ROUNDUP ON EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060021-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: July 9, 1953
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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Approved For Release 200012
OCI No. 4512
Copy No. 35
M gF79R00890A0001000
S3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
8 July 1953
1. Nature and extent of riots and demonstrations (page 2).
II. Soviet reaction (official, semi-official, propaganda)
(page 4).
III. East Germany capabilities with specific reference to the
KVP and VP (page 6).
IV. East German government reaction (page 7).
V. Soviet policy reaction (page 9).
VI. Other reactions (page 10).
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1. Nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations:
The demonstrations in East Germany on 16-17 June were of
sufficient magnitude to bring the entire nation under Soviet
military control and'to disrupt communications for several days.
The focal point of these disorders was East Berlin, where a
demonstration of workers from the Stalinallee construction pro-
ject set off the chain reaction of disturbances on 16 June.
The events of this demonstration are as follows:
A. With a call for a 10 percent decrease in production
norms, about 5,000 workers at the Stalinallee project
started demonstrating at about noon on 16 June. (Some
2-3,000 Stalinallee workers had actually started
striking on the preceding day at 0900).
B. The demonstrators marched to the vicinity of the Leip-
zigerstrasse government offices where two East German
ministers, Rau and Selbmann, attempted to pacify and
disperse them. The crowds shouted down Selbmann and,
at about 1400, a call for all-German elections and
the resignation of the government was made.
C. The demonstrators then moved to Alexanderplatz and
called for a general strike.
E. At about 1700 a. delegation of East Berlin workers called
at RIAS, West Berlin radio, requesting assistance in
spreading their call to East Berliners to go on general
strike the following day.
F. Demonstrations by scattered groups of East Berliners
continued until 0030, 17 June.
G. The demonstrations were continued with increased force
and intensity on 17 June, spreading throughout East
Germany. East Berlin was again the central point of
activities, though strikes and demonstrations of greater
magnitude occurred at least two points elsewhere in East
Germany, Magdeburg and Halle. The following events
occurred in East Berlin on the 17th:
1. At 0500 RIAScalled on the East Berlin popula-
tion to support the demonstrators.
2. The Soviet occupation of the city commenced very
early., with tank units being observed as early as
0430.
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3. About 17,000 demonstrators were marching toward
the government office district by 0830.
4. Some elevated train traffic had been halted by
1100.
5. During the morning the demonstrations became
violent. Police were beaten and thrown into a
canal; several buildings, kiosks and police shacks
were burned; police cars were overturned and burned;
there was looting.
6. By 1200 East Berl.in's elevated and subway trains
were at a standstill,
7. Shortly after noon East German police started
using small arms fire to scatter the mobs, and
during the afternoon both Soviet and German forces
employed firearms.
8. At 1345 martial law was announced.
9. Strong forces of Soviet armored cars, tanks and
troops moved into East Berlin from East Germany
during the afternoon.
10. At 1800, the streets were still filled with crowds
(numbering about 100,000) and two large fires were
in progress,
11. The streets were still crowded at 1900 including
large numbers of Soviet tanks and troops.
12. By 2015 order had been largely restored and only
people's police and Soviet troops were on the
streets.
13. At 2100 the curfew went into effect.
H. Demonstrations and riots occurred simultaneously through-
out East Germany. Disorder was reported from nearly every
city, but demonstrations, strikes and/or riots have been
confirmed in only the following places: Aue (strikes in
the uranium mines), Berlin (see above), Bitterfeld, Bran-
denburg, Chemnitz, Cottbus, Dresden, Erfurt, Gera, Goer-
litz, Gross Beeren, Halle (where the prison was stormed
and prisoners released), Hennigsdorf (strikes in the
steel mills), Hillersleben, Jena Koenigswusterhausen,
Leipzig, Ludwigsfeld, Magdeburg, Merseburg (strikes at
the Leunaworks), Nachterstedt (burning of briquette
factory), Neuruppin, Rostock, Schkopau (strikes at the
Bunaworks), Schwerin, Torgau, Warnemuende, Wismar, and
Zwickau.
It has been confirmed that the following major plants
were inoperative because of strikes:
1.
Oberspree Cable Works, Berlin.
2.
Karl Liebknecht Transformer Works, Berlin.
3.
Treptow Communications Equipment Works, Berlin.
4.
Hennigsdorf Steel Mills.
5.
Buna Works,
Schkopau.
6.
Leuna Works,
Merseburg.
7.
Nachterstedt
Briquette Factory.
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S ITY INFORMATION
The only official Soviet reaction to the riots was a 20
June letter from the Soviet Commander in Berlin to his
allied counterparts. He held that not only had the Western
powers failed to keep agents from crossing into East Berlin
in connection with the riots but that US officers in full
uniform actually directed the rioters.
B. Semi-official Soviet reaction - East German propaganda.
1. Primary blame was placed on Western agents.
a. TIO US bore the main blame. There were reports of
US officers in full uniform directing rioters, US
planes dropping pamphlets to them, US radio cars
issuing instructions, MSA funds used.
b. British and French authorities were also blamed,
but later propaganda gave them a subsidiary role.
c. Adenauer, Kaiser, Ollenhauer, Reuter were all
subject to bitter attack. Nazi remnants were also
blamed.
d. Western responsibility for agents was an excuse of
the Soviets for not resuming normal communications
and travel in Berlin. (This charge was in a 20 June
letter of Soviet military commander in Berlin.)
a. They were tied to Korea. Hands of the Western
powers were seen in both the riots and the Rhee
prisoner release.
b. The West was frightened by the prospect of GDR
reforms destroying the Adenauer war policy, and
tried to sabotage them.
c. A comparison made with the Hitler coup and with
the "invasion" of North Korea.
d. The West was trying to prevent an understanding
between peoples, was even lighting the fuse of a
new war.
3. There were admissions that the workers were in some
cases misled.
a. The party was blamed for letting this happen; it
had lost touch with the workers, failed to heed
their demands.
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b. Now the workers were protesting the attempt to
deceive them.
c. The misled workers would not be punished.
4. There were some indications that the riots would not
stop future reforms.
a. The riots will not deter determination to carry
out reform. But there was insistence that the
riots did not force the reforms; they pointed out
that the reforms started before the riots.
b. Soviet peace policy has made possible a reduction
in military and heavy industry - butter, not guns.
This will permit more consumer goods. Nevertheless
high productivity is still essential.
c. Propaganda continues to stress examples of applica-
tions of reforms - return of farms and private
business.
C. Semi-official Soviet reaction - Soviet Propaganda.
1. Moscow's immediate reaction was to publicize East
German reports and comments.
2. Soviet restraint in initial comment became much less
evident in subsequent propaganda. The 23 June Pravda
lead article -- "Failure of Foreign Hirelings' M-~
venture in Berlin" -- apparently was the first inde-
pendent editorial comment. In general, Moscow's line
was a recapitulation of East German charges.
3. Notes on Moscow's attention to the event:
a. On 25 June public "protest" meetings were organ-
ized in Moscow for the first time since the Koje
riots (May 1952) and only the third time since
World War II. The widely publicized meetings
voiced faith in the German workers even while
repeatedly calling on them to rally around the
SED and the GDR.
b. Comment on the riots was heavy to the home audience,
and news items gave them unusual attention.
c. The meetings and propaganda appeared designed to
establish the meaning of the German events for the
Soviet people -- giving them assurances as to the
stability of the GDR -- but at the same time warn-
ing of the dangers of a new war by explicit desig-
nation of the riots as a provocation to a new war.
d. Moscow's heavy attention to the event in German-
language broadcasts, in contrast to Moscow's usual
treatment of unfavorable Satellite developments,
appears intended as a reaffirmation of Soviet
support of the GDR.
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III. East German capabilities:
In the face of popular uprising, the East German military
(KVP) and police proved to be both inadequate and unreliable
forces. Intervention.of the people?s police during the initial
period was sporadic and half-hearted. For many recruits of the
young people's police, it was the first exposure to violence and
the necessity of using arms against a mob, and their reactions
were varied. Many feared for their lives, and for this reason
fired indiscriminately into the crowds. Others defected to West
Berlin. No doubt many were swayed by sympathy with the rioters
and revulsion at firing on their fellow-countrymen.
No accurate figures as to the number of KVP or police de-
fectors during the riots are available, but it is believed that
150-200 came over to West Berlin during this period. These de-
fectors were probably from the units originally charged with
the maintenance of order who were surprised by the unexpected
ferocity of the demonstrators. There is no reliable evidence
of widespread desertions and mutinies among the KVP or the people's
police units. The KVP forces were confined to their barracks
and not committed until 18 June, when Soviet forces had gotten
control of the situation. This suggests that the Soviets con-
sidered these forces unreliable or inadequate to the situation.
.When committed, the KVP were used primarily as border guards.
On the basis of their performance, it does not appear that
East Germany's military and police forces have either the physical
capability or morale required to maintain order without Soviet
help, The breakdown of KVP morale under the stress of a major
war is probable. It is questionable whether the KVP could be
depended upon to keep order if the Soviet occupation armies were
otherwise committed. There have been many unconfirmed reports
that the KVP will be substantially cut.
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IV. East German government reaction:
A. The East German authorities reacted to the riots by issuing
a series of decrees and announcements, most of them de-
signed to placate the population. These measures were as
follows:
1. At 1630 on 16 June the East German government announced
that the 10 percent increase in workers' production
norms should be considered cancelled as a compulsory
measure and that future norm increases would be depen-
dent upon the workers' voluntary consent.
2. At 2000 on 16 June Minister President Grotewohl and
his deputy, Ulbricht, addressed a meeting of Socialist
Unity Party members, promising "further far-reaching
measures" to correct past mistakes.
3. At 1530 on 17 June the government issued an announce-
ment calling on the people to maintain order and go
back to work, promising punishment to the perpetrators
of the riots, and calling upon the mass organizations
to support the government.
4. At 2200 on 17 June the government issued an announce-
ment stating that "agents of foreign powers, fascists
and other reactionary elements" had started the de-
monstrations.
5. At 2317 on 17 June the government announced that normal
work would be resumed on the following day.
6. At 2346 on 17 June the government announced that the
riots ended "in the complete collapse of the adventure"
and that further disturbances would result in severe
punishment.
7. At 1020 on 18 June the Socialist Unity Party Executive
pledged party efforts in restoring normal operations
and ferreting out "provocateurs."
8. The Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee on 21
June announced the following proposed improvements:
reduction in norms, reinstatement of train fare re-
ductions for workers, increase in pensions and acci-
dent benefits, liberalization of the sick leave policy,
restoration of social insurance benefits to all citi-
zens, improvement of housing in industrial areas,
improvement of sanitary conditions in nationalized
industries, increase in the supply of working clothes,
and discontinuation of daily power cuts.
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SE J PITY INFORMATION
9. Grotewohi on 24 June said a new wage policy was
needed, that there was "no need to build up a heavy
industry" on the scale planned, and that all efforts
must be concentrated on the fight for German unity.
10. On 25 June the government decreed the following;
abolition of work norm increases, improvement of the
food supply, improvement of the supply of working
clothes, improvement of the supply of industrial
goods, improvement of housing, "further development
of peasant holdings," reductions in agricultural
delivery quotas, and increase of pensions and social
welfare benefits.
11. On 26 June, at a staged demonstration in East Berlin,
Grotewohi promised that the government would rectify
its errors and improve the living standard of the
workers.
12, On 26 June, Deputy Minister President Rau, speaking
at Chemnitz, declared that the government would con-
centrate on the consumer goods and export industries
at the expense of heavy industry.
13. Minister of Justice Fechner announced that no special
courts had been set up to deal with the "provocateurs"
of 17 June and that only "persons guilty of crimes"
would be punished.
14. The government announced on 27 June that releases of
food and industrial goods from the state reserves were
possible because of reduced requirements'of the armed
forces.
15. On 28 June the East German radio reported that the
USSR-led peace campaign had made it possible for the
East German government to "consider the reduction of
our police forces ... and use the funds and industrial
goods earmarked for them for the benefit of the popu-
lation."
16. On 30 June the State Commission for Trade and Supply
announced that meat ration cards would be fully honored
and that fish would not be substituted for meat.
17. On 3 July the East German press carried a "correction"
of Fechner's 17 June statement. One change is that
only "persons guilty of serious crimes" would be pun-
ished. A statement was added that the right to strike
is constitutionally guaranteed, and that no one would
be punished for activities on a strike committee.
18. On 5 July, the East German public prosecutor announced
that since 11 June 7753 prisoners had been released,
most of them serving terms for economic crimes.
19. On 7 July the government announced increased pay for
minors based on length of service. According to press
reports, workers' demonstrations were flaring again
in East Berlin on 7 July. These repo't,s indicated
that strong Soviet and German forces had moved in to
maintain order. There were some indications that the
disorders would continue, possibly on an increased
scale, on 8 July.
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SECIANT INFORMATION
V. Soviet policy reaction:
A. The immediate Soviet reaction was a firm show of military
strength, combined, however, with a desire to avoid
shooting whenever possible. The cautious, slow lifting
of martial law indicates a Soviet desire to return to
normalcy as soon as possible without renewing the danger
of new outbreaks. Soviet authorities in Berlin have so
far retained most of the severe restrictions on travel
between the sectors of the city.
B. The USSR has not yet showed its hand on any new long
range policy line in reaction to the German developments.
However, the recall of top diplomats and particularly
the reported recall of top Soviet officials in Germany
may have been for the purpose of re-examining present
policy or gauging western reaction to the new Soviet
tactics to date.
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VI. Other reactions:
The official reaction of all the Satellite govern-
ments to the East German riots has been consistent. On
18 and 19 June all the Satellites, except Rumania which
did not report the riots until 21 June, carried the stand-
ard Communist version. This alleged that provocateurs
and foreign agents had taken advantage of peaceful worker
demonstrations in East Berlin against an increase in work
norms in order to create riots. Subsequently party propa-
ganda and Satellite leaders have continued to refer to the
riots, linking them with Western attempts to prevent any
easing of international tension and citing the nrnvncations
of the "imperialist hirelings?" as making necessary for
increased vigilance.
US observers in Eastern Europe have noted no marked
increase of security precautions following the riots,
Press reports of the movement of a Soviet MVD divi=-
sion to Pilsen on 26 June have been denied by American
embassy officials in Prague who visited Pilsen on 27-29
June. A report that Polish troops, brought into Goerlitz
to help quell the East German riots, joined the demon-,
strators is unconfirmed. Similarly embassy officials in
Warsaw have denied Western press stories of.Soviet troop
movements from East Germany into Poland to quell alleged
Polish uprisings. Soviet troops have been observed moving
out of East Berlin and other East German cities beginning
in the afternoon of 27 June, apparently to return to home
stations following the restoration of order. The des-,
patching, of troops trains toward the East German Polish
border, although not yet confirmed, could be in preparation
for the normal rotation of troops between the USSR and
East Germany which usually begins about this time of year.
On 5 July the Polish Press Agency denied flatly that any
security measures had been taken in Poland and stated that
conditions were calm.
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Following the riots, the Hungarian, Albanian, and
Rumanian governments announced popular concessions de-
signed to improve living conditions and bolster morale.
While the timing of these concessions may have been
partially influenced by the events in East Germany, the
nature and extent of the Hungarian Party and government
reorganization., coinciding with the announced intent of
the regime to slow down the tempo of socialization, appear
to be more a reflection of the Kremlin's new conciliatory
tactics applied to Eastern Europe. Moreover failure of
the Hungarian Parliament to meet on June 17 as prescribed
by the Constitution, suggests that the changes in Hungary
were being formulated prior to the outbreak of the East
German riots.
While there is some evidence that the Albanian decree
cancelling agricultural debts for the years 1949-1953 was
hastily announced on 23 June, it is not clear to what ex-
tent, if any, its timing was influenced by the East German
riots. In Rumania, the plans to release additional food-
stuffs to the people appear to be in preparation for the
meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth Congress
beginning 25 July. However, several recent concessions to
the peasants are in line with conciliatory moves in Hungary,
Albania and East Germany.
In Czechoslovakia, where the population has been
placed virtually in the status of forced labor by recent
government measures, the sudden repeal on 6 July of a
week-old decree specifying stringent measures to combat
labor indiscipline may presage a softer policy similar to
those currently in effect in Hungary and East Germany.
The major concessions which the Hungarian government
has promised to its people are being widely publicized
in other Satellite newspapers and this suggests that other
Eastern European governments will adopt similar measures.
B. Yugoslav reaction:
The major Yugoslavian propaganda theme has been that
the East Berlin and Czech demonstrations resulted from the
Soviet and Czech "betrayal of socialism." Press and radio
have interpreted the 9 June recommendations of. the East
German Politburo as a return of all rights to capitalists
in towns and countryside, and a complete sacrifice of all
possibilities of Socialist development in favor of the
national interests of Soviet foreign policy.
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. The West termed the East.German riots a sponta-
neous outbreak against a regime which had become thor-
oughly unbearable to the East German people. The West
German press almost universally called for unification
through free elections for an all-German government.
Other Western observers saw the riots as the "beginning
of the break-up in the rigid alignment of the cold war,"
and as a severe "blow to Soviet prestige" and the "peace"
campaign. There was extensive speculation as to what
measures Moscow might take to maintain its position in
East Europe and to keep the riots from spreading to other
Satellite countries.
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