INTRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100040017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 27, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

N'sC 27 . ,s3
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SECREI
INTRODUCTION
1. The ultimate aim 'of Communist policy:
world domination.
a. This represents the one real threat to the
security of the US.
b. Lenin publicly allowed for zigs and zags in
policy as dictated by circumstances, but not
as basic changes of course.
c. Stalin never deviated from this principle,
and there is no reason to believe present
regime will.
d. Soviet propaganda presently restrained, but
has not committed Kremlin to ease tensions.
e. Pravda's 24 April reply to President Eisenhower
shows little evidence of inclination to compromise.
2. The threat to US security falls into four categories:
military, economic, political, psychological.
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SEGtLI
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SECRE I
MILITARY THREAT
1. Soviet Bloc possesses preponderant military
power in Europe and Far East, and can launch
direct attacks on Western Hemisphere as well.
a. Soviet military forces alone are judged capable
of waging major campaigns concurrently in
Western Europe, the Middle East and mainland
Asia.
2. Main foundation of this strength is massed manpower.
a. Bloc's armed forces estimated at 8,750,000 men,
of which,4,500,000 are under arms in USSR alone,
and 2,500,000 in Communist China.
b. Soviet trained reserves estimated at 8,500,000
with mobilization potential of 13,000,000 within
year,
c. Military training compulsory throughout Orbit.
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SEGA I
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3. Soviet Army, with strength of 2,500,000, has become
more powerful since war by modernization of many
of the 175 line divisions, renovation of equipment,
and rigorous training.
a. Its weapons, for instance its estimated 43,000
tanks, are battle-proved and excellent.
4. The largest Soviet force outside the USSR is in
East Germany, 22 divisions with about 400,000 men,
backed by 51 divisions, or an estimated 660,000
troops, in border regions of USSR.
a. In Caucasus, 220,000 troops in 17 divisions.
b. In Soviet Far East, 17% of Soviet Army strength
or 427,000 troops in 30 divisions, largely
stationed in Vladivostok and Sakhalin areas.
5. Soviet air power no longer predominantly tactical,
includes an estimated 20,000 planes, with as many
in reserve.
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SECati
a. Strategic threat comes from about 1,000 TU-4's,
modeled on B-29. Capable of carrying and
delivering atomic bomb on any target in US
on one-way mission.
b. A successful research and development program
produced an outstanding jet fighter in the MIG-15,
first observed in 1948, and an excellent twin-jet
light bomber in the IL-28, first seen in 1950.
A bomber, one third larger than the TU-4, was
displayed in 1951, but no evidence of quantity
production.
c. Soviet air defense includes: probably more than
one third of 7,000 jet fighters assigned to units;
radar screen along outer borders of Satellites;
over 400, antiaircraft guns identified in defenses
of Moscow, increase from 50 in 1949.
SEGH?I
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SECREI
6. Soviet naval,. threat primarily from its approximately
360 submarines, many of them long-range.
a. Forces, primarily defensive, include also about
150 destroyers, 20 cruisers, 3 old battleships.
Latest types not designed exclusively for coastal
waters. No aircraft carriers.
7. Soviet atomic capability grown steadily in eight
years and now a real threat.
a. Program, with high priority, under control of
Council of Ministers and personal direction of
Beria.
b. Quantity production of fissionable material.
c. Three tests--one in 1949, two in 1951--with
stockpile atomic bombs capable of mass
destruction.
8. Buildup of Satellite military forces.
a. Communist China has burden of fighting in Korea,
has occupied Tibet agd poses threat to Formosa
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SEC LI
and Southeast Asia.
b. Its air force contains some 2300 planes,
including 1400 Soviet-made jet fighters and
100 jet light bombers, all dependent on USSR
logistical support. In addition, 550 or more
jets, provided by USSR, destroyed or probably
destroyed by USAF in Korea.
c. East European Satellites have 74 divisions
modeled after Soviet Army with 1, 500,000 men.
d. East German armed forces increased from
50,000 to 100,000 in past year with 600 Soviet-
made tanks and expected early pilot training in
MIG-15's.
e. Satellite air force totals 1,500 fighters including
several hundred jets but few bombers. More
than 70 major airfields now available in East
Europe, less than a dozen after World War II.
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SECAtt I
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SECRET
ECONOMIC THREAT
1. The Orbit includes one third the world population
and is almost completely self-sufficient in natural
resources. Hastening to become entirely so.
2. Human resources still can be exploited.
a. With agricultural reforms and improved
technical training, increased industrial force
will become available.
b. Since war, industrial labor force increased at
six times rate of population growth in the USSR.
c. This trend will con tinue in Orbit countries.
3. Acquisition of Western technology has provided
tools for development of these resources.
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4. USSR's industrial plant was brought back to normal
prewar level by 1948, has since increased its out-
put by 50 to 60 percent.
a. Steel production in 1952--34,000,000 tons--
equals combined output of Germany, Italy and
Japan at individual peaks of World War II
production. Rest of Orbit contributes 10,000,000
tons per year.
a. Overt transactions:
A Ceylon needs Chinese rice, but must export
rubber.
A Finland, unable to,find Western markets for
its forest products, must turn to the USSR to
survive.
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SE GAL I
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