing and supporting at least
150,000 troops.
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XIV. Chinese Communist air capabilities.
Communist air division in Kwangsi
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jet fighter division at Canton.
1. It could operate from South
China coast between Canton and
Indochina.
C. In South China there are three air-
fields capable of sustaining jet
operations, six potentially capable,
and seven serviceable for light
propeller-driven aircraft.
D. If Chinese renovate bases nearer
Indochina, they can commit 250 to
300 fighters and bombers, including
jets.
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V. No evidence of Chinese Communist
military preparations for large-scale
intervention in Indochina at this
time.
A. American spokesmen have warned
that such intervention might have
"grave consequences."
B. Peiping seems disinclined to in-
volve itself in another Korean-
type venture.
1. It probably fears retaliation
against the China mainland.
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