THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET TU-95 BEAR D DEPLOYMENTS IN WEST AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1977
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
Interagency
Intelligence
Memorandum
The Significance of Soviet T U-95 Bear D
Deployments in West Africa
Top Secret
NI IIM 77-O1OC
April 1977
Copy N?_ 166
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Top Secre F
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET
TU-95 BEAR D DEPLOYMENTS
IN WEST AFRICA'
KEY JUDGMENTS
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- Deployment of Soviet naval TU-95 Bear D long-range reconnais-
sance aircraft to Conakry and the staging of operational flights from
there is in keeping with the pattern of evolving Soviet out-of-area
naval operations.
- Bear D deployments to Conakry begun in 1973 are one element of a
Soviet effort to expand the area of its maritime surveillance which
includes deployments to Cuba, Somalia, and, very recently to
Angola. Operating from all four of these countries, as well as from
Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula, Bear Ds can conduct operations
over virtually any area of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- In general, Bear D operational missions add little to the Soviet
strategic threat to the continental US. However, Bear Ds staging
from Conakry, Cuba, and Soviet bases in the Kola Peninsula,
contribute to the threat to Western naval forces operating in the
northern Atlantic Ocean, including the western approaches to the
Mediterranean.
- The use of airfields in Guinea and Angola has extended the
Soviets' area of air reconnaissance into parts of the South Atlantic
which they could not reach from Cuba or the USSR.
- In peacetime Bear Ds operating from Conakry can perform ocean
surveillance, collect intelligence, fly search and rescue missions,
and provide support to the Soviet manned space flight program.
' This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces with contributions and concurrence from CIA, State/INR, and DIA.
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To
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The ocean surveillance mission is part of a worldwide Soviet effort
to monitor Western naval surface forces to provide reasonably
accurate knowledge of the dispositions of these forces at the
inception of a crisis or hostilities.
- In peacetime much of the reconnaissance effort and intelligence
collection in the eastern Atlantic now performed by Bear Ds from
Conakry could be accomplished by missions staged from the Kola
Peninsula or Cuba. However, flight time to these surveillance
areas would be increased and on-station time over the objective
would be reduced.
- The wartime roles of the Bear Ds include tactical reconnaissance
in support of Soviet naval operations, direct targeting of
US/NATO naval forces-particularly aircraft carriers-and provi-
sion of additional means for relaying wartime commands to
deployed ballistic missile submarines.
Bear Ds constitute an extremely important component of the Soviet
ocean surveillance system for locating and targeting surface forces at
sea.
- The other components, singly or in combination, do not provide a
comparable alternative to Bear D, but enhance the effectiveness
of Bear D operations.
- With advanced warning of impending Bear D operations, certain
technological countermeasures such as electronic emission control
can reduce the effectiveness of the flights. However, short of
hostile action the US has no totally effective means of negating
the capability of Bear D.
- If the Soviets should lose access to Guinea, they would probably seek
to reestablish their capability in another African country. Most of
the countries are poor and some might be tempted to allow Soviet
use of facilities in return for aid. However, a variety of
factors-political, logistic, technical, and geographic-would ham-
per or thwart a Soviet effort to reestablish a Bear D reconnaissance
capability in West Africa.
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Potential Scope of TU-95D Surveillance Coverage of Atlantic Ocean
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