"THE NEXT TWO YEARS: BREZHNEV, OR A SUCCESSION? IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A003000070002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 13, 1977
• Content Type: MF

l~~R PR7A9tRfj~~ &70002-3
Approved For P HE DIRECTOR6Or
Deputy for National Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
13 September 1977
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
FROM : Deputy N/I to Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : "The Next Two Years: Brezhnev, or a Succession?
Implications for US Policy"
1. Some time back Bill Hyland requested a careful intelligence
look at these questions:
-- How do we estimate Brezhnev's current personal and
political health? What are the chances of his leaving power
in the next year or two?
-- If Brezhnev leaves power within the next year or two,
how long and orderly or otherwise is the early succession
period likely to be?
-- What are the short-term policy implications of the
succession for the US?
-- What succession scenarios are likely? Possible?
With what varying policy implications for the US?
2. State/INR, CIA and NSA have worked out some answers in the
attached memorandum.
1,/
Robert R. Bowie
Attachment
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Intelligence
Memorandum
THE NEXT TWO YEARS:
BREZHNEV, OR A SUCCESSION?
IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
Secret
NI M 77-024
September 1977
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THE NEXT TWO YEARS:
BREZHNEV, OR A SUCCESSION?
IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY *
THE QUESTIONS
How do we estimate Brezhnev's current personal and political
health? What are the chances of his leaving power in the next year or
two?
If Brezhnev leaves power within the next year or two, how long
and orderly or otherwise is the early succession period likely to be?
What are the short-term policy implications of the succession for
the United States?
What succession scenarios are likely? Possible? With what varying
policy implications for the United States?
This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Acting National Intelligence Officer for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with drafting by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State, and by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was reviewed by working-level specialists on the
Soviet leadership in State/INR, CIA, and the National Security Agency.
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consolidate power. It is thus more likely than not that the early
years of the succession will be more troubled, at least within
leadership circles.
- It is most likely that the new leadership will be more collegial
than it has been in the recent past and will probably avoid taking
foreign policy initiatives with far-reaching implications. Soviet
foreign policy focus is likely to be on urgent matters rather than
on items which require long-term planning and consensus-
building among various elite groups. The leadership would, of
course, respond vigorously to perceived significant threats to
Soviet security or interests. Otherwise, its energies will be
devoted primarily to domestic concerns.
- Political succession will probably slow down the pace of Soviet-
US relations and tend to a further gradual cooling. Selective
detente, however, should remain the framework of Soviet
foreign policy after Brezhnev. A loss of momentum in the
conduct of detente need not result in an overall destabilization of
the US-Soviet relationship.
- Specific policies of interest to the United States such as arms
control, the Middle East, and trade could easily get tangled in
succession politics. The influence of those elements urging a
higher priority for maintenance of internal self-sufficiency,
furthering the socialist movement, and, perhaps, projection of
Moscow's influence to areas abroad rather than limited
cooperation with the United States could increase markedly. In
these circumstances, the potentialities for Soviet miscalculations
in dealing with the non-Communist world would be consider-
ably higher than in the recent past.
Succession Scenarios
- Brezhnev's colleagues might ease him into figurehead status
should his performance become uneven enough to cause them to
conclude he could no longer handle the job of general secretary,
instead of pushing him out of the leadership altogether into
retirement. Brezhnev might reluctantly prefer to acquiesce.
Should this occur, Brezhnev's own policy influence would
presumably be drastically curtailed, and the above policy
implications of a collective period of succession would probably
obtain.
- Brezhnev's actual departure from office in the next year or two
would give Kirilenko, now 71 and Brezhnev's unofficial deputy
in the party, perhaps a 70-percent chance of becoming general
secretary. All things considered, however, a reasonable estimate
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Brezhnev's Staying Power
- Barring an unlikely but unpredictable heart attack or stroke,
there is no specific reason to expect Brezhnev to die in the next
year or two, or be incapacitated enough to have to leave office.
- We judge that his colleagues would seek to remove Brezhnev
outright, or ease him into figurehead status, only if they
perceived that he was no longer consistent or vigorous enough to
run the country, or-perhaps somewhat less likely-that the
balance of his power and theirs urgently needed redressing.
- On balance, we think there is a better than even chance that
Brezhnev will remain in office for the next year or two.
Nature of the Succession Process
- Whenever Brezhnev leaves, we expect that the succession will be
in two phases, rather than clean and decisive. The first will be
when Brezhnev is replaced as party boss and head of the party
Secretariat; and the second and longer phase when the new
senior secretary attempts effectively to consolidate his power.
The new leader must gain a working majority in the Politburo.
Winning this influence comes chiefly through control of the
Secretariat and its powerful staff departments, the government's
economic ministries, the security organs and military command,
and the party's territorial organizations in the cities and
republics.
- It has taken several years-an average of about five, depending
on the criteria one usesin marking when the new top leader has
consolidated power-to resolve each of the three previous
succession crises.
- Brezhnev himself is unlikely to want or be able to arrange the
succession definitively.
Policy Implications
- The USSR currently faces serious economic and political
problems. The economic ones, in particular, are expected to
worsen during the next half-dozen years. These problems will
complicate efforts to resolve an early Brezhnev succession and
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of the probability that Kirilenko would be able to consolidate his
rule and maintain it for several years is less than even, say 30
percent, and the greater likelihood is that there would be two
successions.
- There is perhaps a 30-percent chance that someone else will
succeed Brezhnev even initially. While he is unlikely to come
from outside the present top leadership, he could be any one of a
number of men now in it. These leaders each at present have one
or more handicaps to overcome in filling out their credentials for
a claim to the top job. If the Brezhnev succession is delayed or, as
may well happen, occurs in two or more stages, one or more of
these men could well improve their power and experience.
Should a younger man succeed in the next year or two, the initial
succession crisis might be sharper and the leadership's instability
more manifest than under Kirilenko, with an even stronger urge
to concentrate on domestic affairs and with conflicting
tendencies in foreign policy.
- There is an outside chance-say, 10 percent initially and 20 to 30
percent later on-that a strong, innovative, new general
secretary will emerge to capitalize on the manifest need to
rejuvenate the Politburo, Central Committee, and middle levels
of the party as well as to stimulate the economy. Such a
succession scenario would probably impact most on United States
interests, as the party chief would be less dependent on the
collective and freer to pursue dynamic policies, for better or
worse.
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CONTENTS
Page
1. Will Brezhnev Leave Office? ...................................................................... 9
Brezhnev's Current Personal Health ............................................................ 9
Brezhnev's View ............................................................................................... 9
His Colleagues' View ...................................................................................... 10
Does Brezhnev Have Policy Vulnerabilities? ............................................. 10
Brezhnev and Political Developments Since the 25th Congress ........... 11
II. How Orderly a Succession? .......................................................................... 12
The Succession Process ................................................................................... 12
Effects of Succession on Decisionmaking ................................................... 13
Setting of the Brezhnev Succession ............................................................ 14
Domestic Problems To Be Confronted by the Successor Leadership.. 14
III. Policy Implications for the United States .................................................. 15
What We Expect ............................................................................................ 15
The Unexpected ............................................................................................... 16
IV. Scenarios for the Brezhnev Succession ........................................................ 16
A Kirilenko Succession and Its Implications ............................................. 17
Implications of Succession by a More Junior Leader ............................. 18
Possible Emergence and Implications of a Strong and Effective Ruler ......... 18
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DISCUSSION
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1. WILL BREZHNEV LEAVE OFFICE?
What are the
chances of his leaving power in the next year or
two?
Brezhnev's View
5. Brezhnev's behavior suggests that his own
perception has been more 25X1
sanguine, perhaps overly so. His attempts to build up
his position over the last two years indicate that he
expects to be politically active for several more years.
What we know of his instincts for power and general
temperament, moreover, strongly suggests that he is 25X1
unlikely to choose retirement or figurehead status
voluntarily. In any event, no vigorous young leaders
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have been groomed for the succession, and senior
leaders in Moscow, with the partial exception of
Kirilenko, have not been able to broaden their
competencies except when Brezhnev has been out of
action. It would thus appear that Brezhnev has been
more concerned with protecting and enhancing his
own powers than setting the stage for their orderly
transfer.
His Colleagues' View
6. If Brezhnev's objective capacity to survive and
function and his perception of his capabilities were the
only considerations, there would be no strong reasons
for expecting his departure from office in the next
year or two. Brezhnev's political and personal
relationship with his Politburo colleagues, however,
and their perceptions of his performance will also
affect his ability to maintain his authority.J
It is possible that some
individual Politburo members, presumably those least
satisfied with Brezhnev's policies and his performance
in office, may hope to replace him with a more
vigorous and politically acceptable leader.I
Does Brezhnev Have Policy Vulnerabilities?
7. The Soviets remain confident that the long-range
global correlation of forces has been and will continue
to shift in their favor, and they are specifically very
proud of having achieved overall strategic weapons
parity with the United States during Brezhnev's
regime. They assisted their allies in the defeat of US
efforts to maintain a foothold in Indochina. They now
are coping, however, with their perception of a more
confident and assertive America than in some years,
with a deterioration in relations with the new US
Administration, and with renewed fears of US
technology in new channels of the arms race. China
has so far rejected Soviet post-Mao efforts to improve
relations. In Europe the Soviets have won political
recognition of the de facto postwar settlement, their
efforts to improve relations with Western Europe have
eased tensions, and they have seen a weakening in the
political unity of NATO. Continuing Warsaw Pact
force improvements, however, have reawakened
NATO's concerns about its own military capabilities,
the post-Helsinki period has brought with it heavy and
continuing foreign pressures on the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe over human rights, and once-
promising detente relationships are currently stalled
(with West Germany) or largely ceremonial (with
France). Several West European Communist parties
have improved their domestic positions, but their
attitudes toward the Communist movement make
them a mixed blessing for Moscow. In the Middle East
the Soviets have sustained a net loss of influence
continuing since the 1973 war. In sub-Saharan Africa,
on the other hand, they have substantially increased
their influence. It is a mixed foreign policy picture; in
general, Soviet leaders focusing on the immediate
foreign policy balance sheet may be more aware of
their problems than their opportunities, but they
would also count substantial gains in years just past
and would anticipate more within a few years.
8. On the domestic side the balance is somewhat
more negative, with substantial problems looming in
the not-too-distant future. Economic growth continues
to decline; labor productivity remains low; periodic
a
ri
lt
l
i
d
f
g
cu
ura
cr
ses pro
uce
ood shortagesndik
a rs domestic discontent. These problems are chronic, of
j course, and the effect for the present has been limited.
The regime can take some comfort from an overall
j standard of living that is higher now than ever before,
from prospects for two good crops in succession, from
j containment of dissident activity, and from the
system's ability to meet the basic requirements of
superpower status.
9. Recent policy developments, therefore, do not
contain the sudden and visible failures that would be
most likely to jeopardize Brezhnev's political position.
So far, moreover, Brezhnev has always sensed when
the leadership consensus was drifting dangerously
away from him and has trimmed his own policies
accordingly. Furthermore, Soviet problems represent
systemic difficulties and reflect policies based on
general consensus. Nevertheless, if the consequences of
policies that have been closely identified with
Brezhnev visibly worsen in the next months, this may
increase his political vulnerability: This in turn could
reduce his capacity to get the extendedrest periods he
has needed to perform the duties of his office. The
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resulting worsening of his political and physical
fortunes could prevent him from acting with the
requisite vigor and decisiveness to deal with political
opposition. Under these conditions an effort might be
made to oust Brezhnev as General Secretary, or at least
to deprive him of much of his power. This effort
might take the form of a tacit leadership consensus to
push Brezhnev out, or assume more of the aspects of
an outright conspiracy such as toppled Khrushchev in
1964.
10. Organization of a conspiracy, of course, would
be a very risky undertaking, requiring careful prep-
aration and secrecy. To be successful it would
probably require the participation or acquiescense of
Suslov, the unofficial guardian of party collectivity;
Andropov and at least key elements of the KGB center
in order to execute the plan; Ustinov, signifying
support of and control over the military; and
Kirilenko. as a senior party secretary and logical key
figure in the succession.
Brezhnev and Political Developments Since the
25th Congress
11. How, then, is Brezhnev faring politically?
Developments since the 25th Party Congress have
appeared to strengthen, not weaken, Brezhnev's
position. While subsequent changes in the top organs
(see chart on the appended foldout page) did not
entirely reflect Brezhnev's will, their overall result was
largely to his advantage. Brezhnev benefited particu-
larly from the addition of his close associates,
Chernenko and Rusakov, to the Secretariat, and the
removal from the Politburo of Polyanskiy (who was
made the scapegoat for failures in agriculture) and
Podgornyy. Podgornyy clearly was removed from his
post as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium in
order to make way for Brezhnev, although the precise
circumstances of his ouster from the Politburo are not
known and other issues may also have been involved.
influence in the Politburo. It suggests that he can carry
the day on some, but not necessarily all, questions on
which he has strop views.
Now his formal responsibilities have
been further enlarged with the result that more will
have to be exercised by others. The stability of this
new balance between Brezhnev's personal authority
and the Politburo's collective authority will be tested
in the next year or two.
13. Within these general outlines, there is at present
a range of opinion (within as well as between
State/INR and CIA) as to how solid Brezhnev's real
political position is underneath the personnel moves in
his favor. At one end of this spectrum of opinion,
specialists are more impressed with ousters of Polit-
buro members and appointments to the Secretariat;
they see Brezhnev at least holding his own and
perhaps gaining influence. Toward the other end of
this spectrum, analysts focus more on the collective's
tolerance for Brezhnev's power in relation to troubled
policies and his declining energies, and see Brezhnev's
effective influence as waning.
14. In the next several months, as the USSR
approaches its 60th anniversary, Brezhnev probably
will avoid policy initiatives that might give rise to
political turbulence. Subsequently, perhaps at the
customary December meetings of the Central Com-
mittee and Supreme Soviet, Brezhnev might propose
major innovations in domestic policy. If, as some
observers expect, his proposals involve economic
management, this could bring him into conflict with
other leaders (Kosygin in particular) who have
important responsibilities in this area. Moreover,
Ryabov's addition to the Secretariat is a major change,
but probably a plus for Kirilenko. Tikhonov probably
counts as a partial plus for Brezhnev. This Brezhnev
client as First Deputy Premier balances Kosygin and
Mazurov in the Council of Ministers on the govern-
ment side, but Brezhnev has evidently been unable to
get Tikhonov named additionally as even a candidate
member of the Politburo.
12. The recent move against Podgornyy provides a
new and impressive reflection of Brezhnev's political
proposals that appeared to aggrandize Brezhnev s
powers further at the expense of the Politburo might
be resisted by its senior members. *
* Suslov, in particular, has emphasized the principle of collective
leadership. Although he consented, or was obliged, to nominate
Brezhnev to his state post, Suslov described Brezhnev as the chief
"representative" of the "party and state" rather than the "leader of
the party and people." Moreover, Suslov referred to the May
Plenum's having deemed it expedient that "Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the CPSU, should simultaneously occupy the post of
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet," whereas
Brezhnev's formulation had a more institutional and permanent
ring: "the combining of the posts of General Secretary of the CPSU
and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet."
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15. To conclude, the current political balance has almost 300 voting members, however, it is too
within the leadership may change substantially over large and unwieldy to exercise its nominal authority.
the next two years. Given the advanced age and poor Higher Soviet politics is largely the informal and
health of many in the leadership, opportunities for concealed struggle of political organs and powerful
political exploitation will present themselves irrespec- individuals who speak in the name of the Central
tive of the political maneuvers initiated by individual Committee. At the apex of this Soviet hierarchy is the
leaders. We anticipate a continued u course and "collective leadership," the members (now 26) of the
during the
advantage of such opportunities. It may even increase
his vulnerability to the maneuvers of his opponents,
especially if Brezhnev's policies meet with manifestly
poor results.
-- Barring an unlikely but unpredictable heart
attack or stroke, there is no specific reason to
expect Brezhnev to die in the next year or two, or
to be incapacitated enough to have to leave
office.
Whether Brezhnev will be removed by his
colleagues is also essentially unforeseeable. If this
should happen, we judge that the real cause
would probably be his colleagues' perceptions
that Brezhnev was no longer consistent or
vigorous enough to run the country, or-perhaps
somewhat less likely-that the balance of his
power and the collective's urgently needed
redressing.
On balance, we think there is a better than even
chance that Brezhnev will remain in office for the
next year or two.
II. HOW ORDERLY A SUCCESSION?
If Brezhnev leaves power within the next year
or two, how long and orderly or otherwise is the
early succession period likely to be?
16. Our answer to this question is based primarily
on our general understanding of the Soviet system-
especially such precedents from the Stalin and
Khrushchev successions as are likely to be most
Politburo and Secretariat, the Central Committee's
chief executive organs where the dynamics of top-
level politics are played out. These men determine
national and foreign policy as a whole, but in-
dividually also represent all the major elements of the
Soviet system-party, government, economy, military
and police, foreign affairs, key domestic regions-and
carry their associated political clout. The leadership is
not fixed but is constantly shifting as leaders are
removed or added and functions and portfolios are
redistributed. Formally, and frequently in fact, the
Politburo is the ultimately authoritative forum, but the
power of its individual members varies markedly, and
strong external influence can be brought to bear on the
Politburo. Any new party boss must gain a majority in
the Politburo or be frustrated. Any who aspires to the
top role must forge political majorities and at the very
least avoid joining the minority on key issues. This has
been Brezhnev's style. The chief means of winning
influence in the Politburo has been through control of:
the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its
powerful staff departments, the government's eco-
nomic ministries, the security organs and the military
command, and the party's territorial organizations in
the cities and the republics. As a result, the Politburo
has at different times been controlled by an individual
(as under the despotic Stalin in his last years), by a
triumvirate (as in the early 1920s under Zinoviyev,
Kamenev, and Stalin), and by loosely organized
factions (as in the early post-Stalin period.)
18. The most powerful individual in the Politburo
usually has been the General Secretary of the Central
Committee (sometimes called the First Secretary). No
individual or faction since Lenin's time has been able
to make coherent policy in the name of the Central
Committee unless he or it controlled this office. The
General Secretary's power and authority are neither
constitutionally defined nor established by historical
precedent. They vary according to his capacities and
The Succession Process ambitions and to the strength of the forces supporting
him, on the one hand, and those defending collec-
17. The highest authority in the USSR is the party tivity, on the other. Consequently, his departure from
Central Committee which confers legitimacy on the office has initiated a struggle, first to succeed to his
actions of the party and the state. Since the Central office, then to acquire sufficient influence in the
Committee meets for only a few days each year and Politburo to enable the new General Secretary and his
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supporters to speak in the name of the Central
Committee. Accordingly, each of the three successions
that have occurred in the USSR, to Lenin, Stalin, and
Khrushchev, has given rise to acute and relatively
prolonged struggle.
19. Typically in Soviet history there has been a two-
phased succession: a first crisis when the incumbent is
replaced as head of the Secretariat; and a second and
longer phase arising from the new senior secretary's
attempts to arrogate the powers of his predecessor,
powers that he believes to be necessary to provide
stable and effective leadership. While he maneuvers to
consolidate power, the leadership tends to have trouble
making decisions on complex policy matters. Policy
lines tend to become fouled with political ones, and
institutions just below the top leadership temporarily
exercise increased influence on policy. If the party
boss fails to consolidate power quickly, the Secretariat
may become an arena of acute conflict, as in the 1964-
67 period, or there may be an increase in the strength
and assertiveness of the government in relation to the
party apparatus, such as occurred in the early post-
Stalin years. In these contingencies, the. leadership's
capacity to make urgent decisions on serious political
and economic problems would be reduced, perhaps
seriously, until such time as a younger, more vigorous
man might assume the office and expand its powers.
Meanwhile, the political arena may be widened even
further by the enhanced activity of institutional
"interest groups" in the military, the economic
bureaucracy, the scientific establishment, and the
creative intelligentsia. Unless the leadership becomes
considerably more divided over policy questions than
it was in the Khrushchev succession, however, the
party apparatus will probably be able to maintain its
control over the other institutions and to limit their
participation in high Soviet politics.
20. The Soviet military has not generally been a key
active manipulator in Soviet succession struggles. This
is in some contrast to the state security (now KGB)
apparatus, two of whose then current or recent chiefs
have been themselves key contenders for the party
succession (Beriya in 1953 and Shelepin in 1964).
Beyond this, control of key positions within the KGB
has been a political necessity for any leader trying to
acquire or maintain predominance. As the other organ
of force, however, the acquiescence of the professional
Soviet military to new power arrangements is essential
in Soviet succession struggles. And the military
command's general involvement in higher politics has
been important throughout the post-Stalin period.
Like other key institutions, the military's influence
tends to vary according to its own cohesion and
inversely to that of the political leadership. Only twice
has a Soviet professional military figure also been a
member of the top party leadership (Zhukov in 1956-
57 and Grechko in 1973-76). Again like other key
Soviet institutions, military influence has tended to be
strongest at times of succession, as in the early post-
Stalin years and in the post-Khrushchev period, and
weakest under a strong personal leader, as under
Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s.* We
would expect this pattern to recur in the probable
circumstances of disunity and relative weakness in the
early post-Brezhnev years. The present Soviet Minister
of Defense, Ustinov, is an experienced and influential
party leader with broad acceptance in the current
Brezhnev leadership. Should he remain in this position
at the outset of the post-Brezhnev period, his support
would be important-although certainly not uniquely
so-to the new party boss.
21. The real key to success in the succession
struggle until now has been control of the Secretariat
and its powerful staff (the central apparatus of some
22 departments and over a thousand officials). Control'
of the Secretariat, in turn, has been converted into
varying degrees of influence over the provincial party
apparatus, the economic ministries, the security
apparatus, and the military command. After 1937 only
Stalin succeeded in winning complete control over the
regime's entire machinery. Short of this, a strong and
reasonably stable leadership has been possible when
the General Secretary and his factional supporters had
sufficient strength to dominate the Politburo. This was
achieved by Stalin in the late 1920s, by Khrushchev in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and, in much more
limited measure, by Brezhnev in the 1970s.
Effects of Succession on Decisionmaking
22. It has taken several years-an average of about
five, depending on the criteria one uses in marking
when the new top leader has consolidated power-to
resolve each of the three previous succession crises.
During this time divisions in the leadership have
complicated decisionmaking. A successor leadership
tends to concentrate on urgent matters and to neglect
policy innovations that require long-term planning
and the building of a consensus among diverse groups.
* On one important occasion in 1957 Khrushchev successfully
enlisted the assistance of Zhukov and the Soviet military in a unique
appeal over the collective to the Central Committee against his
"antiparty" leadership opponents. Less than five months later,
Khrushchev "repaid" Zhukov for his services by ousting him from
the leadership.
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Second, it prefers if possible to concentrate on
domestic rather than foreign affairs. Successor leader-
ships have not been precluded from taking decisive
measures on urgent matters. If sudden international
crises confront the post-Brezhnev leadership, it will
not be incapable of acting, although it may not be able
to deal with them in optimum fashion. The succession
leadership may find it difficult to respond to early US
diplomatic initiatives-especially complicated or
imaginative ones-but it would respond vigorously to
perceived threats from any quarter to important
Soviet security interests. Finally, factional struggles
within the leadership make it difficult to initiate basic
reforms or to carry out coherent and effective
domestic programs, and this may prove especially
damaging in the Brezhnev succession, when the cost of
a continuing failure to deal with the USSR's growing
economic and political problems may well rise
sharply.
Setting of the Brezhnev Succession
23. The constant clashes of major institutions and
the shifting alliances on issues in recent years,
combined with the natural caution of an aged and
experienced leadership, have resulted in lowest-
common-denominator decisions and frequently in
immobilism in domestic affairs. The present aged
leaders, seasoned by their long apprenticeship under
Stalin, will attempt to continue their policy of barring
the road to the top to a young, energetic, and
ambitious leader who might be tempted to push his
programs with extreme methods. Collective leadership
stands at the opposite pole from Stalinism as a method
of Kremlin rule, and today's rulers find life much
more stable and secure now than in the days of the
dictator. Furthermore, much of what Americans view
as lack of movement in internal policy is seen by the
Soviets as consistency and stability, qualities tradition-
ally prized by Russians.
Domestic Problems To Be Confronted by the
Successor Leadership
24. The stodgier manifestations of these habits of
governing are likely to be severely tested by conditions
in the succession period. The USSR currently faces
serious economic and political problems; and the
economic ones, in particular, are expected to worsen
during the next half-dozen years. These new chal-
lenges will probably cause considerable division within
the leadership, complicating efforts to resolve an early
Brezhnev succession and consolidate power. It is thus
likely that the early years of the succession will be
more disorderly and troubled, at least within leader-
ship circles.
25. The overriding problem is the slowdown in the
growth of the economy, caused in large part by factors
that will continue to operate: a steady decline in the
output obtained from given increments of capital,
increased costs of extracting raw materials, declining
oil production, and reduced growth in the labor force.
As a consequence, we expect annual growth in the
early 1980s to decline to about 3 percent. Energy
shortfalls and bad harvests in one or more years might
cause negligible or even negative growth. Tinkering
with the administrative apparatus that directs the
country's economic enterprises is unlikely to solve the
problem, but a search for administrative solutions may
well be made and could prove a divisive issue for the
leadership in the early succession period.
26. Available alternative policy choices are bound
to be contentious. Further reducing the rate of
increase in consumption might adversely affect labor
productivity and contribute to popular disaffection.
Shifting industrial capacity from defense to the
production of investment goods, or stretching out
R&D and production schedules to slow the rate of
expansion of defense-oriented industrial capacity,
would have little effect in the short run. Moreover,
defense production is what the Soviets do best as well
as the principal engine of Soviet power, and any
encroachment on it would be anathema to many
Soviet leaders as well as to the military establishment.
Selective continued dependence on Western technol-
ogy, while perhaps improving growth potential, would
be expensive, politically controversial, and subject to
Western willingness to cooperate. Options to augment
the labor force-by retaining older workers longer,
bringing more young workers in by adjusting educa-
tion policies, or reducing the armed forces' terms of
service-might be somewhat less controversial to a
succession leadership, but would have limited impact.
Indeed, even a combination of measures-such as a
leveling off of defense production coupled with
measures to obtain additional manpower-would
probably raise economic growth only slightly. In the
energy sector, our estimate is that the longer the
leadership delays adoption of a top-priority program
of feasible conservation and increased production, the
greater the overall adverse economic impact. Such
delays would be particularly difficult to avoid in a
divided leadership.
27. Political problems that will face Brezhnev's
successors include aging cadres throughout the party
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and an erosion of party discipline-a development
serious enough to be noted in Brezhnev's report to the
25th Congress. Outright political dissent in the USSR
will undoubtedly continue to be a manageable, albeit
embarrassing, problem. But the detente era and CSCE
(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)
have set in motion currents of information and
independence that will continue to prove troublesome
for Brezhnev's successors, involving repeated choices
with contentious domestic and foreign policy implica-
tions. The nationalities question is likely to be
manageable in the next half-dozen years, because the
Slavic leaders, if united, probably can cope with the
non-Slavic quarter of the Soviet population. Somewhat
further down the road, however, the nationalities
problem may well become a more serious aggravation.
The Soviets' East European empire has moderate-to-
serious economic problems that will worsen with
Soviet energy shortfalls, and which, combined with
the seeds of detente, CSCE, and Eurocommunism,
forecast a more unstable than usual Soviet backyard.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
What are the short-term policy implications of
the succession for the United States?
the ceremonial rather than substantive. In any case,
summitry will be awkward until a clear single leader
emerges because of the edge in prestige it affords.
30. While prospects are that the Sino-Soviet antago-
nism will not soon be mollified, within a few years
Peking as well as Moscow could view some easing of
tensions in state relations (though probably not party
relations) as desirable. The road to such an easement
will be difficult, and Peking's ability to initiate new
policies or be responsive to Soviet moves in this
direction will be limited by its own succession struggle.
31. The Soviets' perceptions of their foreign eco-
nomic requirements will continue to make it difficult
for the leadership to adopt markedly different
policies. These perceived needs include both a desire
to use Western technology in order to modernize the
economy and the periodic necessity of importing food
and feed grains because of harvest shortfalls. Pursuit of
these two goals reinforces the Soviet interest in
keeping political relations with the West from
deteriorating too far. On the other hand, the drop in
Soviet oil production anticipated in the next few years
will seriously erode Soviet hard-currency earnings
needed to purchase Western products; oil exports
accounted for more than half of the USSR's hard-
currency earnings last year. We imagine that this
redicament may activate residual autarkic sentiment
p
What We Expect in some quarters of the Soviet leadership and
28. No Kremlin leader has been so closely identi- heirarchy. While a drastic shift in economic policies
fied with detente as Brezhnev. He was a prime mover back toward autarky is probably not feasible, we
of the major Soviet-American accords of 1972-74 and expect more Soviet debate and harder choices over
is believed to have had difficulty on occasion selling trade policies in the next few years,
these to associates who took a less conciliatory position 32. A loss of momentum in the conduct of detente
on bilateral issues or preferred other policy priorities. need not result in an overall destabilization of the US-
Any successor will have less personal prestige tied up Soviet relationship. As it is, a slowdown has been under
in the cause of rapprochement with the United States. way to varying degrees since late 1974 without
Accordingly, political succession will probably slow producing any drastic escalation of trouble to the point
down the pace of relations and tend to a gradual of confrontation. Nevertheless, a lapse of two to five
cooling. Selective detente, however, should remain the years in the strategic arms limitation talks, especially
framework of Soviet foreign policy after Brezhnev. without some arrangement to extend the Interim
The motives for dialogue with the United States will Agreement, could have an unsettling effect insofar as
be durable so long as both sides perceive the nuclear pressures for the development and deployment of new
arms race to be dangerous and expensive. At best, weapon systems mount, and the hazards of a
however, any achievable strategic arms limitation downward spiral in US-Soviet relations increase. And
agreement at this stage can only temper the competi- other substantive and atmospheric strains in the
tion for some form of strategic advantage, primarily bilateral relationship could sufficiently cumulate and
through restraining weapons development programs. trouble the dialogue that any top-level Soviet decision
29. Brezhnev's successors will be aware of how to resume a specific search for improved relations
effectively he used summitry to advance his cause at would encounter great difficulty, both in obtaining the
home as well as abroad. They, too, may succumb to support of a domestic consensus and in interesting the
this temptation, though they may be inclined to accent United States.
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33. In view of the signs of controversy during
Brezhnev's tenure, specific policies of interest to the
United States-arms control, the Middle East, and
trade-could easily get tangled in succession politics.
Some Soviet leaders can be expected to urge that
higher priority be given to maintenance of internal
self-sufficiency, furthering the common objectives of
the socialist movement, and, perhaps, projection of
Moscow's influence elsewhere abroad, than to limited
cooperation with the United States. This tougher
outlook is probably well represented among the
ideologues, among many provincial party bosses, in
the security forces, and in the higher officers corps.
The foreign policy influence of these elements could
increase markedly if they come to believe that the
then-extant leadership's policies threaten their perqui-
sites or jeopardize the security of the Soviet state. In
these circumstances, the potentialities for Soviet
miscalculations in dealing with the non-Communist
world would be considerably higher than in the recent
past.
The Unexpected
34. More far-reaching complications could arise
from a sharp deterioration in the Soviets' internal or
foreign situation, especially the former. Elements
within the leadership could become so frustrated with
immobilism that they would launch a palace revolu-
tion. Such a move would be facilitated if Brezhnev
had to delegate major responsibilities to others because
of his declining stamina. In these circumstances Soviet
policy might well become more vigorous, although
changes in direction might be minimal. Major changes
could ensue, however, if, for example, successive
harvest failures generated widespread popular unrest
or a "worst case" combination of economic troubles
impacted simultaneously. Over the longer term,
nationalism among the minorities could even lead to
massive separatist outbreaks with ramifications in the
leadership. This danger is more imminent in Eastern
Europe, where nationalism is combined with anti-
Sovietism. Also of a more immediate nature is the
possibility of Soviet interference in post-Tito Yugosla-
via. While we expect the Soviets' China problem to
remain intractable, we would be surprised if large-
scale hostilities broke out. But if they did, it would be
more likely to be by accident than design, with both
sides striving to limit the conflict. Should any of these
kinds of threatening contingencies materialize, re-
sidual Stalinist orthodoxy would tend to be resurgent,
probably leading to a further stiffening in policy
toward the United States and to general limitations on
contacts with the outside world as part of a tightening
of internal discipline.
35. On the other hand, there is an outside chance
that reformers-from-above will emerge who would
introduce innovative economic measures, both inter-
nally and in terms of greater economic dependence on
the West. In the next section we explore the possible
implications of these kinds of policies in connection
with an outside-chance succession scenario.
IV. SCENARIOS FOR THE BREZHNEV
SUCCESSION
36. Brezhnev himself is unlikely to want or be able
to arrange the succession definitively. Even if he
manages to augment his present authority signifi-
cantly, he probably will not share substantial power
with a single heir presumptive. While Brezhnev may
strengthen the position of several of the younger
candidates, he will probably attempt to balance and
circumscribe their power with extreme care to assure
that none of them does to him what he, in similar
circumstances, did to Khrushchev. He is also presum-
ably aware of the risk either that his other lieutenants
might shift their allegiance from the General Secre-
tary to the heir presumptive, or that a designated heir
becomes the principal target for other contenders and
their patrons among the present leadership seniors.
37. It is conceivable though unlikely that Brezh-
nev's colleagues might ease him into figurehead status
should his performance become uneven enough to
cause them to conclude he could no longer handle the
job of general secretary, instead of pushing him out of
the leadership altogether into retirement, either
honorable or otherwise. We attach perhaps a 10-
percent possibility to this scenario. Brezhnev would
find himself in the position of having to acquiesce in
retreating into the honorary but largely ceremonial
character of the presidency, and might prefer to keep
his hand in than retire altogether. The collective
would select a new party boss-perhaps Kirilenko,
Brezhnev's present unofficial party deputy, but
perhaps not. Should this happen soon, an inner
collective of the present key senior leaders would share
power with the new party leader. Should one or more
of the present seniors precede Brezhnev out of the
picture, the inner collective would consist of the most
senior and influential extant, and they would begin a
period of tugging and hauling with the new party boss
over effective authority in party affairs. In either case,
Brezhnev's own policy influence would presumably be
drastically curtailed. Implications for Soviet foreign
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policy and US interests would probably be along the
lines we consider the likeliest for the actual post-
Brezhnev period, as discussed in paragraphs 28-33
above.
A Kirilenko Succession and Its Implications
38. If Brezhnev does not soon take measures to
prepare the way for a chosen heir, and should he leave
the office of general secretary in the next year or two,
Kirilenko would have by far the best chance to assume
it. (See the appended chart for the present positions of
the key players in this shuffle.) As Brezhnev's chief
deputy in the Politburo and party apparatus, with
responsibility for internal party organization and its
supervision of the economy, Kirilenko has superior
claim to the requisite experience to be general
secretary. This and his current access to the crucial
levers of power strongly favor his candidacy in an
early contest for the succession to Brezhnev. There is
evidence that Kirilenko has in recent years taken over
more of the daily routine of running the CPSU, but it
is not clear how far this has gone. He also appears to
have strengthened his position within the past year
through the appointment of a former associate,
Ryabov, as a secretary of the Central Committee with
the important defense industry portfolio, and at least
partial responsibility for "administrative organs."*
Further, Kirilenko has publicly participated in two
meetings of the Council of Ministers, a break in
precedent he shares only with Brezhnev.
39. Whether or not Brezhnev has deliberately
fostered Kirilenko's strong tacit claim to the succes-
sion, he may welcome that claim as giving assurance,
to himself and others, that the contingency of his own
sudden incapacitation has been provided for. More-
over, given the long career association between the
two men, Brezhnev may feel more secure with
Kirilenko as his heir presumptive. In any case,
Kirilenko's availability gives Brezhnev a plausible
excuse for not grooming a younger, perhaps more
dangerous, heir. Since Kirilenko's age necessarily
limits how long he can serve as a stand-in for
Brezhnev, however, his own impatience to obtain the
top party post might produce increased tension
between them with the passage of time, particularly if
Brezhnev's performance comes into question. If
Kirilenko were deprived of his superior position, and
Brezhnev failed to make new arrangements favoring a
* The CPSU's euphemism for the organs of control, "administra-
tive organs," applies to the Committee for State Security (KGB), the
uniformed police, the military, and the judiciary.
particular candidate, the prospects for an orderly
transfer of Brezhnev's power-which in any event are
dubious-would be worsened. Apart from the loss of
Brezhnev's favor, Kirilenko must fear an alliance
between Suslov as potential kingmaker * and some
other candidate for the succession. Moreover, if the
succession were initiated by a successful conspiracy or
political maneuver, Kirilenko's prospects would de-
pend on the part he had played in forcing Brezhnev
from power. All things considered, a reasonable
estimate of the probability that Kirilenko would
become general secretary is about 70 percent.
40. Kirilenko's succession to the office of general
secretary probably would ease the crisis of leadership
initially and impress the outside world with the
leadership's stability. Consolidating his power would
be something else again. Even if Kirilenko won
election as general secretary and survived a turbulent
initial phase of the succession, his age and the
magnitude of the economic and political problems
that face the USSR in the next few years make it
doubtful that he could bring relative stability to Soviet
politics as Brezhnev did in the late 1960s. Little is
known, however, about either Kirilenko's policy vision
or his political acumen-key factors in predicting his
chances for success. We might conceivably be
surprised by a dynamic and even innovative Kirilenko
in power. All things considered, however, a reasonable
estimate of the probability that Kirilenko would be
able to consolidate his rule and maintain it for several
years is less than even, say 30 percent. Even if
Kirilenko were not simply defeated in this contest and
forced from office, he might be able to hold onto it
only by accommodating to the pressures of his peers in
the Politburo and to the powerful constituencies and
interest groups they represent.
41. The prospects in the event of a Kirilenko
succession are for a relatively weak leadership, one
unable to deal vigorously with the worsening perform-
ance of the Soviet economy, and incapable of
achieving far-reaching agreements with the United
States. Little is known of Kirilenko's foreign policy
views. In general, he is believed to be somewhat more
conservative ideologically than Brezhnev, and likely to
give a lower priority to improving relations with the
United States and the West. Brezhnev's detente policy
probably would be continued in an attenuated form,
* Suslov is not himself inclined or suited (by age, health, and
expertise) actually to run the party. So long as he remains active,
however, his unique 30 years' experience in the Secretariat and
unofficial role as senior custodian of both party ideology and
collective rule give him a key say in who does run the party.
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particularly out of concern to avoid dangerous
encounters in the international arena.
implications of Succession by a More Junior
Leader
42. There is perhaps a 30-percent chance that
someone else will succeed Brezhnev even initially.
Should Kirilenko depart the leadership for whatever
reason* in the next year or two, Kulakov currently is
probably immediately best placed of the younger
figures for the party succession. He is the only
secretary of the next generation of Soviet leaders who
is simultaneously a member of the Politburo. At 59, he
appears, in the few glimpses Westerners get of him, to
project well politically among his colleagues. Although
he is presumably generally acquainted with the
country's business from six years of participation in
Politburo and 12 in Secretariat deliberations, his own
portfolio has been almost exclusively agriculture and
he has not been given broad party responsibilities to
oversee personally. Should Kulakov become party boss,
either instead of or after Kirilenko, he would probably
be more under the constraints of the leadership
collective, since his current experience, power base,
and party authority, at least, are much less striking
than Kirilenko's, and he would have much further to
go to consolidate his position in the leadership.
43. While in the closed system of CPSU politics the
next party leader or two are unlikely to come from
outside the present top leadership, they could be any
of a number of men now in it. Each of its present
members has one or more handicaps to overcome in
filling out credentials for a claim to the top job, but if
the Brezhnev succession is delayed or, as may well
happen, occurs in two or more stages, one or more of
these men could well improve their power and
experience.
44. Of otherwise promising young candidates,
Romanov and Shcherbitskiy for example, have not
worked in the central Secretariat, or even in a
responsible capacity in Moscow. Unless they are
brought into the Secretariat in the very near future,
they will lack both the experience and the power base
needed to assert an effective claim to Brezhnev's office
if it were vacated within the next year or two. Of those
currently in the central Secretariat who might
suddenly be elevated into the Politburo, some, like
Dolgikh and Ryabov, lack experience with and access
to the organizational levers of powers; others, like
Kapitonov, lack broad policy experience. The chances
of any of these are low now, but may well improve
substantially ovrar the next two to five years.
45. If a younger figure rather than Kirilenko
succeeded Brezhnev in the next two years, the initial
crisis of succession might be sharper and the
leadership's instability more manifest than under
Kirilenko. The new general secretary's efforts to
consolidate his position might lead to a further
weakening of the leadership, and perhaps to a new
succession. Less probably, they could lead to a
resolution of the succession crisis on the basis of strong
personal leadership by Brezhnev's heir. The urge of
these men to concentrate on domestic affairs and to
conduct a foreign policy conducive to that end might
be even stronger than Kirilenko's. Soviet foreign policy
might be subject to conflicting tendencies as the older
Politburo figures tried to guide the new incumbent
along established lines, while his age peers would
perhaps favor more venturesome policies, particularly
to deal with sudden dangers and attractive opportuni-
ties that might appear on the international scene.
Possible Emergence and Implications of a
Strong and Effective Ruler
46. The above analysis indicates that an early
Brezhnev succession would probably lead to a
weakening of the leadership's capacity to deal with the
worsening problems confronting it. Are there circum-
stances in which an early Brezhnev succession might
have the opposite result-that is, lead to a strength-
ened leadership better able to cope with these
problems? Several of the necessary conditions cur-
rently exist, and these could provide an able and
ambitious candidate for the succession with large
opportunities for aggrandizing personal power:
- There is a manifest need to rejuvenate both the
Politburo and the Central Committee, which
have grown old and complacent during Brezh-
nev's reign.
-There is a similar need to purge the middle
levels, where bureaucratic tenure and promotion
based on seniority have fostered stagnation and
caused some loss of discipline.
- There is a substantial reserve of able and
relatively young officials whose ambition for
rapid advance has been frustrated by Brezhnev's
conservative personnel policies. If a candidate for
* Kirilenko is a few months older than Brezhnev.
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the succession could mobilize the support of these
men, by rewarding them with positions in the
Central Committee and the Politburo, he might
be able to create a powerful personal machine
that could dominate the Soviet political system.
- The relatively poor performance of the Soviet
system in recent years, which is reflected in
reduced economic growth and in the failure to
fulfill high expectations of foreign policy suc-
cesses, could provide the basis for an appeal to
patriotic and Communist sentiments for support
in order to compete more effectively on the
world scene.
47. Militating against the rapid rise of a powerful
and innovative new general secretary is the apparent
capacity and determination of bureaucratic groups to
protect their institutional and personal privileges from
reformist measures and arbitrary commands imposed
from above, Normally the system penalizes innovators
and risk takers. A leader possessed of a powerful will
and superior cunning would be needed to overcome
their resistance, and it is hard to discern such a figure
close to the peaks of power. Still, it cannot be ruled out
that one of the contenders may possess the requisite
qualities but is obliged to conceal them temporarily so
as not to provoke his colleagues. The probability that a
leader will emerge to capitalize on the conditions
favoring strong personal rule is a bare 10 percent in
the next two years, perhaps 20 to 30 percent in the
next five years.
48. Such a succession scenario would probably
impact most on US interests, as the party chief would
be less dependent on the collective and freer to pursue
dynamic policies, for better or worse. Internally, of
course, even if a strong, dynamic leader tried seriously
to ameliorate the basic problems of the Soviet regime,
he might manifestly fail, as Khrushchev did, and his
rule might be followed by a new phase of bureaucratic
conservatism and acquiescence in the decline of the
economy. On the other hand, he might have some
success in reforming the Soviet system. His reforms,
unlike Khrushchev's, would most likely be directed at
strengthening party and state discipline, with the
object of achieving increased efficiency in the
economy. At the same time, he would probably find it
necessary to encourage initiative in economic manage-
ment. Technocrats might have a greater influence on
policy formulation, although the leader's position
would still depend on his control of the party
apparatus. Were he to succeed in his endeavors, the
Soviet Union might end up having greater resources
available for competition with the United States than
now seems likely.
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Interlocking Directorate of the Soviet Leadership
!Brezhnev
Andropov
Grishin
Gromyko
s Kirilenko
Kosygin
Kulakov
Kunayev
Mazurov
Pelshe
Romanov
it
Suslov
Ustinov
Aliyev
Demichev
Masherov
Ponomarev.
RasI idov
So~omet~tsev
COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS
BIRTH
12/19/06
6/15/14
9/18/14 - Moscow party boss--
7/18/09
9/08/06
h' 2/21/04
2/04/18
!/!2/!2 - Kazakhstan party boss-
t4/07/14
2/07/99 - Party Control Committee
2/07/23 - Leningrad party boss -
2/17/18 - Ukraine party boss-
11/21/02
10/30/08
Suslov-Ideology
Ustinov-Defense Industry
Trade Unions
Shibayev
5/10/23 - Azerboydzhan party boss
1j/03/1i8
2/26/ 18- Belorussian party boss
1I Ponomarev-Nonruling
W17/05
Communist Parties
x;1,/06/ 171 Uzbek party boss
/05/13
Kapitonov-Cadres
Dolgikh-Industry
Zimyanin-Ideology
Chernenko-?
Ryabov-Defense Industry
Rusakov-Ruling Communist
Parties
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Mazurov-1st Deputy Chrmn
Tikhonov-lst Deputy Chrmn
Members
Ustinov-Ministry of Defense
Andropov-KGB
Gromyko-Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Solomentsev - RSFSR Premier
PRESIDIUM OF
SUPREME SOVIET
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Secret
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