CUBAN INOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Ree 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP79R00603A 00040001-1
PPLLMETTA DISTRIBUTION LIST
ESTIMATE NUMBER: NI M 77-015C
Cuban Involvement in Angola
LOGGED BY
DATE
COPY NO.
ASSIGNED TO*
30 Jun 77
#16
t
ISG/SAID ATTN: Dottie
#17-18
OCR/DSB
#19
Finished Intelligence Program.
1120
Presidential Library
#21
Agency Archives
1122-23
NI0 Master File
A, tj
* Requests for supplemental copies must be checked with the 1,110
responsible for that estimate.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 pproved For ReWMp 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP79ROO603AO 0040001-1
ROUTING
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE I
NITIALS
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPAR
E REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOM
MENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM
: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
,V
1 e /
S
A ~4
(Security Classification)
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Secret
(Security Class ifii Pali n)
2 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79ROO603AO02700040001-1
25X1
V
V
V
CONTROL NO.
 Approved For as(J(111 "~Ff~79
NI-1589-77
23 June 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
: Acting NIO for Latin America
w/transmittal letter to Dr. Brzezinski
1-1
Approved For Release 01JI-AP 1 W~iSROO6O3AOO270004000I-1
: Cuban Involvement in Angola
1. Action Requested: DCI signature of transmittal memorandum
to Dr. Brzezinski.
2. Background: Attached is a memorandum on Cuban Involvement
in Angola requested by Henry Richardson, NSC Staff Officer for Africa.
The memorandum, written by ORPA with coordination by the DDO, OER, and
OSR, will be one of the documents included in the Africa Review for
the PRC scheduled to be held on 30 June.
25X
25X
 Approved For ase W (1i -~ F 9R0060 2700040001-1
NI-1589-77
SUBJECT: Cuban Involvement in Angola
Distribution:
0 - DCI w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - D/DCI/NI w/att
1 - AD/DCI/NI w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - NI Reg w/att
2 - NIO/LA w/att
Approved For Release 2Oj1ik3 ~At I F OO603A002700040001-1
 Approved Forgffipase 2006/01/03: CI -I BPz7 A66 79040 9 -
1 C TIDE TIL'
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
2 9 JUN 1977
xi
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Cuban Involvement in Angola
Attached is a memorandum on Cuban Involvement
in Angola which was requested by Henry Richardson,
the NSC Staff Officer for Africa. It will be one of
the documents included in the Africa Review by the
PRC scheduled for 30 June 1977.
Stansfield Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER
Attachment: (1) as stated -
CCU' -HDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
25X
 Approved For ase 2006/01tf,~ 6., k RDP79R0060J#2700040001-1
25X
SUBJECT: Cuban Involvement in Angola
Distribution:
cy 1 - Dr. Brzezinski
cy 2 - DCI
cy 3 - DDCI
cye'V- D/DCI/NI
cys 12 & 13 - NIO/LA
)Y-' 15 k) !o/4f=
cy AD/DCI/NI
cy 6 - DD I.
cy 7 - C/LA/DDO
cy 8 - C/LA/ORPA
cy 9 - NIO Africa
cy 10 - ER
cy 11 - NI Reg
Approved For Release 2006/0ff6 LOl RDP79R00603A002700040001-1
 X1
Approved For
SECRET
SUBJECT: Cuban Involvement in Angola
SUMMARY
Cuban support for the Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA) began in the early 1960s. Until 1975,
however, the number of Cubans serving with the MPLA probably
never went beyond a few hundred. The Cuban intervention be-
gan.on a large scale in September 1975. By March 1976, the
Cuban presence had reached an estimated 20,000. With the civil
war essentially ended, Havana began a gradual withdrawal of
its combat forces. By September, however, the withdrawal was
apparently stopped as a result of increased insurgent activity.
From September 1976 to May 1977, the total Cuban presence
probably remained fairly constant at an estimated level of
10,000 to 14,500.
The Castro regime is clearly worried by the deteri-
orating situation in Angola. The-difficulties are considerable.
Angola is experiencing worsening economic and social condi-
tions; political instability was aggravated by the attempted
coup on May 27--a coup suppressed by Cuban, not Angolan troops;
the Cuban presence is increasingly resented by Angolans;
and the defeat of the Katangan invaders has kindled fears of
a Zairian military retaliation.
So far the Cuban response has been escalation. Dur-
ing May six Cuban ships sailed to Angola carrying troops and
military equipment. The Cuban airlift capacity was also
utilized.
between 3, to ngo a in May,
increasing the total number to an estimated 13,000 to 18,500.
Even though Cuba's military involvement in Angola has
been greater than either Moscow or Havana anticipated, it
is unlikely that the limit of Cuba's support has been reached.
If necessary, Castro probably would be willing to raise the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79 00603A002700040001-1
25X1
25X1
25X
25X
 Approved Fo~ease 2006/0 3 I - P79R0060D02700040001-1
X1
number of combat troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000 if
he was assured of continued Soviet support. If Havana were
faced with a need for an expansion significantly beyond this
number, the Cuban leadership might be forced to reassess
its policy. Continued commitment would be unlikely without
strong Soviet support and some signs of military progress
against the insurgents. Without these ingredients, the Castro
regime would probably begin to encourage a negotiated solution.
25X
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 Approved For0ase 2006/01 CftFVP79R006
3A002700040001-
DISCUSSION
1. Cuban support for the MPLA-began in the early
1960s as an extension to Africa of the Castro regime's policy
of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America.
Havana's connection with the MPLA was never broken. For more
than a.decade,.the Cubans have been sending arms, supplies,
and advisers to MPLA bases in Africa, training MPLA repre-
sentatives in Cuba, and giving the MPLA strong propaganda
support. Until September 1975, however, the level of Cuban
support had been low. The number of Cubans serving with the
MPLA probably never exceeded a few hundred during this entire
period and for most of the time probably was between 20 and
40 men.
3. The first Cuban troops left for Angola--by ship--
during the first week of September 1975. Five Cuban ships
with men and/or__military equipment sailed to Angola in Sep-
tember and October._+ On September 30 the Cuban airlift to
Angola began, with five Cuban planes carrying men and arms
for Angola. By the end of October there were probably at
least 2,000 Cuban troops in Angola.
the
CuDuns su ere heavy losses in the early stage of the war.
In mid-October, when the Cuban forces found themselves in
danger of being overwhelmed by a drive by the National Front
- 3 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040001-1
25X11
25X1
25X
25X1
 X1.
Approved Fo~ase 2006/0EECRET P7
1 9
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) from the north and a South
African invasion from the south, Castro was faced with the
choice of withdrawing or augmenting the force already committed.
He chose the latter course.
5. In November the Cuban airlift stepped up markedly
and averaged five flights per week. During December, the
sealift also increased, with 10-Cuban vessels sailing for
Angola in that month alone. Both the airlift and sealift
continued until the Cuban presence had reached a level esti-
mated by the Intelligence Community in mid-1976. to be between
13,500 and 17,000 men. Subsequently, additional information
became available causing the estimate of the maximum Cuban
presence to be raised to approximately 20,000 men.
6. With the civil war essentially ended in early
1976, Cuban leaders began to make a number of public and
private statements in April and May indicating that a gradual
withdrawal of Cuban forces had started or would begin soon.
Havana suppressed all details of the withdrawal, however, to
keep its options open and avoid the restraint of a set schedule.
Between mid-March and mid-August 1975, ship convoys began to
return combat troops from Angola.to Cuba. Some military per-
sonnel also were returned to Cuba by air.
7. By September, however, the withdrawal hit a snag
following the MPLA's inability to consolidate its gains in
the face of a persistent insurgency in northern and southern
Angola. From mid-1976 to early May 1977, the Cuban presence
remained fairly static at a level estimated to be between
10,000 and 14,500 personnel. Although some military person-
nel were probably withdrawn during the latter half of 1976:,
most were apparently replaced by civilian technicians. There
are probably 4,000 to 5,000 Cuban civilian technicians in
Angola. Most of them, however, are believed to be reservists
who have had military training and could be mobilized in place
should circumstances require it.
8. In addition to combat troops, the Cuban govern-
ment provided the Neto regime with a large number of military
advisers tasked with organizing and training an air force,
navy, militia, national police force, and a secret police
force.
25X
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 Approved For ease 2006/01'SEde:13QP79RO060 Q2700040001-1
9. Civilian advisers were sent to fill at least part
of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial,
supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era.
These advisers include agricultural and livestock technicians,
medical personnel, advisers to help restore sugar and coffee
production, merchant marine and ports advisers, and teams of
construction personnel to assist in the construction of public
buildings, roads, airfields, and in the creation of a con-
struction industry. Havana also sent three fleets of fishing
boats to operate out of Angolan ports.
10. To help the MPLA broaden its political base,
the Cubans sent. experts in the formation of mass organizations
and a vanguard party of political cadre. To complement the
development of a political structure, advisers were also sent
to develop a national education system. Some Angolans have
apparently also been sent to Cuba for training.
11. This extensive presence became increasingly evi-
dent throughout the country and the image of Cubans as a new
breed of colonialists has spread. The Cubans are frequently
criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sen-
sibilities. They are also faulted for their tendency to
take command of a given situation instead of acting as ad-
visers. Angolan resentment also stems from the Cuban and
Soviet monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in the
country and the fact that their presence has not brought.
any economic progress or resulted in the. elimination of the
insurgent threat.
The Situation Today
12. The Cuban government is clearly worried by the
mounting problems it faces in Angola. What appeared last
year as a relatively easy triumph for Cuban "international-
ism" is now becoming a foreign policy quagmire. From the
Cuban viewpoint, the difficulties are many and serious:
--Angola is experiencing deteriorating economic
and social conditions;
--political instability was heightened by the up-
rising on May 27--the Cubans reportedly played
a critical role in putting down the revolt;
25X1
25X1
- 5 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 Approved Forase 2006/0 C&IJpP79R0 -1
--there is increasing resentment among Angolans
toward the Cuban presence; and
--the defeat. of the Katangan invaders has kindled
fears of a Zairian military retaliation.
13. So far, the Cuban response has been escalation.
In.mid-April and early May of this year the Cuban government
began activating reservists for service in Afri
r Inot less than 4,000 reservists were activated
during this period. All apparently were asked to volunteer
for one year of service in Angola.
14. Six Cuban merchant ships sailed from Cuba for
Angola in May, compared with an average of about two per
month since the end of the civil war. At least three of the
ships apparently carried'a mix of troops and military equip-
ment (see Table). The urgency felt by the Cubans was demon-
strated by the frantic nature of the loading process. Work
continued around the clock, the hurried pace caused at least
one serious accident, and confusion was rampant.
15. During the escalation the Cubans also used
their airlift capability. has reported
that since early May, the twice-weekly Cubana flights--
utilizing Soviet leased and piloted IL-62 aircraft--were
flying to Angola with full capacity loads of 136 passen-
gers and returning to Havana nearly empty.
II reported that the same pattern was being followed
the by weekly flights by the Cuban-owned Bristol Brittania
aircraft, which has an 88-passenger capacity.
16. The flights in May reportedly carried both
civilian and military personnel. During the month there
were nine IL-62 flights and five Bristol Brittania flights
permitting a maximum total of 1,650 seats in each direc-
tion. Given the reported small number of passengers
from Angola to Cuba, the net influx of Cuban personnel
by air could have been as high. as 1,500 persons in May
alone.
25X
25X
25X1
25X1
25X
25X
- 6 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 Approved For0ase 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP79R0060 2700040001-1
SECRET
This woul increase the estimatea size
o e u an presence in Angola to 13,000 to 18,500.
An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 are civilian technicians,
most of whom are believed to be reservists who could be
mobilized in place if necessary.
18. Other indications of Cuban concern have appeared
in recent weeks. Raul Castro, Cuba's Armed Forces Minister
and number two man in the Cuban leadership, made a hastily
arranged and unannounced visit to Angola after the uprising
in May. Moreover, Angola may have been the primary reason
for a rare meeting of the Central Committee of the Cuban Com-
munist Party on June 10. During Raul Castro's trip, he re-
portedly inspected the critical military zones, including
Cabinda, and Angola's borders with Zaire and Namibia. The
communique issued after. his visit pledged continued Cuban
support for the beleaguered Neto regime and suggests that
the Cubans are not yet ready to start looking for a way out.
19. The fresh troops arriving from Cuba will prob-
ably enable Neto to survive the current crisis. Their pres-
ence probably will enable the Angolan government to bring
the insurgency in Cabinda and northern Angola under control.
There have been several reports indicating that an influx
of Cuban troops into Cabinda has occurred in recent weeks.
Some minor success against Jonas Savimbo's UNITA forces in
the south also may be achieved. Over the long term, however,
the Cuban/MPLA forces will probably be unable to effectively
neutralize the insurgent threat without a much larger mili-
tary force.
20. Even though Cuba's military involvement in Angola
has been much greater than either Havana or Moscow antici-
pated, the rapid reinforcement indicates that the limit of
Havana's support has not yet been reached. Despite the ap-
parent addition of some 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, Cuba still
faces the likelihood of a steadily worsening situation ac-
companied by pressures for additional military and technical
support. With few options available, Castro may escalate
further; he probably would be willing to raise the number of
combat troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000. In the mean-
time Cuba will probably press some East European nations and
the USSR for additional material aid as well as some African
nations for greater moral support.
HKI
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040001-1
 Approved For 0 ase 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP79R0060 2700040001-1
SFC:R FT
X1
21. The economic burden of Angola is not yet an im-
portant constraint on Cuban policymakers. The estimated
13,000 to 18,500 men now stationed in Angola represent only
a small fraction of Cuba's labor force and an economic drain
of about $40 million to $45 million annually--only 0.5 per-
cent of total GNP--assuming average worker productivity and
zero Cuban unemployment. Actual maintenance costs are prob-
ably even less. The diversion of merchant vessels for logis-
tical support involves at most 10 percent of the Cuban fleet
and a financial loss of $15 million annually if these ves-
sels were available for charter.
22. Virtually all other costs of the Cuban involve-
ment are borne by the USSR. Moscow has replaced--probably
on a grant basis--most of the military equipment which Havana
has sent to Angola. Most of the equipment used in Angola, how-
ever, has been furnished directly by the Soviet Union. The
Soviets have loaned Soviet planes and pilots to facilitate
Cuban logistics and have leased Cuba two long-range IL-62
aircraft for twice-weekly flights to Luanda. This has en-
abled Havana to continue uniterrupted its civil air service
on Cubana's current route network.
23. While the real economic cost is relatively small,
Havana is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over
the Cuban populace's exaggerated perceptions of the cost of
the Cuban involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed
knowledge of Havana's overall commitment in Angola, but they
are aware that the highly visible call-up of forces has coin-
cided with a. sharp economic downturn. The Cuban leaders
have consistently and correctly maintained in all of their
public announcements that the island's-economic downturn is
due to low world sugar prices. Nevertheless, the populace
apparently views the Angolan adventure as a major cause of
Cuba's economic difficulties. Castro prefers to rule through
genuine popular support rather than repression and does pay
close attention to mass attitudes. Out of respect for public.
opinion, he has never told the Cuban people the full story
of the intervention in Angola.
24. If Havana is faced with continued demands for
a significant expansion of its forces, the Cuban leader-
ship may find itself forced to reassess its policy.
USSR's attitude toward a worsening Angolan situation will
weigh heavily upon Cuba's actions. The Cuban presence
25X
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040001-1
 Approved For 0 ase 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R0060IM2700040001-1
SECRET
there is dependent-upon the continued full backing of
Moscow. Cuba does not possess the military capabili-
ties or the economic strength to go it alone. Even more
important, Cuba itself is economically and militarily
dependent upon the USSR. But their different roles in
Angola may cause Moscow and Havana to develop different
views on the most appropriate policy to follow. Thus,
there is potential for friction--but not conflict--
between the two.
25. The most likely Soviet reaction, however, will
be to balk at providing financial and material support for
a major expansion of the Cuban presence. At the same time,
the USSR will probably refrain. from attempting to dictate
whether the Cubans should utilize their own resources to
finance the increase. In the absence of strong Soviet
pressure for a specific policy, the Cuban decision would
be influenced primarily by Fidel Castro's views and
secondarily by economic implications and political pres-
sures within the Cuban leadership.
26. Castro's natural inclination would be to stick
it out. with President Neto. The Cuban leader probably senses
that a defeat would seriously erode Cuban influence on the
continent-and undermine his campaign to become a major
leader in the Third World. Furthermore, Castro probably
realizes that an even more negative reaction would be pro-
voked by a sudden switch of Cuba's support from Neto
to another leader or faction. Finally, Castro is a
confirmed revolutionary, convinced that supporting other
revolutionaries--be they guerrilla fighters or legitimate
governments--is a moral obligation.
25X1
25X1
- 10 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA- DP79R00603AO02700040001-1
 Approved Formase 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP79RO06OW2700040001-1
SECRET
28. The position of the military will be repre-
sented by Raul Castro. His recommendations will probably
have the greatest influence on Fidel's decisions. The
younger Castro probably would be more willing than other
members of the hierarchy to commit additional military
resources to Angola. Nevertheless, he is unlikely to
continue the tactics of escalation if the military situa-
tion continues to worsen, especially if the Cuban forces
suffer heavy casualties. Given that situation, Raul Castro
would probably decide that a negotiated settlement was
necessary. If Raul were to weigh in on the side of those
arguing against increased support for Angola, Fidel most
probably would agree that a policy change was in order.
29. Thus, the Cubans are still committed to the
Neto regime. An additional 3,000 to 4,000 troops were
sent to Angola in May and Raul Castro pledged continued
support during his visit in June. The Castro regime
would probably be willing to raise the number of troops
by an additional 5,000 to 7,000 if necessary. A further
commitment, however, would be unlikely without strong
Soviet support and some military progress against the
insurgents. Without those ingredients the Cuban leadership
would probably be forced to seek a negotiated solution.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040001-1
25X
25X
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02700040001-1