REACTIONS TO US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 2, 1977
• Content Type: STUDY

_Alpproveq For Release 200@3j$fiClA-RDP79R00603A002500020016-9
2 May 1977
SUBJECT: Reactions to US Troop Withdrawals from Korea
1. Since my LDX message to you this morning (which
inadvertently did not include questions)
on subject above, further gui s been received
from the DCI.
-- The paper, contrary to the set of questions,
will focus on the impact of troop with-
drawal on the two Koreas; it will also
address reactions of Japan, the PRC, the
USSR, and
-- CIA draft to be complete by COB ]riday,.
6 May.
2. I will LDX copies of draft to you over the weekend.
A representatives' meeting will be held on Monday, 9 May.
I I
A/NIO/EAP
25X
25
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29 April 1977
Asian and Other Reactions to Ground
Force Withdrawal in Korea
Japan, the PRC, and the USSR will need the most
extended treatment. Southeast Asia can probably be treated
as a region with variations noted where necessary.
The paper should focus on perceptions and reactions --
when, as, and how we proceed with ground force withdrawals.
Current attitudes toward our presence and perceived intentions
should be treated as the point of departure; their description
is not an end in itself. It will be necessary to deal
both with expectations -- when decisions are announced
--
of how our policies are likely to work out, and with per-
ceptions for better or worse as implementation proceeds. Given
the number of variables and our own uncertainties as we examine
the problem over exactly what we will be doing and when, the
answers it is possible to provide will probably be a lot less
elaborate than the questions below. They are intended to
suggest lines of thought, not as an outline.
How will the countries considered react to the prospect
of complete ground force withdrawal?
-- How will our motives be perceived?
-- To what extent will concerns over the US role
in Asia be accentuated?
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-- To what extent will the move be seen as
affecting the security of other countries?
-- Will it cast doubt on the efficacy of US
security commitments elsewhere? With what
impact on our relations with the countries
concerned? With what impact on their policies?
-- Will other Asian countries be inclined to
move closer to the ROK or draw further away
from it? How will perceptions of future
prospects of the ROK be affected?
Given a firm US commitment to ground force withdrawal,
what would other countries concerned see as the most reassuring
modes of implementation? the most disturbing?
-- What confidence will be placed in the efficacy
of the compensating measures we may adopt?
-- What measures would be most confidence inspiring?
-- What measures would be most likely to be
regarded with skepticism?
-- As we proceed what will be perceived as the
principal benchmarks of success or failure?
Will perceptions of reduced US involvement correspondingly
reduce the interest of Moscow and Peking in restraining
North Korea?
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-- Or will Moscow/Peking concerns over the
prospects for destabilizing actions by
either Korea increase, and with what likely
impact on policy?
-- How will Peking and Moscow envisage the impact
of our drawdown on Japan?
-- Will either see significant implications --
advantages or disadvantages for their own
broader interests?
How will Japan perceive the impact on its security?
-- How will it perceive the impact on its
own security relationship with the United States?
-- Is it likely to adopt more supportive policies
with respect to South Korea?
-- In what areas?
-- Is it likely to take initiatives of its own with
respect to North Korea?
Will the commitment to withdrawal affect US/ROK diplomatic
problems in the UN, Third World, elsewhere?
-- Will it bring us any diplomatic or foreign policy
bonuses?
-- Will it increase pressures for direct US/North
Korean contacts?
-- Will it move the waverers further away from the
North Korean cause?
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