LETTER TO MR. ROBERT W. TENNANT FROM GEORGE BUSH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002700070006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 12, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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S
May 12, 1976
Dear Mr. Tennant,
Thanks so much for your letter of May 3rd.
The Walter Parks are indeed great friends of ours
from Midland.
I appreciate your invitation to appear on
the David Brudnoy Show and will be glad to do it
sometime in the futu Please contact my
Executive Assistant,
to set up data and ti e can De
reached at
Again, thank you for writing,
George Bush
Mr. Robert W. Tennant
Producer
The David Brudnoy Show
WHDH Radio
441 Stuart Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
kgt/12 May 1976
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DIRECTOR OF CE AM INTELLIGENCE
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WIHIDIHI
RADIO 85
FOUR FORTY-ONE STUART STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02116
TELEPHONE [phone]
May 3, 1976
Director George Bush
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20005
Dear Director Bush:
As producer of the David Brudnoy show and a nephew of Dr.
& Mrs. Walter S. Parks, Jr. of Middleland, Texas, I would like
to extend to you an invitation to appear on the David Brudnoy
show which can be heard over WHDH Radio (850am, 50,000 watts)
here in Boston.
Recently, my aunt, Mrs. Walter S. Parks, Jr., was visiting
my family in Massachusetts and mentioned that she and my uncle
know the Bush family of Middleland, Texas. My aunt, although
reluctant because she does not like to take advantage of personal
relationships, said I could use her name in trying to reach you
to be a guest on the David Brudnoy show.
David B_rudp
Nation Review Maga
'. Buckley, Jr. He i
element in the defense of
would be dealing with a f
libertarian conser jv who believes in
igen Agency as an important
e United States. In other words, you
iendly interviewer who supports t rra~
Personally, I had the pleasure of meeting you when you were
Chairman of the National Republican Committee and spoke at our-
Annual Lincoln Da Dinner in Newton, Massachusetts. I understand
rom my aunt that since you have become Director of the CIA that
you cannot answer any political questions. Mr. Brudnoy will con-
fine his questions to the role and operation of the CIA and will
remain as a-political as possible.
The David Brudnoy show is broadcast live, Monday-Friday,
10pm to Midnight EST. Since your schedule and committments must
be extremely burdensome in your role as director, I would like
to make a conference call hookup. With a conference line, I can
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, who you may or may not know, is a writer for
ire and is a close personal friend of William
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0
call you anywhere on the North American Continent when your sched-
ule permits during our two hour segment on the air. The interview
will be brief. All I'm asking is ten minutes of your time and
I would not expect you to take any loca pone calls.
I will call your Washington office in a couple of days to
see when this can be arranged.
RWT: j
THE DAVID BRUDNOY SHOW
obert Wj Tennant/Producer
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15 MAY 1976
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Our Passive, Timid CIA Needs Leadership!,
HE CLASSIC . Intelligence (allure = of '
Pearl Harbor, when U.S. intercepts?of
the Japanese attack plans remained
untranslated In a low-priority . "Incoming" ?
basket, sparked the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War
II.- Because the Japanese attack hinged on I
complete surprise,- an Intelligence warning
would have made a difference. That knowl-
edge remains the driving force behind'the
billions devoted to foreign analysis by the
CIA and Its sister agencies In the Defense
and State departments:
Despite the billions spent, the United
States has been caught unprepared time and
time again because-there is no kinder way
to put it-our intelligence has failed. Even if
we assume the CIA would be able to detect
a nuclear attack on the United States in ad-
vance, which I do not, continued failures to
anticipate important foreign developments, i
make the conduct of a. sound foreign policy
increasingly .difficult. To ignore our intelli-
gence system's flaws-continuing flaws that
stem from an uncertain leadership-is to risk
our very security. To examine the record, the House Intelli-
gence Committee selected six major foreign-
policy turning points at random: the 1968
Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1968
Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1973 Mid-
dle East war, the 1974 coups in Cyprus and
Portugal, and India's 1974 nuclear explosion.
(Because the House has voted not to release
the committee's findings, this article is de-
rived from the public record.)
Intelligence Failures
We knew that Czechoslovakia had dashed
the Johnson Administration's hopes for nu-
clear-arms talks with the Russians; that Tet
cost thousands of lives; that the Middle East
war resulted in the Arab oil embargo, a high
cost to the U.S. in terms of military assts
tance to Israel, and risked U.S.-Soviet con-
flict. We knew that the coups in Portugal and
Cyprus had raised the possibility of Com-
munist Influence in a NATO ally and hurt
our relationships with Greece and Turkey.
We knew that India's nuclear explosion
threatened the spread of nuclear weapons.
. We did not know intelligence failures had
contributed to each unfortunate situation.
But we know it now.
mitted to their particular'policies, regardless
of facts, hindered analysis. Post inortems of
Intelligence failures tended to blame mid-
level analysts, yet the real problems were
caused by the leadership. And the Intelli-
gence leadership lacks the stature to with-
stand political pressures that threaten to cor-
rupt the entire system.
After the 1973 Middle East Intelligence
failure, the CIA acknowledged that the "ma-
chinery" of which the analyst was a part had
not always eased an exceedingly difficult
task. The two most visible parts of that ma-
chinery, or bureaucracy, are current-intelli.;
gence publications and national Intelligence
estimates. Neither runs well.
Our intelligence agencies cannot report
timely and accurate information consistently.
The initial and most obvious sign shows up
in what the current-intelligence publications
said at the time of key foreign events. The
morning that Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus
was overthrown by Greek strong man Dimi-
trios Ioanilldis, the CIA wrote that "General
Ioannidis takes moderate line while playing
for time In dispute with Makarios."
The intelligence agencies had observed
signs of Arab military mobilization for more
than a week prior to Oct. 6, 1973, when Egypt
and Syria attacked Israel. But current-intel-
ligence reporting provided reassurances that
neither Egypt nor Syria would go to war.
- ? In the months prior to the April 1974 coup
in Portugal. at least four signs of serious
political discontent-including an abortive
military coup-surfaced In the press. Yet
current-intelligence writings followed the
sound and fury, not significance, of each
"hard news" development. As the director
of State Department intelligence, William
Hyland, told our committee, "There was
enough Information to suggest trouble, but It
wasn't really subjected to a detailed analysis
and a projection of where the trends might
be going." 0
Too- Many Pressures
Those who read current Intelligence often'
complain about its redundancy, duplication,
and poor analysis. During Cyprus alone there
were 83 messages classified "CRITIC," or
critically important, yet "the significance of
many ... was obscure," the CIA found.
The National Security Agency (NSA)?
which intercepts and decodes foreign coin
munications, produces raw reports that are
nearly incomprehensible to the lay reader;
the written summaries are understandable
to few. The NSA collects so much data that
it must shred or burn more than 30 tons of'
paper each day; it Is literally burying Itself.
-in classified Information. NSA spews forth
so much data that the analyst Is burdened
with hundreds of NSA reports per week, the
CIA. complains. During the Cyprus crisis,
readers, complained about "an excess of
cryptic raw reports from NSA. which could
not be translated by lay readers," as the CIA
puts it. The few who can comprehend NSA
reports. often have no time left to compare
them with other intelligence. So intelligence
puzzles are left half-assembled.,
V.S. Intelligence cannot follow, trends
much better than it follows day-to-day
events because of weaknesses in the estima-
tive system. Before Tet, U.S. officials had
anticipated attacks in Vietnam's highlands
and northernmost provinces, but not -simul-
taneous strikes at nearly every urban center.
Our intelligence estimates had-in the CIA'a -
words-so "degraded our image of the en-
emy" that we were unaware they Communists
were capable of such attacks. -
The CIA's post 'mortem of the 1974 Cyprus
crisis reports that analytical. performance.
"fell quite short 9f _the-mark,". particularly..
because of the "failure` In July to estimate
the likelihood of a Greek-sponsored coup
against Archbishop.Makarios."
After the MiddWEast war In October 197,
the CI4 realized there had been no National
Intelligence Estimate :report prepared from
time to time-on the likelihood of war since
May-and that estimate had only addressed
the next few weeks. A brilliant analysis pre-
pared by the State Department's Bureau of
Current intelligence publications suffer .
from lack of depth not because those who
write them are unimpressive. Most mid-level :
analysts who write current intelligence are
knowledgeable Individuals. But they are vic-
timized by the pressures imposed on able
people by the bureaucracy.
There are too many intelligence-- publica-
tions: spot reports, instant summaries, daily
reports, morning and afternoon reports for
the Secretary of State, Presidential briefs,
memoranda, communications-intelligence
summaries, national-intelligence dailies,
weekly summaries. Analysts have meetings
to attend. superiors to please (often by soft-
ening bold judgments), "positions" of their
office to "co-ordinate" with other offices anq
agencies, deadlines to meet. There is pre- ;
cious little time left to think and write well.
U.S. intelligence agencies, we found, had
collected a considerable body of excellent
information, often at great cost and risk. But
the' information was not always made avail-
able to those -who needed It. Written esti-
mates lacked perspective. A few courageous
analysts who sounded alarms were not fully
supported by their more cautious superiors.
Technical breakdowns prevented valuable in- 1
formation from reaching Washington until
after the event had passed. Policy officials
In the State Department, the White House,
Intelligence and Research. also in May, told
then Secretary of State William Rogers that
the Arabs might well resort to war by au-
tumn. That "wisdom." as the CIA rightly
called It, was forgotten in October..
The latest National Intelligence Estimate
prior to Portugal's 1974 coup was prepared
in 1964.
The National Intelligence Officer (NIO)
system at the top of the analytical hierarchy
Is weak and is responsible for the poor quali-
ty of estimates preceding the Portugal, Cyp-
rus, and Middle East crises. NIOs. work un-
der the director of the CIA, in his capacity
as head of the entire intelligence community.
Their influence varies with the CIA direc- :
tor's Influence. If he's liowerful, their voice
ax, theirInfiuence is too._
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man The has NIO mo for Western&f8 e,ie CIA's figures In Saigon in Sep ' ^ tome so rancorous it helped destroy the
e tha 20
t
i
t
r
coun
r
es
ver. ber 1567 that two categories of irre respected Board of National Estimates.
=But he has just one staff assistant. stead
Th
board
I
e
, an
nteragency body of intel-
Communist forces were dropped from .
of command authority over the time of an- ligence experts responsible for esti-
alysts in the CIA and other agencies, the NIO the official order of battle. ImmediateI-r mates had become moribund in the
must "cajole and plead" for assistance, as thereafter the Saigon command pre. eyes of some. Moribund or not, the
one close observer told me
pared press briefi
Whe
Turke
'
.
y
n
ngs on the war
s prop- board fought for the integrity of Its
was preparing to Invade Cyprus, an NIO Tess that one CIA official labeled "one Vietnam estimates to the bitter end.
memorandum that predicted the Invasion of the greatest snow jobs since Po- Three persons close to the board have
was never disseminated: The NIO was busy temkin constructed his village." An- told me they knew the battles were
preparing a briefing before the U.S. Intelli- otherSCIA analyst termed the military nearly finished when one of President
gene Board on a National Intelligence Esti-
ma numbers "contrived," "phony," and I..Nixon's favorite press leaks wrote that
re for Italy.
Most NIOs have regional responsibilities,
yet some crucial Issues, such as nuclear
proliferation, cannot be covered In regional
terms. There has been no NIO for Africa.
The value of the NIO system is consider-
able to busy policy officials who need quick
answers, say before a Kissinger shuttle to
the Middle East. But the very closeness of
NIOs to policy makes the system vulnerable
to pressures that can destroy the Indepen-
dence of their analyses. This Is a far cry
from the expectations of some of its founders
that the CIA would provide independent
When the Germans began losing World
War II, Hitler began disregarding accurate
intelligence evaluations that conflicted with
the Nazi line. This lesson (fortunately for us)
Is worth remembering always, especially
when thinking of the Vietnam War.
Doubt Becomes Heresy.
Just as Vietnam tore our society, it
caused great pressures inside U.S. Intelli-
gence agencies. The basic problem was ac-
curate intelligence that cast doubt on the
wisdom of Vietnam policy. That doubt be-
came heresy when the policy stakes rose.
The. first National Intelligence Estimate
that I'm positive was "shaded" to reflect
policy officials' optimism was published In
early 1963. That estimate was first weakened
during the drafting' process to reflect the
Kennedy Administration's hopeful views. The
draft estimate had forecast long-range prob-
lems with our South Vietnamese allies with-
out Increased U.S. support. Instead of heed-
ing such sound advice, the Administration
influenced the CIA to weaken it.
The CIA uncovered evidence in 1966 and
1967 indicating the U.S. military command
had understated Communist strength, that
there probably were more than 500,000 en-
emy personnel, not the prevailing-and pub-
lic-estimate of fewer than 300,000.
The CIA's efforts to provide honest intel-
ligence ran directly Into the overriding pub-
lic-relations concerns of military and civilian
policy makers. Like used-car salesmen, mili-
tary officials tried strenuously to set the
mileage back. If the higher figures became
known to those who had an "incorrect view"
of the war, the Saigon command cabled to
the Joint Chiefs ? of Staff, the command's
"image of success" would be undermined.*
The military fought so fiercely with the
"controlled by the desire to stay be- ! it was unlikely Nixon's sharp eye had
low" the 300,000 public estimate. escaped the "gloomy" CIA estimates
on Vietnam and that changes in the es-
After the Tet? offensive began, the timative hierarchy were needed.
Defense Intelligence Agency agreed Shortly thereafter a new CIA director-
there were at least 500,000 Communist a Nixon "team player" and a Vietnam-
.forces In Vietnam, and the Joint Chiefs policy supporter-abolished the board
asked for more American soldiers to for the weaker NIO system.
fight them.
Kissinger Is Criticized
nc
A Ai D' b
r
a
o
ous a ate The lesson of Pearl Harbor has not
A good example of policy abuse of been absorbed by the CIA leadership.
Intelli
c
i
th
gen
e
n
e State Department is The "watch committee" that met to as-
shown in a memorandum State inteli. sess the outbreak of war in the Middle
Bence was asked to send to Assistant East on Oct. 6. 1973-after hostilities
S
ecretary William Bundy in September had begun-could not discuss certain
1967. "Unclassified" findings that could classified Information because not
be made public said'enemy morale and ever. one present was cleared to re-
recruitment were declining and Viet ceive it. Other classified information
Cong defections were Increasing. But that would have been helpful to an-
facts directly. contradicting each of alysis was not disseminated until the
these points, and more, were classified war had begun.. Similar problems
secret on "national security" grounds: plagued the Cyprus ,and other crises.
Enemy morale robs
em
p -
s were of no
The lack of d,
.sse:ni:?aslon of Yntelli-
great military import; defections were : Bence
Increasing less than In the previous Kissinger because -
th e Is
e CIA leadershi leadership's lack of star-
veals
American Int
elligence still suffers
at tilde
their d!sgust at such tactics found their
careers threatened. Those who kept,
quiet" were promoted,
By 1973 the Vietnam debate had be-
ure. H.gh intelligence and policy offl-
{
dials recognize the intelligence value in
dt 1
t
.p omat
c discussto:is. To Study the
nuances of these conversaticrs for their
hidden meanings, and to compare this
information with other findings, Is es-
sential for accurate Intelligence:
Prior to the 1973 Middle East war,
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Kissinger was engaged in intensive dis-
cussions with Soviet, Arab, and Israeli
officials. According to The Secret
Conversations of Henry Kissinger by
Israeli journalist Mattl Golan, Kis-
singer later told Israeli Premier Goida
Meir that an Egyptian official had
hinted at possible war, but he dis-
missed this as an empty threat. U.S.
Intelligence was denied access to the
discussions which might have assisted
analysis.
During the Cuban missile crisis of
1962-a notable intelligence success-
President Kennedy and his staff worked
intimately with senior intelligence offi-
cials. Yet Secretary Kissinger did not
even consult his Intelligence arm in the
State Department prior to the U.S.
troop alert of Oct. 24, 1973, which alleg-
edly came in response to Soviet threats
to intervene with military force against
Israel. Testimony before the House In-
telligence Committee that "certainly
the technical intelligence available in
INR [State Department intelligence]
did not support such a Soviet intention"
raises the question: Did the United
States risk war without justification?
Embarrassed Officials
The CIA complained after the Cy-
prus crisis that "analysis ... may also
have suffered as the result of the nona-
vailability of certain key categories of
information, specifically those asso-
ciated with private conversations be
tween U.S. policy makers and certain
principals In the dispute." The CIA
added: "Because Ignorance of such
matters could substantially damage the
ability to analyze events as they unfold,
in this or in any future crisis, the prob-
lem'is serious and one which should be
addressed by the (intelligence] coin-
'munity and by policy makers as well,"
Yet CIA officials were so embar-
rassed when I asked them which policy
makers they had in mind that the name
of one of Kissinger's principal aides
was excised from the House Lnleili-
gence Committee copy of the Cyprus
post mortem. The phrase " e, U.S. of-:.
ficial" was typed In its place. Such in-
formation is still "ronavailable" to the .
CIA on such important issues as U.S.-
China relations.
Third-Level Assistant
In 1973 some intelligence officials..
were greatly concerned that Kissinger
might be suppressing intelligence re-
lated to alleged Soviet violations of the
SALT agreement. Two of them recom-
mended that acting CIA Director Ver-
non Walters (who has announced he.
plans to retire soon) approach the Pres-
ident to ensure that Kissinger's conduct
was authorized. Walters, fMlowing the
pattern he established when Nixon's
aides had tried to abuse the CIA in the
Watergate affair, never approached the
President. CIA Director Colby later got.
in. the habit of writing to Kissinger's
aides for permission to disseminate cer-
tain intelligence concerning Soviet.
nuclear-arms matters. Thus the Presi-
dent's statutory Intelligence adviser
was reduced to a third-feel assistant.
Kissinger aides justify this by citing
numerous leaks that seemed designed
to undercut SALT policy,
,
Such timidity does net encourage
one to believe the CIA is equipped to re-
sist the inevitable encrcachmer,;s from
dominating Presidential assistants. The
CIA has become not the "roue ele-
phant" some fear, but a passive circus
piny, ridden at will by Presidential as
sista:its. Newly appointed CIA Director
George Bush would-4)ewell-advised to i
attract new leadership.
0 .-;
Gregory G. Rush/ord was are investi-
gator for the House Intelligence Com-
mittee in its recent investigation o/ the
CIA.
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