ACTIVITIES OF THE CUBAN MILITARY IN ANGOLA FROM MARCH 1976 TO JUNE 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 27, 1977
• Content Type: IM

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27 July 1977
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Activities of the Cuban Military in Angola
From March 1976 to June 1977
Cuban combat forces in Angola during the past 15 months
have been heavily involved in joint operations with government
forces in attempting to extend the regime's authority through-
out the countryside.
-Operations undertaken include the attempted
opening of the Benguela Railroad and the
protection of important elements of the
Angolan economy, such as the oil industry in
Cabinda and the coffee-producing regions of
the north.
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-Despite these efforts, the overall security
situation has deteriorated throughout major
portions of the countryside.
The Cubans have not succeeded in converting the Angolan
military forces (FAPLA) from an insurgent force to a conven-
tional military force, and they are not optimistic that they
will be able to do so in the near future.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional
and Political Analysis and coordinated within CIA. Questiny
and may be addressed to
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-The Cubans are disillusioned with -the capa-
bilities-and potential of FAPLA.
-Growing security requirements are.hamper-
ing Cuban participation in the training of
FAPLA.
Havana's broad-based Angolan involvement has tested a
wide range of Cuban military capabilities.
-A large number of regular and reserve per-
sonnel have gained valuable combat experi-
ence in conventional and counterinsurgency
operations.
-Cuba's. civil airline and its expanding
merchant fleet have contributed heavily
to the military effort by carrying out
efficient transatlantic logistics opera-
tions.
The Cuban military presence has recently been augmented
by upwards of 5,000 men (raising the total Cuban presence in
Angola to as many as 18,500), and it may well increase even
further given the expansion of anti-government insurgency
and the continuing ineffectiveness of FAPLA.
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Introduction
Since early 1976, when UNITA and FNLA military forces
ceased to pose ?a conventional military threat to the MPLA and
the South African expeditionary group withdrew from southern
Angola, Cuba has maintained a large military presence in
Angola. Cuba's armed forces have performed a wide range of
duties in the region, highlighted by a primary role in security
activities and a major effort to create an effective Angolan
army. On a lesser scale, the Cubans have been involved in
creating an embryonic Angolan airforce and navy. The greater
than anticipated responsibility for internal security stems
largely from the ineptitude and corruption within the Angolan
military and police services.
There are a number of additional aspects related to the
Cuban presence in Angola. Cubans are providing training,
limited amounts of hardware, and logistic support to SWAPO
insurgents operating from southern Angola into neighboring
Namibia. Similar aid is reportedly being channeled to ZAPU.
Moreover, despite official Cuban denials, the Cubans were
involved in the preparations for the Kantangan attack against
Zaire in March 1977. In addition, Cuban military personnel
are gaining combat experience in both conventional and
counterinsurgency operations.
FAPLA/Cuban Counterinsurgency Efforts Against UNITA
The initial FAPLA/Cuban drives against UNITA in May and
June 1976 were aimed at extending their control beyond the
urban centers of Bie (formerly Silva Porto), Huambo, and Luena
(formerly Luso), located along the Benguela railroad, and
preventing UNITA from disrupting traffic on this vital trans-
port link. A joint FAPLA/Cuban force of 5,000 to 6,000 men
using T-34 tanks and armored cars reportedly participated in
these efforts. Close air support was afforded by Soviet-
supplied aircraft piloted by Cubans.
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The use of aircraft became increasingly important for
counterinsurgency operations in southern Angola. Fighter air-
craft from regional airbases such as Luena and Menongue
(formerly Serpa Pinto)'bombed and strafed suspected enemy
concentrations or positions prior to ground force attacks.
The persistent ambushing of government convoys and the lack
of adequate surface transportation routes increased the im-
portance of air operations ferrying FAPLA/Cuban troops and re-
supplying isolated garrisons. As a result, Soviet AN-12 (Cub)
transports were dispatched from the USSR to Angola to help
move supplies from Luanda to airfields in the interior. This
was in addition to the use of AN-26s which were already in
Angola's air inventory.
By July the focus of counterinsurgency operations had
shifted farther south with the emphasis on attempting to clear
UNITA from Cunene Province. In August a second offensive,
dubbed "Operation Kakauenga," was initiated farther eastward
in Cuando-Cubango Province. These operations continued into
the fall, with the additional objective of establishing base
camps and operational zones for SWAPO insurgents along the
Namibian border.
Despite the Cuban-FAPLA actions, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA
forces demonstrated a continuing ability to disrupt the
Benguela Railroad and to counter the FAPLA/Cuban effort to
pacify those areas that have traditionally supported his move-
ment. From late September through November, UNITA actually
went on the offensive and forced government and Cuban troops
to evacuate eastern Moxico Province, including a withdrawal
from the garrison at Lumbala (formerly Gago Coutinho) to Luena.
N'Giva (formerly Pereira de Eca) was attacked and reportedly
held for three days in mid-November by UNITA before being re-
captured by FAPLA/Cuban forces following intense artillery
shelling and air raids.
Cuban and government efforts to open and secure the
Benguela Railroad reportedly have been largely ineffective, and
portions of the 600-mile line remains inoperable. Furthermore,
major garrisons such as Huambo and Luena have come under fre-
quent. rocket attacks oy UNITA. Several non-UNITA sources have
echoed Savimbi's claim that the joint FAPLA/Cuban offensives
have been ineffectual. A who spent six months 25X1
with UNITA states that most of Angola along the Benguela Rail-
road and to the south, with the exception of the major towns,
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is under defacto UNITA control. He maintains that UNITA'.s
force is well armed and disciplined and enjoys the support of
the bulk of the population in these regions.
Because of the failure to neutralize UNITA opposition or
open the Benguela and southern railorads, FAPLA/Cuban forces
have been unable to extend the effective authority of the MPLA
government to the countryside. Their failure to check UNITA
has resulted in deteriorating morale among those members of
Havana's expeditionary force stationed in the south. Extended
tours of duty and growing friction with. the Angolan populace
are additional factors contributing to the lowering of Cuban
morale.
Cabinda--Keeping the Oil Flowing
Cabinda, with its refinery and offshore oil wells, poses a
particular problem for its FAPLA/Cuban defenders. The focus
of Cuban military personnel in the exclave has been on ensur-
ing the continued operation of the Gulf Oil Company facility,
the main source of foreign exchange for the government. The
bulk of FAPLA/Cuban forces are deployed in defensive positions
in and around Cabinda City and the refinery 10 kilometers
north of the city. 25X1
artillery and tanks guarding the approaches of the city.
In April 1977, 12 revetted hard-
stands had been added at the airfield on the outskirts of
Cabinda City. This development suggests that fighter air-
craa't may soon N -I to Cabinda.
Beyond Cabinda City and the Gulf installation, FAPLA
units, generally in company strength and with Cuban advisers,
are posted at isolated garrisons within the heavily forested
interior of the exclave.
Despite repeated claims by FLEC that it controls more
than two thirds of the province, much of the territory is
probably not controlled by either side.
Most of FLEC's operations are limited to ambushes,
shelling of garrisons, and mining of roads. An exception was
the isclation of the government forces at Dinge for several
days before Cubans could reinforce the garrison in early
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May of this year. By late May and June, the government, aided
by about 1,800 additional Cuban troops was attempting to regain
the initiative in the exclave. Two towns occupied by FLEC were
recaptured, and FLEC was driven from its provisional head-
quarters near the Zairian border. These setbacks reportedly
have been compounded by FLEC's internal dissension and dwin-
dling amounts of military supplies.
FNLA-?-Harassment in the North
In the spring of 1976, remnnants of the FNLA army operat-
ing from the densely forested region of northern Angola and
Bas.-Zaire Province in Zaire, continued to resist FAPLA/Cuban
efforts at pacification. The goals and tactics of the FNLA
appear to mirror those of UNITA and FLEC. The primary objec-
tive of FNLA was to prevent the MPLA from extending its con-
trol: tactics employed included ambushing of FAPLA/Cuban
convoys on roads in the north, attempting to sabotage the
coffee economy in the Uige Plateau, and restricting the move-
ment of FAPLA/Cuban elements to urban areas.
As in the south, the vulnerability of military convoys to
ambushes has compelled the FAPLA/Cuban command to use trans-
port aircraft to resupply its troops. An additional supply
line was established by using former Portuguese landing craft
to move equipment from Luanda, to the port at Sovo, (formerly
Santo Antonio Do Zaire) at the mouth of the Zaire River from
where supplies were sent to various FAPLA and Cuban units.
The major airbase in the north is the former Portuguese facil-
ity at N'gage. As was the case at Huambo, revetted hardstands
capable of accommodating fighter aircraft were identified for
the first time in April 1976.
Evaluating Counterinsurgency Campaigns
The largest counterinsurgency campaigns undertaken by
tha FAPLA/Cuban forces have been against UNITA. These offen-
sives failed tc reach. their basic objective and in early 1977
encountered strong opposition, leaving government forces largely
restricted to a. defensive posture within garrisons. In north-
ern Angola, the attempts to eradicate the remnants/of the FNLA
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have been equally unsuccessful. Favorable terrain conditions
and the ability to take sanctuary in Zaire have aided the FNLA
insurgents. Only in Cabinda has the FAPLA/Cuban military effort
achieved its more limited goal of defending the Gulf facilities
from sabotage and ensuring the continued operation of this
vital installation. Even here, however, the FAPLA/Cuban pre-
sence is largely confined to urban areas.
Developing Angola's Security Capabilities
A second objective of Cuban military personnel in Angola
is the conversion of the MPLA military from an insurgent force
to a conventional military institution. An agreement re-
portedly was reached between Castro and Neto in March 1976
calling for an expanded training role for Cuban military per-
sonnel in Angola. In the largest undertaking, the Cubans are
providing the FAPLA ground forces with basic training for NCOs
and officer candidates and are instructing personnel on the
array of weapons provided by the Soviets, ranging from small
calibre arms to heavy equipment such as tanks and rocket
launchers.
While limited numbers of Angolans are sent to Havana for
specialized instruction, most training is conducted within
Angola at former Portuguese
Soviet-type motorized
rifle obstacle courses and a training aid commonly seen at
army facilities throughout Cuba have been observed at numerous
military installations throughout Angola. Other more conven-
tional training aids, such as small-arms firing ranges and
driver-training courses, have also been observed.
Limited reporting suggests that the results of the Cuban
training program have been far from satisfactory from Havana's
point of view. The majority of FAPLA recruits, drawn from the
unemployed masses of Angola's urban centers, are illiterate and
poorly motivated. Cubans complain that the typical FAPLA
soldier lacks the. ability and motivation to acquire even rudi-
mentary military skills, let alone the proficiency to operate
and maintain sophisticated military hardware. A second pro-
blem has been the increased demand for the use of Cuban mili-
tazy personnel and Soviet-supplied hardware in the campaigns
against opponents of the MPLA government.
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Very few details are available on the training of pilots
and support personnel of the FAPLA air arm. Although some
pilots are sent to the Soviet Union for instruction and others
are being trained by Nigerians, Cuban pilots, when not engaged
in combat missions, are helping to train Angolan pilots, pri-
marily at the Angolan international airfield at Luanda where
the majority of the aircraft and helicopters of the airforce
are based.
The airforce training program is probably on a small scale
and is not expected to meet with any major success. The remarks
of various Cuban officials indicate their belief that Cuban
advisers/pilots will be needed for a long period and that
there are few Angolans who possess the skills needed to become
pilots.
The Cubans have also given specialized training to Angolan
security personnel, including those responsible for protecting
President Neto, and they have helped maintain law and order
in Luanda and other regions of Angola. In addition, the
Cubans have reportedly participated in efforts to restore
Angola's economy. Cuban military personnel, for example, par-
ticipated in the coffee and sugar harvests in northern Angola
and in attempts to reestablish order in the diamond production
area in the northeast.
Assisting Black African Nationalists: The SWAPO Connection
Cuban military personnel in Angola have also given direct
support to the insurgent forces of SWAPO that are operating
from southern Angola against Namibia. SWAPO defectors have
claimed that Cuban cooperation increased following Sam Nujoma's
visit to Havana in October 1976. During October and November,
joint FAPLA/Cuban/SWAPO offensives were launched in an attempt
to remove UNITA elements and the local populace from regions
in southern Angola contiguous to the Namibian border. The
purpose of these campaigns was to create "safe areas" where
SWAPO base camps could be established for training. and for
preparing for operations into Namibia.
A training and logistics base was reportedly estaolished
ir. the south-central area of Angola, approximately 240 kilo-
meters north of the Namibia border. The decision tc) create a
base so far from the border probably reflects a genuina Cuban
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respect for the combat ability of the South African armed
forces and concern over potential South. African retaliation
against SWAPO facilities. The main logistics, supply, and
training base for SWAPO was set up at Jamba, which is located
on a spur of the southern railroad that.connects with the port
of Mocamedes. Military equipment for SWAPO is delivered by
ship to Mocamedes, moved by rail to Jamba,and then trucked to
N'Giva for distribution to base camps along the Namibian
border. Basic training and weapons training has reportedly
been conducted at Menongue, another MPLA-held city on the
southern railroad.
A number of base camps from which SWAPO units infiltrate
Military Capabilities
The Angolan episode, viewed solely in a military context,
has provided counterinsurgency and conventional combat experi-
ence for both regular and reserve personnel of the Cuban armed
forces. The amount of equipment and manpower committed to
this venture has probably far surpassed the original estimate
of officials in both Havana and Luanda. As a result, Cuban
capabilities, ranging from transoceanic movement of men and
hardware to combined-arms operations in an unfamiliar environ-
ment, have been thoroughly tested.
The initial challenge of transporting Havana's expedi-
tionary force across the Atlantic to Angola was met success-
fully Cuba's merchant marine and the national airline--Cubana--
fulfilled difficult assignments, on time and without accident.
Between May 1976 and April 1977, at least 12 vessels were in-
volved in convol activities :.-id conducted 23 voyages. There
was a. st.rge ir r.tilitary shipments in May 1977, when six ships
loaded arms, vehicles, and troops at Mariel, and sailed for
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Angola. (The time spent in loading these ships in Cuba was
markedly less than had been the case previously.) Charter
Cubana airline flights._using Bristol Britannia and IL-18
(COOT) aircraft were begun as early as September 1975. Carry-
ing capacity was expanded dramatically by employing leased
Aeroflot IL-62 aircraft: 155 flights were made between Havana
and Luanda from January 1976 through early June 1977. Finally,
regularly scheduled Cubana airline service began in June 1976
on a weekly basis using Bristol Britannias.
Although Cubans have previously served in an advisory
capacity elsewhere on the African continent, Angola provided
the first large-scale battle-testing of regular Cuban armor,
artillery, and infantry units. The combat scenarios have
ranged from the conventional combined-arms offensives to
counterinsurgency search and destroy patrols. Cuban pilots
have not engaged in air-to-air combat, but have furnished close
air support to FAPLA/Cuban ground forces. Perhaps the great-
est challenge has involved logistics. A severely damaged
communications and transportation network coupled with harass-
ment of surface routes in certain regions by insurgents has
complicated the supply effort. Certain isolated garrisons
rely solely upon aircraft for supplies.
Summary
Castro apparently underestimated the Cuban manpower and
resources that would be required to maintain and support the
Neto regime in Angola after the civil war. While Cuban man-
power and firepower proved decisive in gaining victory for
the MPLA in conventional warfare, Havana's efforts to counter
the insurgency threat of FLEC, FNLA, and UNITA have not had
corresponding successes. An anticipated reduction in Cuban
combat forces and a gradual replacement of troops by civilian
advisers has been scrapped due to a deteriorating security
situation. Havana's troop strength., in fact, has increased
by as many as 5,00a men since May, raising the total number
of Cuban civilian and military personnel to as many as 18,500.
Increased Cuban participation in maintaining security has
also been made necessary by the mediocre performanc, by FAPLA
and other Angolan security personnel. The prospect foi: im-
provved performarce by FAPLA, resulting from Cuban a;td other
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Communist countries' training programs, appears slim in the near
future. As a result, the need for continued participation by
Cuban personnel in military and security matters will continue
for an indefinite period.
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