'INTERMEDIATE' TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500090039-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: June 5, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1976
CONFIDENTIAL
(With SECRET Enclosure)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Cabinet Committee
to Combat Terrorism
FROM: Henry A. Kissin Chairman
1?Intermediate1? Terrorism
CONFIDENTIAL
(With SECRET Enclosure)
GDS
0CM 7-E-12
Head ua rr (EX ECVT
State Dept. revlW Cq*p }I For Release 20029/04: CIA-RDP79M00467A002500090039-4
There is a heightened risk of terrorist activity this
year in this country centering on the Bicentennial celebra-
tions, Montreal Olympics and Presidential campaigns.
Attacks by US-based or foreign terrorist groups could take
the form of the bombings and assassinations with which the
world is now all too familiar. But there is also the pos-
sibility that more sophisticated weapons will be used
involving a major escalation of terrorist dangers.
As you are aware, the Department of Justice is the lead
agency in coping with domestic terrorism. Investigative and
operational responsibility rest with the FBI. The Department
of State has the lead responsibility for dealing with ter-
rorism involving Americans abroad and for handling the
foreign relations aspects of domestic terrorism incidents.
While the Justice and State Departments thus bear the
primary responsibility, their success in confronting the
terrorism problem is dependent upon a vigorous, well-coordi-
nated effort by all concerned US Government agencies. I
therefore wish to take this opportunity to re-emphasize our
Committee's charter and to solicit your continuing coopera-
tion in "efforts to prevent and, as necessary, deal with,
terrorist threats or attacks during our Bicentennial year.
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CONFIDENTIAL
(With SECRET Enclosure)
I enclose for your information a memorandum which
reviews the actions which the Cabinet Committee's Working
Group has undertaken to meet the possibility of heightened
terrorist dangers in this country.
Briefing Memorandum
CONFIDENTIAL
(With SECRET Enclosure)
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
sr~~
"`''~Wxl-4) BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
SECRET
To: The Secretary
Thru: M Mr. Eagl
From: S/CCT - Robert A. Fear'ey
"Intermediate" Terrorism
. On May 21, 1975 the Working Group of the Cabinet Com-
mittee to Combat Terrorism established an interagency
Study Group, chaired by Dr. Robert H. Kupperman, Chief
Scientist, ACDA, to examine possible terrorist threats or
attacks involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
of mass destruction. The Study Group's report, submitted
on September. 17, 1975, effectively identified the issues
involved in the USG's seeking to prevent, and if prevention
failed, successfully dealing with such threats or attacks.
The Cabinet Committee/Working Group concluded, on the basis
of the study, that responsibility for further research and
planning on the problem properly lay with the NSC. The
study was accordingly submitted to the NSC Staff for
appropriate action.
On January 22, 1976 the Cabinet Committee/Working Group
initiated a follow-on study on "intermediate" terrorism.
This was defined as a level of terrorist violence lying
between mass destruction terrorism and the types of assassina-
tions or abductions of medium-grade USG officials or private
citizens with which US terrorism policy has, been primarily
concerned. Examples of intermediate terrorism are the use of
man-portable missiles to destroy commercial aircraft,-with
the possible objective of bringing all commercial air service
in the US to a halt; use of such missiles to assassinate a
visiting head of state; blowing up of a nuclear power reactor
with possible dispersion of nuclear materials; or the sabotage
SECRET
GDS
June 1, 1976
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2 -
of key elements of a multi-state electric power grid. The
Working Group felt that this scale of terrorism presented
prevention and management problems largely distinct from
those presented by possible mass destruction terrorism, on
the one hand, or by terrorist assassinations and abductions
of the type thus,far experienced, on the other.
On April 21, 1976 the Study Group, also chaired by
Dr. Kupperman, submitted its report, the highlights of which
are as follows:
(a) The Bicentennial celebrations, Montreal
Olympics and Presidential election campaigns present
serious risk of intermediate-level terrorist incidents
in the US during 1976. The many public events will
provide attractive targets for terrorist groups, and
the movement of terrorists into and within the country
will be facilitated by the heavy visitor flow.
(b) A number of US-based militant extremist
organizations, such as the Weather Underground and
American IndianMovement, present a current-danger of.---
engaging in intermediate terrorist attacks. The
.Palestinian Rejectionists and affiliated groups such
.as the Japan Red Army are the most likely sources of
foreign-based intermediate terrorist incidents.
(c) Measures to counter such threats and to pro-
vide as much protection as practicable for potential
targets lie in the areas of intelligence, physical
protection, and availability of anti-terrorism resources.
Timely intelligence and the judicious use of barriers,
guards, sensors, communications, and anti-terrorist
materials (e.g., antitoxins) can enhance the security
of targets.
(d) While much has been accomplished in these
respects, further action is required, particularly to:
-- Study the present systems for collecting and
disseminating intelligence on terrorism to determine
if they are adequate and comply with Federal law;
recommend whatever additional collection, dissemina-
tion and centralization may be necessary and
appropriate -
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3 -
-- Increase security at potential high-risk tar-
gets, including restricting the dissemination of
sensitive installation plans and operations
Locate and make advance plans for the use of
anti-terrorist resources, such as immunization
materials and antidotes
-- Survey and present recommendations on media
problems in relation to intermediate terrorism
-- Implement Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
.staff recommendations for reducing the vulnerability
of nuclear power reactor sites
-- Expedite the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA)
analysis of the vulnerability and recoverability
of the US power grid from terrorist attack
-- Investigate means of strengthening controls
over terrorist acquisition of automatic weapons
and man-portable rocket launchers
-- Monitor or initiate R&D programs on devices
or techniques for frustrating rocket attacks against
civil aircraft and for deterring or thwarting other
forms of intermediate terrorism attack
-- Provide funding (an estimated $15.8 million)
for anti-terrorist screening measures proposed by
the Customs Service
(e) Responsibility for the management of an inter-
mediate terrorism incident in the US should focus in the
Department of Justice, with investigative and operational
responsibility resting with the FBI, and with the Secre-
tary of State responsible for international aspects.
There should be adequate monitoring, command and control
arrangements to permit the President to bring the full
resources of the Government to the aid of the FBI, the
lead agency within the Department of Justice, and to
direct management of the incident personally to the
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extent he desires. (The NSC Staff is studying this
problem.) The FPA should be responsible for coordi-
nating US Government-wide, and Federal-state, emergency.
actions to cope with the dislocative effects of ter-
rorist attacks.
(f) The USG's publicly declared policy should con-
tinue to be one of no concessions to groups or individu-
als threatening, or carrying out, terrorist threats or
attacks, including those at the "intermediate" level,
and to endeavor to treat such threats or attacks in
normal law enforcement channels. However, because of
the scale of the human, physical, financial or political
damage which intermediate terrorism incidents could
enstail,.tactical bargaining with the terrorists -- seeking
to bait and trap them while saving the lives of the
hostages -- should not be excluded.
The Cabinet Committee/Working Group on April 29 invited
each member department and agency to consider whether, in
light of the Study Group's report, it should take additional
measures within its area of responsibility (a) to help to
deter or prevent major terrorist incidents in this country-,-
and (b) to prepare to discharge effectively its perceived
role in the management of such an incident if one occurs.
On May 27 the Working Group, meeting at'?the Assistant
Secretary or Deputy Assistant Secretary level:
(a) Considered and took appropriate action on
the Study Group's recommendations summarized in sub-
paragraph (d)above;
(b) Approved this Briefing Memorandum for sub-
mission to the Chairman of the Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism, with the recommendation that he
distribute it for the information of all members of
the Committee.
Drafted: S/CCT:RAFearey:ijg
5/28/76 ext. 29892
SECRET
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