MEMO TO JENNIFER FROM DEBBIE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002700090020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 30, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Jennifer
STATOTHR
FORM
5.75 10
Army review(s)
completed.
Per Mr. DuBois, Special Asst. to the Sec. of the Army,
Mr. Bush requested a copy of Mr. Hoffman's address
to the Commonwealth Club. Mr. Hoffman asked for
a copy of Mr. Bush's address also, which I gave.
FExecutive Eeaiatzv ? ALG `ia?.~'.
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Eoec"Itn e RCc ytry
7_41-.307
28 July 1976
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM
STATINTL
Attached is the transcript of
Mr. Hoffmann's address to
the Commonwealth Club of
California, per your conver-
sation with Mr. DuBois today.
25X1
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ADDRESS BY
HONORABLE MARTIN R. HOFFMANN
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
TO THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
FRIDAY, 9 JULY 1976
President Bates, distinguished head table guests and members,
distinguished guests and members, one and.all. I'm particularly happy to
be here and to have a chance to share with you some thoughts and I hope
some enlightening perspectives on conventional warfare in a nuclear age.
Let me hopefully put you at ease at the outset by saying I'm mindful
that I follow not only Tom Reed to the podium, who is a good and close
friend and'who I am delighted for the opportunity to work with in many
ways, but also Fred Weyand who was, out and appeared before this distin-
guished group earlier in the spring. The Chief of Staff.of the Army,
Fred Weyand, I think, is an unusual man, and his subject that he brought
here, the relationship between armed force foreign policy and its correla-
tion to the national will, was a timely one then, and continues to be so.
He himself is a very fine example of the military leadership from which
the country benefits in this day and age. Fred, who cut his combat teeth
in Korea, has seen firsthand the tremendous costs in time. and treasure
occasioned by lack of preparedness, and occasioned by lack of readiness
in the face of a fairly obvious conventional as opposed to nuclear threat.
Tout Reed's message 2 weeks ago reflects in profile a problem that all the
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services have. You have heard about the B-1 from him and in the newspapers;
you've heard about the Navy's shipbuilding problem, in which the number of
our warships has'shrunk dramatically until our Navy, in terms of-numbers.
of ships, is now at a level approximately where it was slightly before
Pearl Harbor, which has some historic as well as interesting perspectives
in absolute.
We have the same problem in the Army, and the basic problem is'a
problem of modernization. A question as to whether or not we will mount
a modern capability that is realistically geared to the threat that we
face. And so I wi_11 hope to capitalize byway of background on the earlier
- remarks -- Tom's enlightened discussion of the Soviet threat and its
buildup of course is one of the key factors that we all regard as being
important in this mix. But I would underscore that though you hear a
great deal of this from the Pentagon, the problems of which we speak are
not our exclusive property or province. These are national problems of -
deep and pervasive significance in my judgment, particularly as we look
ahead. A watershed year, the. bicentennial, gives us the opportunity to
take stock, looking backward for strength, as well as forward for vision.
And I would hope that in that perspective I may make one or two points
here today with respect to conventional power that will peak your interest.
Now the Chief of Staff and Secretary Reed and I share the same view
of the historical perspective in which we find ourselves, and I would
briefly summarize that. Perhaps the overwhelming historical fact with
which we must contend today is the achievement by the Soviet of strategic.
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parity with the United States in the nuclear field. Now we enjoyed after
World War II what was fondly known as the "atomic monopoly." That yielded
to a position of-rather sublime superiority over the Soviet in strategic
and nuclear terms, but while we were interested in manipulating and deploy-
ing our strategic capability after World War II in order to assure the
maximum return for that investment, you will recall that we let our con-
ventional capabilities fall to nearly nothing, thus setting the stage for
Now the story of the time since that time to this is that the Soviet
has inched away both in numbers and in the degree of sophistication of
_ his technology. And our superiority in strategic terms has disappeared
to where there is now hopefully a stalemate. And reflected in the SALT
Talks we would hope to cap further arms race in the strategic nuclear
area in order to assure that neither country and the world in general
suffers from too low a nuclear threshold which would invite the nuclear
holocaust which we are all of course dedicated to avoid.
Now the second historical fact, in addition to the arrival of
:strategic and nuclear parity . . . The second overwhelming fact'is the
growth and momentum of Soviet capability -- militarily, exclusive of the
rocket forces. Now this development has not been unseen but it has gone
somewhat unnoticed, filtered as it was by the circumstances of the Vietnam
war, and I say filtered from our own intelligence community as well as
from the public at large. At the time that our defense resources in
absolute terms have been declining and also coincident with this period,
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the Vietnam war drawing off those-resources so that we were spending
them for the practical business of fighting a war -- they were current
expenditures -- as opposed to being investments against_a future con-
tingency. During this time that we were preoccupied the'Soviet built
his capability in almost every field of military endeavor, slowly,
undramatically, but with a constant upward drift of his resources.
Interestingly enough, within the money that he spent, although the figure
was going up in absolute terms, his percentages that he spent for con-
ventional ground warfare were absolutely steady.
went down, the percentage for Air Force went down,
wage the conventional ground war stayed absolutely
mentioned a few of*the results of this, and I have
The percentage for Na-ry
but the percentage to
level. Tom Reed
think a few of them will suffice. To suddenly find the Soviet Union, with
a ratio of 6 to I in tanks -- he has approximately 42,000 tanks as com-
pared with our 6,000 to 6,500. To look at the ratio of armored personnel
carriers -- 3 to 1 in favor of the Soviet; 9 to 1 advantage in artillery
pieces deployable in the field; 3 to 1 advantage in people in the Army
alone. These sorts of statistics didn't just accrue-overnight. They
reflect not only this upward trend that I've mentioned, but a tremendous
momentum that has built up in his program, which seemingly carry him along
at advanced levels every year. And again I would underscore the conven-
tional capability reflected in these munitions.
Now, the third historic aspect is a very simple point -- that the -
Soviet Union has expressed quite clearly what they intend to do'with.this
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military power and what it's good for. And all we have to do is corre-
late their protestations with their actions to see that they still regard
warfare of all kinds as being an appropriate instrumentality of inter-
national policy. And whether you look at the buildup in Somalia that
occasioned great congressional concern some 4 or 5 months ago, whether
you look at adventurism by surrogates in Angola, whether you look at
the general supplying of arms in pressure spots and unsettled areas'in
the world, you see a pattern which is too unmistakable to mistake.
Now the sum of these developments is found in what one would call in
an era of strategic parity or strategic stalemate increased freedom for
military adventurism. Increased freedom for, not from, military
adventurism.
Now you remember in the Cuban Missile Crisis we were able to face
down the Soviet with our preponderance of strategic power and we were
able to convert that tremendous deterrent force into a very practical
lever, against what was a conventional intrusion into Cuba. Stalemate
means we can no longer do that. And the question is, how will he seek to
exercise his foreign policy and undergird it militarily, and are we pre-
pared.to do this.
Now conventional deterrence, or conventional forces, particularly
in a nuclear age, have changed very little in their basic makeup since
the old days of World War II and. even before. The basic element is still
the soldier, the ground soldier. He is still that priceless military
capability that allows the holding of territory. The Soviet Union
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understands the importance of ground forces, not only in the percentage
figures I alluded to, but in their positioning of forces. Their forces
stationed in the Warsaw Pact nations are there for a rather unforgettable
reason. And in case we forget the reason, we have the reminders of
Hungary and Czechoslovakia to see that they well perceive the political
advantage of military coercion. And again, the utility of the soldier,
in this regard, is very familiar to all of us. And if you look in the
Declaration of Independence, you find that the first six complaints of the
colonists had to do with the intrusive use of military power for political
advantage. And here 200-years ago we see as one of the threats against
- our way of life in the world today remaining that same basic factor.
Now obviously;'if our purpose is to mount a deterrent, which it is,
r
history may have changed but the mission of the U.S. armed forces remains
the same, and our purpose is first to deter an enemy from armed aggression,
and should deterrence fail, to have the capability to resist him mill- -
tarily and to defend not only our country but our interests. So that one
looks in an age of conventional warfare as to how well w'e' are able'to
deter his views, not only of strategic capability, which Tom Reed talked
about -- and again, remember he talked about the necessity of running very
hard in terms of the B-1 and modernization of those strategic means
running very hard to preserve a stalemate. Now here we are talking in
conventional terms about the necessity to mount a deterrent to an adversary
who advocates the use of armed ground forces. And the only sure deterrent
to that kind of a force is another armed ground force. Historically, the
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United States has not done well in mounting ground forces during times of
peace. If you look at the instance I mentioned in World War II where we
reduced our forces in two and a half years from some 8-1/2 million men
to 514,000, which is the number that was available in the U.S. Army when
the North Koreans attacked. You see an example of this. It happened
after World War I, it happened to some extent after Korea, except at that
time we had the handy reminder of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the $erlin
Blockade to remind us of the necessity to maintain strength in conventional
terms. And then of course with the coming of Vietnam we found we had to
build our forces again to handle that contingency, and we now find follow-
ing that engagement that we are once again in a position where there is a
requirement to mount a conventional deterrent, maintain conventional
strength in terms of soldiers. And that is a process that has not been an
easy one for the United States.
We have a myth, born of our tremendous mobilizations for World War II
and tremendous mobilizations for Korea, and again for Vietnam, of an instant
,-,ground force. We are very aware in Air Force and Navy terms that it`s
-necessary to maintain technology and keep it well exercised and flexed,.
and that we need to push frontiers in these high technological areas.
But we still have a lingering impression which is more a hope than a per-
ception of reality that the constitution of ground strength can be done
almost instantly at any given point in time. And with the increased tech-
nology of the ground forces of today, that is no longer a practical reality.
So that at the present time, although we're faced with the conventional
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threat, when we see historically we have not been good as a nation at
mounting the kind of deterrent necessary to deter such a threat, we see as
well some startling suggestions that perhaps we are on that track again..
When you look at an Army that has but 50 percent of the dollar value of
the equipment it needs to go to war, one becomes somewhat concerned.
When you see the Congress cutting the monies necessary to recruit the
quality soldiers that we need in an age of technology, in order to be
successful in ground combat, one gets somewhat concerned. And so it goes
with an upward level in ground forces, an upward level of resources bein3
expended by the So_viet_Union, and up to last year and hopefully again
this year, but up till that time a constant declination in the resources
we were willing to, spend for ground combat.
Now, again, against the background of these shortcomings, I am not
here to tell you that all is lost.. In the U.S. Army today, to meet that
conventional threat, to constitute that conventional deterrent, we are
probably in as good shape now as we have ever been in our history,_pro-
,,-vided we follow through.. And-let me give you some examples. In the first
place, thanks to the Middle East War, we have a. very clear picture of what
the ground war looks like in this day and age in its most exhausting form.
This has been the first clash since World War II of two technologically
mature combatants. And what we learned from that war, not only in terms
of the advance of technology and a return to the importance of the initia-
tive of the small unit and the individual soldier, but what we learned
about rates of attrition, how much it cost to stay in a modern armored
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clash, have been very valuable in. identifying with some precision what we
need to constitute a meaningful deterrent. So we are not in a situation
where the future is not clear. We are in a situation where the task at
hand is highly discernible and quite readily definable.
Now, our use of resources, particularly in the Army, has never been
better. I would underscore that point. Our use of taxpayers' resources,
our ability to turn taxpayer funds into combat power, has never been better,
and-1 will give you a small example of that. 1964, just before the buildup.
to the peak in Vietnam, was the last time in peacetime that we had 16
active divisions. Now a division is armed for 16,000 people, and the
division is the main fighting unit of the Army. It's the smallest unit
that can sustain itself in combat from a logistical and command and con-
trol point of view. It's the equivalent of a.ship or a wing of planes or
the like, but it's our basic combat unit. Sixteen we had in 1964. Given
full funding of the 77 budget, we will, in the first quarter of fiscal
78, again return in peacetime to 1.6 active combat ready divisions. But
the difference this time is we are doing this job with 180,000 less uni-
formed personnel, and 60,000 less civilians on the Army payroll. And as
an indication of conservation of resources and ability to get the job
done with less, that is probably the outstanding defense example that we
have today. Again, our ability to shrink the base structure in recent
years, which is met with some congressional opposition, is a tremendous
advantage to us. It gives us a leaner posture in resources for support
than we've had in many years. And I would add to that our forward
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deployments of troops, both in Korea and in Europe, give us one of"_Chg
strongest peacetime posturings of ground forces that we have ever had._
And that is a capability and an advantage which cannot be overly stressed.
Now, finally, I would say that our assets in terms of. people where-
with to build a relevant and a strong deterrent have never been better.
We have, as a major power, the greatest array of combat tested leader-
ship that has ever been assembled in a peacetime Army. Vietnam, while
it was a .bitter experience, was not without its advantages in these
aspects. We have the finest leadership at the company level and on up
through the batta].ions_and brigades that we've ever had -- combat tested
veterans. This, in combination with the all volunteer force, which is
yielding us a very'determined, very willing, increasingly well qualified
and dedicated young man for the force, provides us with the greatest
potential to mount an Army that will be sufficient to our needs today and
tomorrow that perhaps we have ever had.
I think in addition to the bicentennial, that we are in an erq of
.some historic proportion. We-are at that point, from the point of view
of the Army and therefore from a point of view of a conventional capa-
bility. We are at that point historically where we will make the deci-
sions this year and next year 'as a people, reflected through our Congress
in levels of resources that will be made available, but we will make the
choices of how we will constitute our will and our strength for the fore-
seeable future in an era which we hope is an era of peace.
Leaders from Weyand to Washington have told us that we cannot deter
without real capability, and that the strongest assurance we have that we
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V 01
will not go to war is to be prepared for it. And therefore although a
return to conventional-warfare, a return to geo-politics, and a return to
the basic military potential -- losses of life, losses by destruction of
property, and the yielding up of our sons to battle, which has never been
easy for the United States. But if we do not respond to this sort of
challenge with strength, we shall certainly not fulfill the hopes and-
expectations of 200 years of a free democracy.
Perhaps most of all the trick is not to substitute our hopes for the
way the world should be, or our hopes for a level of force we could main-
tain in the United States successfully?-- not to substitute our hopes for
the realities that we see around us. This has been difficult in the past,
particularly in the conventional ground force arena. It remains diffi-
cult today. But by the same token, we must not let the discomfort in-
volved in raising such a force cloud the utility that comes from being
truly strong, truly responsive, and mounting a true deterrent in those
conventional terms which are once again the preeminent means of inter-
Thank you very much.
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A Division of 4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
National Broadcasti ng Company, inc. Washington, D.C.20016 202-686-4200
July 29, 1976
The Honorable
George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear George:
In case I can't reach you by phone,
let me try the print medium ...
I was kind of surprised when it appeared
some months back that you had been maneuvered out of
vice presidential consideration. So now I'm not
wholly amazed, considering the assets you muster, to
learn that you might become a factor after all.
If you are tapped as running mate in
Kansas City, we'd like very much to have you as guest
on Meet the Press on the Sunday immediately following
the convention -- August 22. The program could be
done live out of Kansas City or Washington.
If that's not feasible for some reason, we
would hope to have you the first Sunday you're available,
assuming you can give us enough notice so we will not
have locked in someone else. And if you're disposed
to provide a hypothetical acceptance to a conditional
invitation, we'd love to have it.
Montoe
Executive Producer
BM:hhf 'ry " , ...I Meet the Press
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