US GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWAL: KOREAN STABILITY AND FOREIGN REACTIONS*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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US GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWAL: KOREAN
STABILITY AND FOREIGN REACTIONS*
be diminished. The extent to which these
less certain than.it is-now, and the general
perception of the US.as an Asian power will
major Asian powers. Following a withdrawal,
the military situation in Korea will be
Withdrawing US ground forces from Korea
involves a variety of risks that revolve
around stability on the peninsula and inter-
national reactions -- especially of the other
tendencies develop depends largely upon
the combination of measures employed to
Stability on the peninsula
Impact on the Koreas
1. Pyongyang has not renounced the use of force asa
means of reunification. It has thus far been deterred by US-.
South Korean military strength and the US commitment to the
South, the most credible manifestation of which has been the
presence of US combat forces on the peninsula. Pyongyang will
view .a withdrawal of US ground forces as 25X1
removing key elements of deterrence. Moreover, since 1970
the static military balance between North and South Korea
has changed from rough equality to one that substantially -
favors the North. - This imbalance is likely to. continue for:
at least the next five years.
gains. In so moving, Pyongyang would hope to deny the South -
'South, its most likely immediate military objective would be
the rapid seizure of Seoul, and the consolidation of its
conditions in the South. If Pyongyang decided to attack the
security commitment, the military balance, and political..-.
influenced by its perceptions of the reliability of the USA
during or after a US withdrawal, Pyongyang would be-heavily"- I
2.; '.. In deciding whether to undertake major hostilities`
* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific. it is
largely based on a draft prepared by CIA and reviewed by
representatives of that Agency, DIA, NSA, and intelligence
organizations of the military services.
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the opportunity to bring its larger reserve forces into play,,
minimize the duration and extent of US involvement, and avoid
reliance on Soviet or Chinese military assistance. It might
calculate that the US, China, and the USSR would all seek
to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible time.
In such a situation, with the ROKG likely in disarray, the
North would see itself in an extremely advantageous position.
3. The impact on South Korea will range over a wide
of the US over..ROK reactions to North Korean
a significant reduction in US ground forces.
This would remove the restraining influence
control of their-own forces in-light of
-- The--South Koreans will -likely"'seek. greater
provocations.
-- AUS ground force withdrawal could greatly
reduce ROK.command and o o and
gence capabilities.
existing debts, keep its economy'growing, and
build up its defense industries. Seoul's
economic progress over the years has been a
critical factor in maintaining political
stability and general confidence in the Pak
government.
-- ki. grouna rorces, witnarawal. may maze it more
difficult for South Korea to attract needed
foreign capital. South Korea depends on a-
heavy flow of foreign capital to pay off
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-- A US withdrawal, combined with a deterioration
in US-ROK relations, could create political
instability in the South. President Pak's
ability to remain in power hinges in an
important way on his management of relations
with the US; this could become critical
during and after a troop withdrawal.
-- A withdrawal of US ground troops could undermine
always been an important psychological factor-
South Korean resolve. US ground forces have
in South Korea. The withdrawal of.these troops
would have a major impact on the morale of the
South.Korean military and is also likely to
of the country, as well.
affect general civilian confidence in the future
4 South Korea has a limited ability to increase defense
allocations above planned levels without seriously reducing
economic yL VWLh. The US,.. nowever,. can reduce the risks at
to withdrawal in a variety of ways:
-- Retaining US tactical air capability will
maintain an impression of commitment and a.
capability for supporting ROK forces in
combat. It is unlikely, however, that air
power would be a decisive factor in defeating
a surprise thrust by North Korea toward Seoul.
-- Phasing troop withdrawals. Leaving open.the--
.date-for the final withdrawal of all ground
forces' would have important effects in Pyongyang
schedule as an indication that withdrawal--would
ana Seoul., Both would view an open-ended:".".
be governed more by security conditions on t-h e
peninsula-"than by US domestic pressures.
-- Retaining intelligence assets that might provide
early warning of a North Korean attack. Early
warning of an attack is essential for the
successful defense of the South.
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and in acquiring the military equivalence of
the US ground forces now stationed in Korea.
A strong, unequivocal US effort to improve
ROK military capabilities would be critical
to continued stability on the peninsula.
Such an effort would alter Pyongyang's per-
ception of the military balance, enhance the
prospects for continued political stability_
in the South, and-diminish any. inclination in
Seoui to--reconsider a nuclear- weapons option..-
Assisting the ROK in strengthening its defenses
its behalf and by Pyongyang with discomfort.
Seoul as continued US willingness to work in.
hand, initiatives.to increase understandings-,,.,-
among the major powe:-s about the ?'_lesirability
of stability on-the peninsula would be seen by
ofthe cross recognition formula.. On the other
is acutely sensitive to the possibility of US-
North Korean contacts and to any_modification_
North or the South.._Diplomatically, the ROK-
could send the wrong signal to either the
Avoiding other US actions or statements-which`
capabilities through field exercises.
The US security commitment would also be re-
inforced in Pyongyang and Seoul by the
augmentation of US air power in the South,
forward basing of US Navy assets in the
Pacific, and demonstrations of US mobility
5. Japanese leaders, believing that stability in.Korea*is
essential s to Japan's own security, prefer that US ground forces
remain in Korea. -The Japanese government has voiced greater "
concern about our intention to withdraw the remaining US ground
forces than it did in 1970 about the removal of the 7th Infantry
Division. Nonetheless, Tokyo is resigned to a withdrawal. It
is unlikely that Japanese security policies will be changed
appreciably. Tokyo still considers any direct military con-
tribution to South Korean security a political impossibility in
light of its "no war" constitution, its limited self-defense
forces, and consistently negative Japanese popular attitude
toward issues termed either "Korean" or "military."
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6. In voicing concern about a withdrawal, Tokyo is re-
assuring South Korea that it remains of paramount importance-
in Japan's view of the peninsula. At the same time, Tokyo
is privately signaling its willingness to expand trade,
cultural, and unofficial political exchanges with North Korea.
Predictably, Pyongyang has reacted strongly to Tokyo's
public support for a continued US military presence in the
South. But Tokyo's continuing support for Seoul is no surprise
to the North, and the economic.benefit of closer ties with
Japan- may prompt some positive -responses__by Pyongyang. _ Tokyo
does.-.-not expect the North. to change its'_ hostile attitude toward
.the South or to abandon its objective of controlling the entire
peninsula. The Japanese, however, believe that closer ties.
with Pyongyang will at least improve their chances of acting.-
as a moderating influence and serve as a hedge against any
further unanticipated adjustments in US policy"in the region."
Still,.. Tokyo realizes that its increased nonmilitary involve-
ment _,in Korean affairs cannot compensate for. a shrinking US
military presence in the South. Thus, Japan can be expected
to continue to work for new international understandings that:
would-shore up stability on the peninsula; in this respect,
Tokyo would undoubtedly welcome any new US initiatives..
7. A possible lingering Japanese concern that will need
to be offset by US actions and words is that our unwillingness
to treat North East Asia with anything approximating the same
concern as Western Europe is the product of a racist order of
priorities. This theme has appeared recently in the Japanese
press. .
8. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan probably will see
--withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea as reinforcing
.
-their view of Washington's reduction. of its commitments in East'--
Asia and of. the- inevitability of an eventual normalization of
:relations between Washington and Peking. Over the short-term,.,
nowever,_Taipei.may.also argue that the US should not simultane-
ously withdraw its ground forces in South Korea and abrogate
its security treaty with the Nationalists.
9. The ASEAN states share the general concern that
stability be maintained on the peninsula and see a continuing
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link between the maintenance of American power in Asia and
their own security. None, with the possible exception of the
Philippines, has confidence that the US would defend them in
any regional conflict. But all of them believe that a continued
American presence and interest -- including a military presence
"over the horizon" is an essential element in maintaining
the present equilibrium in Southeast as well as Northeast Asia.
10 :` A major--factor--currentlyshaping the'strategic balance
in Northeast Asia has been-a rare convergence of Chinese'and
Soviet interest in.maintaining_Korean stability. The PRC and
USSR approach the Korean situation in ambivalent terms.-..--Both
are Pyongyang's treaty allies and traditional military suppliers,
and both, in part because of their political rivalry with each
other, publicly- support.North Korea's call for withdrawal - of
US_.forces.from the-South. On the other hand, both Peking and
Moscow clearly have placed-pursuit of useful relations with the.
US and Japan above North Korean :ambitions for reunification.
They seek to disassociate themse_Lves from Kim Il-song's more
-rash actions and vier the US security commitment to Seoul as
a useful ingredient in the mix of factors-that keep peace on the
peninsula and restrain any Japanese impulse toward rearmament.
The Chinese tacitly have taken an especially positive view of
US military presence, not only in Korea but throughout East
Asia., seeing it as a help in blocking the expansion of Soviet
influence in the region.
11. The Chinese and. Soviets are probably concerned that
any withdrawal of US ground forces be accomplished in a manner
that does. not disrupt the basic political and military status duo
on the peninsula. As long as.a.US force reduction is accompanied
by effective compensating measures -- and - the maintenance of
.Moscow and Peking. as the removal of a credible US security
-commitment to'South Korea- .Moscow and Peking, moreover. would
be motivates to discourage Kim from embarking on a major conflict
with all of its troublesome and uncertain implications for
Japanese security policy, bilateral relations with the US, and
the power balance in East Asia. But, if Kim became convinced
that the US no longer posed a credible deterrent and that other
signs of weakness or instability in the South had opened the
door for a quick victory, it is doubtful that either Moscow or
Peking would be willing or able to place a veto on the venture.
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further: tilts the military balance in favor cf the North.
respond to requests for offsetting aid -in a manner_which-
_12. Moscow and Peking no doubt are anticipating North
Korean pressure for increased military assistance in the event
that a US force reduction leads to a substantial upgrading of
South Korean military capabilities. Pyongyang would have to
turn primarily to Moscow since China cannot supply the advanced
equipment North Korea would require to match. a US assistance
package for the South. If the Soviet Union believed that
South Korea's military capability had been significantly up-
graded, it would probably respond with assistance to strengthen
the North. Over the next year or so, Moscow is not-likely-to
manner in. which the Chinese and Soviets will.. view an American.-
war in Asia. But there are some important differences in the.,
specifically, as unwilling. to become engaged in a-- land`
US as generally on the defensive internationally and-i-more-.:
13. Both Moscow and Peking,.. for :some :1time,'-have seen. the
In this context, we do not believe that a withdrawal of ground:
forces from South Korea will significantly complicate the US-
Soviet relationship or lead Moscow to conclude that the US is
less of a global adversary.
to-.be-SALT, commercial dealings, CSCE review and MBER;..Moscow,
will. continue to deal with_ all of these. on their own merits_
14. The bellwethers of the US-Soviet relationship continue
reduction of force in South Korea.
South. Korea not. only as a'deterrent to rash action by Kim
The Chinese tacitly have supported a US military-presence.in.
reduction could raise some troublesome implications.. for Peking..
with the USSR on a global basis. Nevertheless,. a US force
15. Peking's perception of the value of the US relation-
ship depends primarily on its reading of US resolve in.dealing
power role in opposition to the Soviet Union. Peking, however,
is primarily concerned that the US maintain an ability to
project military force as a Pacific power. If a ground force
withdrawal from South Korea is accompanied by effective
compensating measures -- and the maintenance of US air and
a help. in blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in.the-
region and as a sign of continuing US resolve to play a great
presence-.throughout East Asia (except in Taiwan}, seeing 'it as
the Chinese have generally'taken a positive view of US military..
Il-song, but as one element of the strategic ..counterwe-ight to`:..
the threat of Soviet. military: "encirclement"'Jbf- China-, Indeed,
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naval power in the area -- we do not believe that China's
view of the value of the US connection will be significantly
downgraded-
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