US GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWAL: KOREAN STABAILITY AND FOREIGN REACTIONS*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

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US GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWAL: KOREAN
STABILITY AND FOREIGN REACTIONS*
Withdrawing US ground forces from Korea
involves a variety of risks that revolve
around stability on the peninsula and inter-
national reactions especially of the other
major Asian powers. Following a withdrawal,
the situation in Korea will be more uncertain
than it is now, and the general perception of
the US as an Asian power will be diminished.
The extent to which these tendencies develop
depends largely upon the combination of
measures employed to offset or reduce the
risks of a withdrawal.
Stability on the Peninsula
Setting
1. The North continues to seek reunification on its own
terms and has not ruled out the use of force. It has been
deterred by US-South Korean military strength and the US
commitment to the South, the most credible manifestation of
which has been the presence of US combat forces on the
peninsula. Since 1970, however, the military balance between
North and South Korea alone has changed from rough equality
to one that substantially favors the North. This imbalance
is likely to continue for at least the next five years.
The Risks
2. Our most important judgment is that Pyongyang would
view the withdrawal of US ground forces and nuclear weapons as
removing key elements of deterrence.
* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific and is
based on a draft prepared by CIA and reviewed by representatives
of that Agency, DIA, NSA, and intelligence organizations of
the military services.
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-- A US ground force withdrawal could greatly
reduce ROK command and control and intelli-
gence capabilities. ROK forces are highly
dependent on the US command structure for
coordinating multi-division operations and
for sophisticated intelligence, to include
early warning.
-- The withdrawal of US ground forces could lead
to diminished US control of the ROK armed
forces. The South Koreans may seek greater
control of their own forces in light of a
significant reduction in US ground forces..
This would remove the restraining influence
of the US over ROK reactions to North Korean
provocations.
-- Foreign lender confidence in South Korea may
decrease. A ground forces withdrawal may make
it more difficult for South Korea to attract
needed foreign capital. South Korea depends
on a heavy flow of foreign capital to pay off
existing debts, keep its economy growing, and
build up its defense industries. Seoul's
economic progress over the years has been a
critical factor in maintaining political
stability and general confidence in the Pak
government.
-- A US withdrawal, combined with a deterioration
in US-ROK relations, could create political
instability in the South. President Pak's
ability to remain in power hinges in an
important way on his management of relations
with the US; this could become critical during
and after a troop withdrawal. If South Korean
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military leaders and other members of the
elite came to believe that his policies
and behavior were diminishing the overall
US security commitment, they might attempt
to force him from power. This would entail
considerable political turmoil, which
Pyongyang would view as an opportunity for
intervention.
-- The withdrawal of US ground troops could
undermine South Korean resolve. US ground
forces have always been an important
psychological factor in South Korea. The
withdrawal of these troops would have a
major impact on the morale of the South
Korean military and is also likely to
affect general civilian confidence in the
future of_ the country, as well.
4. In deciding whether to undertake major hostilities
during or after a US withdrawal, Pyongyang would be heavily,
influenced by its perceptions of the reliability of the US
security commitment, the military balance, and political
conditions in the South. If Pyongyang decided to attack the
South, its most likely immediate military objective would be
the rapid seizure of Seoul, and the consolidation of its gains.*
In so moving, Pyongyang would hope to deny the South the
opportunity to bring its larger reserve forces into play,
minimize the duration and extent of US involvement, and avoid
reliance on Soviet or Chinese military assistance. It might
calculate that the US, China, and the USSR would all seek
to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible time.
In such a situation, with the ROKG likely in disarray, the
North would see itself in an extremely advantageous position.
Compensating Measures
5. The ROK cannot, on its own, correct its military
deficiencies and compensate for the capabilities of the US ground
* The imbalance favoring the North over the South alone is probably
sufficient to assure the success of a well-executed military
operation to seize the Seoul area. This assessment is based in
large part on the ability of the North to achieve sufficient
surprise to preclude South Korea from bringing its ground and
air capabilities to bear in time to counter such an attack.
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forces over the next five years under the current Force
Improvement Plan. ROK planning includes an increase in defense
spending from $1.5 billion in 1976 to $4 billion, or 6.9 percent
of GNP, by 1981. Even so, South Korea will remain well behind
the North in force capabilities at least until the mid-1980s
if the North continues military acquisitions at current rates.
6. South Korea has a limited ability to increase defense
allocations above planned levels without seriously reducing
economic growth. During the next five years, each additional
$1 billion in annual ROK defense spending above programmed
levels will reduce the planned annual increase in GNP by roughly
15 percent. The reduced GNP growth rate in turn would restrict
subsequent government revenues, and increase Seoul's difficulty
in attracting the large amounts of foreign capital it needs
to sustain its export oriented economy.
7. The US, however, can reduce the risks attendant to
withdrawal in a variety of ways:
-- Retaining US tactical air capability and a
residual logistical support group. Given
the military balance, there is little question
of the importance of maintaining US tactical
air and residual logistic support facilities.
-- Phasing troop withdrawals. A prolonged ground
force withdrawal would have a less unfavorable
impact than an early, compressed withdrawal.
Indeed, leaving open the date for the with-
drawal of all ground forces would have
important effects in Pyongyang and Seoul.
Both would view an open-ended schedule as an
indication that withdrawal would be governed
more by security conditions on the peninsula
than by US domestic pressures. Moreover,
the continued presence of US ground combat
units, although reduced in size, will still
confront Pyongyang with the possibility that
aggression could result in some form of
massive US intervention. Any inclination in
the North to undertake provocations during a
withdrawal would thus be inhibited. The South
might be more inclined to delay assuming
greater control of their own forces or more
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willing to compromise in determing transfer
of command arrangements. The result would
be more US restraining influence over
possible ROK military reactions.
-- Retaining intelligence assets that might provide
early warning of a North Korean attack. Early
warning of an attack is absolutely essential
for the successful defense of the South. Warning
time is already critical and will become more so
-- Assisting the ROK in strengthening its defenses
and in acquiring the military equivalence of
the US ground forces now stationed in Korea.
A strong, unequivocal US effort to improve ROK
military capabilities would be critical to
continued stability on the peninsula. Such
an effort would alter Pyongyang's perception
of the military balance, enhance the prospects
for continued political stability in the South,
and diminish any inclination in Seoul to
reconsider a nuclear weapons option.
-- Assuring that other US actions or statements do
not send the wrong signal to either the North
or the South, but rather underscore the
continued US security commitment. Diplomatically,
the ROK is acutely sensitive to the possibility
of US-North Korean contacts and to any
modification of the cross recognition formula.
Movement in these areas could increase South
Korean anxiety that our ground force withdrawal
is only a prelude to a total pull out.
On the other hand, initiatives
to increase understandings among the major
powers about the desirability of stability on
the peninsula would be seen by Seoul as continued
US willingness to work in its behalf and by
Pyongyang with discomfort.
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The US security commitment would also be
reinforced in Pyongyang and Seoul by the
augmentation of US air power in the South,
forward basing of US Navy assets in the
Pacific, and demonstrations of US mobility
capabilities through field exercises.
To be credible in the Koreas and else-
where, our public statements regarding US
commitment to South Korea's security should
carry the clear message that our decisions
on force levels will be based on security
considerations. Such statements, supported
by the compensating measures mentioned above,
would have an important ameliorative effect
on all elements relating to stability on
the peninsula, including morale in the South,
and confidence of its economic lenders.
International Reactions
Japan
8. Tokyo prefers that US ground forces remain in Korea,
but is resigned to a withdrawal. Japanese perceptions of
and policies regarding security issues in Northeast Asia and
the peninsula in particular are unlikely to change appreciably.
9. Japanese leaders want the US to preserve a maximum
presence in Asia. They believe that stability in Korea is
essential to Japan's own security. Even so, Japan has been
especially wary of direct involvement in South Korean security
issues in light of its "no-war" constitution, its limited
self-defense forces, and consistently negative Japanese
popular attitudes toward issues termed either "Korean" or
"military." Although the Japanese public dialogue is now
more open and rational about security issues, Japanese leaders
still consider any direct military contribution to South
Korean security a political impossibility.
10. In 1976-77, the Japanese government voiced greater
concern about Washington's intention to withdraw US ground
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forces than it did in 1970 about the removal of the 7th
Infantry Division. In stressing these concerns, Tokyo must
realize that it is inviting a US counterproposal, i.e., that
Japan more directly contribute to Korean security, something
Tokyo is not prepared to do. Specifically, the Japanese are
concerned that a withdrawal:
be undertaken only after a careful review
of strategic considerations and explained
in such terms. The Japanese do not want
a US withdrawal to be perceived as a
consequence of US domestic pressures to
chastise President Pak. Any evidence that
US domestic concerns are overriding the
strategic interests of its Asian allies
would, in Japanese eyes, call into question
American reliability.
-- be carefully phased over 4-5 years to lessen
the impai:.t on the strategic balance and
provide time for strengthening South Korean
capabilities.
-- involve consultations with Japan, enabling
the government to assimilate US thinking
and to demonstrate at home that Washington
is taking Tokyo's interests into account.
At the same time, the Japanese do not want
to be cast in a codeterminant role that might
involve responsibilities Tokyo would like
to avoid.
11. In voicing concern about a withdrawal, Tokyo is
reassuring South Korea that it remains of paramount importance
in Japan's view of the peninsula.
Predictably,
Pyongyang has reacted strongly to Tokyo's public support for a
continued US military presence in the South. But Tokyo's
continuing support for Seoul is no surprise to the North, and
the economic benefit of closer ties with Japan may prompt some
positive responses by Pyongyang.
12. Tokyo does not expect the North to change its hostile
attitude toward the South or to abandon its objective of con-
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trolling the entire peninsula. The Japanese, however, believe
that closer ties with Pyongyang will at least improve their
chances of acting as a moderating influence and serve as a
hedge against any further unanticipated adjustments in US policy
in the region.
13. Tokyo realizes that its increased nonmilitary i.nvolve--
ment in Korean affairs cannot compensate for a shrinking US
military presence in the South. Thus, Japan can be expected
to continue to work for new international understandings that
would shore up stability on the peninsula; in this respect,
Tokyo would undoubtedly welcome any new US initiatives. Japan
has been quietly representing Seoul's interests in both Moscow
and Peking.
Pyongyang's Major Allies
14. A major factor currently shaping the strategic balance
in Northeast Asia has been a rare convergence of Chinese and
Soviet interest in maintaining Korean stability.
15. The PRC and USSR approach the Korean situation in
ambivalent terms. Both are Pyongyang's treaty allies and
traditional military suppliers, and both, in part because of
their political rivalry with each other, publicly support North.
Korea's call for withdrawal of US forces from the South. On
the other hand, both Peking and Moscow clearly have placed
pursuit of useful relations with the US and Japan above North
Korean ambitions for reunification. They seek to disassociate
themselves from Kim I1-song's more rash actions and view the
US security commitment to Seoul as a useful ingredient in the
mix of factors that keep peace on the peninsula and restrain
any Japanese impulse toward rearmament. The Chinese tacitly
have taken an especially positive view of US military presence,
not only in Korea but throughout East Asia, seeing it as a help
in blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.
16. We lack hard and authoritative information on Moscow's
and Peking's reaction to proposed US force reductions in Korea.
Low level Soviet commentary has emphasized the likely maintenance
of US air power in South Korea, pointing out that this represents
continued US support for the Pak government and connotes no
real change in the situation. The private comments of a few
Chinese officials abroad have been in the same vein.
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17. This scant evidence probably reflects Chinese and
Soviet concern that any withdrawal of US ground forces be
accomplished in a manner that does not disrupt the basic
political and military status quo on the peninsula. As long as
a US force reduction is accompanied by effective compensating
measures -- and the maintenance of US air and naval power in
the area -- it will be seen by Moscow and Peking as a continuation
of the US military drawdown in Asia but not as the removal of a
credible US security commitment to South Korea.
1.8. Peking and Moscow probably fear that Kim will move too
quickly and aggressively toward a "tension-building" policy in.
the wake of a US force reduction. There is some evidence that
Kim unsuccessfully sought Chinese support for such a policy
following the fall of Saigon in April 1975.
19. Moscow and Peking would be motivated to discourage
Kim from embarking on a major conflict with all of its
troublesome and uncertain implications for Japanese security
policy, bilateral re:.ations with the US, and the power balance
in East Asia. But, if Kim became convinced that the US no
longer posed a credible deterrent and that other signs of
weakness or instability in the South had opened the door for
a quick victory, it is doubtful that either Moscow or Peking
would be willing or able to place a veto on the venture.
20. Moreover, the buildup of offensive military capabilities-
in the North and its growing self-reliance in arms production
suggest that Pyongyang recognizes that it must be able to mount
a surprise attack without Soviet and Chinese support. We
believe that the North is capable of such an operation.
21. Moscow and Peking no doubt are anticipating North
Korean pressure for increased military assistance in the event
that a US force reduction leads to a substantial upgrading of
South Korean military capabilities. The Chinese in recent years
have been more forthcoming than Moscow in supplying military
assistance. But Pyongyang would have to turn primarily to
Moscow since China cannot supply the advanced equipment North
Korea would require to match a US assistance package for the
South.
22. Moscow has turned a deaf ear to Pyongyang's requests
for more sophisticated military equipment in recent years. if,
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however, they believed that South Korea's military capability
had been significantly upgraded, they would probably respond
with assistance to strengthen the North. Over the next year
or so, Moscow is not likely to respond to requests for
offsetting aid in a manner which further tilts the military
balance in favor of the North.
23. We do not believe that a US force reduction,
accompanied by compensating measures, would significantly alter
current Soviet or Chinese perceptions of the US as a world power
or significantly complicate the US relationship with either.
Both, for some time, have seen the US as generally on the
defensive internationally and, more specifically, as unwilling
to become engaged in a future land war in Asia. Both will base
their future calculations of US influence in the East Asian
region in large part on the degree to which the US maintains
its ability to project military force as a Pacific power..
Elsewhere in East Asia
24. The ASEAN states share the general concern that
stability be maintained on the peninsula and see a continuing
link between the maintenance of American power in Asia and
their own security. None, with the possible exception of the
Philippines, has confidence that the US would defend them in
any regional conflict. But all of them believe that a con-
tinued American presence and interest -- including a military
presence "over the horizon" -- is an essential element in
maintaining the present equilibrium in Southeast as well as
Northeast Asia.
25. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan probably will see
a withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea as reinforcing
their view of Washington's reduction of its commitments in East
Asia and of the inevitability of an eventual normalization of
relations between Washington and Peking. Over the short term,
however, Taipei may also argue that the US should not simul-
taneously withdraw its ground forces in South Korea and abrogate
its security treaty with the Nationalists.
2`6. Elsewhere, North Korea may hope that a US ground force
withdrawal from South Korea will be seen as vindicating its
policies and thus provide additional support for Pyongyang.
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We believe, however, that US withdrawal plans will more likely
work against North Korea's efforts to mobilize world opinion
against Seoul and Washington. Support for North Korea. in the
Third World has levelled off in the last year or so due to
.Pyongyang's blunt tactics and an effective counterattack by
South Korea and the US. With a US withdrawal underway, the
Korean problem in general is likely to become less urgent in
the nonaligned movement, even for Third World militants.
Indeed, the US and South Korea may find it easier to focus
international attention on the key issue of maintaining
stability on the Korean Peninsula.
13 May 1977
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