FOR HOLBROOKE TESTIMONY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002900110011-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 4, 1977
• Content Type: STUDY

pffi?` 6j}fpfi ajqq~2 clearly
(testified that the Department would not be seeking further
authority to admit Indochinese refugees under parole but
would if necessary seek special legislation for that purpose.
Why are you now seeking additional parole authority?
A. The urgency of the present situation precludes our seeking
special legislation at this time. However, President Carter
has evidenced his concern for a more orderly approach to this
problem in the future by the establishment of an Inter Agency
Task Force to develop a program to deal with this long term
problem. We look forward to working with the Committee in
developing a more durable solution. One approach which must
be considered is the possibility of legislation to deal with
the problem.
The Department has attempted to deal with this problem
but has found it impossible to do so for a number of reasons.
As we had hoped, we identified and began processing the bulk
of the refugees under the Expanded Parole Program for 11,000
refugees by June 30, 1976 and most of these refugees had ar-
rived before October.
In August 1976 the problem of those escaping by boat,
primarily from Vietnam, became more serious. Countries around
the periphery of the South China Sea began to turn these
boats away and numerous tragic reports reached us of long and
harrowing odysses often with unhappy endings. As refugees who
had earlier been selected to come within the 11,000 program
State Dept. review completed
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droAApec eout;Rp'Zaces00we0re0 assigned to00boa case10refugees. Thus,
about 500 places under the Expanded Parole Program were uti-
lized to assist these boat cases while we sought a response
within the international community.
The United Nations High Commissioner did issue an appeal
in 1976, and a number of nations.responded positively. As
the United States contribution to the solution of this prob-
lem, a program was developed to utilize up to 100 conditional
entry numbers per month for boat case refugees. We also
hoped to utilize non-preference numbers for accompanying de-
pendents of these refugees.
Initially the several diplomatic initiatives combined
with increased resettlement opportunities led to a cessation
by most countries principally involved, with the exception
of Singapore, of the practice of forcing these boats back to
sea.
Unfortunately, this approach proved inadequate. Except
for France, other countries provided too few resettlement
opportunities. Lack of availability of non-preference numbers
restricted our own response. Refugees left by boat in ever
greater numbers. The result has been that over 7,000 refugees
who escaped by boat are now stranded in various countries in
Asia, and some of these countries once again are forcing ref-
ugees to turn back to sea. Thus, while we share your desire
for-longer term solutions, we believe there is also an urgent
need-for action now.
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Q. Who are these people in the camps in hailand?
A. Of the more than 80,000 refugees in 13 in-land camps,
approximately 68,000 are Lao and Hmong, 12,000 are Cambodian,
and 1,300 are Vietnamese. (There are another 2,100 Vietnamese
in two locations on the coast
Of those 80,000 people, we believe that at least 8,000
meet the categories employed in earlier paroles to select
those towards whom the U.S. had an obligation in conscience.
Those categories are:
I-refugees closely related to someone in the U.S.
II-former employees of the U.S. Government
III-Those whose positions in the civil and military
services of their homeland, or in the public life of the
nations of Indochina before the communist victory, brought
them into close association with U.S. policies, programs,
and personnel.
The ethnic breakdown under these categories is as
follows (the numbers include accompanying family members):
CAT I
CAT II
CAT III
TOTAL
Lao
500
1,500
2,000
4,000
Hmong
1,000
400
1,600
3,000
Cambodian
200
50
500
750
Vietnamese
125
100
200
425
Thai Dam
50
50
75
175
Total
1,875
2,100
4,375
8,350
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Q. Just wTio is in this thir c
A. Those refugees, numbering approximately 4,000, include
through
government administrators at levels from national,
province and district, down to city. In the armed forces
they were officers and non-cams. Labor leaders, political
and religious figures, teachers and writers are among this
group.
Q. Are they a bunch of war criminals no one else wants?
A. No. Many were stigmatised by the new authorities as
puppets of the Americans, and because the American support
of the former governments was labelled criminal, people were
tarred with the same brush. But we run security checks on
each applicant, and any who have questionable backgrounds,
as far as our records show) will be investigated further.
If there are reasonable grounds to believe the person was
either a war criminal, a civil criminal, a drug dealer or
addict, or is otherwise inadmissable under our immigration
laws respecting conduct and morals, that refugee will not
be paroled. Our procedures for this program call for INS
officers to approve each case, and they are experienced in
examining prospective immigrants in this regard.
Q. Are they all Meo or other tribespeople.
A. They are not all Meo, or Hmong as they prefer to be called.
and
As the table shows, about 3,000 of the 8,000 are Hmong,
make up another
another group the Thai Dam, or Black Thai,
175 or so. To think of these people as primitive and
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uncivilised is quite wrong, frankly speaking. In last
year's parole of 11,000, about 4,700 were Hmong, and another
600 were Thai Dam. They were carefully screened and fully
met the criteria. Their customs and life styles were dis-
tinct, but their values and experiences and association with
U.S. programs made them fully qualified for admission.
Q. Aren't they unresettleable and shouldn't we help them
resettle in Thailand?
A. First, the ones selected for our program last year are
proving themselves resettleable. There are some problems
of adjustment for the women and the elderly, but, as the
voluntary agencies report to us, the men move very quickly
into employment, where they are highly regarded as willing
workers and the young do what young have done throughout
our history as a nation of immigrantsadapt quickly to the
two worlds, the new home of the family and the outside world
of school and neighborhood. The people of Iowa would be glad,
I'm sure, to testify about the place the Thai Dam have in
that heartland state.
Even after we have taken those Hmong who strictly qualify
under the criteria IAoutlined, theee will be somewhere near
50,000 others and probably more coming into Thailand with
little or no prospect for resettlement outside Thailand.
The Thai Government is considering what to do about them, and
the UNHCR is urging that they be resettled in the country.
We will be examining that subject in the Interagency Task Force
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which at the President's instruction has been established
to look at the long term problem of Indochinese Refugees.
I should like to say, however, that those qualified under
the criteria to be paroled ought not be left to languish in
camps until the Thai Government accepts the idea of their
resettlement in Thailand, and implements it, just because
they are from a culture that is unlike ours. They are
anxious to be part of life here, and those already here
have shown that the gulf of cultures in not unbridgeable.
If they are not afraid, I don't think we ought to be.
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Q. Are your* *figures any good? What ab Ydt discrepancies
between your statistics in February 1976 and those refugees
actually brought in under the EPP? Are your figures any
better now?
A. The figures on the number of boat case refugees is
relatively accurate since it is only a matter of counting.
It is, however, fluid as new refugees arrive and others
proceed to third countries.
Figures on refugees in Thai camps within our program
criteria are much harder to come by. The selection of
limited numbers of refugees from among the 81,000 in camps
is a time consuming task. This figure is also a fluid one
as new qualifying refugees arrive or are uncovered through
the interviewing process and others leave.
In 1976 there were substantial differences between our
estimates by Category and the final EPP caseload. (Figures
attached). Our assurance to the Committee is not that the
Categories and ethnic mix will remain exactly as predicted
but that each individual refugee will be screened by both
State and INS officers and will meet the criteria for eli-
gibility outlined to the Committee.
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omparative Statistics on EPP
Estimated and Actual
Estimated Caseload-February 1976 (Thailand Only)
Lao
Cat I
(Relatives)
126
Cat II
(Employees)
534
Cat III
(High Risk)
972
Totals
1,632
Hmong
-
-
2100
2,100
Cambodian
303
10
3579
3,892
Vietnamese
838
116
771
1,725
Thai Dam
-
-
2000
2,000
Totals
1,267
660
9,422
11,349
Admitted Under EPP - (Thailand Only)
Cat I Cat II Cat III Totals
Lao
378
192
1455
2056
Hmong
1186
3109
4766
Cambodian
368
884
1281
Vietnamese
741
286
1160
Thai Dam
501
25
73
604
Totals
3174
742
5807
9867
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Q. This Committee has reported ou
legislation. Would not such a bill provide a foundation for
a long range solution to this problem?
A. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration testified
in favor of many basic aspects of HR 3056 while differing on
others, including the imposition of numerical limitations
on group admission of refugees in emergent situations.
In fact, the present parole recommendation would fit the
criteria outlined in the bill. The President has reviewed
and approved, in principle, the exercise of parole by the
Attorney General. The present emergent refugee situation
is one of special concern to the United States. It has
proven impossible to accomodate this problem under the con-
ditional entry authority. We believe the parole action will
significantly promote the national interest and is strongly
justified by grave humanitarian concern. Concurrently with
the exercise of this authority, it is our intention to prompt-
ly seek the cooperation.of the international community in the
resettlement of these refugees, both present and foreseen as
a part of the longer term problem.
While continued group actions under the present parole
authority or the procedures provided under the proposed legis-
lation provide one possible method for dealing with the con-
tinuing problem of Indochinese refugees, we will want to
consider other solutions, as well, which might minimize the
necessity for recurrent consultations with the Congress on this
matter.
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 Q=4pp~rmays~ndochninese~Afleei9ng Othe2 homeland, really
economic refugees?
A. It is true that economic conditions in Indochina are
bad. It is, however, also clear that the members of the
populations of these countries who suffer the most from de-
pressed economic conditions are those who were previously
t H,,- s,~-macesS
among the ruling or privileged classe of the former socie
ties in these countries. Thus, the Vietnamese selected to
go to a New Economic Area and there toLsuffer
grave depriva-
tion N perhaps suffer malnutrition or disease because of lack
of food and medicine 5 is not the former associate of the
communist movement but is the former civil servant or business-
man. Similarly such individuals in urban areas often find
it impossible to obtain any employment because of their past
associations. Unable to earn a livelihood, they subsist
by selling their possessions. In other words, this is the
classic case of political persecution through economic depriva-
tion. Thus, it is really not useful to speak of "economic"
refugees from the Indochinese countries at this time when the
new communist regimes are totally reshaping the society.
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Q. Isn't this " temporary measure? Won' refugees keep coming
out? Won't you be back again in about six months?
A. Yes, Mr. Chairman
C/he proposed parole action is clearly a temporary measure.
We plan to parole 7,000 boat case refugees. There are
over 7,000 such refugees now stranded in various locations
in East Asia and more are coming out at the rate of about
500 per month, a rate which we believe will be sustained or
even increased.
Some of the present 7,000 boat cases will resettle in
other countries but the proposed parole action will only be
adequate to cover the requirements for the next few months.
Similarly, we believe that there are probably already
enough qualified refugees among the 80,000 Indochinese in
camps in Thailand to fill the proposed parole action for
8,000 Indochinese refugees escaping by land. More arrive in
these camps daily; we estimatever 1,200/per month and expect
this rate to continue or rise. Some of these will also
qualify under the criteria previously used to identify ref-
ugees to whom we believe we owe a special consideration.
In short, we agree completely that something beyond this
parole action is required. The present proposal is to meet
the emergency situation and will be followed by others, de-
signed to meet the longer term need.
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