THE ALBANIA-CHINA RIFT: FOR TIRANA, FEW OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002900070002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE ALBANIA-CHINA RIFT:
FOR TIRANA, FEW OPTIONS
August 1977
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KEY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . i
I. THE SINO-ALBANIAN ALLIANCE:
POINT OF NO RETURN? . . . . . .
. . .
Origins of the Alliance . . . . .
. . . 2
The Source and the Growth
of the Dispute . . . . . . . . .
. . . 3
Motivations . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 5
II, INTERNAL ALBANIAN UPHEAVAL. . . .
. . . 8
Phase One: Cultural Purge . . . .
. . . 8
Phase Two: Military Purge . . . .
. . . 9
Phase Three: Economic Purge . . .
. . . 10
Hoxha and the Party Leadership. .
. . . 10
III. FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS. . . . . .
. . . 13
Fear of Soviet Intervention . . .
. . . 13
Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 15
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 16
Relations With the US . . . . . .
. . . 17
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31 August 1977
THE ALBANIA-CHINA RIFT:
FOR- TIRANA,- FEW OPTIONS
The rapid deterioration of Albania's relations with
Peking this year for the first time raises the possibility
of a break between the two formerly close allies. Avail-
able evidence is insufficient to permit a full explanation
for the Albanian motivation in provoking such a rupture.
There are indications however, that Tirana is trying to
devise a strategy to follow should it lose the political
and material support provided by the Chinese for the past
16 years.
In view of Albania's strategic geographic location, its
future course is of deep concern to all of its Mediterranean
neighbors. The Soviet Union, which was allied with Tirana
until 1961, might try to take advantage of a Sino-Albanian
break to reestablish a political foothold in Albania, but
Moscow would probably be rebuffed. Should the Soviets be
successful, the status quo in the Balkans would be upset,
and Albania's closest neighbors--Yugoslavia, Italy, and
Greece-.-would perceive a serious threat to their security.
Driven by xenophobia and radical ideological fervor,
the Albanian leadership has kept the country in relative
isolation from the outside world. Economically backward,
it has for the past 15 years been heavily dependent on
Chinese help for its industrial development.
Tirana's apparent efforts to reorient its foreign
policy have been accompanied by signs of ferment within
the leadership. The massive purges of the cultural, _
military, and economic establishments since 1973 afford
ample evidence of internal tensions. The Communist
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"old guard", led by aging party boss Enver Hoxha, is
holding on to the reins of power, but younger functionaries
who entered the power structure in the wake of the purges
can be expected to make their mark on regime policies
before long.
Fragmentary evidence suggests that certain new foreign
policy trends may be emerging in Albania.
--Although Sino-Albanian relations have fallen to an
unprecedented low, Tirana may still be able to
avoid a final break with Peking. In mid-August,
the Albanians hinted that they would like to talk
over their differences with the Chinese.
--Should a break nevertheless occur, the regime would
probably not shut itself off entirely from the rest
of the world.
--Rather, Albania is likely to strive gradually to
improve its relations with a number of countries,
including industrialized Western states. There is
evidence that the regime is already making probes
in that direction.
There are obvious limitations to forming such new
relationships.
--Since the break with Moscow, the Albanians have
been obsessed with fear of a Soviet threat to
their security. Hoxha, who engineered the split,
and the rest of the Albanian leadership are likely
to remain opposed to reestablishing better relations
with Moscow.
--There is no evidence that Tirana is interested
in a rapprochement with the US at this time. A
policy change might emerge gradually, however.
--Ideological differences, combined with ethnic
and territorial tensions, prevent Tirana from
normalizing its relations with Yugoslavia--its
most natural economic partner. Tito's success
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in improving relations with China has doubtless
aroused Albanian suspicions of Chinese betrayal
and political encirclement, making its opposition
to Yugoslav "revisionism" even firmer.
--Despite Tirana's stepped-up efforts to improve
relations with the West Europeans, the ideological
rigidity of the Hoxha regime forecloses much pro-
gress. Under no foreseeable conditions would the
West replace China as a "protector" against threats
to Albania's security.
--Albania hopes it could compensate for the loss of
Chinese aid by increasing trade with the West. The
non-Communist world, however, is unlikely to provide
enough assistance to enable Tirana to maintain its
industrial development programs.
Albania faces a slow and frustrating job in trying to
work itself out of its exclusive foreign ties with the
Chinese. Its alternatives to China's friendship and pro-
tection appear extremely limited.
Hoxha's departure and the formation of a new, younger
leadership--when it happens--may open the door to important
policy changes, but our knowledge of Albanian political and
policy forces is too fragmentary even to guess at their
direction.
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I. THE SINO-ALBANIAN ALLIANCE
Point of No Return?
1. In the late 1960s cracks began to appear in the
Sino-Albanian alliance. Until late last year, however,
disagreements were more or less covered up by the regimes'
public insistence on their "unbreakable friendship."
2. Mao Tse-tung's death last October deprived the
Albanian Communists of their main benefactor. The Albanian
leadership realized that the emergence of Hua Kuo-feng,
a less doctrinaire politician, would lead to a more prag-
matic political climate in China. The purge of the radical
members of the Chinese leadership--the "Gang of Four"--
whom Tirana considered as its ideological allies, further
upset the Albanians. Tirana expressed its dissatisfaction
in coolness toward Hua and unwillingness to endorse the
Chinese campaign against the radicals.
3. Early this year Tirana began to use certain
parties of the formerly pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist splinter
movement as surrogates in its polemics against Peking. In
response, the Chinese began to advise some other splinter
parties of their differences with Albania in an attempt
to prevent defections to Tirana.
4. By mid-summer relations between the two regimes
had reached an unprecedented low. In recent months:
--The Albanian press launched fierce attacks on the
basic tenets of China's foreign policies as formu-
lated by Mao.
--Tirana recalled military personnel training with
the Chinese air force and began a phased withdrawal
of Albanian students studying in China.
--Rumors circulated that the Albanians had requested
Peking to withdraw its technical experts from
Albania. Despite denials on both sides, there is
evidence that these technicians are returning home,
allegedly "for vacation."
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--Tirana continued to convert Marxist-Leninist splinter
parties to its ideological line. At least one party
quoted by the Albanian press has acknowledged Tirana
as the sole leader of the Marxist-Leninist movement.
--The Albanians hinted that Chinese foreign policy
principles might be as damaging to world revolution
as Eurocommunism.
5. As of mid-August, however, neither country had
engaged in public name-calling. There are also some indica-
tions that the Albanian leadership may not be united in
wanting to provoke a final breakdown of the partnership.
An Albanian hint that the regime would be willing to hold
talks with Chinese could postpone a showdown. Peking has
not as yet responded to this overture.
Origins of the Alliance
6. Khrushchev's theoretical innovations, as outlined
at the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956, met with adverse
reaction in both Tirana and Peking. Both regimes were
skeptical about the feasibility of the "parliamentary road"
and viewed revolutionary violence as the only effective
road to revolution. Both considered Khrushchev's policies
of "peaceful coexistence" with the West opportunistic, and
both continued to see the US as the main obstacle to achieving
a world-wide victory for Communism. Additionally, fearing
domestic repercussions, the Albanian leadership decided not
to abandon the Stalinist legacy. Moreover, in the face of
Moscow's rapprochement with Yugoslavia in the early 1960s,
the Chinese and the Albanians shared an unrelenting hostility
to Titoist "revisionism."
7. As their ideological quarrel with Khrushchev
mounted, the Albanian leaders increasingly saw the Soviet
Union as a threat. One result was the purge of elements
thought to be close to Moscow; another was reliance on
China to protect Albania against a potential Soviet threat.
8. For the Chinese, Albania's rejection of Moscow
presented the first--and only--opportunity to rally a
ruling communist regime in support of their policies.
Although the alliance with Tirana entailed some economic
burden, Peking was convinced that the price was justified
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by the acquisition of an ally in a region that the Soviet
Union traditionally regards as its sphere of influence.
The Source and Growth of the Dispute
9. Differences between Tirana and Peking, mainly
over foreign policy issues, first appeared in the late
1960s. China's efforts to seek closer international ties
with an increasingly large number of states, including
NATO members, troubled the Albanians, who detected a
neglect of revolutionary principles and a tendency toward
opportunism.
10. The differences over practical approaches on
foreign relations were soon reflected in the ideological
formulations on which foreign policies of the two countries
were based. Concerned over a Soviet military threat, Mao
revised his views on the status of the two superpowers--the
US and the Soviet Union. He concluded that despite the
continuing war in Southeast Asia, the US presented a lesser
danger to China's security than the Soviet Union.
11. The resulting rapprochement between Peking and
Washington was condemned by the Albanian leadership, which
held that it is not permissable to "lean on one imperialism
to oppose the other." Tirana continued to equate the danger
posed by the two superpowers and claimed that "collusion"
existed between Moscow and Washington at the expense of the
communist movement. The Chinese, on the other hand, main-
tained that fundamental conflicts between the US and the
Soviet Union would undermine prospects for lasting coopera-
tion.
12. During-the 1960s, Albania was heavily dependent on
Chinese economic assistance. Since 1961, this has totaled
between 600 and 900 million US dollars.* In the early 1970s,
however, signs of a reduction in Chinese economic and
* In 1970, imports accounted for more than one-fifth of
Albania's GNP. Albania must purchase abroad virtually
all the machinery and equipment, structural steel,
chemical fertilizer and coke indispensible for industrial
development. China has provided more than half of these
imports, either directly or through purchases from West
and East European countries. The Chinese have also made
periodic wheat purchases abroad for Albania.
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military assistance to Albania appeared. There is no
clear evidence, however, that the decline--in the form
of delays in the flow of materiel--was a conscious
Chinese attempt to blackmail the Albanian leadership.
But the latter probably viewed the decline as a confirma-
tion of its suspicions about Peking's "opportunism."
13. Despite underlying ideological differences, on
the surface Albanian-Chinese relations remained cordial
until the death of Mao Tse-tung. One month after Mao's
demise, Enver Hoxha, in a widely publicized report to the
Albanian party congress, gave a comprehensive account of
Tirana's opposition to Chinese foreign policy positions
and Peking's attitudes toward the Marxist-Leninist splinter
movement. The report did not directly attack China, but
reiterated Albania's opposition to China's rapprochement
with the West and projected the Albanian positions as more
revolutionary than Peking's. Conspicuously absent were
references to Albania's moral and material debt to Peking
and praise for the new Chinese leadership.
14. The extent of the decline in Albania's relations
with Peking became publicly known only last July, when
Albanian media published a bitter attack on the theory of
the "three worlds" that has been the basis of China's
foreign policy since the late 1960s. Tirana denounced the
theory as anti-Marxist and charged that it undermined the
revolutionary enthusiasm of the world proletariat. Since
the theory had been formulated under the guidance of Mao
Tse-tung, the attack was a clear break with Tirana's
longstanding recognition of Mao as the paramount figure of
contemporary Marxism-Leninism, the equal of Marx, Engels,
Lenin, and Stalin.
15. A month after the first open attack, Albanian
media began to hint at Chinese collusion with Eurocommunism.
The Albanians charged that the theory of the "three worlds"
was similar to Eurocommunist concepts in that it served
to confuse the proletariat and divert it from the class
struggle, that thus contradicting the theory and practice
of revolution and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.
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16. Even before Mao's death, relations between
Tirana and Peking had been impaired by conflicting eval-
uations of the importance of the Marxist-Leninist splinter
parties. In the early 1960s, the existence of these
parties was symbolic of Peking's success in splitting up
the previously cohesive pro-Soviet Communist movement.
After the cultural revolution, the decline in China's
ideological fervor and Chinese efforts to establish ties
with West European governments lessened the importance
of the Marxist-Leninist movement for Peking. Contacts
with foreign Marxist-Leninists during this period were
left mainly to members of the radical faction in the
Chinese leadership.
17. In contrast, the Albanians continued to regard
the splinter parties as important allies. By the mid-
1970s, Tirana began to play an active role in providing
organizational and ideological guidance to such groups,
particularly those in Latin America and Western Europe.
It sought,. successfully, to become the spiritual center
of the Marxist-Leninist movement, the position earlier
occupied by Peking.
18. Tirana's involvement with the splinter parties
has further intensified this year. The Albanians have
used Marxist-Leninist groupings as surrogates in publicizing
their opposition to China's foreign policies, and were
successful in splitting some,of these parties. Some
splinter parties recently acknowledged the Albanian party
as the sole leader of Marxism-Leninism and rejected Chinese
policies that were not in accord with Marxist-Leninist
principles.
19. Early this year the Chinese leaders became in-
creasingly aware of the challenge. The Chinese explained
their policies to selected splinter parties and termed the
Albanian line erroneous. Peking now appears to be actively
cultivating those splinter parties still loyal to it, and
is countering Tirana's activity by setting up new groups
with direct financial assistance from China.
Motivations
20. Why Albania decided to challenge Peking cannot be
conclusively determined from available evidence. The
Albanian actions appear less than prudent, in that their
campaign could lead to a complete loss of Chinese economic
assistance. While there appears to be no single, over-
riding motive, the following factors probably contributed
to the decision.
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--Albania's fierce sense of independence rejects
submission to or interference by any foreign power,
even a close ally such as China or, formerly, the
USSR. Since the early 1970s China may have inter-
fered in Albanian domestic affairs. Earlier this
year Tirana came close to hinting at Chinese com-
plicity with the "anti-party" elements who were
purged in recent years.
--Albania may be acutely frustrated by the realiza-
tion that its importance to China as an ally has
been reduced. The improvement in recent years of
China's relations with Yugoslavia--whose revisionism
is an anathema to the Albanian regime--has no doubt
exascerbated Tirana's frustration.
--The Albanians set great store in their pursuit of a
"principled" foreign policy in the face of what the
Albanians consider China's "opportunistic" approaches
toward the West and particularly the US.
--Albania is reacting to economic difficulties caused
by the delays in Chinese assistance, which the
Albanians associated with China's political oppor-
tunism.
--Ideological messianism prompts the regime to chal-
lenge China as the leader of the Marxist-Leninist
splinter movement. They thus seek to replace the
"adulterated" ideology of the Chinese leadership
with Tirana's "correct" Marxist-Leninist line.
21. Explanations for the Chinese motivations for
tolerating the Albanian challenge are equally tentative.
--Since the early 1970s, Albania has lost its impor-
tance for China as its-sole ally and ideological
supporter. The Chinese probably feel that the
present relatively low cost of assisting Albania
is compensated for by the political advantage of
retaining their limited presence there which also
provides a deterrent to Soviet re-entry.
--Having subdued its radical opposition, the new
Chinese leadership perceives no immediate danger
that Albania's ideological views will find a sig-
nificant following in Peking. Nor can Albanian
criticism of China's foreign policies distract from
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the overall advantages of China's pragmatic
foreign policy line.
--In view of China's extensive contacts with other
governments, Peking no longer considers support
from the basically weak and ineffectual Marxist-
Leninist parties as essential. But since its
continued ideological conflict with Moscow makes
it necessary to portray the image of orthodoxy,
China is embarrassed by the Albanian charges of
political "opportunism." With its superior finan-
cial resources, Peking has been able to oppose the
Albanian efforts to split the Marxist-Leninist
splinter movement and is already setting up surro-
gate puppet parties to advocate its policies.
--Having demonstrated aloofness from the Albanian
challenge, the Chinese have retained the option of
striking back whenever it should appear convenient.
Peking's initial response to Tirana is likely to
be indirect, essentially a warning. The Chinese
may also take advantage of the Albanian feeler
about direct talks by delaying an answer, or by
appearing magnanimous in publicly accepting it.
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22. Despite the appearance of political stability
and totality of dictatorship, there is evidence of fer-
ment within the Albanian leadership. In the past four
years a large number of high- and middle-level officials,
including Politburo members, were ousted on trumped-up
charges. The purges, which were carried out in three
phases, have decimated the cultural, military, and
economic establishment.
23. The full meaning of these purges is obscure,
but they seemed to involve the existence of high-level
dissatisfaction with Hoxha's policies and concern over
Albania's economic difficulties which have been aggravated
by the decline in Chinese assistance.
24. The party leadership is aging. Moreover, Hoxha's
health and authority appear to have declined in recent
months. The leadership may be under pressure from younger
persons--still unknown quantities to the West--who entered
the highest party echelons in the wake of the purges.
While a substantial impact on policy may not come soon,
this new generation of leaders is already making its mark
on the political scene.
Phase One: Cultural Purge
25. Despite its consistent efforts, the Albanian
leadership has not been able to seal the country completely
off from foreign influences. The few instances of relaxa-
tion of barriers to outside contacts only prompted an in-
flux of more liberal trends and the regime quickly drew
back. The most recent such "opening," which occurred in
early 1970s involved: a party campaign to eliminate back-
ward social concepts that in the end encouraged tendencies
favoring change and liberalism; the climate of detente and
accompanying relaxation between the US and the Communist
nations; China's decreasing hostility toward the West and
particularly its opening to the US in 1972; and the intro-
duction of television in Albania. This latter development--
particularly the Yugoslav and Greek transmissions--allowed
some Albanians to circumvent official censorship and acquaint
themselves with foreign cultural trends.
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26. The party's ability to quickly close this
opening and restore cultural and ideological orthodoxy,
however, proved that the totalitarian nature of the re-
gime had not been significantly weakened by the temporary
impact of outside influences. The first phase of the
purges, in 1973, targeted on those held responsible for
''incorrect'' cultural policies. Leading functionaries
in the Tirana party organization, the state radio and
television network, and the youth organization, were
ousted. The entire leadership of the Albanian Writers
and Artists Union was also replaced. Rigid cultural and
ideological orthodoxy has been maintained ever since.
Phase Two: Military Purge
27. In 1974, the regime thoroughly purged the mili-
tary establishment. Since Albania's break with the So-
viet Union, its defense capability had been dependent on
Chinese supplies of military equipment. Fluctuations in
the flow of military assistance in the early 1970s--in-
cluding no deliveries at all in 1973--probably caused
uneasiness within the Albanian military establishment
about their ability to resist aggression. The Soviet
Union's success early in 1974 in securing limited naval
repair facilities in Yugoslavia--at Tivat, some 50 miles
north of the Albanian border--probably reinforced doubts
within the defense establishment about the adequacy of
Albania's defense structure.
28. The real reason behind the purge of Defense
Minister Balluku and his close associates in 1974 is
unclear. Charges against them, including treason and
collaboration with Moscow, are not convincing. Balluku's
close ties with the Chinese military leadership make it
unlikely that he had sought to. replace Chinese assistance
with Soviet weapons. It is possible, however, that Bal-
luku and other military leaders had recommended the
broadening of economic and political ties with the West
along the lines then being followed by Peking. Such a
proposal, coming from the military, could have been in-
terpreted by party chief Hoxha as an attempt to undermine
the party's control over the military.
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Phase Three: Economic Purge
29. The third and most extensive phase of the
purges hit the economic establishment. It appears to
have been directly related to the difficulties experi-
enced by the economy during the 5th Five Year Plan
period (1971-1975).
30. Despite large Chinese contributions in the
form of complete plants and equipment, during the 5th
FYP the country's economic growth declined. The real
extent of the decline is not known to us but the main
indices of economic development for the 5th FYP period
show generally lower percentages than those for the
previous FYP period (1966-1970). (Table) The delays
in Chinese assistance probably contributed to the down-
ward trend of the economy.*
31. The full impact of the reduced assistance prob-
ably became clear to Tirana's economic planners toward
the end of the Plan period. it may have prompted some
members of the leadership to advocate counter-measures,
such as lessening Albania's economic isolation from the
rest of Europe. Possibly alarmed by the political re-
percussions of those initiatives, the Hoxha administra-
tion launched a widespread purge of the Albanian economic
establishment in 1975.
Hoxha and the Party Leadership
32. The purges had initially seemed to strengthen
the hands of the Party's ''old guard'' that was losely
associated with first secretary Enver Hoxha. Now in his
69th year, Hoxha has been the acknowledged head of the party
* Among the largest projects the Chinese have built in
Albania are the iron and steel complex in Elbasan,
two oil refineries, a chrome ore processing plant, a
nitrogen fertilizer plant, a superphosphate plant and
a number of hydro-electric plants. Last June, the
Albanians publicly blamed delays in the construction
of the Elbasan complex and the oil refinery in Ballsh
on the failure of ''outside'' sources to delivery ma-
chinery and materials.
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since it was founded in 1941. His control of the state
and party apparatus was secured by subsequent purges of
political opponents of all hues. The hard-core element
of the leadership still forms the majority of the twelve-
member Politburo.
33. There are indications, however, that in recent
months Hoxha has encountered some opposition within the
leadership and his position may have weakened. Debate
within the highest echelons of the party over economic
priorities and consequent alternate courses is apparently
continuing. The new Albanian constitution, published in
December 1976, revealed differences over the relative value
of Chinese assistance and of self-reliance. One faction
had apparently managed to incorporate its views on the
importance of self-reliance as the primary force in so-
cialist construction without a corresponding reference
to Chinese assistance. Hoxha, for his part, continued
to cite the importance of ''selfless'' Chinese aid, im-
plying his disagreement with those advocating sole re-
liance on the country's meager resources.
34. Hoxha's economic views--which show him as more
of a realist than some of his colleagues--stand in sharp
contradiction to his image as the challenger to the Chi-
nese over the issue of ideological orthodoxy. In any
case, the divided economic councils raise the question
whether the party leader, known to be in failing health,
retains full control over the regime.
35. The ''old guard,'' although still active, has
become just that--old. Premier Mehmet Shehu, who has
been generally considered Hoxha's chosen successor, is
64. His power was bolstered when he assumed the post
of Defense Minister in 1974. Shehu however, also has
medical problems that would appear to disqualify him
from replacing Hoxha.
36. We have little information on the younger
functionaries who now occupy leading positions in the
state and government apparatus. The Politburo has two
new younger persons and there are quite a few on the
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Central Committee.* They were probably handpicked by
Hoxha on the basis of their performance and personal
loyalty. While their backgrounds are obscure, one
common denominator seems to be a shared experience in
the provincial party apparatus.
37. Despite the introduction of new people into
the highest levels of the party and government, there
has been no visible progress in solving the country's
economic problems. Moreover, the escalating differences
with China could have a destabilizing effect on official-
dom. Having started their political careers in an era
characterized by Albania's strong reliance on China,
some of the younger leaders may be concerned about the
consequences of provoking the Chinese. Unlike the ''old
guard,'' these leaders may also be less willing to make
economic sacrifices for the sake of ideological ortho-
doxy.
38. As long as Hoxha formally heads the party,
Albania's political course is likely to reflect the
ideological radicalism that has characterized it for
two decades. We cannot exclude the possibility, however,
that once he departs, more pragmatic policies may be
pursued.
* The two additions to the Politburo, Hekuran Isai and
Pali Miska, are both believed to be in their 40s.
Former provincial party functionaries, they entered
the government in the wake of the purges and rose
rapidly. In addition, four new functionaries have
entered the Politburo as alternates since 1975. On
the new Central Committee, elected at the November
1976 Congress, 43 of the 77 members are newcomers;
18 of the 38 alternates are also new.
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III. FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS
39. With their relations with Peking deteriorating,
the Albanians have been forced to consider their future
foreign policy options. These are limited. The leader-
ship's obsession with a Soviet threat to its security and
its fierce anti-Americanism constrain its turning to
either superpower for political or economic support.
Neighboring Yugoslavia, which would be a natural economic
partner, is ideologically unacceptable to the Albanians,
and the Yugoslav's are wary of the Albanian minority and
influence in their poorest border province of Kosovo.
Recent efforts to improve relations with certain West
European countries suggest that Tirana is seeking polit-
ical support against the Soviets. The regime's dogmatic
opposition to democratic systems, however, is likely to
prevent the development of closer political relations.
Albania's inability to substantially increase its exports
to industrialized countries or to accept Western credits
is bound to prevent it from replacing China as the prin-
cipal economic partner.
Fear of Soviet Intervention
40. Since the break with Khrushchev, the Albanians
have consistently viewed the Soviet Union as a threat to
their security. Despite recurring purges--which probably
eliminated all elements sympathetic to Moscow--Tirana still
insists the Soviets want to reestablish hegemony in Albania.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which demonstrated
Moscow's willingness to intervene militarily in East
Europe, came as a further shock to the Albanian leadership.
Tirana renounced Warsaw Pact membership*, and probably
also ordered a thorough reevaluation of Albania's stra-
tegic planning. In addition to seeking more military aid
from the Chinese, the Albanians made some attempt to re-
duce their isolation from Balkan neighbors, including
Yugoslavia, and explored contacts in Western Europe.
41. Having personally engineered Albania's break
with Moscow and the Albanian alliance with China, Hoxha
* This was a symbolic gesture as Albania had not partici-
pated in the Pact since the late 1950s.
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has been fearful that the Soviets might attempt to over-
throw him. The regime's long-standing anti-Soviet propa-
ganda campaign is aimed at instilling a permanent hatred
of Soviet "social imperialism." Although there is no
evidence of any substantial Soviet attempt to undermine
Hoxha, internal opponents have almost invariably been
accused of being pro-Moscow or, in the case of former
Defense Minister Balluku, of joining the Soviets in a
conspiracy against the regime.
42. Although it has diplomatic relations with all
the East European states, Albania has since 1961 stead-
fastly refused to reestablish contacts with the Soviet
Union.* It has also invariably rejected frequent offers
by the Brezhnev leadership to improve relations. A re-
cent Romanian attempt to mediate--possibly encouraged by
the Soviets--was also turned down by the Albanians. Tirana
uses its defiance of Moscow's "revisionistic" foreign poli-
cies to demonstrate the correctness of its own ideological
stance. Ironically, in their polemics with Peking the
Albanians have hinted that the Chinese have been following
policies similar to those of the Soviets in the 1960s.
43. We do not expect Albania to begin a rapprochement
with Moscow as long as Hoxha remains in power. After his
departure there may be an easing in hostility toward the
Soviets, but Hoxha's heirs will still probably view Moscow
as a lasting threat to Albania's independence.
Tirana's relations with Moscow's East European allies,
although correct, remain low key throughout this period.
Romania's strained relationship with the Soviet Union
and friendship with Peking helped create better rela-
tions between Tirana and Bucharest, including exchanges
of delegations and occasional party contacts. There is
evidence that in recent years Moscow tried--unsuccessfully--
to use the Romanians as mediators in its dispute with
Albanians. Albania has maintained a modest level of
trade exchanges with Warsaw Pact countries but none with
the Soviet Union. Although its exports to East European
countries rose by 55 percent between 1971-1975, they may
have remained stagnant, or even declined, in real terms.
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Yugoslavia
44. Hoxha bears a personal antipathy to Tito that
originated in the Yugoslav leader's support for one of
Hoxha's rivals during the immediate post-war period when
Yugoslav influence with the new Albanian communist party
was paramount. Belgrade's plans to annex Albania were
thwarted only because of the Soviet-Yugoslav split of
1948, and Albanian paranoia about possible renewed Yugo-
slav intervention has persisted. The large Albanian
minority in Yugoslavia's bordering Kosovo Province, and
Tirana's periodic interventions on its behalf, also
trouble Albanian-Yugoslav relations--the more so because
Kosovo's poverty and political restiveness make the region
a drain on and a vulnerability in the Yugoslav federation.
45. The antipathy is also ideological. Ever since
the 1948 Cominform resolution excommunicated Yugoslavia
from the Communist camp, Albania's opposition to Yugoslav
"revisionism" has not wavered. The Khrushchev rapproche-
ment in the mid-fifties and subsequent periods of improve-
ment in Soviet-Yugoslav relations aroused suspicions of
encirclement. The commitment against "revisionism" miti-
gated against a full normalization of relations with
Belgrade despite Albania's and Yugoslavia's mutual condem-
nation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
46. The Albanian leadership's opposition to Yugoslav
"revisionism" can also be explained partly in terms of
Tirana's relations with the Marxist-Leninist splinter
parties. In challenging Peking as the sponsor of the
Marxist-Leninist movement, Tirana presents itself as the
sole remaining defender of "correct" Communist dogma. As
long as Hoxha remains in power, ideological considerations
alone will probably block normalization of Yugoslav-Albanian
relations.
47. The Albanians probably believe that Tito's current
visit to China will formalize Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement,
and Tirana will no doubt increase its anti-Peking polemics
as well as nourish this additional reason to mistrust
Belgrade.
48. Albania's unrelenting hostility to the Yugoslavian
form of Communism is ironic since non-aligned Yugoslavia has
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long provided a buffer between Albania and the Warsaw Pact
nations. In addition, Belgrade's ideological differences
with Moscow have curtailed the emergence of pro-Soviet
forces in Yugoslavia that could present a threat to Albania.
49. Even though the Albanians revile Tito, Tirana
must be disturbed by the thought of his eventual demise.
Tirana would view any increase in Soviet influence in
Yugoslavia during the post-Tito era as endangering Albania's
security. Moreover, possible Yugoslav apprehension over
heightened Albanian irredentism in Kosovo Province after
Tito's departure--a likely accompaniament of any post-Tito
strains in Yugoslav federalism--could pose a serious problem
for Tirana.
50. The ideological rigidity of the Albanian party
has also inhibited economic contacts between the two coun-
tries. Although bilateral trade showed a seven-fold in-
crease between 1970 and 1975, it has not reached its full
potential. For example, a planned railroad line, connecting
the Yugoslav rail system with the main Albanian line, was
not completed because of the uncertain political climate.
There have been no new Albanian initiatives toward Belgrade
in recent months, but the possibility of losing Chinese
assistance could prompt the regime to try to increase its
economic ties with Yugoslavia.
Western Europe
51. Albania now has diplomatic relations with all West
European nations except Spain, West Germany and the UK, and
is currently trying to strengthen its existing contacts. In
doing so, Tirana is cultivating ties not only with non-
aligned governments, but also with NATO members the Albanians
perceive as independent of the US.*
52. The Albanians hope they will be able to establish
closer economic ties to compensate for anticipated loss of
economic assistance from Peking. Their meager economic re-
sources, however, permit only a modest expansion of exports
Italy, with which the Albanian Communists have maintained
a special relationship since the 1950s, is an obvious ex-
ception. That relationship stems from historical contacts
and geographical proximity, and it has not been influenced
by Italy's close political ties with the US.
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to the industrialized states. Despite a five-fold in-
crease between 1970-75, Albania's exports to the OECD
countries amounted to no more than $50 million in 1975.
53. Moreover, as long as ideological extremism
determines policy, Albania cannot conclude credit arrange-
ments with the West. The constitution forbids borrowing
from "capitalist" countries and prohibits forming joint
enterprises with foreign concerns.
54. These restrictions seriously hinder the importa-
tion of foreign equipment necessary to maintain the indus-
trialization program. By sharply reducing machinery imports,
Albania could probably purchase the most essential industrial
and agricultural materials. In the long run, however, this
would inevitably have a negative impact on economic develop-
ment. Albanian planners are probably also aware that the
West will not find it expedient to replace Chinese economic
aid and technical advisers.
55. There is also some evidence that Albanian over-
tures to Western Europe involve political considerations.
This may be Albania's tirst tentative 1 to tin a new
protector to replace China. In view of the regime's ideo-
logical incompatibility with democratic political systems,
it is not clear what sort of political arrangement Tirana
may hope to establish with West European governments. The
Albanians probably feel that the Mediterranean countries
will want to take out some insurance against the
bility of increased Soviet influence in Albania.
Relations with the US
56. The Hoxha regime's attitude toward the United
States has been unrelentingly hostile. Hoxha and other
Albanian leaders depict Washington as the world's leading
reactionary power and a direct threat to Albania's security.
This rhetoric includes elements of genuine uncompromising
hostility to the US, as well as considerable ideological
posturing.
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57. Tirana went out of its way to rebuff US over-
tures in the early 1970s. We have seen no hint of any
change in this attitude. It would no doubt be awkward
for the Albanians to make an overture to the US while
criticizing the Chinese for doing the same thing. A US
connection, however, or the hint that one was in the
making, might serve Tirana's interest in fending off any
perceived threat from Yugoslavia and the USSR.
58. Although the Albanians are unlikely to pursue
relations with Washington as long as Hoxha is in power,
they could indirectly signal a moderation of their anti-US
stand by deescalating criticism of Chinese-US contacts.
Albania might be willing to purchase US-licensed equipment
from Western European countries, pretending not to notice
the American connection. Tirana may also gradually modify
the extremely hostile tone of its anti-US propaganda,
without essentially changing its ideological opposition to
the US.
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TABLE MAIN INDEXES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALBANIAN ECONOMY DURING THE 4th and 5th
FIVE YEAR PLAN PERIODS (1966-1970 and 1971-1975)
(Percentages)
Overall social production
Overall industrial production
Overall agricultural production
State Investments
Transport of goods
Retail sale turnover
National income
Per capita national income
4th FYP 5th FYP
(Growth in 1970 compared with 1965) (Growth in 1975 compared with 1970)
(claimed imple-
mentation)
61
41-46
34
41-46
25-27
45-50
15-17
Sources: Reports by Mehmet Shehu at the 6th and 7th congresses of the Albanian Worker's Party (November
1971 and December 1976).
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Albania and Surrounding Countries
or TIRANA
Yzberis-ht
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CNrrik _
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ITALY
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
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JLA
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