SPEAKING APPEARANCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002700110006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 13, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Approved. Release 2002/06/06 : CIA-RDP7911.67A002700110006-5
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
DDA
NIO
SUBJECT
13 December 1976
Speaking Appearances
On occasion (e.g. Counterspy article based on Don
Gregg's remarks to students at the University of Texas)
a speaking appearance by an Agency official may be inaccurately
reported. Although more often than not we are left with no
possible or effective rebuttal anyway, absence of our own
record frustrates this option in every case. Accordingly,
I urge that Agency speakers make it a practice of recording
their remarks, including Q A exchanges. This is a standard
procedure, I may add, whenever the DCI speaks in public.
The tape should be retained, for a reasonable period of
time (45-60 days). STATINT
cc: DCIZ
DDCI
1,
1 i ir-
u,
1 ,
( 4 4 e ??? ?,",,..r. .... , ..
, .
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Andrew T. FaXktiewicz
Assistant to the/Director
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r Release 2002/06/06 ClA,R1)P79M 467A.062700110QW5
. Don'ak reveals f7A Could
adhroW Par C.10.1.0:1:3,7310
On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speak-
ing at the University of Texas, .warned that if. President park
; run.for.another.siX year terrn.,-a?he expeCted to dcohe
?;!-.will.'probably not livF:.-to?se.rv.e.- Out his term. The CIA agent
..?:?:;left.it.- open whether the:CIA would support a coup against
:. Park like the One in _i.vhich-Diein kvas-assasinated in Viet-
, .
nam.:?:.The agent was .'Dort Gregg Whose background for
'sounding such .a warning inaudes being the CIA chief O. T
'.:.station' in Korea until last yea-r..Gregg spent 18 of his 25
years:,in.'the CIA in Asia Ten of those years were spent in
'Japan,. 'the .rest in ..-the,?Nlarianas, -Vietnam Burma and
occasion -for these surprisingly.can did remarks was a ?
7 :trip: to., Austin, Texas to-give_ a lecture for -a. course: ow
.."Policy. Makers- in .doiernment'.", direcled..by '.Dr. Sidney.
Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in 'meeting with
* :
foreign students and. the Center, 'for -Asian Studies Was pie-.
? ?yailed upon to provide a.meeting place?
Gregg- had. much to say 'about his. work in South Korea
ahd about General Park:He stated that South Korea must
Stave McGuire .
'.?.- the Koreans ...were building a berth for the weapon. Ser
? ? enough they were and. the U.S.. then confronted the
?Koreans. with \the evidence. Gregg evidently. thought- that
placing sophisticated weapons in _Korea's hands was rcai
funny, We are lucky that they did not decide to use them.
- ? "--- ? ?The CIA evidently wants to keep Pack and his boys from
getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as
as. they do?hot get carried away. The CIA was involve,1 in
the life.of an opposition leader in Korea who was
a-fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied. around
his feet_ In another incident the Korean 'CIA head wa-:
?-?;???"-; removed after he committed a brutal murder of a profess.
-. Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill" Castro by .o:
Mafia-hit men,- Gregg said that he once.
:why Richard Helms failed to..tell d;.e Warren Cornmissic.e:
? about the cm plots 'against Castro. Gregg was told. that
. Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about Th.,-
: -
? attempts but said nothing; so Helms did likewise.
,-..Gregg character.ized Kissinger as a man who likes inteili-
?-_gence information. Since the end of the.Vietnant War, Kiss-
depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence mfor meet lii .been one of the CIA's -most 'avid-customers*,
:- -? ? .
_,.
--.?.2rnatiOn about the North .-..Gregg peisonally..feels.ithat- the ...%:.`:.7. Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because
? - best---:thing which Park. coUld . do - woUld ? be *to resign.. He they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were
, .
? ...
:? could.- then be a national hero and also be responsible for......-. going to lose The CIA was a: major source of information
? .....-
South ? Korea's first Peaceful change of .goveinmen t. How- .,.::-...e. during the Angolan- conflict...Gregg stated that the. CIA. was
.-.:. :ever; the CIA feels that a. coup :right now might_encourage. -'..;. only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba beca me.
?-? :-.
? . - ,.,the North to attack,' so they continueto provide Park with.' " -?_. involved. Ho,:vever, in: order to get into Angola-to-provid3
information. about coup attempts. Whether .they will con--:....:..:: reports, as Gregg put it, training some military _troops was -
:?.tintra to do soin the future is unclear. ;.:.:H.;.' :-.`???-.. - ? ?- -?,-; ' ---::?-?.:1..a quid pro quo for being allowed near the -action: --.-'-'-'.: ,-oi -:?- --
? :--?*--,Gregg had high ? praiSe'fOr'Lt. General ...lathes F-.:?1`Holly,,,?-,e?-e..- . Gregg claimed ignorance of the nimors that ,Saipan Was .--
'? 'Hollingsworth, former allied cprnmaridei along the DMZ in -.'-,:,.-=. a major .nuciear:weaPons base. He said that. the 'mariannas .
-- -. .-Korea..Arl'article"whichappeared. in the. Wall Street Jo urital -- ? :?were not overflowing with CIA men-, and that the CIA was .
: ? recen tli, (January .13 ,.1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as.. ? .-..?not involved in squelching dissent on the islands.
:an old-style general whose. primal instinct- was.to kill com-' ?-:?''.-----:Frorrr -1953 to 1963,- Gregg .VI:is inVolVed - in covert .
rnies- Hollingsworth ? claimed that he 'could end another ? :::. activitieS in Japan. Japan was a case where ,--as Gregg.put it, -
Korean War in nine days, fotir;days of 'real violence' and -?:-:. the CIA 'did their job right Apparently Meaning that the"
:
. ?-?' ?.- five- days' to clean up. :Gregg said he agreed with 1-101lings-:'''-'-;?radical left opposition, such a? the Communist Party of
. . . .
.: . .
. ..- .
-""worth's assessment of a nine day ? war, and stated that the -- .:-.::-Japan, was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA,
?-.-.? . WSJ article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth: . ....,-.'.--... employing one .of their favpfite..techniques, provided. sup-
: .,.? Gregg told an 'amusing story about how the U.S. once .".;'..","-port for Moderate left opposition .parties_Stich as- the .
-caugat the"South Koreans with. sophisticated weaponry ::.:'. Socialists and the Social .Democrats. While engaged in these -.
which they Were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his . -:'7covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working
- information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confronted ' -- - for the 'Department of Army. and an employee. or the
. _
. '. the Korean Admiral With the charge. Of cOurse the Korean" '-American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked- directly with" the
' I .denied ? it and the U.S. Admiral believed him-. 'The .U.S.* - Japanese police.- .- -. ?.- --- .--rs.- o.- .: . - ?-.: r'? .?:.'?.....,' .-...,??---: :, -
-0 ? ;.: Admiral then proceeded to chew . Gregg out about his -,:., Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg, served in
'.?' ? ? .
..., . 'sources': ? . ---- - ? ::.,.;-1:-.?-:-.:;?-? ?;?:'-',;... ?.. . - .? - ? '. .. . . Vietnam where he began his CIA career- in 1952. He WM,-
. . . ,
Gregg suggested that -aerial surveys be made /IQ s.e.e if....:,A: AlovolryitkoirkehitgAtilkOettitWinft made no 'mention of:
. . _ . .
- -- ? ? 'Ala- broVed Fdr-Rlease-.2.002/Vblut.-:'--
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. _..,........
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.t,
Operation Phoenix. .. -.-approached twice by Bill Wood with the offer on, spe,..--?,
Regarding CIA involvement in ' the overthrow -. of. from the C.I.A. including .ozte time shortly after Wei
Allende's regime in Chile, Greg said that the election of a... ..traub's arrival (Fall 1976)..- . . '... .. ? -. - --._ .__-.:.,..
Marxist in South Arne.rica posed a threat to the U.S. govern- ... BM Wood, the personnel director, of the local C.I.A2:.
ment's design for South America. It waS. essential that . office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a,"! don't be- -
? Allende be overthrown as a -lesson to other...Third World . have we've met.." No one escapes being asked: "Do you -
countries-that the U.S. will not tolerate- any.Communist.. .think this sort of thing is worth while?" The .universal ''
governments which it feels threaten U.S. interests. ? ? . : ?:,.... answer is affirmative, althonah some for different reasons.-..
- On international terrori .7
sm Gre0 felt that .Libya was the than others. . -.- - - - -. : - - -._:: ? _ . ... ..
. . .
. - -
'patron saint'. of the terrorists-. According to...Oregg, Libya .1' i_ ; The process, begun earlier, ia the afternoon, discussion _.
appears to .be the Country which is providing a substantial -:'.iession of stressing the idea that the CIA_ is basically an
part of the financial and moral support for the terrorists ? . "alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy, ,s
. ..
throughout the world.: ::.-, :-.'.1- .- - ?' ?? '. :. :.--:-...--......, ,::-.-1.,--. continues unabate.d. There might have been occasional cases
, After the2aeneral Meeting with Don Gregg a number of -...-of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured. ' ---1
.
professors gathered in-.the?plus'n surroundings .of the Uni-i.-. ? The less public -Process of establis'ning liaison with the :.
..
versity of _Texas faculty club for.-a.--cocktail.-party.?,-Don ':-.. academic community engaged in . foreign area studies also ? ,
.. _ .
Gregg and Bill Wood Served as both the. guests of honor and continues unabate.d. The foreign area.studies-centers repre--:.-
- - :the hosts After drinks -8Orneone .asks,l."Whats your Sign,. ;_ -sent valuable sources Of training and expertise to the C.I.A.. .---,-
... :
n. ,......?.:...z.- ..... ?. . and the centers are highly dependent an always uncer-
,:. .
- - -....."Sattarius.," he said....- .., Lain grant ftinding. Grant support is a powerful inducement ?
..,:. -
-- "I kne,:iiit; dfire signia 'Sign 'Of adventure. .. ...even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would
. : ..-
- -Doh adds,' `.`-!....-don't regret my twenty five years inthe...,-.. accrue..in due' time: to al of me centers associates and
. . .. _
C..1_k.after all . what did the rest of :my -Classmates do irf. students_ . That tins might - be rnorally.-%-vrong,- that area '---
.. . . .
. ..
r. . .... .
- - - that time, just divorces and dull jobsA joined up because it, specialists should- mit be agents of a particulargovernment,..-.,
? .
.was the thing to do at that time :. -;;.-:?':;-::.--.?:;-- ,:.::::'...:-.-:?.-.:'....iliY-....&?:::.::*.i. and that they may be accordingly shut out of their :court-
... In the midst of the polite chit-chat the C.1.A'. gets .down ::. tries of interest, is mit brought up... -,-'.....*...--...:?.;:-.7.,;.,..., : '
, . to .!.'brass....tacks", Dr. Jannuzi, director of the Center for . , . Bill Wood, 'always- his effervescent self, attempts ? to'?
Asian Studies, is collared and ..vert. the had sell, to allow :recruit 1.vhere possible;. "When you get to the job hunt:dig
, _
- the CIA to .train Allele. people at the Center..:Jannuii stage give me a tall down at the Federal Building." In gen--,:-..
? equiVocates:-a bit,. We -can't give them any -special. ;.r.5,..t7.,:... .eral, the urbane, sophis:ticated approach 'seems to have an
.....
-,..rnent.-.; Wouldn't '-?a.::...place.'.nearer:.Virginia .?be more ? con-... .-..,almost narcotic effect on Inc fascina- feckfaculty.....r...:,....:5 ? .
-- i?-e.nie4tt Nervous at .thribvious.jeopardy in Which such an .s: -...:.. ..In'concl usion,.Gregg.maintaine.d .that ?the CIA,.throtigh- ...:,:
..--:.?:arrangernentcWoUld- put :the-reputation:61.the:Cei?ter,s:hef.:-;out'its-historY;-%vas:only do-ingswIlatit.was told to do. This :'?
.L.;,,,..,. ,..;.apparently..iesi their. blandishrne* nts.........:.:,.....::-...--..i.:.--...includes both the legal and illegal' acts which the CIA corn- -.:-.----,
_
Dr Sidney Weintaub;.. who had invited Don' -Giegg.:to.::,::..: nutted in toe nameof democracy After' all, Gregg noted; ?"-
. - . , - . ..
:speak at the.:LIB-J:i.School of Public Affairs catches people..--,:;.1the .CIA is really the .'people business7.?W;w&now that;..-.
. . . .? . . ....?. - . . . . .. . .. . :
to ierruriEeVeryone- of the 'excellent-. opportunity to Meet ;:...tind' that's what bothers us, because we do hoitriowi which. --.:-
., . . ._.... , ..,_?.... .... , __..? _ . , ...,..,.
-..'and.interat:...with-.PoliCy Makerk:Di:-.Weintraub hcf-been '-'people.,-::::, -7.. . . .-..:--%%---.---:- - - r:---.'
, ? . ?
.,. ?.,.??,
. -? ::::(7:-...7:1-...:,-:-...s..i.-?-?---.- ,- 7 .----. , .:: : --:-.-- .,----, :-:--:!_f-c..:.-.2.-*::;4?-?,-:.'-7---.,t-,:-.:-;-:;:, f.-7::1!:,0:,-5..:e? ? .e., , - ...e,}",:. _ . , -, ,
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10 December 1976
1:15 p.m.
Ereerveve Fi?-jietry *
Mr. Bush,
President, ABC Sports,
Roone Arledge/would like you to do him a favor. Larry Collins,
a writer (Oh Jerusalem), would like an appointment with you to
discuss a new book he is writing. Mr. Arledge was wondering if
you would see Mr. Collins.
Debbie
Jeannette (Mr. Arledge's sec.)
[phone] X8844
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG
:94 -
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
rNi. 1:L4ola-Air
45u4A.veci, lotis."
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The Houston Post
2 December 1976
;
orris
an ana
o cover-up in Oswald 's
The current flurry of interest in Lee Har-
vey Oswald's 1963 visit to Mexico City is a
perfect example of paranoia at work. It all
looks so sinister, and who is trying to cover
up what, and why?
The answer, of which nobody in the intelli-
gence business has the slightest hope of con-
vincing anyone outside the business,..is that
nobody was covering up anything.
? The CIA had and has a large station in
Mexico City, with excellent liaison ties with
the Mexican internal service. The Mexicans
and the Americans naturally monitor every
telephone line into every Soviet installation ?
these are not "CIA" taps, although the agen-
cy may provide equipment and technical ad-
vice. (The agency, thoroughly tarred, may
claim the taps simply to spare the Mexican
government embarrassment.)
These taps do not provide as much sub-
stantive material as one' might think. The
Soviets do indeed meet American agents in
Mexico City ? but they are not children and
they know perfectly well that their lines are
tapped. Their communications arrangements
with their agents include very firm instruc-
tions not under any circumstances ever to
call the. Soviet embassy, and they will shun
like the plague anyone who does. What pops
up on the taps, therefore, are the assorted
nuts and cranks who for various reasons
want contact with the Soviets.
Every shred of evidence shows that neither-/,
the Soviets nor the Cubans wanted anything
to do with Oswald, whom they regarded as'''
very bad news indeed. In September 1963 he
went to Mexico City and called both the Sovi-
ets and the Cubans, offering "information" in
return for a free trip to Moscow or Havana ? -
a splendid example of how little Oswald knew
about the intelligence world.. (Nobody gives
f.
exico visit
free trips for unspecified "information." But
nobody.) " ?
The Soviets had nointention of letting him'
return to the' USSR, where he had been a
major nuisance. They told him it would take
? three or four months to "process his visa
application." Oswald lied to the Cuban offi-
cials about what the Soviets had told him
(another example of ignorance on his part ?
did he think they wouldn't check?) and left
Mexico in a huff. ?
? The agency ? which turned over all infor-
mation on contacts between Americans and
Soviets in Mexica to the FBI ? did in fact
turn this contact over weeks before Nov. 22.
?But it was one crank call among scores of
others, and the name Oswald, while known as
a crank, had-no significance whatsoever to
anyone in October 1963. There are American
nuts in every country calling Soviet installa-
tions for one reason or another, and Mexico is
as fertile a source of such names as any-
where else.
The record of the call also Went to the
Warren Commission. It was not a verbatim
transcript. No clerk typist whose work, week
after week, is typing transcripts' of tapes, can
or does make absolutely verbatim tran-
scripts. (Just watch a TV. show "captioned
- for the deaf" to see how impossible it is.)
- On-the whole, the CIA performed com-
mendably in catching the contact, transcrib-
ing it and passing it to the FBI through its
normal channels in such a short period. The
transcription errors were minor. Had the con-
versation been reported even with absolute
precision it would have had no more signifi-
cance than what was passed on. It would sim-
ply have confirmed what was already known
-- that Oswald was one of a great number of
left-wing nuts again rebuffed in one of his ef-
forts to make himself attractive to the
Soviets.
This was not sinister in October 1963. It did
not even become sinister in November, al-
though ? because of what Oswald then did ?
it certainly became interesting. It was not
sinister during the Warren hearings, and it
isn't sinister now. -
? But no one inside the business will ever
convince anyone outside of that. For which
. we can probably thank Ian Fleming and a
host of nameless TV writers.
?
?
Donald Morris served with the CIA 11 years. He has
been a columnist for The Houston Post since his retire-
ment from government service in 1972. . -
,.
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APPEARED
ON PA GE * 57 ?
rd.
PENTHOUSE
January 1977
BY-TAD SZULC
The spy agencies have been
ordered to behave theMselves. Theselive items, touching upon the whole
But as these sensational,
,spE.,?ctrurn of United Stales intelligence ac-
tivities, are among the many subjects
,top secret schemes make about which Americans have not been told
painfully clear, it's -business as
des, ite three teparate investigations of the
. intelligence community conducted in 1975
? usual in the land of dirty tricks. and 1976. .
In some instances the investigators sun-
* The United Stales and the Soviet Union ply were not informed about highly sensi-
are engaged in a top-secret "satellite tive operations. The intelligence agencies
?war" in outer ?Sfiace. The aim is to de- volunteered very little and, as a rule. were
- stroy each other's intelligence surveil- responsive to questions only when the
lance satellites with laser-beam weapons. committees developed independent leads
Thus Jar 6e score is 2-0 for the Russians. or sturrilic.d upon information (as in the
WashineO firriejniains latal-silence about case of the cover-up by the CIA and the FBI
? this.wer to avofd public complications in of crucial facts pertaining to the assassina'-
the_riegdpations" for a new strategic-arms tion of John F. Kennedy). -
pad. with-Mo.?cow. - in other instances the intelligence agen-
? foreign insurgent groups are being se- cies invoked "national security" as a rea-
,....crefly trinedin guerrilla operations by son for denying investigators access to
niilitary inte'ffigence agencies and the CIA certain material Finally, there were corn-
..
n"
i au -o -re-way o es ern promises: the Senate Select Committee on
"-United Slates. The trainees include Lao- Intelligence Activities, -tor example. negoti-
Vans, Cambodians. Afghans, Kurds, and ated the extent to which information would
even Russians. This, presumably, por-. be "sanitized" by them?censored, of
tends new covert operations, to be run course, is a better word?before appear-
mainly by the military, all over the world, ing in public reports. ?
Appropriate congressional committees Perhaps the most important area of such
apparently haw:: not beethinformed of it compromise on the part of the Senate
,despite legislative requireMents. committee, which engaged in - the most
? With the surreptitious aid of American exhaustive investigation of all the groups
professors,Third World students at United looking into the intelligence scandals, con-
States colleges and universities are being cerned the CIA's use of American news
recruited by the CIA as 11.11U19 "agents of media and the involvement of university
influence" for the day when they assume professors and administrators?the "aca-'
leadership in their countries. Currently, demics"?in the recruitment of foreign stu-
the CIA has its pick of 250,000 foreign dents by the agency. The majority of the
students attending our institutions of academics, some 60 percent of them, were
higher learning. Such a program clearly- "witting" (they knew that they were used by
degrades our American educational 01-6 CIA to finger prospective recruits);
_system some were paid for their talent-scouting; l
? The CIA still secretly uses-in a variety others acted out of their perceived sense of
of ways American _news, organizations patriotism.
obi-62d as, intelligence "covers" and in- But it's not entirely the CIA's fault that this
formation sources. This is being done description- of the recruiting process failed
to surface in the final repo
despite the CIA's public pledge to keep rt. The burden
its hands oft United States news media. ties chiefly on Sen. Frank Church, the Idaho
Democrat who served as the committee's
? Shortly before the 1973 Vietnam peace
? chairman, and who, despite his many pub-
settlement, United States military intelli-; tic pronouncements of indignation over
; . gence agencies secretly organized an CIA operations, tended to be rather reluc-
1 elaborate "stay-behind" espionage net- tent to embarrass the intelligence commu-
> work?linked to a parallel plan for resum-
i . nity.
! mg American air operations in Vietnam if
: the Communists violated th* cease-fire?
including covert penetrations by special
I teams from abroad. Thus the United
States was prepared lb violate the peace
?
:? agreement even before it was signed.
. _
. ?
? :.
0,
This tendency incased whe-n C
entered the Democratic presidenti prt,-
merles, a pericid coinciding with th draft's
ing of his committee's final report. As a
former committee staff member observed
privately. "Church?was away a lot, he was
not willing to risk his candidacy on pushing
too hard, he'd keep things out of the report
even lithe CIA was willing to let them be
printed." ,
In the case of the academics, the com-
mittee staff and the CIA arrived at an
agreed "sanitized" draft; but in the rush of
things, as the report was being written;
Church Said, "The hell with it!" and the
.section on academics was thrown out.
Thus this whole subject of foreign. student
recruitment is dismissed in the report with
the comment that "American academics
-are now being used for such operational
purposes as making introductions for intel-
ligence purposes:' ?? ?
? The Church committee also compro-
mised to a significant degree on the ques-
tion of how the CIA's collection of intelli-
gence, a legitimate pursuit. often becomes
entangled with covert operations, which
was a matter of substantial concern to the
investigators. In the year-long tug-of-war
between the Senate committee and the
? agency over what materials could be made
available to the senators, the CIA often re-
fused to discuss any number of coven ac-
tions on the grounds that intelligence-
? collection activities could have been corn-
promised in the process. This also applied
to "black" propaganda, the CIA's planting
of provocative Or erroneous information in
foreign news Organs with the aim of achiev-
ing specific political gains.?
The agency's-argurnent. forcefully, ex-
pressed by its outside attorney,' Mitchell
Rogovin, was that disclosures of all types
of covert actions?including polii ice)
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? ?
After Frank Church
became a
presidential candidate,
? he kept some things ?
secret even
. if the CIA was willing to let
them be printed.
T;C:C1 a --10
covert action--could damage intelligence
collection. The CIA, in fact, would not even
agree to the use of the word espionage to
describe its supposedly legitimate work.
Committee staffers came to Suspect that'
the agency was using the sacrosanct
shield of protecting intelligence collection-
-
to conceal covert actions of which the Sen-
ate should have been aware. ?
These distinctions are, of. course, ex-
tremely hard to document, but the commit-
tee's frequent compromises serve to make
one wonder how aggressive the individual
members of the committee were. Church
himself. in the judgment of some of his
staffers. was "too soft." Senators Walter F.
Mondale of Minnesota and Gary Hart of
Colorado, both Democrats, were said to
have been "the best," with Sen. Walter D.
Huddleston, the Kentucky Democrat, a
close second. Tennessee's Republican
Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr., was described
as "okay, but pro-administration." John G.
Tower. the Texas Republican who was the
COMMil:fe,e'S vice-chairman, won the repu-
tation of acting with "benign neglect:*
The performance of these committee
members raises the larger question of how
effective congressional oversight of intelli-
gence activities is likely to bain the future.
Some of these senators serve on the new,
permanent intetligence-oy_ersight corn-
mittee created by ?the Senate. Will
they be aggressive and insistent that the
Waite House and the intelligence agencies
live up to their commitments? Or will they
lapse back into the traditional "benign ne-
glect" that characterized Congress when it
came to keeping the intelligence commu-
nity honest. Protecting our civil rights, and
sheltering the best interests of the United
States from mindless and dangerous for-
eign adventures?
These questions lead, in turn, to the fun-
damental problem of accountability for the
actions of the intelligence community.
Notwithstanding Gerald Ford's eminently
reasonable view (which, somehow, I lad not
occurred to his predecessors) that the in-
telligence agencies must ultimately be ac-
countable to the president of the United
States, who mUst take total responsibility
for their deeds and misdeeds. Arnee-ieues
still cannot be certain who, if anybody, is in
charge.
The CIA, which was the target of the
greatest criticism during the two-year in-
vestigation, still insists, of course, on se-
crecy and on the need for such opera-
qtrestion_able accerding to a
great many outsiders?as the recruitment
of foreign students as "agents in place."
and on a variety Of other covert actions. But
oddly enough, the CIA seems to have
taken the new strictures more to heart than
have most of its fellow members of the intel-
ligence community.
Considerable credit for this stale of al-
leles is given by intelligence experts to the
CIA's new director, George Bush, who has
turned out to be much more assertive
about the control and management of the
agency than. had been generally antici-
pated. Presumably, he has not yet discov-
ered all the skeletons in all the closets of the
10,000-employee agency that for decades
had a virtually free rein in what it did at
home and abroad?and that had long tol-
erated such private fierdoms as Counterin-
telligence and Clandestine Services.
Nonetheless, Bush has shaken up the,CIA
with new top-level headquarters appoint-
ments and major changes overseas.
Moreover, he appears to be presiding over
the crumbling of the "old-boy network,"
which for many years had a free run of the
agency and was responsible for some of its
most damaging policies and enterprises.
But while the CIA is, at least temporarily,
accommodating itself to some Of the re-
quirements of an open society while retain-
ing its operational capabilities, the same
cannot be said of the military agencies?
the largest, richest, and most powerful
segment of the intelligence community?
and, still less, of the FBI.
Military intelligence has become an em-
pire unto itself, supposedly controlled by
the secretary of defense (who reports to the.
president and the National Security Coun-
cil) but wholly 'autonomous for all practical
purposes. The FBI, even late in 1976,
,
seemed to be run by the miniolls of the-lat,e
J. Edgar Hoover, with neither Clarence Kel-
l- fey, the director, nor Ford's attorney. gener-
al Edward Levi, having much of an idea or
what the bureau had done in the past or
what it is do:ng now. As a Church commit-
tee senior staffer, who helped investigate
both organizations, remarked recently,
-Next to the FBI, the CIA smells like a rose:'
Both the military intelligence establish-
ment arid the FBI pose serious accountabil-
ity problems. Under a 1976 internal reor-
ganization plan, the Pentagon has, brought
all its agencies under a director of defense
intelligence (a new post) who, in turn, re-
ports to a second deputy secretary of de-
fense (also a new slot), with special re-
sponSibility for intelligence. This was
Wged necessary by the Pentagon bosses
because several of their intelligence agen-
cies, notably the huge and supersecret Na-!
fional Security Agency (NSA), had long en-
joyed quite a bit of independence from just
about everybody in Washington.
But there was a double purpose in reor-
ganizing the military intelligence estab-
lishment. First. Defense Secretary Donald
F1umsfeid wanted to tighten up the opera-
ten, an intention which is probably corn-
mendable. But the reorganization has also '
served to?isotate this whote empire from ri;-
rect civilian control.
In theory, the director of central
intetii-
gence (who is also the CIA director) runsi
the entire United States government intelli-
gence complex. In the past, agencies such
as the NSA and the Defense Intelligence
Agency (as well as the CIA) were directly
? responsible to him?at least oper-
ationally?and they couldn't ignore him.
Under the Rumsfeld reorganization, they
no longer have this responsibility. Now the
director of central intelligence, known as
the DCI in professional parlance, has to go
through the Pentagon intelligence corn-
mand to deal with these military agencies. I
Thus a filter has been established.'
Moreover,
Moreover. the DC! (George ,Bush) has ?
lost control over the intelligence comrnu-
nity's purse strings, which is the real power. !
In November 1971 Nixon decide,d. in one of
the few rational rnoveshe made in this area
of government, to vest in the DCI the full I
power to allocate budget resources to the
various intelligence agencies?including
the military. The idea was that a strong DCI
was essential to keep order in the commu-
nity. However; the DC! (then Richard i
Helms) never chose to exercise this author-
ity. Responding to military pressures in
1976. Ford moved the budoet allocation? i
.authority to a new steering committee. in
. which this responsibility is now divided i
among the DCI, the deputy secretary of de4
? tense, and the deputy director of the Na-!
tional Security Council stall. ?
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Berta:Ise. Defense. controls 90 percent o.
the overall irdelligence budget (wh;ch stands
around $25 billion annually, although the
adrnnistration insists it is no more than S10
billion?actual figures are 'secret?by ig-
noring the vast sums spent on research
and development of electronic intelligence
hardware). it becomes clear that today the
Pentagon is actually the most powerful
voice in foreign intelligence.
And considering the qualitative weak-
ness in mititary intelligence evaluations?
analysis is the strong suit of the CIA. and
most of it is remarkably honest?there is a
? growing danger that the intelligence prod-
rxt .given to the president and top policy-
makers will be slanted toward "worst-
se" assessments endemic with the
Thee asSeSsinentS, of 6OUrSe, irifte '-
once the formulation of national delerr
and foreign policies. It should also '
added that covert-action responsibilit?
including paramilitary operations, are
cre.asingly being shifted from the C .
military intelligence agencies.
So. once again, vie face the question o
Kitt-time civilian control (including the pres-
ident's) of the intelligence apparatus. With
the DCI effectively deprived of his role as
the president's principal advisee on intelli--
gence. it becomes debatable whether the
Chief executive can truly be accountable
? and responsible for all the actions of the
intelligence community.
The principal conclusion of the Senate
Intetligence Committee after its lengthy in-
N.,ligation is that the president must be
fuTty accountable for United States
inlelti-
? canoe. Speaking of the CIA. the commit-
tee's report noted that "Washington is,
?vtiere the problem arises. No one outside
the CIA, unless it be the president himself,
is responsible for directing and supervis-
ing CIA clande.stin.e intelligence operations
or is authorized access to the information
necessary to do so." This, of course, ap-
plies equally to the military agencies, par-
ticle:arty the NSA: as matters stand now, the
law even prohibits the public disclosure of
the NSNs mission.
It is generally known, nevertheless, that
the NSA is in charge of everything affecting
technological intelligence. It monitors all
etectranio cornmuniCations int the World,
military and civilian (it illegally eavesdrops
on all international telephone calls by
Americans and reads all the cable and
le.tex traffic sent and reCeived by Ameri-
-cans):eit surveys developments in Soviet
and Chines :ttt strategic-arms testing and
deployments (as it should): and it is deeply
involved in breaking secret foreign codes
and devising U.S. codes it hopes will be
unbreakable.
Investigators for the Senate Intelligence
Committee acknowledge privately that, as
a practical matter, they were unable to
study adequately the NSA and other mili-
tary agencies. Bu: :hey have seen enough
to conclude that the NSA's principal weak-
ness is that it is not atlowed to analyze the
data it obtains. Raw data, often wholly
meaningless, is sent on to the White House,
. _ ? .
?
sometimes oescrsoeo as ilia IlVIi IJ. ii
1 trouble is that often nobody can make any
sense out of it. As one staffer noted, "The
state of Maryland [NSA headquarters are
located at Fort Meade in Maryland] is sink-
ing under the weight of NSA material that
nobody has the time or capability to use."
When .investigators for another congres-
sional committee, which was pursuing
NSNs illegal eavesdropping on private
telephone and cable traffic by American
citizens; requested pertinent information,
NSA officials asked them to sign first a se-
crecy pledge, which meant that they would
be unable to pass on their findings to
members of Congress. The investigators
refused and Went home.
In terms of domestic intelligence, the FBI
.
. was,--and iset-by far the, worst offender. In
testimony before the Senate committee, At-
torney General Levi simply refused to make
late available on the FBI's illegal opera-
ons ranging from wiretapping to physical
trveillance and "black-bag jobs," unau-
lrized break-ins into homes and offices
or individuals and organizations consid-
ered radical, dissident, Or subversive. FBI
director Kelley first convinced committee
staffers that he was lying when he said that
these operations had ended in 1966; later
they learned that Kelley did not know what
he was saying. .
In what unquestionably was one of the
most pathetic public performances on rec-
ord, Kelley kept repeating on the CBS pro-
gram "Face the Natio'," on August 8, 1976,
that he had been "deceived" by his own
bureau about "black-bag jobs"---the latest
had occurred three weeks earlier?and
other lawless FBI operations. Just as
pathetically, he acknowledged that he had
been unable-to find out who in the bureau
had so deceived him.
. lithe FBI director and the attorney gen-
eral cannot control their runaway bureau,
how can the president be accountable for
its actions? Considering that the FBI is a
vital agency in domestic law enforcement,
now long can American presidents tolerate
this state of affairs, including the emerging
eViclence of finahoial 'Corruption in the
bureau? (Kelley himself has been accused
of misusing government services and
?property _and acceptieg, expensive gifts_
from his subordinate)
The problem of accountability also un-
derlies the five secret intelligence commu-
nity endeavors mentioned, earlier.
r_ (1) foreign students: recruitment. In
general, according to ifie Church commit-
tee's report, "The CIA considers. . . opera-
tional relationships with the: United States
academic community as perhaps its most
? sensitive domestic area:' The report added
that "the committee has far from the full
picture of the nature and extent of these
relationships and the domestic impact of
foreign clandestine operations. Neverthe-
less, ,it has enough .... to underscore its i
serious nature." I
The report spoke but against the overall
use of the United States academic corn-
, munity by the CIA, which ranges from pay-,
log? ec isocnh?ov lha rt es lt oh eeyn
travel abroad to provides.
age in intelligence col- ?
"leads" and making "introductions" for inee
telligence purposes. It was unable, as
noted above, to go in any detail into the
recruitment of foreign students as
agents (it did not even mention the sub-
ject) but it emphasized that "time and ex-
perience would give increasing cur-
? rency to doubts as to whether it made
sense for a democracy to resort to such
practices as the clandestine use of free
American institutions and individuals--
practices that tended to blur the very dif-
ference between "our' system and 'theirs'
that these programs were designed to pre-
serve."? -
The foreign students' recruitment pro-
haste long history. It was initiated in
the 1950s by military intelligence and then
taken over by the CIA. which simply re-
fuses to terminate the program although it
is now supposedly at a much lower level
than in past years.
The idea behind this extraordinary pro-
bran', concentrating on students from Latin
America, the Far East, the Middle East, and
Africa?the Third World?was that through
recruitment on American campuses, the
CIA would in time acquire "deep-cover as-
sets" inside foreign governments, educa-
tional and cultural centers, private industry,
the military, and so on. These are known as
"agents of influence" or, more commonly,
as "motes."
? The CIA created this covert program on
the theory that many young foreigners ed-
ucated in the United Slates would become
part of ruling elites in their countries. Em-
bedded in gov'ernmental or private power.
these agents can render two types of ser-
vices to the CIA: influencing policies fa-
voring the United States, and supplying
vital inside intelligence.
Such recruitment is, of course, a long-
term investment. The CIA does not expect
results for years. even decades. But pa-
tience is a hallmark of intelligence work,
and the agency is working for the future.
However, the- agency cannot be certain
that, once recruited, these students will re-
main faithful to the CIA and respond to.
the control of case officers. The rule of
thumb is that no more than one Out of ten
recruited agentS aCtualliremain in CIA
service once he matures and acquires a
responsible position.
? To assure itself of loyalty, the agency
can, and on occasions does, avail itself
'of "subject? refuses to
cooperate, disCreet ways are found to '
spread the word about his CIA connections
?which could ruin him at home. Yet black-
mail in this instance could be double-
edged: disclosure of recruitment could be
immensely damaging to the CIA, to say
nothing of the reputation of the United
States educational system. But, as a CIA
official remarked in a recent conversation
"It was a risk worth taking."
(r:14
It is impossible to say how many such eott:
."agents of influence" are nowadays opera-1 1
Ilona This is one ot the CIA's closest kept
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secrets, known only to a. handful of peceee any paid or contractual relationship with
in the agency. But we can ?suggest tee any full-time or part-time news corre-
magnitude of the potential pool of recrues sponc.lent accredited by any U.S. news
available to the CIA. -I service, newspaper, periodical, radio or
In 1955. for example, there were 34.232 television network or station."
foreign students in the United States. lhe The Senate committee believes. how-
number went up to 82.045 in 1965, and re ever, that "fewer than one-half [of the fifty]
close to* 250.000 in 1975. Over a twentv- will be terminated under the new CIA
year period, therelore. the CIA had its pick guidelines." At least one staffer believes
of some 1 million foreign students_ Bu: that 194 American news-media personnel
those familiar with the program doubt the: .had CIA ties if "infrastructure" workers,
more than 100 or so foreigners would be such as telex operators, are included.
recruited. during an average year. Ex- In some instances American journalists
.tre.rnely high selection standards had to be were CIA employees Vvhile' performing
applied, considering both the promise a bona fide professional functions. "Infra-
student held for the future and his political structure" workers used these jobs as
receptivity to CIA enticements. "covers" for other activities, usually taking
It is believed that one of the most impor- advantage of the fact that they had unusual
tent recruitment areas was the foreign train- working hours and thus their movements
ir'prOgrarn'fTheAgcyfbrint?att?r.e' escaped suspicion. Speaking of CIA-em-
Development. AID in the past has serve Ployed newsmen, a Church committee
as a "cover" for other CIA operations, mo staffer said, "They were CIA case officers
notably through its refugee relief prograr -masquerading as journalists rather than
in Indochina. The CIA believed that a' newspeople who were used 'wittingly.?
eign "contract" student had at least a frtOra. Although the Senate report has not gone
debt to the United States and thus might be into these operational details, it is also
more open to its persuasion. . known that in numerous instances special
Agency .officials still claim that this is a re..lationships existed between CIA officials
necessary ingredient in building an elec.- and legitimate newsmen besed either on
live foreign-intelligence network. They pro- professional favors or even payments for
. fess to see no difference between it and the sPecific jobs performed. For example, ea"-
open recruitment of American students. cording te a Senate staffer; "a coffee
Another side of this story is the way in spondent would be told by a CIA officer
which the CIA hs been using?and con- that 'so- long as you're going to such dr
tinues to use?"academics" (professors such ritv. why-don't vou look into this or that
and administrators) to help in its recruit-1
these academics were selecting promisin6
recruit-
merit. As noted above, some 60 percent of
candidates for recruitment and making "in=e
.troductions" in lull knowledge that they
vA.re acting on the CIA's lehalf. In an unde-
termined number of cases, money woulo
change hands. The other 40 percent of
these, academics were "unwitting": they
did not know that they were fingerinc
recruits for the CIA. thinking, instead. the:
they were being helpful to the students by
introducing them to prospective above-
board employers. The CIA recruiters
worked, of course, under deep cover.
Evidently, both the -CIA and the -witting"
academics were guilty of vastly reprehen-
sible behavior. They were?and still are?
responsible for polluting, prostituting, and
for me?" This procedure, it should be
noted, is distinct from normal relationships
between foreign correspondents and CIA
officials, who maintain special contacts and
exchange information or opinions on a
"two-way-street basis." A great many
newsmen engage in such relationships,
just as they do with State Department or
U.S. Information Agency personnel.
The CIA's use of the media is dangerous
because it undermines the credibility of the
American press both abroad and at home.
Thus it is, in the long run, a disservice to
United States institutions. That the Soviet
Union, say, uses its journalists for intelli-
gence work is, obviously, not an,excuse. As
the Senate report observed, the line be-
tween "our" system and "their" system
should not be blurred.
(3) Vietnam "stay-behind" sipies. The
degrading the ArneriCa'n-edu-catianal sy-Se --
Vietnam peace agreement. negotiated by
tern, one of our most admired institutions.'
The CIA is guilty of suborning the academ-
ics. The academics, in turn, are guilty of
allowing themselves?and their institu-
-tions--to f5e corruptede-Otten they do it
because they have individual CIA con-
tracts for research or books that they do not
wish to jeopardize.'
Curiously, no investigative body has ever
thought of looking into these relationships
that exist in more than 100 American col-
leges and universitie.s.
Henry Kissinger for the United States and
signed in January 1973, provided that -the
United States will mg continue it military
involvement or intervene_ in the interneLefe
lairs of South Vietnam" and that within sixty
days of the signing, the United States
would withdraw ? all "troops, military per-
sonnel..., and military personnel.associ-
ated with the pacification program; arma-
ments, munitions, and war material:'
Two months earlier, however, the Penta-
(2)Use of American ne-- media. In 1976 gon approved atop-secret Wan designed
the CIA admitted that it rotations with to violate the peace agreement the mo-
some fifty United States journalists "ac- Tnent it was signed. Worked out between
credited" abroad, atthough it refused .10
disclose their names. It also said that "ef-
fective immediately. CIA will not enter into
?
_
the American military commandin S,aigon
(MAW) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington, this plan, denominated -Or-
ganizational Changes in Southeast Asia."
provided for the establishment of a covert
minicommand in South Vietnam, heavily
emphasizing intelligence operations, when
the peace agreement went into effect. The
cover for this minicomreand was the De-
fense Attach?ffice (DAC)) at the Ameri-
can Embassy in Saigon.
Normally, defehie attache. offices are
staffed with a handful of military personnel.
The new Saigon DAC% however, was as-
signed 50 military personnel and 1,345
persons described in the document as
"Department of Defense civilians!' In this
case "Department of Defense civilians"
were created by changing from military uni-
forms to slacks.- and sport shirts: -Of the
1,395 personnel attached to the Saigon
DAO, 219 were described as "intelligence
'personnel." The operational order noted
candidly that six military personnel in DAO
"will perform traditional DAO missions-
andior functions." It was a carefully, en-
gineered piece of deception.
Dated November 27, 1972, this im-
mensely detailed order included a contin-
gency plan for the reintexiuctior tkrrieti-
can tactiCI .air- operations Into' -Vietnam
should the Communists violate the cease-
fire. But the main emphasis was on intelli- '
pence operations.
The minicomrnand thus encompassed
the 219-man "Intelligence Division":
charged with responsibility for "continuing I
essential aspects of operations. intelli-
gence and contingency planning. land) I
force development:* An "Intelligence I
Branch" of DAO's "Readiness Operations
Section" acted as the "primary U.S. etre I
ment for collection, evaluation, and dis-
semination of intelligence information per- 1
taining to NVANC [North Vietnam Army/Viet j
Gong) activities in the Republic of Vietnam 1
[RVN):' A "Surveillance Section" coordi-
nated "Humint" (human intelligence) ac-
tivities, which was the Pentagon's espio-
nage network to be left behind after the
cease-fire.. This- eurereillance section was
also the "in-country contact point for coor-
dinating unilateral 'Humint' operations with
Department of Defense collection, units
I rorri out-couritrknhisi,Vas the plan for se-
cretly introducing military intelligence
teams into Vietnam from abroad. These
teams, crossing by air from Thailand to be
dropped in Vietnam, worked with the South
Vietnarti army's intelligence units *under
DAO's coordination.
. Additionally, DAC; provided daily intelli-
gence summaries on South Vietnam and
"adjacent territories," indicating that mili-
tary intelligence operations in Cambodia
and Laos (and; presumably, North Viet-
nam) were run out of Saigon by Americans.
A "Counter Intelligence Section" formu-
lated "security policies to prevent, detect,
neutralize hostile espionage and subver.
sion attempts, conduct discreet liaison with
ARVN [Army of Republic of Vietnam] coun-
terintelligence and police agencies,"
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The plan took into account the possibility
that United States military intelligence op-
erations would "not be authorized" in South .
Vietnam Under the DAD cover, probably
because they would be violating the peace
agreement. Noting that in such an event
there "would be appreciable degradation
of intelligence available to support U.S. ob-
jectives," the document devised alternative
methods.
Thus a small group within DAD "would
be required to obtain the total intelligence
-output" of the South Vietnamese military
intelligence and "to forward it in some
meaningful format to an agency capable of
collating, analyzing, and disseminating
this intelligence." This would be 'exter-
nally" cdordinated:-The top'-s-ectet "Fast -
Pass" operation?the standing arrange-
ment for exchange of intelligence with
'South Vietnam?"would be appreciably
expanded."-
Because Americans held South Viet-
namese intelligence in low esteem and
were particularly concerned about "cover-
age" atong the borders and in Laos and
Cambodia, United States military intelli-
gence personnel were stationed net only in
Saigon but also in Da Nang. Pleiku, Bien
Hoa, Can Tho,. "and other areas as re-
quired:* *
This Pentagon intelligence network had
to be removed when. South Vietnam was
taken over by the Communists in the spring
of 1975. But intelligence experts say that
there are still American, or American-
directed.. "stay-behinds" workieg under
deep cover in Vietnam.
(4) Insurgent, training. Military intetti-
gence agencies, with CIA assistance. are
training foreign insurgent groups at aban-
doned airfields in out-of-the-way areas in
California. The purpose of this effort is un-
clear except for the likelihood- that the
United States wishes to have ready-to-
move foreign guerrilla -units for possible
covert operations in different parts of the,
world.
'Among several hundred guerrillas be.inc
trained in California there are Laotians and
Cambodians drawn from post-1975 refu-
gees. as well as A_fghans?..Kurds.. ped,Rus-
sians. The Kurds are the survivors of the
Kurdish tribal army that fought for years tree
-government of Iraq with help from the Ira-
nians next door and from the CIA under p.
secret program approved by Nixon in
1972. The 'Kurdish army was deStroy-ed in
1975 when the shah of Iran, ?vho struck a
deal with Iraq, withdrew his support and
the CIA followed suit.
There are, of course, ample precedents
for secretly training foreign gueiiillas on
American soil. ItAvas* done with Cuban.
exiles in preparation for the 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion arid with Tibetans secretly ,
brought to Colorado by the CIA in the mid-
1960s for reasons that .still remain myseeri-.
OLIS.
?
;
The California training program suC
bests that the Pentagon is increasingly
ing over paramilitary covert-operations re-
sponsibilities from the CIA.
(5)Space warfare. This information is ex-
.tremely limited and closely held in the
While House. Reliable sources say. how-
ever, that during 1976. Soviet satellites
damaged one United States "spy-in-the-;
sky" satellite and destroyed another by fir-
ing a laser-beam charge.
Under the provisions of the 1972 Se.viet-
American agreement on limiting strategic
arms, both sides are permitted to use
space satellites and other "national means
of verification" to potice the enforcement-.
of the pact.
Washington specialists are perptexed ?
over these Soviet attempts to interfere wilh
United States satellite verification proce-
dures. Some of them suggest that the Unit-' ?
ed States has not yet fully developed its :
laser-firing capability in space.
In any event, these attacks on American
satellites are a top intelligence secret. As
far as can be determined, the Ford admin-
istration LiOeS not wish them to be known
publicly so as not to damage current
,negotiations on a new strategic-arms
? agreement with the Soviet Union.
But it seems that the government al,.???ays
- feels there is a reason why Americans
"should" be kept in the dark about what
the intelligence cemmunity is up to. Clearly
the time has co-ea to end the, cover-ups
and stonewalling, and to inform our citizens
about what the intelligence agencies are
doing that aft ects all of us and the Legiti-
mate interests of the United States.01?a
Approved For Release 2002/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700110006-5