BACKGROUND FOR THE DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE ON MEET THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002700050019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 20, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Approve r Release 2004/0 it L4-RDP79M 67A002700050019-8
NIO No. 0285-76
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
20 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DCI
Assistant to the DCI
SUBJECT: Background for the Director's Appearance
on Meet The Press
1. Should the press suggest that CIA failed in its
responsibilities by not predicting the recent shake up in
the Chinese leadership as is indicated in the attached article
in The Star, I suggest the Director can make a case that we
anticipated to some degree the current struggle in China by
citing the following two OCI articles. Both of these OCI
articles were published before the announcement of Hua Kuo-feng
as acting premier.
2. The first article written in December 1975 suggests
that the Chinese leftists attacks on the Chinese schools was
in fact an attack on Teng. The article suggests there were
severe strains between Teng and the left wing of the Party.
3. But even more important, the second OCI article
which was published just before the announcement of Hua as
acting premier specifically states that "the Party's left wing
appears to be making a determined effort to forestall the formal
designation of Teng Hsiao-ping as premier."
a es Lilley
r National 1Intelligence Offi J er
for China
Attachment:
Article
dated
19
Feb
1976
Article
dated
11
Dec
1975
Article
dated
7
Feb
1976
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MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DCI
Assistant to the DCI
SUBJECT: Background for the Director's Appearance
on Meet The Press
25X1
NIO/CH-JRLilley:fmt
Distribution:
1 - SA/DCI, w/atts.
1.- Asst./DCI, w/atts.
1 - DDI/OCI, Watts.
1 - D/DCI/NIO, w/atts.
2 - NIO/CH, w/atts.
1 - NIO/RI, w/atts.
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MI. :
20 February 1976
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CIA OPERATIONS CENTER
NEWS SERVICE
DISTRIBUTION 11
The attached are from today's Stare
Future Trends Remain Unclear
V. 0
L?c
euna i C m ' r a
PocaU
the
By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Stott Writer
The political shakeup in China in
which a relative unknown. Hua Kuo-
feng. tecame acting prime minister
took the U.S. intelligence community
completely by surprise, CIA Director
George Bush said today.
Bush. who was U.S. envoy in Pe-
king prior to his selection to head the
CIA, said he does not even know flua'.
Asked at a breakfast meeting with
a group of reporters whether the CIA
predicted the shift, which doym-
graded President Ford's Peking
host, Teng Hsiao-ping, Bush said,
"There --as a ma!or surprise facror.
in those ''eveicpments."
Bush -added that it is not yet el^ir,
what suture developments will bring
in China.
ON OTITER topics, Bush conceded
there is nothing in President Ford's
intelligence reforms that would pre-
vent a futureWatergate scandal.
""That is a question of trust," Bush
said. "I don't think someone can
draw legislation in a way to make
sure that these things won't happen."
Bush conceded that Ford's new re-
strictions on present and former gov-
ernment employes and employes of
government contractors to prevent
disclosure of classified ir.!or:.~ation
might make it more difficult for the
public to learn of Watergate-type
abuses.
But he insisted that
Ford's plan to strengthen
the CIA's inspector general
would give an emp:oye
"some place to go to blow
the whistle" on abuses.
BUSH SAID HE is deter-
mined to prevent as much
as possible disclosure of
classified information.
He said he would attempt
to obtain a court order to
prevent publication of se-
crets in newspapers or
magazines if he learned of
the disclosure prior to the
publication time.
The executive order Ford
issued yesterday authorizes
injunctions against govern-
ment employes, former
employes or employes of
contractors disclosing
classified material. But it
does not authorize injunc-
tions directly against publi-
cations. .
Bush said his new job
places him in an "adver-
sary relationship" with the
press concerning informa.
tion about classified
material.
Bush said that Ford's
reorganization plans pro-
vide no new guidelines to
govern CIA efforts to
manipulate the govern-
ments of other nations.
"I don't think you need
special written guidelines
for covert activity," he
said.
Bush repeatedly refused
to be drawn into the debate
over the sort of committee
Congress should establish
to supervise intelligence
activities.
He indicated he personal-
ly favors Ford's proposal
for a joint Senate-House
committee to reduce the
number of congressmen
who must be informed. But
Bush said he could "work
with whatever the Congress
sets up."
The intelligence commit-
tees of both the Senate and
House have each recom-
mended individual commit-
tees for each house.
THE EXECUTIVE order
Ford issued yesterday au-
thorizes Bush to expand the
scope of a secrecy oath
which all employes of the
government and its con-
tractors will be required to
sign in order to obtain ac-
cess to classified material.
Bush said he plans to
seek legal advice on the
exercise of that authority,
but he indicated he expect-
ed to issue the orders ex-
pandinI the coverage of the
oath from informatioy
relating to intelligence
sources and methods to al
classified information.
"I disapprove of the idea
that a Government employs
can divulge classified info,
mation." Bush said.
['r.rer the terms of the
order. if an ernpln,
HE ADDED that there
were no secret restrictions
on CIA efforts to manipu-
late vo!itics overseas ex-
cep! for a prohibition on ef-
fort; to assassinate foreign
leaders.
Covert activity. which
can run the gamut free se-
cret wur s to bribery of p oli-
n
ticians, will be approved o
t
n~
Approved Fot`'i c~al~? kg4t 11V1Tt?e t~
operations group createa
by Ford's executive order.
e7e -R~'t~ t e R2le orMet
Date. , to Fob.
Item No.
Ref. No.,
he would be subject to
civil court action filed
the Justice Department a
to discipline from his d
partment or agency.
THE PENALTIES pro
Ford is proposing in:legi
lation to make it a crime
reveal intelligence sours
and methods.
But the criminal statu
requires action by Co
gress, and approval is f:
from certain. Ford was ab
p!edge under his own a
thori ty.
In the words of ti
to improve the protection
sources and methods
intelligence, all members
the executive branch a
.
its contractors given acce
to information contain-
sources or methods of int
licence shall, as a corditi
ofeobtaining access, sign
agreement that they w
not disclose that inform
.
tion to persons not autho
ized to receive it."
The order authorizes t
attorney general to obta
an injunction prohibits
unauthorized disclosure
he learns in advance of
impending leak.
just such an order again
former CIA official Vitt
Marchetti, prohibiting hi
from publishing his "Cl
and the Cult of Intel
gence" without official cc
sorship. The book was pu
fished with gaps marki
the passages that had be
removed. It was the fir
time a book was censor
officially before publicati
The courts upheld the i
signing the CIA's secre
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
5 75 101 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
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0
USSR: Military Costing
The Washington Star carried several stories this week
claiming that CIA has been grossly underestimating Soviet
defense spending and that new information has caused CIA
to double its estimates. Would you please comment on these
allegations?
--The man who wrote the stories has obviously talked to a
number of people in Washington about the problem. As is
often the case in such matters he got some things right,
some things partly right and some things wrong.
--It is true that CIA is engaged in,a review of a large new
body of evidence bearing on our estimates of Soviet ruble
defense spending. Preliminary indications are that our
estimates of the number of rubles the Soviet spend for
defense will be substantially higher than in the past.
It is important to note, however, that this review-is not
yet complete.
--It is even more important not to misconstrue the implica-
tions of this reassessment. If the forthcoming estimates
do indeed show defense activities cost more rubles than
we had believed:
--it would mean that we have been crediting Soviet
defense industries with being more efficient
than they are;
--it would mean that the Soviets have been willing
to bear a greater burden for defense than we
had believed;
--on the other hand, it would not mean the Soviets
have recently engaged in a more rapid buildup of
their forces than previously believed,
--it would not mean that the physical size of Soviet
forces--as measured in dollars--were any larger
than we have believed. These estimates are based
on direct observation of their forces, not on
ruble costs.
--Nor would it mean that the capabilities of Soviet
forces are any greater. A different body of
force related data, including technical character-
istics, must be considered for such judgments.
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 MEMORANDUM FOR: Angus Thuermer
Attached are background pieces on:
--The Spanish Sahara Situation
--Angola
--Recent Political Developments in China
-The Soviet Party Congress
--Economic Intelligence
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The military costing item will be along
later.
I hope to hear from you some time tomorrow.
STAT
STAT
Deputy Director
Current Intelligence
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 The S apish Sahara Situation
--Arab mediation efforts have failed to get Morocco
and Algeria to com
ro
i
p
m
se.
General Riad's'current effort Arab
success.
hasLlittleschancerof
--Morocco continues to insist on Algerian recognition
of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara before enter-
ing into meaningful negotiations.
--Algeria refused to drop its demand for a referendum
on self determination for the people of Spanish
Sahara. Algiers maintains that the Moroccan-Mauri-
tanian takeover is illegal and that Spain is still
accountable to the UN as the administering power of
a non-self governing territory.
--Morocco should be able to contain--but not eliminate--
the Polisario Front's insurgency in Spanish Sahara so
long as the conflict remains an insurgency with only
limited Algerian support.
--An escalation of the fighting short of all-out war
would most likely produce a repetition of the incon-
clusive border war of 1963 between Morocco and Algeria.
-In the unlikely event of a full-scale war, Algeria
should win because of the numerical superiority of
its air and armored forces.
E-2 IMPDET
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-- After more than six months of fighting, the conventional
aspect of the.war in Angola is over.
-- In the north, the National Front has retreated into
Zaire and is finished as a political and military force.
Zairian President Mobutu, the National Front's long-time
backer, is now attempting to reach an accommodation with
the Luanda regime of Agostinho Neto. Neto's prime minister
is scheduled to travel to Kinshasa this weekend for dis-
cussions with Mobutu.
-- As a result of the Popular Movement's overwhelming
military superiority, National Union leader Jonas Savimbi's
forces are now confined to remote areas of southeastern
Angola.
-- Savimbi claims he will continue fighting a guerrilla
war. Some local skirmishing is going on, but in the long
term we doubt Savimbi can maintain an effective insurgency.
-- Thus far, the Popular Movement and Cuban forces in
the south have made no move against the South African
forces still in southern Angola. The South Africans are
approximately 30 miles inside Angola while the Popular
Movement is still some 100 miles away from the South
African lines.
-- The OAU has officially endorsed the Neto regime as
the Peoples Republic of Angola and only six OAU members
have not yet recognized the Luanda government. Major
European governments, led by France and Great Britain,
are extending recognition.
-- The Neto government faces formidable tasks in extend-
ing its political control throughout Angola and in
restoring Angola's potentially rich but shattered economy.
The Popular Movement will need extensive technical and
financial support from the Cubans and Soviets for some
time to come.
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 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Recent Political Developments in China
The present political infighting in China looks both
backward and forward. It grows out of personal and political
quarrels of the past decade. At stake is,the shape of the
succession to Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung.
-- The central issue is whether or not the
Cultural Revolution was really legitimate.
-- As a major victim of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the "rehabilitated" Teng Hsiao-ping
.is a very controversial figure. If he
were premier the Cultural Revolution
would be in effect repudiated.; the party's
left wing also feared he would take
revenge against them.
-- The left wing has not yet reversed recent
political trends.
-- Acting premier Hua Kuo-feng is a compro-
mise candidate. Politically he is closer
to Teng than to the leftists. He will
probably eventually be confirmed as per-
manent premier.
-- The left is now attempting to eliminate
Teng again from political life. The
returns on this struggle are not yet in.
Teng has many powerful friends.
-- Although a major political struggle is
under way, it does not appear that China
is in for another Cultural Revolution.
-- There is as yet no sign that major
foreign policy changes are contemplated.
Chinese officials have been insisting
that there will be no changes in this
area.
-- China's invitation to former President
Nixon indicates that Peking does not
intend to abandon its connection with
Washington. Propaganda attacks on the
Soviet Union are continuing.
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 The Soviet Party Congress
The 25th Soviet Party Congress opens on Tuesday, Feb-
ruary 24. We expect the following results:
--Brezhnev and the core of top leaders will be
reconfirmed in office.
--Some leadership changes are likely at the
secondary level; if a top leader should de-
part, Premier Kosygin seems the most likely.
--Shifts among second-echelon. leaders may offer
some clues about how the succession problem
will develop in the post-Congress period.
--The basic outlines of present policies will
be reaffirmed, but account will be taken of
policy disappointments and difficulties.
--Brezhnev will come out for a new SALT agree-
ment and for getting detente with the US back
on the tracks--while noting the increasing
activity of "anti-detente forces" in the US.
--He will emphasize Soviet leadership of the
world communist movement as well as support
for national liberation movements.
--Concerning the economy, the leadership will
try to gloss over the worst aspects and will
stress improving quality and efficiency at
this stage rather than quantitative growth.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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 s
Economic Intelligence
?
Why does the Agency, rather than Commerce or
some other agency, conduct economic analysis?
Why doesn't the Agency just address political
and military intelligence?
International economics is now an inseparable part of
foreign policy. Moreover, international economic raatters
impact heavily on US domestic policy. The high prices of
oil, meat, and bread are largely due to events abroad.
Economic interdependence has created a multitude of friction
points with both the Third World and our traditional allies.
And it is still necessary to our national security to know
the war-making potential of the Soviet and Chinese economies.
There is widespread acceptance of CIA's unique role:
-- We can provide an independent assessment of
economic issues. CIA has no stake in any
particular policy or course of action.
-- We provide analysis based on all kinds of
sources.
-- We can provide integrated analysis of the
relevant political and military factors
that bear on economic issues.
-- And we have the ability to respond quickly
and flexibly to the needs of policy officials.
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