ASSESSMENT OF SAVIMBI'S ACTIVITIES AND PROSPECTS IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002700050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM: Savimbi's Guerrilla Activities in Angola
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
activities and prospects in Angola, and sign the covering note (also attached) to
Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
. Assessment of Savimbi's Activities and Prospects in Angola
1. Action Requested: That you approve the attached memorandum on Savimbi's
2. Background: Mr. Brzezinski on 8 June informed you by memorandum that
the NSC needed an assessment of the present scope and longer term prospects of
Savimbi's (UNITA's) guerrilla activities in Angola. He related this requirement
to the forthcoming (30 June) "African review" by the PRC.
3. The attached response was prepared by the NIO/AF on the basis of mater-
ials provided by CIA/DDT and by DIA. The response has been coordinated both
within CIA and by working; level representatives of the NFIB agencies. The con-
clusion of the assessment: is that.
-- Savimbi's forces now move freely in an area of southcentral and
southern Angola, although the Cubans and Neto's forces still occupy
major towns there.
-- Savimbi can survive any offensive the Cubans are likely to mount
against him.
-- But Savimbi's ethnically based forces probably cannot enlarge much
.on the territory they now control without substantial outside help.
-- Savimbi's long-term prospects, over the next two years, thus depend
on a decision by Havana and Moscow to negotiate or abandon Neto rather
than to continue to try to break what amounts to a stalemate.
3. Recommendation: That you approve this response and forward it to Mr.
Brzezinski accompanied by the covering note.
Director of Central Intelligence
DISAPPROVED:
TS-771547-77/1
Copy No.
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Director of Central Intelligence
DATE: 27 JUN 1977
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The Director
ntral Intelligence Agency
Dear Zbig:
*7 JUN 1977
The attached memorandum on Savimbi's guerrilla activities
in Angola and long term prospects responds to your request
to me of 8 June for an assessment to support the forthcoming
Africa review by the PRC. Briefly, we believe that Savimbi
has the men and materiel to survive as a guerrilla against
Neto and the. Cubans over the next two years, but that he
.will not be able to expand his present territory very much
unless he has substantial outside assistance. Without such
assistance, Savimbi's long term future depends mainly on
whether Moscow and Havana are willing to continue to support
a frustrating campaign against him.
Please let me know if you have comments or questions
on this subject.
Yours,
LD Stansfield Turner
Attachment
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
TS-771547-77
Copy No. _7
TOP SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Savimbi's Guerrilla Activities in Angola
Summary
1. Jonas Savimbi's effective leadership of UNITA has kept in the field
a force of about 7,000 regular and 8,000 irregular fighters; this force now
moves freely within and is supported by the inhabitants of an area of southern
Angola that is roughly between a third and a half of the country's territory.
In this area, UNITA does not occupy the major towns, which remain in Cuban
and MPLA hands, and its administrative organization is probably rudimentary,
in part because operations in ethnically friendly territory do not really
require much elaboration at this stage. Given this base area, and UNITA's
demonstrated ability to survive major offensives against it, it has good
longer-tern prospects for maintaining forces in being and in effect denying
southern Angola to the MPLA/Cuban regime in Luanda. At the same time, an
effort by Savimbi to expand much beyond his present limits would encounter
some of the same difficulties now faced by the MPLA and its Cuban supporters.
Under these circumstances, Savimbi's movement is not likely to "take over"
in Luanda in the foreseeable future. Its long term prospect for achieving,
or more likely sharing, national power in Angola will depend on the intensity
of Neto's problems within the NPLA; the duration of the Cuban commitment to
Neto; and tie MPLA's eventual willingness to abandon its claim to exclusive
jurisdiction.
UNITA's Assets
2. The major single asset of Savimbi's movement is Savimbi himself. He
has impressed Americans and other foreigners as serious, hard working, realistic,
intelligent, and easy to deal with. Within his movement, he insists on disci-
pline and allows virtually no autonomy to his subordinates. This organizational
principle and the force of his personality have kept UNITA free of the faction-
alism and feuding that have characterized the other Angolan nationalist movements.
25X1 3. Among Savimbi's strengths is hi
s attention to the welfare of his troops
in the field. He commands loyalt
y
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4. These units conduct reconnaissance and patrols, man road blocks, and
are the basic elements for offensive operations; larger 'concentrations probably
conduct the "sieges" that UNITA maintains to isolate the'MPLA'and Cuban forces
occupying towns within the UNITA area of control. A specially trained unit
operates against the Benguela Railway and other'rail'lines and bridges. These
UNITA units are armed with a variety of light infantry weapons left over from
the civil war or captured from the Cuban/FAPLA'forces. UNITA reportedly has
8-9 months supply of small arms ammunition. There are relatively few weapons
of large calibre, although UNITA does have various sizes of mortars, bazookas,
and rockets, for example. Motor transport is scarce, largely for want of
fuel, and captured armored vehicles are used'for static defense. In the area
of their operations, UNITA forces have a'logistical advantage over their
opponents, as well as the advantage of operating in'a familiar geographic
and a friendly ethnic environment, and when used'in combination with guerrilla
tactics these more than balance the technical superiority of Cuban/MPLA forces
operating far from base.
.5. Other, so-called irregular UNITA forces, claimed to number 8,000,
guard stores, participate in political indoctrination, and generally conduct
themselves along what UNITA believes to be Maoist lines. Military duties for
this group evidently shade off into political and social action; UNITA officials
assert that, as they have gained the military initiative in southeastern Angola
25X1 from the Cubans and FAPLA, greater emphasis is being placed on political action
programs.
7. The geographic limits of Savimbi's territory -- his "zone of influ-
ence" -- include most of southern and southeastern Angola, but not the southern
coast nor, apparently, the-far southern border with Namibia. The provinces of
Cuando-Cubango, Cunene, Moxico, Mocamedes, Huila, Bie, Huambe, Benguela and
parts of Cuanza Sul, Malanje, and Luanda would-be included. Within this area,
UNITA "controls" the countryside along and south of the Benguela railroad in
that it has the allegiance of the local population, sharply-limits the movement
of FAPLA/Cuban forces, and is subject to only sporadic 'opposition from them.
Notable exceptions to UNITA's'control within its own zone are the towns of
Cangamba, Serpa Pinto, Huambo and Bie -- all still occupied by FAPLA/Cuban
garrisons.
2?x1
8. Savimbi also has foreign friends, whose support is useful but not
critical at this time.
it is
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of course in the South Africans' interest to keep the Angolan regime focused
on its internal insurgency problems so as to limit practical support for
SWAPO's operations against targets in Namibia. 'UNITA has the British,
Zambian IUMIL n , who has had similar relationships, is an old sup-
porter of Savimbi. The "moderate" West Africans, Senghor'and`Houphouet-Boigny,
are also favorably inclined, but Zaire under Mobutu is not trusted by Savimbi,
and the French fall in this category too. The UNITA leadership, despite its
home grown quality, has considerable experience in exploiting these foreign
relationships.
UNITA's Liabilities
9. Many of UNITA's strengths are also sources of weakness. Savimbi's
ability to dominate the organization and enforce discipline means that, despite
the existence of a group of talented subordinates who work well together, none
has anything like his stature or would be able to take his place as a national
Angolan figure if he were to be removed from the scene. There are signs that
Savimbi is aware of and attempting to remedy this situation, but is still
moving slowly in delegating authority.
10. The ethnic core of UNITA is among the Ovimbundu people of the central
highlands of Angola, although the movement has been and is supported by other
tribes of the southern and eastern regions and'its top leadership includes
Cabindans and others from outside its base. area. This degree of ethnic homo-
geneity, along with Savimbi's talent as a mediator, is the source of much of
UNITA's cohesiveness, but it simultaneously inhibits UNITA's acceptance as a
national movement.. If and when UNITA mounts substantial military operations
outside the area in which it now moves freely, it will be moving in what is
now still an alien ethnic environment. This again is a disability that Savimbi
is aware of and one that he is trying to overcome, but if he does so he will
probably owe more to the ineptitude and disarray in the MPLA than to his own
efforts.
11. From a military standpoint too, UNITA's logistical problems would
multiply as it sought to expand and, unless there had been very thorough
political preparation, it probably would have to adopt more conventional tactics.
In these conditions, the lack of armor and heavier firepower would become more
telling as Savimbi's forces moved out of their-accustomed habitats. Savimbi's
success in hanging on and in keeping the FAPLA/Cuban units to the towns has
encouraged him to consider a northern offensive, but unless the MPLA had
collapsed internally or the Cubans had already given up, it is unlikely that
he could carry such an operation through successfully without substantial
foreign support.
25X1 UNITA's Prospects
12. UNITA's current thinking lindicates
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Savimbi's basic objective is to drive the Cubans and Soviets out of Angola
and replace the Neto regime with a "government of national unity" led by
UNITA. But how? At one point Savimbi?thought of declaring a "liberated
republic" in southern Angola, but this idea smacks of ethnic separatism which
he wants ultimately to overcome.
13. A safer, less spectacular, but in some ways more difficult course
would be to develop UNITA's political and administrative apparatus in the
area it now largely controls, and to use:this as a secure base for politico-
military operations against the MPLA regime. Such'a longer range strategy
could make use of the underground assets UNITA may'-have in Luanda and other
coastal and northern cities, whose takeover at some point will be essential
to long term success. But this strategy assumes that Neto and,the Cubans will
continue to stumble and that
a couple years Neto will col apse for-primarily after
pressures could, of course, contribute to such alcollapse rorstosa changebofs
leadership in the MPLA; they might in time also force the MPLA to some kind
of compromise with Savimbi -- although there are now'no indications that
Neto is considering a deal. But if Neto does not cave in one way or another,
and the Cubans remain committed to defend him, UNITA would remain an essen-
tially regional insurgency which could be contained though not suppressed.
14. The answer to Savimbi's dilemma thus does not lie primarily with his
own assets and liabilities but with those of his opponents.in Luanda and
Havana -- and Moscow. As long as Castro continued to receive strong Soviet
backing and could see some military progress against the insurgents, he
probably would be willing to commit additional civilian resources and combat
troops to Angola beyond the 3-4,000 Cubans arriving there now. Savimbi too
can survive, but the key to his doing more than that is in the will of the
Cubans to continue to provide those technical and military services that allow
the Neto regime to survive as the "government" of Angola.
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ESTIMATE NUMBER: NI M 77-018
Savimbi's Guerrilla Activities in Angola
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