LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002400130006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 184
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 13, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
v W m
~0LUTION
r I(F I/ DF b;,>76-1916^
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
The scope of the several investigations being made of American
intelligence has inevitably raised the subject of its organization. The
Rockefeller Commission made certain recommendations on this subject,
and it is predictable that the House and Senate Select Committees will
do the same. Your own staff has also given consideration to whether an
Administration initiative would be desirable on this subject.
Some weeks ago, six senior professional intelligence officers in
CIA were asked to examine this question. I believed their experience in
this field could possibly offer insights into the matter which would sharpen
the issues, eliminate unnecessary focus on useless or even counterpro-
ductive proposals and identify some subjects for attention which otherwise
might be missed. They approach the subject from a CIA perspective, of
course, but in the nature of their work and in this study they have acquired
a broad familiarity with the intelligence interests and problems of the
other agencies and departments. They represent the various aspects of
the intelligence process, from clandestine and technical collection to
analysis and management.
This booklet is the result of their study, with an Executive Summary
to provide a quick overview. It should be read as their work, embodying
their ideas, and not as my own or any agency's or department's official
view or recommendation. I do believe, however, that the ideas are worth
considering with the other factors affecting the likely final outcome of
the several investigations in process. For this purpose, I am planning to
make it available to the members of the National Security Council, the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and members of your
staff such as Messrs. Buchen, Marsh, and Lynn.
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I am of course at your disposal for any discussions or other action
you would like to take with respect to this study.
Respectfully,
W. Colby
Director
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AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE:
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE
CIA Study Group
13 October 1975
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUr2_rIARY .....................................
PART I - INTRODUCTION .................................
1
PART II - ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMI,IUNITY .......................
10
Statutory Basis .............................
11
The Three Roles of the DCI ..................
13
Authorities of the DCI ......................
18
Different Customers in Intelligence .........
22
The Transition of National Intelligence
to War ....................................
24
The Merging of National and Tactical
Intelligence ..............................
25
Crisis ~'Ianarement and the Extended
National I-lilitary Command Center ..........
28
The DCI and Defense's Budgetary Process .....
30
Consequences of the DCI-Defense Impasse .....
33
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE .......
33
THE DCI AS it1ANAGER OF CIA ........................
35
Production ..................................
Science and Technology ......................
37
Operations ..................................
3(
CIA'S CURRENT ORGANIZATION .......................
39
The DCI and Covert operations ...............
41
Continued Subordination to CIA ..............
47
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TABLE OF CU,JTEJTS
(CONTINUED)
Page
DCIs AND THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE
COMMUNITY .................................. 49
DOES THE COMMUNITY NEED A MANAGER? ........... 51
PART III - THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ................... 53
BASIC APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION ... 54
The Monolithic Solution ................. 55
The Defense Solution .................... 56
A National-Departmental Balance ......... 59
A CRITICAL CHOICE ............................ 60
THE PREFERRED PATH ........................... 64
OPTION ONE ................................... 66
OPTION TWO ................................... 69
Necessary Conditions .................... 69
THE DGI APPROACH ......... I 71
The DGI's Resource Controls ............. 73
The DGI and the Community ............... 73
The DGI's Relationship to the Department
of Defense 75
Specific Problem Areas .................. 77
The DGI and the CIA ..................... 82
RECOMMENDATIONS .............................. 92
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................... 97
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ANNEX A - THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ANNEX B - COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
ANNEX C - NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
ANNEX D - PROBLEMS IN THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ANNEX E - THE NATIONAL/TACTICAL PROBLEM
ANNEX F - THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS
ANNEX G - A PRODUCT REVIEW CONCEPT OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the past year American intelligence has been
subjected to intense scrutiny by both the press and
Congress. In early 1975 the President established
the Rockefeller Commission, and the Senate and House
each established a Select Committee to investigate the
American intelligence system and make recommendations
for change. The Rockefeller Commission focused on al-
leged improprieties in the domestic area and recommended
ways to prevent the American intelligence system from
posing any threat to civil liberties. The Congressional
investigations still underway are broader. They have a
mandate to consider the full range of questions deal-
ing with intelligence, from constitutional issues to
the quality of the product.
These developments led the Director of Central
Intelligence to commission this study, in the belief
that a thorough analysis of American intelligence by
a group of experienced professionals could make a
useful contribution to the ultimate decisions to be
made.
This paper does not address past excesses or
steps to correct them. Nor does it address the re-
lated issue of oversight. We fully recognize the
need for stronger oversight, but we believe the ap-
propriate arrangements for this function require more
than an intelligence perspective.
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This study concentrates on basic issues which
will need consideration in any reorganization of
American intelligence. The President has a particu-
lar opportunity not available to his predecessors, who
saw to varying degrees a need for basic reform in the
intelligence structure but also recognized that basic
reform could not be carried out without amending the
National Security Act. Now the Act is certain to be
reconsidered, with or without a Presidential initia-
tive.
The intelligence structure must be made more ef-
ficient and effective. It must also be made more
acceptable to the American polity. Thus, efficiency
achieved through rationalization and centralization
of authority is not the only test. Structural im-
provements must be accompanied by provisions for ex-
ternal controls and internal checks and balances,
even at a cost in efficiency, to develop and sustain
public confidence. Changes in the elaborate struc-
ture in being must also. be justified by the improve-
ments which would be achieved. These must be weighed
against the losses and disruption which would result
from altering the existing machinery; our recommenda-
tions must build upon the present, rather than start
from scratch.
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Part I describes the present environment of in-
telligence. Part II focuses on present problems in
the organization and management of intelligence, em-
phasizing the central role of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the difficulties in meeting his ex-
tensive responsibilities with the limited authorities
vested in him. The expanding breadth and depth of
national requirements for intelligence and the grow-
ing sophistication of the technology developed to
meet them add year by year to the difficulty of this
management task. We place particular stress on two
problems:
-- First, the relationship between the DCI, who
has at least nominal responsibility for all US in-
telligence, and the Secretary of Defense, who has op-
erating authority over the bulk of its assets. This
relationship is ill-defined and hampers the develop-
ment of a coherent national intelligence structure.
-- Second, the ambiguity inherent in the current
definition of the DCI as both the head of the Intel-
ligence Community and the head of one element of the
Community. This poses internal management problems
for CIA and also reduces the DCI's ability to carry
out effectively his Community role.
Part III outlines three basic approaches to or-
ganizing the Intelligence Community. These are:
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-- Transfer most national intelligence activities
out of the Department of Defense into a reconstituted
and renamed Central Intelligence Agency, responsible
for servicing the fundamental intelligence needs of
both the nation's civilian and its military leader-
ship.
-- Absorb the Central Intelligence Agency within
the Department of Defense, eliminating the DCI's role
as it has been conceived since 1947 and placing respon-
sibility for effective coordination of all American
intelligence on a Deputy Secretary of Defense for In-
telligence who would absorb the Community responsi-
bilities now exercised by the DCI, as well as those
exercised by the present Assistant Secretary of De-
fense/Intelligence.
-- Leave mostly unchanged the division of labor
between Defense and CIA which has evolved since 1947
and, instead, focus on the office of the Director of
Central Intelligence; modifying that office, and its
authorities, in ways that will enhance the DCI's ability
to play a more effective role in contributing to the
overall effectiveness of the Intelligence Community,
at the same time reducing his direct involvement in
managing CIA.
The study argues that fundamental political prob-
lems and the unquestioned need to maintain both Defense
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involvement in intelligence operations and an inde-
pendent CIA preclude the first two of these solutions.
The third basic approach structures the office of
the DCI so that its holder can discharge the responsi-
bilities of Community leadership without adversely af-
fecting the legitimate interests of the Departments of
State and Defense. The DCI clearly needs a stronger
voice in decision making on fundamental substantive
intelligence judgments and on management issues in the
Intelligence Community. At the same time, individual
program managers in Defense need to retain considerable
latitude and flexibility in the conduct of day-to-day
operations. Both goals can be met by increasing the
DCI's voice in the processes which determine how in-
telligence judgments are made and disseminated and
how resources -- money and people -- will be allo-
cated in the Community, while preserving an independent
CIA and continuing Defense responsibility for actual
operation of most present programs.
There immediately arises, however, a critical
choice, namely whether:
1) The DCI is to be responsible in a major way
for stewardship of the resources this nation
devotes to intelligence and, simultaneously,
to be the nation's principal substantive for-
eign intelligence officer, or
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2) The substantive and resource management re-
sponsibilities are to be split, with the DCI
being replaced by two senior officers; one
charged exclusively with resource manage-
ment and the other with substantive respon-
sibilities.
For reasons explained, we reject the second of
these choices and argue that the Community leadership
role must include responsibility for both resource and
substantive matters. We present two options for re-
structuring the office of the DCI, leading to two quite
different DCIs of the future.
In the first option, the DCI retains direct respon-
sibility for CIA and a staff role with respect to the
balance of the Intelligence Community. This option
would much resemble present arrangements, but would
differ from them in several significant. respects.
This DCI's ability to influence decision making
on certain important issues would be enhanced somewhat
by creation of an Executive Committee, under his chair-
manship, for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program,
along the lines of the present arrangement with respect
to the National Reconnaissance Program. His line re-
sponsibility for management of CIA would be reduced
by creation of two statutory deputy directors, one
responsible for day to day supervision of CIA and one
for Intelligence Community coordination.
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Implementation of this option would improve in im-
portant ways the overall management arrangements which
currently exist within the Intelligence Community. The
study group is convinced, however, that the changes
needed are more fundamental than those reflected in
this option, and that an opportunity for effecting such
basic changes now exists.
The second option would create a new kind of DCI
called the Director General of Intelligence (DGI). He
would be separated by statute from the present CIA,
which would be renamed the Foreign Intelligence Agency
(FIA), with its own Director (D/FIA). Funds for most
US intelligence programs would be appropriated to the
DGI, then allocated by him to program managers for actual
operations. The DGI would assume broad substantive
production and resource coordination functions and would
receive staff support to exercise both responsibilities.
Finally, the DGI would be a statutory member of the Na-
tional Security Council with concomitant access to the
.President and standing-with the Secretaries of State,
Treasury and Defense.
Under this arrangement, two important and inter-
related questions must be answered:
To whom should the Director of the FIA report;
specifically, should he report directly to the NSC (as
does the present DCI), or should he report to the NSC
through the DGI, himself a member of the NSC?
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-- Should the DGI's staff include the production
elements of CIA or should these remain in the new FIA?
We present two workable solutions to the problems
raised by these questions. Both have important advan-
tages and serious disadvantages. The study group did
not make a choice between them. A chart of these
organizational choices appears opposite page 85.
If fundamental change could be at least contem-
plated in 1971, it is a central issue in 1975. Current
political developments suggest that the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 will be rewritten, at least to some
degree. Our analysis of the Act and the intelligence
structure it established convinces us that it should
be. We have made no effort in the pages which follow
to set forth how precisely the law should be rewritten,
but rather have addressed the broad principles which
we believe should be incorporated in such an effort.
It is not an exaggeration to observe that we are fast
approaching an historical moment and unique opportunity
to charter the Intelligence Community to meet future
needs for effective intelligence support. It may be
another 25 years before events provide the President
a comparable opportunity. Our detailed recommendations
are presented at the end of Part III.
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The Central Intelligence Agency and the outlines
of a national intelligence structure were created by
the National Security Act of 1947. They grew out of a
consensus -- in Congress, the Executive Branch, and
major elements of public opinion -- that the experience
of World War II ("No more Pearl Harbors") and the emergence
of the United States as the first superpower required the
creation of a permanent national intelligence structure.
Today that structure is under.intense examina-
tion, and the consensus out of which it grew has been
seriously eroded. Moreover, 28 years of experience
suggest that the intelligence provisions of the Act
are obsolete and too weak a foundation for the large and
complex system that has evolved over that period. This
paper examines some of the problems that beset Ameri-
can intelligence today. It recommends ways the struc-
ture might be modernized and broad support for it re-
stored. Both are necessary, and the former cannot be
achieved without the latter.
In 1947 Congress had in mind the creation of a
small independent agency, not subordinate to any Cabi-
net Department, to "correlate and evaluate" the prod-
uct of the existing, largely military, agencies respon-
sible for strategic intelligence -- a term then understood
to cover primarily the military intentions and capabili-
ties of potential enemies. The Congress placed on the
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Director of Central Intelligence responsibilities
thought to be modest and provided him with what it con-
sidered commensurate authorities. After almost three
decades, it is apparent that the contribution of Ameri-
ca's intelligence organizations is immeasurably important,
that the responsibilities imposed by Congress are enor-
mous and that the authorities it provided are less than
adequate.
Those who drafted and enacted the National Security
Act of 1947 neither anticipated nor could have foreseen:
-- That by 1975 the national intelligence effort
would become a major part of Government, larger in the
peace of 1975 than in the war of 1945.
-- That the definition of strategic intelligence
would expand to cover diplomacy, commerce, economics,
and sociological and political trends worldwide, as
well as the more traditional military considerations.
-- That the extraction of intelligence from
closed societies capable of threatening major US
interests, or even survival, would require the de-
velopment of large, complex, and expensive collec-
tion systems; and that efficient employment of
these systems in the national interest would re-
quire central, unified management.
-- That the Act would not provide a basis for
resolution of important management problems, primarily
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involving the Department of Defense, inherent in the
development of these major systems.
-- That incorporating within the new CIA the
operational elements of OSS, but not its analytic
ones, would require CIA to start from scratch in its
primary function -- collation and analysis -- with a
staff heavily oriented toward espionage and action.
-- That the onset of the Cold War would compound
this problem by creating a critical need for a na-
tional covert action arm, a responsibility that would
logically and naturally be assigned to the CIA at some
further cost to its original mission, thereby causing
it to become publicly identified with covert action ra-
ther than with correlation and evaluation.
-- That the silence and total secrecy tradition-
ally maintained by governments about their intelligence
activities would prove impossible to maintain in the
United States when its intelligence structure grew
large and complex.
-- That, further, such secrecy would be considered
inappropriate within the American political system for
something playing so pervasive and so critical a role
in decisions vital to the national interest.
With respect to the last point, the framers of
the Act evidently believed that the intelligence tradi-
tion of silence and discretion could be maintained in
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the United States. The OSS-trained cadre of CIA were
thus encouraged to follow this path. Secrecy was es-
tablished, but at significant cost: it prevented the
education of the public and of all but a few Congressmen
in the realities of intelligence and helped to insulate
intelligence itself from detailed oversight.
Intelligence thus had as its political base only
a small group of senior Congressmen, who both protected
it from and blocked its exposure to their colleagues.
Over a quarter of a century, however, age and electoral
defeat took their toll of this small group of Congressional
elders. The position of those who remained in Con-
gress was weakened, partly because the national at-
titudes of the 1940-1945 period were changed and the
consensus they reflected was eroded by the Vietnam
War and by Watergate. Intelligence became exposed
to a rapidly growing new generation of national leader-
ship that shared neither its traditions nor its view
of the world. The oversight of intelligence became
a battlefield both in the generational struggle within
Congress and in the overall struggle between Congress
and the Executive Branch.
The national turmoil of recent years had two other
related effects: intelligence security was damaged and
the public was presented with a distorted image of
intelligence. The intensity of political emotion gener-
ated by the Vietnam War led to intelligence being
leaked by both supporters and opponents of that war
for advantage in partisan debate, and the atmosphere
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thus created led to a breakdown in intelligence
discipline. When subjected to the investigative
reporting in vogue since Watergate, some intelligence
activities were exposed for the sake of exposure, or
at the behest of a "higher morality." Many skeletons
-- real and imagined -- were dragged from the intelli-
gence closet. Disclosure of some activities that were
illegal and others which were injudicious gave ammuni-
tion to those hostile to intelligence itself. Further,
those encouraged by recent events to believe the worst
of their Government have been tempted to accept at
face value often exaggerated imputations of impro-
priety to legitimate activities.
This, then, is the dilemma for American intelli-
gence in 1975. It has failed to win public acceptance,
partly because public attitudes have changed, partly
because its own secrecy has prevented it from educating
the public to the need for intelligence and to the
costs, moral and monetary, of getting it. Yet the
nation's need for foreign intelligence has never been
greater.
To the intelligence officer, if Pearl Harbor
was a valid reason for creating a national intelligence
system in 1947, the possibility of a Soviet first
strike is an equally valid reason for strengthening
it today. The argument that nuclear war is unthink-
able, or that the construction of nuclear armaments
is driven by the military-industrial complex, is to
him largely irrelevant; so long as the USSR continues
to build and improve its strategic forces, the US
must know how and why.
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To the intelligence officer, the new challenges
of supporting negotiations and agreements on arms
limitation and force reduction give rise to important
new requirements and demanding new methodological
approaches. At the same time, the increasingly com-
plex environment confronting military field commanders
leads to difficult new challenges for intelligence
support.
To the intelligence officer, the knowledge that
the world's resources are finite, and that population
growth is rapidly overtaking food and energy supplies,
means that national interests once considered important
will soon become vital. When there is not enough to
go around, intelligence on the capabilities and inten-
tions of foreign producers and consumers becomes as
essential to the survival of the United States as in-
telligence on Japanese intentions was in 1941.
To the intelligence officer, the turmoil afflict-
ing much of the world in many cases directly affects
important American interests; he sees in this new
demands for intelligence on the political and social
forces in foreign societies.
Pursuit of such intelligence has required the
development of procedures, techniques, and programs
far beyond any conceived in 1947. These have added a
new dimension to the concept of intelligence, and demon-
strated to the satisfaction of the Executive -- over
a number of Administrations -- that a copious flow of
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quality intelligence is essential to the conduct of
national security policy in today's complex world.
But these efforts have sometimes been wasteful and
the product sometimes less useful than it might have
been, to a considerable extent because neither the
organization nor the management of the national in-
telligence structure has kept pace with the evolving
complexity of its techniques and the expanding scope
of the requirements placed upon it. The Act of 1947
aid not provide the LCI with authorities and an ad-
ministrative structure adequate for the management of
the Intelligence Community in 1975. Instead, there
Sias evolved an accretion of improvised structures,
lacking statutory basis, over which the DCI exercises
varying degrees of influence.
There are therefore two sets of needs: to re-
store public confidence and to establish a sound statu-
tory basis for American intelligence for the future.
These are not irreconcilable. The President, in meet-
ing Congressional requirements for reforms in the con-
duct of intelligence, can at the same time meet the
Executive requirement for fundamental improvements in
its management.
Any President will probably:
-- Want a strong intelligence system, including a
responsive covert action capability.
-- Want reassurance that the system is under control.
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-- Want the system.run efficiently, with due regard
for budgetary considerations.
-- Want intelligence activities not to be a source of
political difficulty or embarrassment.
-- Want independent advice, particularly in time of
crisis, from capable people primarily loyal to the Presi-
dency and independent of the departments that execute policy.
-- Want a system that can function well in both
peace and war.
This President has a particular opportunity not
available to his predecessors, who saw to varying degrees
a need for basic reform in the intelligence structure
but also recognized that basic reform could not be car-
ried out without amending the National Security Act.
This they were unwilling to undertake. Now, however,
the Act is certain to be reconsidered, with or without
a Presidential initiative.
The intelligence structure must be made more effi-,
cient. It must also be made more acceptable to the Ameri-
can polity. Thus, efficiency cannot be achieved simply by
rationalization and centralization of authority. Struc-
tural improvements must be accompanied by provisions
for external controls and internal checks and balances,
even at a cost in efficiency, in order to develop and
sustain public confidence. Congress and the public must
be satisfied that foreign intelligence activities pose
no domestic threat and that such a threat cannot be created.
Parts II and III which follow are addressed to efficiency
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and needed changes in the organization and management of
intelligence.
There are two other aspects to the question of con-
fidence: how to establish effective Executive and Legis-
lative oversight of intelligence; and how to reconcile
the need for secrecy in intelligence with greater public
pressure for disclosure and accountability. We fully
recognize the need for stronger oversight, but we believe
it inappropriate for intelligence officers to suggest how
they might themselves be overseen.
On the other hand, the need for secrecy is critical
to the continued effectiveness of American intelligence.
Intelligence operations require some measure of secrecy
and cannot be conducted unless Congress and the public
accept this fact. This is not impossible. The public
accepts -- because it understands -- the need for secrecy
in a wide range of private and public matters from the
lawyer-client relationship to the Federal Reserve's inter-
ventions in the nation's monetary system.
The issue of secrecy, however, is complex: Resolving
the problems it raises in our society requires a fresh
analysis of what aspects of intelligence actually require
protection (of what kinds and to what extent), a fresh
analysis of the concepts involved, and a careful examina-
tion of the kind of legislation needed. These issues go
beyond the scope of this paper and should be the subject
of a separate study.
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PART II
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEIvic NT
PROBLEMS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
At this writing, the "intelligence problem" is often
described as one of combatting an assault on civil liberties.
The professional intelligence officer, however, sees a
uifferent problem and views it from a different perspective.
ie believes that domestic civil liberties are not seriously
threatened by the US Government's foreign intelligence
activities. These domestic liberties could be seriously
threatened, however, by a, foreign adversary whose capa-
bilities and intentions were not understood by our Govern-
ment. The intelligence officer, in short, sees him-
self as the protector -- not the subverter -- of his fel-
low citizens' liberties. For him, the "intelligence
problem" is defined by the need to improve our Govern-
merit's foreign intelligence capabilities to the highest
attainable degree. He is, however, fully aware of the
need to protect civil liberties; the suggestions that
follow do not in any way impinge upon them.
This paper addresses the organization and manage-
ment of US intelligence from the point of view of the
professional, describing the present state of US intel-
ligence and cataloguing some of its problems. Because
we are proposing changes, our emphasis is necessarily
on those things we think need to be changed, and not
on the many strengths of American intelligence. Equally
important, it must be noted that our concern with the
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organization and management of intelligence is based
on a conviction that these issues are important deter-
minants of the ultimate quality of the intelligence
product: its scope, perceptiveness, timeliness
and even availability.
Of these issues, several of the most important in-
volve the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
This paper therefore discusses:
-- The central role of the DCI as it is defined
i:>y law and as it is in fact.
-- ii is relations with the Departments of Defense
and State.
its management of CIA: wily it complicates the
aisc urge of iris responsibilities for the Intelligence
Community.
-- how various DCIs and Administrations have
handled this office, and how it appears now.
Statutory Basis
The present American intelligence structure derives
from the National Security Act of 1947.* Laying the
foundation for a national intelligence structure was
The Central Intelligence Act of 1949 only clarified cer-
tain administrative authorities of the DCI.
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neither the primary purpose of that legislation, how-
ever, nor the topic on which its drafters focused the
bulk of their attention. Their main purpose was to
merge the old War and Navy Departments into a new De-
partment of Defense under a civilian secretary, estab-
lish the Air Force as a separate service, and sketch
the outlines of the National Security Council. The in-
telligence portions of the Act were secondary.
The Act's legislative history suggests that those
who wrote its intelligence sections had a clear pur-
pose in mind but knew they were venturing into uncharted
waters. There is also a suggestion that they planned
a second look at the intelligence portions of the Act
in a few years to make more permanent arrangements in
the light of experience. They certainly do not seem
to have realized that they were laying a foundation
which would last without significant legislative change
for more than a quarter of a century.
The Act implicitly makes the DCI the leader of
something that has come to be called the "Intelligence
Community." It does not, however, specify his func-
tions beyond providing that the CIA which he heads
should "correlate and evaluate" and "perform... services
of common concern...[that] can more efficiently be ac-
complished centrally." Nor does it provide him with
specific authorities over the agencies that now make
up the Community.
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On 1 November 1971 President Nixon signed a directive,
developed by an Executive Branch task force on intelligence
headed by the present Secretary of Defense, which elaborated
and made explicit certain responsibilities of the DCI only
implicit in the Act. In so doing, that directive increased
the DCI's responsibilities without increasing his powers.
iie was directed to:
-- Plan and review all intelligence activities
including tactical intelligence, and the allocation
of all intelligence resources.
-- Produce national intelligence required by the
President and other national consumers.
-- Chair and staff all Intelligence Community
advisory boards or committees.
-- Reconcile intelligence requirements and prior-
ities with budgetary constraints.
Th Three Roles of the DCI
On the skeleton provided by these two documents*
there has grown, by accretion, a congeries of bureau-
cratic mechanisms, doctrines, and the equivalent of
Much of the following discussion concentrates on formal
responsibilities and authorities. It should be recog-
nized, however, that the effectiveness of each DCI has
been directly proportional to the confidence placed in
him by the President and Congress and the belief of
his colleagues in the Community that he had that con-
fidence.
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case law precedents all centering on the institution
that we call the DCI. To understand, one must first
define some terms. First, what is the national intel-
ligence that the DCI is supposed to produce? Second,
what are the functions he must carry out to produce it?
Third, what is the Community he is supposed to lead?
Fourth, what management tools are available to him as
leader?
-- National Intelligence is used here to denote
that foreign intelligence needed by the senior levels
of Government to do their job in making and implement-
ing policy.
-- This paper discusses the production of national
intelligence in terms of six functions: the collection
of information, its processing, its analysis, the pres-.
entation of findings and judgments, research and de-
velopment, and support. Covert action, broadly de-
fined, is a separate area of DCI responsibility, which
employs assets also used in collection but is not directly
related to the production of national intelligence.
-- The composition of "The Community" is a com-
plicated question, discussed in detail in Annex A.
There are separate, though overlapping, communities
of collectors, producers, resource managers, and con-
sumers, each with a few primary members and several
peripheral ones.
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-- Management tools or controls include the line
authority the DCI exercises over the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and four instruments by which he can exert
influence over the Community: (a) the management of
resources: including manpower, money, and -- peculiar
to intelligence -- cover; (b) collection management:
by which we mean the allocation of collection resources
to substantive requirements, specific tasking of those
resources, the continuing review and assessment of col-
lection results, and the identification of collection
gaps and deficiencies; (c) product review: which in-
cludes both the final shaping of the intelligence prod-
uct to match the needs of the national consumer and a
continuing evaluation of the product against those
needs; and (d) inspection. All of these except inspec-
tion are interdependent.
In some senses, the DCI is a member of all the
communities identified above, although in precisely what
sense is not always clear. He wears three hats -- as
Presidential advisor, as head of "the Community" and
as line manager of CIA -- but his hats by no means cor
respond fully with the four functional communities.
Moreover, he also has responsibilities to the Congress
that represent a complicating factor.
-- The DCI as Presidential advisor. In this ca-
pacity he is the primary source of national intelli-
gence for the President and the NSC. He personally
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advises the President and the NSC on all foreign in-
telligence matters, including budget, and serves on the
various NSC sub-Committees.
-- The DCI as head of the Community. Here the
DCI is the primary source of national intelligence for
the Federal Government and is its senior foreign intel-
ligence advisor. He coordinates, to varying degrees,
administrative and operational matters that concern
more than one intelligence agency. He advises the
President on the Community budget. For the Congress,
he provides intelligence, defends the Community bud-
get, and advises on foreign intelligence matters.
-- The DCI as Manager of CIA. As the head of CIA,
the DCI is a line officer administering a large independent
agency under the NSC. He is a producer of intelligence
for the mechanisms over which he presides in his two
other roles. In addition, he has a specialized line
function as the agent of the NSC in the conduct of
foreign policy through covert action. For the Con-
gress, this DCI too is a source of foreign intelligence.
Congress expects him to present and defend CIA's bud-
get, and to account for its performance. He is also re-
quired to inform the Congress of covert action programs.
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Schematically, the DCI's various roles and functions can
As Presidential
Advisor
As leader of
Community
As Director of
CIA
- Provides national
intelligence
- Advises on intelligence
- Produces national
intelligence ----------
- Advises on Community
budget ----------------
- Coordinates Community--
- Produces intelligence--
- Carries out covert
action programs ------- - Informs on covert ac-
tion programs and de-
fends them in the ap-
propriations process
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Authorities of the DCI
Charts such as this are misleading, for they sug-
gest the DCI has great authority. This is true more in
principle than in fact. In his capacity as Chairman of
the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), for example,
he has less authority than is suggested by the fact that,
on paper, the USIB is only advisory to him as Chairman.
Even the "observers" at USIB have the right to dissent
from the DCI's Estimates. His authorities as chairman
of other boards and committees are similarly limited.
The DCI has direct or line authority only over those ele-
ments of the collection and production communities that
are part of CIA.
Though they pay lip service to the DCI's primacy,
program managers within the Community (outside of CIA)
are primarily influenced by the views of their own line
superiors or of those who control their budgets. It
is possible for a staff officer who controls resources
to exert as strong an influence over an organization,
at least on some issues, as its nominal departmental
superior. In intelligence as elsewhere, money talks.
There is no single manager for an enterprise as
complex and as expensive as the national intelligence
system which has evolved over the past quarter century.
The DCI not only lacks line authority, but his ability
to use the management devices we have identified is at
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best limited. In cases of conflict, the DCI's only
real recourse is to go directly to the President, a
course of action that must be taken sparingly.
-- In the resource field his nominal authority is
limited to giving advice to the President through the
Office of Management and Budget. It is sometimes
further limited by the DCI's inability to acquire im-
portant information on resource issues in timely fashion.
(A full discussion of this problem follows in the next
section.)
-- In collection management, the DCI has no mech-
anism cutting across independent and autonomous
systems. As head of the "Community" he has a set of
USIB Committees, developed ad hoc and operating inde-
pendently, responsible for individual systems. They
range from the Committee on Imagery Requirements and
Exploitation (COMIREX), which is elaborately developed
and in which he has strong influence, to the Human
Sources Committee, which is rudimentary and through
which his influence over Foreign Service reporting is
minimal. Also, important collection management deci-
sions are often made outside the USIB structure, in
the Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee (IRAC) or
in the National Reconnaissance Program Executive Com-
mittee (EXCOM). Here at least the DCI plays a major
role, but sometimes such decisions are made between in-
dividual producers and collectors, or by individual sys-
tem managers acting on their own. Annex B deals in
greater detail with these matters.
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-- The DCI's authority in product review is more
fully established than in any other field, probably.
because it was so clearly the intent of the 1947 Act
to give him this power. He exercises it through
USIB's consideration of National Estimates, through the
less formal procedures of current intelligence, and
through his contribution to the NSC and its sub-Committees.
The Act that set up the DCI also authorized the continuing
production of departmental intelligence, however, and the
distinction between departmental and national gets
exceedingly blurred at senior policy levels. Depart-
mental views regularly bypass the national system.
Mechanisms for the evaluation, or consumer response,
aspect of product review are less structured and much
less effective. The National Security Council Intel-
ligence Committee (NSCIC), charged with this function,
has met only twice in four years. A further analysis
of national intelligence production appears as Annex D.
-- No DCI has ever asserted, much less exercised,
the right to inspect in the traditional sense intel-
ligence agencies other than CIA, although such a right
is implicit to some degree in the basic statutes and
directives.
We believe that at the national level resource manage-
ment, collection management, and product review and evalua-
tion should all be parts of an integrated system. In
fact, although a beginning has been made in relating these
functions systematically to one another, they are fragmented.
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RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Through the preceding discussion runs a common
thread: the difficulty the DCI has in dealing with
the Department of Defense. The drafters of the Act
did not address this squarely in 1947, and it remains
a fundamental problem in 1975, one that has blocked
the creation of a coherent national intelligence system.
In the absence of a clearly understood and mutually
agreed relationship between the DCI and Defense, the
best each can hope for is compromise and improvisa-
tion to bridge differences of view and perspective af-
fecting a wide range of issues.
These differences fundamentally affect the overall
management of national intelligence and, ultimately, the
intelligence product. The responsibility of the Secre-
tary of Defense in peace is to prepare the forces needed
to defend the nation; in war, to fight and win it. These
responsibilities dictate certain organizational, program-
matic, budgetary, and other needs. The responsibility
of the DCI in peace is to produce intelligence for a
variety of national purposes, a responsibility which
is also mirrored in his programs and priorities. His
responsibility in war is nowhere defined.
It has been argued that this difference is irrele-
vant: in peacetime, the DCI and Defense missions can.
ire made more or less compatible given a certain amount
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of goodwill; major war, in the unlikely case it ever
comes, will make any extant arrangements meaningless
in any event. This argument misses the point. For
Defense, wartime requirements have a critical impact on
peacetime priorities and organization. Defense must
plan for war, regardless of its likelihood or consequences,
if only to prevent it, and must assure itself in peace
that it will have the intelligence capabilities it will
need in war. of necessity, Defense takes this respon-
sibility seriously. In so doing, however, its interests
often run counter to the interests of the DCI.
Different Customers in Intelligence
The basic difference in mission and responsibility
outlined above is reflected in differing perceptions of
the ultimate customers of the intelligence product. The
DCI must serve the President, the National Security Council
and its staff, the senior economic policy officers, and,
to the extent he is invited, the leadership of State and
Defense. Defense intelligence, on the other hand, must
meet the needs of what Defense terms the National
Command Authority (NCA) -- a single chain of command
reaching from the President through the Secretary of
Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- and those of
the entire range of field commanders.
For his customers, the DCI must provide intelligence
across the entire spectrum of national interests. He
recognizes the importance of major strategic questions
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but also must give attention to the large economic and
political issues which will be central concerns of our
foreign policy for the rest of this century. For the
NCA, however, military questions must be paramount and
must be considered. from both the strategic and the
operational viewpoint. The field commander at every
level needs intelligence in great detail on the forces
and weapons that might oppose him. Moreover, he must
amass it in peacetime if he is to be effective in war.
He believes he must exercise in peace the collection
assets that will support him in war, both to collect
intelligence and to train them for their wartime missions.
These institutional differences are reinforced by
the attitudinal ones standard to civilian-military rela-
tions. There is understandable resistance in Defense,
particularly in the uniformed military, to the concept
that civilian outsiders should provide independent
analyses to the President which affect decisions re-
garding US military forces.
Thus, there is in peacetime a broad divergence of
national and departmental intelligence interests. This
can be seen in what we have called the "transition
problem," which is our shorthand description of the fact
that Defense fights hard to assert control over certain
technical collection assets in peace because it will
need them in war. It can be seen in the closely related
"national-tactical problem," where, because tactical
intelligence needs must increasingly be met by centrally
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controlled national systems, Defense naturally tries to
assert effective control over those systems. It can
be seen with respect to the "crisis management problem."
Finally, it can be seen in the resources world where
the DCI's attempts.to assert his staff responsibility
with respect to Defense intelligence budgetary matters
meet understandable resistance.
The Transition of National Intelligence to War
The transition problem arises from the absence of
a coherent national plan for the evolution of control
over intelligence systems from peacetime through crisis
to war. In peacetime, centrally managed technical
collection programs -- such as the National Reconnaissance
Program and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) --
are controlled by a variety of mechanisms in which the
DCI's voice ranges from dominant to marginal. In war-
time, it is generally understood that Defense's interests
should be paramount.
There are however large gray areas in times of
peace and particularly in times of "crisis." At what
point in a crisis should control be passed to Defense?
Defense naturally seeks to define this point as
far toward the "peace" end of the spectrum as possible.
To the DCI, however, political and even economic con-
siderations remain at least as important as military
ones until the actual outbreak of hostilities. In-
dependent political assessment is essential if the
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door is to be kept open for negotiations and war to
be avoided. To turn intelligence support of the Presi-
dent over to an organization for which intelligence is
secondary to operations, i.e., fighting a war, is to
make military considerations overriding. There is a
grave danger that, in the absence of independent as-
sessment of enemy intentions, the actions and reactions
of opposing forces will acquire a momentum of their own.
This is clearly a dilemma. In the absence of a
basic understanding between the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI, the two will dispute the control over indivi-
dual collection systems in peace. Should a major crisis
arise, individual assets would be transferred to Defense
piecemeal, in confusion and with a sharp drop in efficiency,
at a time when the nation needs efficiency most. Again
it may be argued that this eventuality is too far-fetched
to matter in the light of real present-day national
concerns. Perhaps it is, but because Defense takes its
responsibility seriously, it will continue to contest
the development of a coherent peacetime system directed
at those concerns until the civilian authorities accept
Defense's wartime concerns as equally valid.
The Merging of National and Tactical Intelligence
The question of national versus tactical require-
ments, while as much a problem for the Secretary of
Defense as it is for the DCI, gives a new dimension to
their wartime-peacetime dilemma. Until a few years
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ago, tactical intelligence was collected for the field
commander by assets under his control. The more sig-
nificant portions of this intelligence were passed to the
next echelon above, and by successive steps of selection
and aggregation became an input to national intelligence.
.In return, general conclusions on enemy doctrine, tactics,
and weaponry were passed down through the chain for the
background use of the field commander.
In such a system the DCI had neither responsibility
nor great interest. He was not brought into the problem
formally until 1971, when the President's directive made
him in some way responsible for budgetary aspects of
tactical intelligence. This was done partly because,
given the growing capability of tactical intelligence
assets, it was thought necessary to consider whether
money could be saved by using these assets in peacetime
for national purposes, a concept that put the DCI squarely
at odds with the military from the JCS on down. Even
if he had not been given this budgetary responsibility
however, we believe the DCI would increasingly be forced
to involve himself deeply in tactical questions, because
these questions have become thoroughly entangled with
national ones.
To fight an enemy equipped with nuclear weapons,
missiles, and sophisticated electronics, the field com-
mander needs equally sophisticated intelligence support,
often of the kind that can only be provided by national
collection and analytic assets. Moreover, the rapid
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pace of modern war means that this support must be pro-
vided almost instantaneously, a concept that has come to
be termed "real time."
On the other hand, the perspective from the national
view has.changed as well. When even the most minor in-
cident can rapidly escalate into strategic warfare,
the national authorities must have timely and accurate
intelligence on activities which. in the past would
have seemed purely local and tactical in character.
This happened as early as 1961, when the President was di-
rectly following by radio the actions of individual
Soviet tanks in Berlin. Moreover, local military
activities can be of great political significance at
the national level, e.g., the USS Pueblo and the SS Mayaguez.
A fuller discussion of the national/tactical problem
is included as Annex E.
The "national/tactical" problem is being progres-
sively complicated by the advent of new centrally managed
collection systems whose capabilities provide intel-
ligence essential for national decision-making but
equally essential for the conduct of tactical operations.
These considerations suggest that, if the US is to
maintain an effective military force over the next few
years, it will have to develop an integrated military
intelligence system incorporating both strategic and
tactical interests and serving both the NCA and the field
commander. It can be argued that development of such
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a system is a departmental responsibility for Defense.
This is true as far as it goes, but because of its scale
and. because of the many overlaps with national concerns
and with national intelligence assets, such a system will
tend to displace the national one unless it is incor-
porated within a larger system devoted to all national
intelligence purposes including the tactical. This
obviously affects the DCI's responsibilities, and he
is already being forced to deal piece by piece with some
of its aspects -- a danger in itself to comprehensive
national planning.
Crisis Management and the Extended National Mili-
tary Command Center
Many of the issues between the DCI and Defense are
illustrated by Defense's current plans for the Extended
National Military Command Center (ENMCC) as the national
center for crisis management. The ENMCC, which is to
incorporate a National Military Intelligence Center
(NMIC),is to serve the NCA. There is minimal recognition
of the roles of the Secretary of State and the DCI in
Defense's emergency plans.
The concept of the ENMCC is of course valid for the
conduct of military affairs in wartime. It is not well
adapted, however, to national security policy. making
in conditions short of general war. Here, as we have
noted, most decisions have political, and often economic,
as well as military dimensions. The Secretary of State
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and the DCI both have a not inconsiderable responsibility
to the President. This is presently reflected in the
composition of the NSC and its sub-Committees and in the
flow of intelligence to those bodies. Since 1969, the
arena for crisis management has been one of those com-
mittees, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG),
and the DCI is responsible for its intelligence support.
Defense is proposing that the ENMCC serve this
function, that all intelligence be directed to it, and
that it be the source of intelligence support for
national decision-making in times of crisis. Such an
arrangement would make it extremely difficult for the
Secretary of State and the DCI to contribute to Presi-
dential consideration of policy, not only in general
war but in a broad range of politico-military crises.
Again, when does a situation become a crisis? At what
point in a crisis does the military security of the nation
override political considerations? And can such a system
be effective in crisis if it is not functioning effectively
when no crisis exists? The ENMCC concept, intentionally
or not, will sharply reduce the influence of the DCI in
crisis situations if accepted as designed.
Another problem is in the area of tasking collection
systems. The NMIC is to contain a central tasking fa-
cility which, in a crisis, is supposed to control all
collection systems including overhead satellite systems,
NSA's assets, and CIA's stations, in support of the NCA.
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These plans are moving forward with minimal con-
sultation with the DCI. Again the fact that a system
is being developed to function in general war is
acting to distort arrangements for serving broader
national interests in times of peace or of crisis
short of general war.*
The DCI and Defense's Budgetary Process
Our final point about the overall DCI-Defense
relationship concerns the DCI's staff responsibili-
ties for resource review with respect to all intel-
ligence activities.
We have noted that the DCI has a responsibility
under the November 1971 directive to propose solutions,
balancing national and departmental interests, to the
problems catalogued above. It is difficult to strike
such a balance when the resources of a single depart-
ment far outweigh those of all the others combined,
including those which the DCI can himself marshal. We
can identify at least. four ways in which the DCI's
ability to exercise his responsibility is limited in
practice.
It should be noted that the creation of NMIC, as a
mechanism for focusing military intelligence require-
ments and for supporting the JCS and its major subordi-
nate commands, meets Zong-established and important
needs. The problem is how to make it compatible with
the DCI's interests and fit it into national decision-
making machinery.
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First, the November 1971 directive changed none of the
legal authorities that charge the Secretary of Defense
with sole responsibility for decisions on Defense pro-
grams. Regardless of what any DCI may conclude about
how Defense allocates its intelligence resources, in the
last analysis it is the Secretary of Defense who is respon-
sible for these decisions and accountable to the Presi-
dent and Congress for them. Clearly, the directive was
not intended to change the Secretary's line authorities.
Rather, its intent was to give the DCI a staff responsi-
bility to the President on Intelligence Community matters,
a role which is of course compatible with Defense's con-
tinued exercise of its line responsibility for budgetary
matters. However, Defense has, from time to time and not
unreasonably, been reluctant to share information about
resource recommendations with the DCI in sufficient time
to enable him to have significant impact on the decision-
making process.
.Partly this is due to the fact that final Congressional
decisions on a current year Defense budget have, at least
in the recent past, been made in November and December
after extended negotiations between the Executive Branch
and Congress. The need to pull together a current year
program halfway through the fiscal year and to present
a budget for the following year -- given the enormous
size of the Defense budget, the literally thousands of
decisions which must be made, and the very short time
available to finish the task -- forces reliance on a
process in which fairly arbitrary numbers are handed
out to a variety of program managers and the related
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Service components late in the year. The program managers
themselves and the Services must decide how they will
live with the levels they have been given. It has proven
extremely difficult for the DCI to involve himself or
his staff effectively in this important part of the
decision-making process, which is generally compressed
into a very short time period.
Over decades, the cumulative action of many Congresses
has contributed to the problems which face both a DCI,
and a Secretary of Defense, in trying to involve them-
selves deeply and effectively in the myriad details
which characterize the United States Government's in-
telligence programs. The various intelligence pro-
grams described above are funded from a variety of dif-
ferent appropriations made to different organizations
within the Pentagon. The numbers of people who must
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participate in decisions about the Consolidated
Cryptologic Program, for example, make difficult the
conduct of a comprehensive review of the resource
requirements of the total program. An outsider who
lacks the necessary time or information to do much
more than monitor the process by which these programs
are shoehorned into a given overall total will always
be frustrated.
Consequences of the DCI-Defense Impasse
The DCI's responsibility to provide national intel-
ligence cannot be discharged unless there is an effective
system in which national needs can be balanced against the
departmental needs of Defense, including those of the
tactical commands. But Defense's control over the bulk
of the Community's collection resources inhibits the develop-
ment of such a system. Conversely, the DCI's statutory
authority and influence inhibits the establishment of a co-
herent departmental system. This situation serves no one.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The DCI's relations with the Secretary of State,
though less complex than those with the Secretary of
Defense, also present a number of important and per-
sistent problems. (We speak here of the general rela-
tionship, not of the unusual situation created by the
dual responsibilities of Dr. Kissinger.)
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-- As Defense resists independent intelligence
assessment and reporting on matters affecting the mili-
tary, State resists on matters affecting diplomacy. On
the other hand, the DCI needs State support to balance
the military hand in intelligence assessment.
25
Some of these problems would probably yield to
the changes we propose below. There does not now exist,
however, any mechanism by which the entire range of
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Community-State relationships can be regulated at the
policy level. We believe there should be an arrangement
whereby a senior officer at the Undersecretary level .
is charged with these matters in the Department, and the
DCI is charged with coordination between him and the Com-
munity elements concerned.
THE DCI AS MANAGER OF CIA
The DCI's Community responsibilities would by them-
selves be overwhelming, but the DCI must also manage CIA.
CIA, like the Community, is not the organization Con-
gress thought it was creating in 1947. CIA did not evolve
its present structure by reasoned design, but through prag-
matic response to challenges as they arose. Congress,
working with its investigation of Pearl Harbor freshly in
mind, was seeking to ensure through CIA that never again
would the US Government be disadvantaged because it failed
to consider as a whole all the information available to
its parts. (An agency set up for this purpose could
however serve other necessary purposes as well, and the
Act authorizes CIA to carry out a number of largely un-
specified functions in addition to "correlation and
evaluation.")
Production
Seen in the context of Pearl Harbor -- and of
Hiroshima -- Congress obviously meant by "intelligence
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relating to the national security" political and military
intelligence of a strategic nature with emphasis on its
military aspects. (Peacetime applications of national-
intelligence in support of diplomacy or of economic
policy were apparently given little if any weight.)
Moreover, Congress was acting in response to collective
and individual failures of War and Navy Department
intelligence, and to a lesser extent of the State De-
partment. Its solution was to establish an independent,
and by inference largely civilian, central intelligence
agency to "correlate and evaluate" strategic intelligence,
then thought of.in 'Largely military terms.
While CIA was to be the instrument through which
the DCI would correlate and evaluate, the Act did not
specify whether it would also "produce" intelligence
or conduct intelligence research. Congress seems to
have had in mind that it would not. Experience with
the office of National Estimates (ONE) demonstrated
that the DCI, to be independent in his judgments, had
to be able to do independent analysis as a check on and
stimulus to the other intelligence agencies. ONE found
that it could not take issue with a military service in-
terpretation of events without the analytic resources to
back up its argument. Moreover, the progression from
policy needs to requirements to tasking or to R&D and
the resource decisions which. both flow from and control
this process have come more and more to depend on an
independent substantive evaluation capability. Over
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time, therefore, CIA developed an analytic and pro-
duction capability in the Directorates of Intelligence
(DDI) and Science and Technology (DDS&T).
Science and Technology
A second major influence in the growth of CIA --
also unforeseen in 1947 -- has been technology. Be-
ginning with a modest analytic effort against Soviet
science on the one hand and with the development of
the U-2 on the other, CIA has over 20 years developed
major national assets both for scientific analysis and
for technical collection. These two aspects were tied
together in the early 1960s by the creation of the
Science and Technology Directorate.
At the same time a broad research and development
program was formulated with the objective of developing
a center of expertise and technical capability focused
on areas of unique interest to intelligence. This
growing technical expertise, when married to other
unique CIA operational capabilities, has led to a num-
ber of relatively small but extremely productive col-
lection programs.
The existence of these operational and technical
assets, independent of the Department of Defense, has
provided an essential stimulus to the much larger De-
fense activities in similar areas. Interaction between
technical and engineering personnel of CIA and Defense
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has led to an exchange of information to the advan-
tage of both, and has made programs not under the direct
control of senior intelligence managers more productive
and better focused on real needs.
Operations
Long before this had been achieved, however, CIA
had become a powerful arm of Government through the
rapid development of its espionage and covert action
capabilities in the Operations Directorate. This came
about because the CIA, just created by Congress, seemed
the only place to lodge the remaining operational elements
of OSS. Almost by accident, therefore, a CIA supposed
to concentrate on correlation and evaluation was staffed
with a cadre of clandestine operators steeped in the
security discipline and no-holds-barred tradition of World
War II. The onset of the Cold War and the resultant clear
need for extensive covert action programs, especially in
Europe, gave a tremendous impetus to an organization al-
ready inclined in that direction, and successive DCIs
devoted much attention to this aspect of their responsi-
bilities. Their preoccupation had an important impact
on the DCI's bureaucratic position: the more he was
seen as leader of a single operating agency, the less
he could claim to preside impartially over the entire
intelligence effort. Their attitude also had an impor-
tant effect on the public image of CIA. Clandestine
operations are sexy; correlation and evaluation are not.
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CIA'S CURRENT ORGANIZATION
As now organized, the CIA has four Directorates,
each headed by a Deputy Director:
-- Intelligence, responsible for analysis and produc-
tion other than scientific and technical.
-- Operations, responsible for clandestine col-
lection (principally from or through human
sources), covert action and the control of
CIA's overseas stations.
-- Science and Technology, encompassing intelli-
gence analysis plus the development and manage-
ment of technical collection systems or activities.
-- Administration, encompassing communications,
security, personnel, training, finance, medical
services and other internal housekeeping func-
tions.
The first two Directorates -- Intelligence and
Operations -- came to be housed in the same agency more
or less by historical accident, as explained above.
The third -- Science and Technology -- was created out
of evolving components of the first two. All three
Directorates developed virtually independently of one
another and came to have quite distinct, some might say
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introverted, characters.* (The Administration Directorate
has its own individuality, but it is better integrated
with the other three than any of them are with each
other.) In practice, CIA always has been largely managed
at the Directorate level, with all threads ultimately
coming together only in the office of the DCI, which
has traditionally been a very leanly manned institution.
This is not to imply that the Directorates do not
cooperate, but that their cooperation is frequently
achieved through something gkin to treaty alliances
among virtually independent fiefdoms. In some re-
spects, the DCI resembles a medieval king ruling over
four baronies. He, and only he, can adjudicate among
them. (With but one exception, no DCI has yet found it
possible to delegate these functions in any meaningful
way to his principal Deputy. The brief exception was
Admiral Raborn, under whom Mr. Helms became the only
DDCI ever to exercise significant line authority over
the day-to-day management of the Agency.)
The above described arrangements have had two re-
sults: one obvious, one easily overlooked. The obvious
one is a further, continuing burden on the DCI. Less
* Each Directorate has its own career service, covering
all General Schedule grades through GS-18. Apart from
short-term, avowedly "rotational" assignments, the
number of Agency officers who have been permanently
assigned to more than one Directorate during the course
of their careers is very small.
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obvious but also important is the anomaly produced when
the DCI, as head of the Community, is arbitrating a
disagreement between two or more Community components
where one party to the disagreement is the CIA. In such
situations, the institutional equities of each of the
other Community components involved has a vigorous ad-
vocate -- that component's head -- while the CIA, in-
stitutionally, has no advocate. The DCI is thus placed
in an unenviable position: he must be both partisan
advocate and impartial arbiter simultaneously, run the
risk of appearing to be unduly partial to his own sub-
ordinates, or give the legitimate concerns of his own
Agency short shrift.
The DCI and Covert Operations
As head of CIA, the DCI is responsible for, and
spends considerable time supervising, the activities
of the operations Directorate which controls the
Clandestine Service (CS).
In Annex F, we discuss the Clandestine Service and
the questions posed by its operations, particularly those
posed by covert action -- a term here used to encompass a
wide variety of activities, ranging from small scale
media-influence operations to large-scale paramilitary
operations bordering on conventional war.
At the moment, covert action is a subject much dis-
cussed in Congress and in the press. Some argue that
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the US should not engage in such activities at all. Others
accept the need for covert action in certain situations
overseas, but question whether such operations should be
conducted by the same service or organization also respon-
sible for the clandestine collection of positive intel-
ligence, i.e., espionage.
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The two activities appear to belong within the
same organization for the reasons given above. This
paper will not review in detail the 1949 to 1952 period,
when there were two separate organizations, but it should
be noted that virtually every professional intelligence
officer who lived through this period and emerged to serve
in the unified service has opposed a return to that earlier
arrangement.
Assuming the Clandestine Service remains one organ-
ization, the question remains where in the government it
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should be housed. There appear to be three options:
under the Department of State, under the Department of
Defense, or under CIA.
Placement in the Department of State. Just how the
Department would react to such a suggestion or how it
would include the service organizationally is difficult
to judge. There are the following advantages:
-- Coordination of covert action should be easier.
-- Planning would be easier.
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-- There would be a tendency to restrain the CS
from carrying out its activities because these might
endanger diplomatic equities of the United States. Restric-
tions on independent reporting from the field would be
harder to resist.
-- There would be great difficulties in maintaining
a separate line of command, separate communications
channels and the degree of compartmentation* essential
to the conduct of clandestine operations.
-- Budgeting would present problems since it would
be difficult to hide the CS budget within that of the
State Department.
Placement in the Department of Defense. At first
blush this appears a more logical choice. The Defense
Department includes intelligence organizations, the
"Compartmentation" is a concept central to the secure
conduct of clandestine activity which, in turn, rests
on another concept: "need to know." Under it, access
to sensitive information is restricted to those who
need it to discharge their specific responsibilities,
with. no one being automatically entitled to such in-
formation by virtue of other considerations such as
rank.
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military services are traditionally prime customers
of intelligence, and the Defense Department is a large
organization with many functions in which the Clandestine
Service could be sequestered.
Advantages:
-- Much of the support now available to the CS
in CIA is available in the Defense Department.
-- Closer coordination with Defense intelligence
organizations would be achieved.
Disadvantages:
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-- The ability of the Clandestine Service to serve
the production elements of CIA would diminish, since there
would be increased emphasis on Department military re-
porting. It would be more difficult to maintain a
balanced intelligence collection effort directed at na-
tional goals.
-- It is doubtful that much saving would be effected
through joint budgeting.
Continued Subordination to CIA
Against the arguments for transfer elsewhere must
be considered the advantages of leaving the Clandestine
Service within CIA.
First, it can be argued that the CS would lose some,
or most of its "objectivity" as a collector of intel-
ligence should it be moved into either of the two large
customer organizations. A tradition has developed in
the Clandestine Service that it serves everyone --
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, other
departmental secretaries, the working Foreign Service
Officer, his counterpart in the military and any other
US Government office with a legitimate need for clandes-
tinely procured information. While it serves these
customers, its primary responsibility to the President
and the NSC keeps the CS focused on national objectives.
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Second, the clandestine service is now supported
by the rest of CIA. CIA's Directorate of Administration
provides the CS with communications assistance, physical
security for its personnel and its buildings, computers
and other data storage, transportation, the recruitment
and retirement of its personnel, a host of housekeeping
advantages, and a link to the administrations of other
departments and agencies. The Intelligence Directorate
provides the CS with finished intelligence papers to be
used by the CS and with foreign intelligence services.
It also provides guidance for the collection of intel-
ligence, guidance and assistance in relationships with
other departments -- particularly in communications
intelligence -- and a unique exchange of ideas on world-
wide political, economic, and military events. The
Directorate for Science and Technology provides the CS
In return, the CS supports other elements of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Its reports are a major
input to the Intelligence Directorate
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If the Clandestine Service is to be placed else-
where than in CIA, it will be necessary to develop
such support either within the Clandestine Service
itself or within the host US department. In short
it is probably best to leave the CS where it is.
Faced with such a bewildering array of functions
and organizations, each DCI has chosen to concentrate
on a part of his responsibilities. Dulles saw himself
primarily as director of the Government's covert arm.
McCone saw himself as Presidential advisor, and found
CIA a useful instrument for that purpose.* Raborn was
only in office fourteen months. Helms concentrated on
the management of the Agency; under President Johnson,
he functioned to some extent as advisor but resisted
asserting his authority over the Community. Schlesinger
appeared in the short time he served to be putting the
Community role first. Colby has sought to give equal
weight to his Community and Agency responsibilities.
More broadly, he has sought to bind both these responsi-
bilities together, across collection, production, and
resource management, through the concepts of the National
Intelligence Officer (NIO) and the Key Intelligence
Question (KIQ).
Only McCone chose to do battle with Defense on re-
source matters, and even he was not notably success-
ful.
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The Schlesinger study of 1970-1971 attempted to
redefine the role of the DCI with two stated objectives:
saving money and improving the product. It suggested
several possible organizational/managerial structures
for the Community, some quite radical, and analyzed them
in terms of the bureaucratic equities and substantive
realities involved. As noted above, the President's
directive of November 1971 ultimately selected the least
traumatic of these options, one that might be characterized
as "status quo plus." The DCI was to go on wearing all
three hats and was to receive limited additional respon-
sibilities in the resource field. He was to have a
larger staff for managing the Community, and devices
were to be created by which the assessment of senior
intelligence consumers could be brought to bear on the
product.
Whether under Helms, who did not feel he had the
Presidential backing necessary to carry out the full
intent of the directive, or under Schlesinger, who set
about to implement the plan he helped write in a man-
ner that set his newly formed Community staff in some-
times bitter opposition to his own CIA, or under Colby,
who has been too involved in dealing with the external
difficulties he inherited to give full attention to the
problem, the directive only marginally changed power
relationships and therefore solved little.
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To the two objectives pursued by Schlesinger, recent
events have added two more: the need to build effective
internal and external oversight, and the need to develop
public confidence in the effectiveness of intelligence
that will permit it to function.
No DCI or anyone within Defense, before the Schlesinger
study, considered that his Intelligence Community respon-
sibilities included making recommendations on all the
various resource questions arising within the Intelligence
Community. Should there be such a role at all?
The need for an effective overall management mechanism
in the Intelligence community was clearly recognized in
the 1971 Schlesinger study; the need is no less important
today. The Intelligence Community of 1975 is larger and
vastly more complex and sophisticated than anything con-
templated in 1947. Evolving technology is increasing,
not reducing, both the need for effective central manage-
ment over all intelligence and the difficulty of that
management task. In addition, the size of the Intelligence
Community and the demonstrable need to balance the con-
tributions made by all of the various components argue
strongly for a leader. The compartmentation which
characterizes many individual intelligence programs in-
creases the likelihood of unnecessary duplication of ef-
fort. This requires that a special effort be made to
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insure that someone in the Community, who is knowledge-
able about all of the programs, coordinates the alloca-
tion and use of resources. There are signs that if the
Executive Branch cannot find an effective way to carry
out this responsibility, the Congress will try its hand.
The question, in our view, is not whether there
ought to be some such role within the Community, but
rather how that role should be defined, how it should be
exercised, and by whom. On some elements of the role
there is probably little disagreement. Most would agree,
for example, that one individual should present a total
Community budget to Congress and help defend what has
been agreed to, and there would be little quarrel over
the need for someone to present a unified recommendation
on Intelligence Community resource requirements to the
President. There is, however, little agreement within
the Community that the DCI, the statutory head of an
agency in his own right, should have a significant role
in the decision-making processes of other intelligence
programs for which he has no legal responsibility in
other than the staff capacity in which he now serves.
The DCI in 1975
As Presidential advisor, the DCI has always been or-
ganizationally removed from the President he is supposed
to advise. In 1975, this separation is increased by the
fact that the current DCI is head of an agency under po-
litical attack for "improprieties." If the position of
the DCI as manager of national intelligence was seen in
1971 as too weak to accomplish the job, that position is
even weaker relative to his problems today.
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PART III
THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COIIsNUNITY
Based on the analysis presented in preceding
sections, this section outlines three basic approaches
to effecting necessary changes in the current manage-
ment arrangements and organizational structure of the
Intelligence Community: creating an independent uni-
tary national intelligence agency; placing all intel-
ligence components now independent of departmental
control within the Department of Defense; and con-
centrating on reordering the office of the DCI.
We find the first two approaches create more
problems than they solve, and hence reject both
in favor of the third: building an intelligence sys-
tem which has both independent and departmental com-
ponents, but is under an independent authority.
When one goes through the gate of this third
approach, however, the path immediately forks: One
fork follows the path of separating the substantive
and the resource management responsibilities now
combined in the Office of the present DCI; the Other
keeps them combined. For reasons explained in our
argument, we opt for the latter.
Having concluded that the US intelligence sys-
tem ought to be presided over by an independent
senior official who is (in all senses) the nation's
principal foreign intelligence officer, we set forth
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the conditions under which this officer can be effec-
tive, and propose some new organizational concepts for
making him so. Change is not suggested for the sake
of bureaucratic neatness. Rather, it is proposed to
bring about improvements in the quality and efficency
of the American intelligence process.
The number of possible organizational permutations
is infinite. Practical considerations, including the
extent and weight of Defense Department interests, nar-
row this range to three basic approaches. The Presi-
dent, in collaboration with Congress, could:
-- Transfer most intelligence activities out of
the Department of Defense into a reconstituted and re-
named Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for
servicing the fundamental intelligence needs of both
the nation's civilian and its military leadership.
-- Absorb the Central Intelligence Agency within
the Department of Defense, eliminating the DCI's role
as it has been conceived since 1947 and placing responsi-
bility for effective coordination of all American in-
telligence on a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intel-
who would absorb the Community responsibilities
now exercised by the DCI, as well as those exercised
by the present Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelli-
gence.
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-- Leave mostly unchanged the division of labor
between Defense and CIA which has evolved since 1947
and, instead, focus on the office of the Director of
Central Intelligence; modifying that office, and its
authorities, in ways that will enhance the DCI's ability
to play a more effective role in contributing to the
overall effectiveness of the Intelligence Community,
and at the same time reducing his direct involvement
in managing CIA.
The Monolithic Solution
The first of these basic approaches was considered
in the Schlesinger study. It would involve consolidating
all or most existing US intelligence into a large new
independent agency under
one individual responsible to the President or the
National Security Council. This approach is superficially
appealing in that it would create an organization with
control over all aspects of the intelligence process,
establishing the preconditions for solution of the manage-
ment problems outlined above. One man could be held ac-
countable for rationalizing existing structures, creating
effective management processes, and getting results. There
would be far fewer barriers to effective decision making
across the Community, and the head of this new organiza-
tion would have effective authority to resolve those
that did arise.
For several reasons, however, we believe this basic
approach is unsound. First, we doubt Defense could be
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persuaded to give up all control over the intelligence
programs now conducted within Defense. Military lead-
ers who are entrusted with our nation's defense must
have a measure of control over their "eyes and ears,"
in peacetime as well as wartime. If.all existing US
foreign intelligence organizations were to be consoli-
dated under a single head, we believe that many both
inside and outside of Defense could argue with justifi-
cation that a parallel though perhaps smaller intelli-
gence apparatus would need to be reconstituted under
direct Defense Department control. Second, over the
short term (and probably for many years to come) the
manpower needs of the programs now carried out in Defense
but incorporated by this approach into a new agency
could probably only be met by military personnel, ex-
cept at extraordinary cost. Thus, some continuing De-
fense involvement would be required in any event. Finally,
and most fundamentally, there is the political problem.
We doubt either the President or Congress could agree to
the establishment of a very large organization that we
feel certain would be widely characterized, however
unfairly, as a threat to civil liberties.
The Defense Solution
.We have argued that there should be a strong
overall leadership function exercised within the In-
telligence Community. The alternative discussed above
is one extreme approach toward meeting this objective.
At the other end of the spectrum, it can be argued that
this responsibility should be lodged not within an in-
dependent intelligence agency but within the Department
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of Defense. The CIA program would in effect become
part of the Defense intelligence program and budget.
CIA would no longer be an independent agency and the
DCI's role as Community leader would be eliminated in
favor of an appropriate Defense official. After all,
as has been pointed out many times, the bulk of the
dollar resources in the Intelligence Community already
belong to Defense.
This second basic approach also would allow control
over all US intelligence to be consolidated in the hands
of one individual, though it is questionable how real
such control would be unless all existing intelligence
organizations were placed under his line command -- a
difficult move that would be strongly resisted within
Defense.
There are, however, more fundamental disadvantages
to this approach. First, we do not believe that intel-
ligence as a discipline would receive the attention it
ought to have in Defense, where it always has been and
always will be legitimately regarded as a support func-
tion. Quality in intelligence, as in other matters,
can best be achieved by an organization which regards
this as its sole mission.
Second, and even more important, this approach
would effectively repeal the 1947 Act's most basic
provision with respect to intelligence: placing the
correlation and analysis function in an independent
agency. We doubt anyone would seriously advocate this
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basic change since the need for independent intelligence
appraisal seems well accepted everywhere.
The argument for an independent CIA is based on
the need in policy councils for "objective" intelligence
on which to base the discussion of policy issues. CIA
does not necessarily perceive truth more clearly than
others do. Nonetheless its views can be communicated
directly to the ultimate decision makers without being
influenced by departmental superiors who have other in-
terests on which these intelligence judgments will in-
evitably impact, or simply a different world view.
If CIA were integrated into Defense, protecting
its substantive independence would not be easy. A law
could stipulate that the DCI, now a Defense official,
would continue to report to the National Security Coun-
cil or even the President on all but resource matters.
This would be similar to the arrangements under which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff now report independently to
the President. But this independence, even if sup-
ported by law, would be difficult to maintain.
One early task of the newly created Deputy Secre-
tary for Intelligence would certainly be to examine and
rationalize the diverse production elements for which
he would now have a responsibility. Resource and other
pressures would make sensible an effort to combine the
existing DIA and Service production organizations with
the newly transferred DDI and DDS&T production entities.
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We doubt this process could be completed without perhaps
irreparable damage to the capabilities of the CIA pro-
duction entities and to their independence of view.
There would also be other statutory and bureaucratic
problems: different legal authorities, personnel sys-
tems, etc., would need to be made consistent with other
Defense authorities or explicitly excluded from them if
what is now CIA is to remain a flexible instrument.
A National-Departmental Balance
The third basic approach -- finding a way to assert
greater control over the whole intelligence process
while leaving both Defense and CIA in the intelligence
business -- seems to us the only practical one. The
fundamental political and substantive problems described
above preclude classical organizational solutions placing
command and control over all or most intelligence func-
tions in one individual, either the Director of Central
Intelligence or an appropriate Defense Department official.
Moreover, there are cogent arguments for the con-
tinuing existence of an independent intelligence organ-
ization not subject to the control of any other line de-
partment or agency.
At the same time, the Department of Defense,
charged with responsibility for defending the nation,
requires a measure of control over important collec-
tion, processing and other intelligence activities
in which CIA also has a major continuing interest.
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The key to successful implementation of this third
basic approach is structuring the office of the DCI so
that its holder can discharge the responsibilities of
Community leadership without adversely affecting the
legitimate interests of the Departments of State and
Defense. The DCI clearly needs a stronger voice in
decision making on fundamental issues in the Intelligence
Community. At the same time, individual program managers
in Defense need to retain considerable latitude and flex-
ibility in the conduct of day-to-day operations. Both
goals can be met by increasing the DCI's voice in the
processes which determine how resources -- money and
people -- will be allocated in the Community, while
preserving an independent CIA and continuing Defense
responsibility for actual operation of most present
programs.
If the President and the Congress opt for this
third approach, they will soon find themselves at a
critical fork with two diverging paths leading to quite
different future Intelligence Communities.
The Act of 1947 established the DCI, and the CIA,
primarily to discharge a set of substantive respon-
sibilities: to "correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security." Over time, the
DCI that the Act created came to be acknowledged as the
nation's principal foreign intelligence officer. His
orientation in this sphere was primarily toward sub-
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stance: the collection of intelligence, and the
synthesis of all information available to the US Gov-
ernment into objective and comprehensive appreciations
and estimates. As the techniques and instruments of
technological collection became more complex and costly,
however, the DCI was inevitably drawn into basic issues
of resource allocation and resource management. This
process was gradual and, to a large extent, unplanned.
Part II of this paper explained how and why the
foundations Congress laid in 1947 are not adequate to
bear the structure that has been erected upon them.
It devoted particular attention to explaining why the
office of the DCI, as now constituted, is ill-equipped
to discharge the substantive and especially the resource
management responsibilities with which he is now vested.
If structural reform is to be grounded on altering the
DCI's role and authorities, a crucial decision has to
be made, namely whether:
1) The DCI is to be the true head of the Community
in both senses; i.e., to be responsible in a major
way for stewardship of the resources this nation
devotes to intelligence and, simultaneously, to be
the nation's principal substantive foreign intelli-
gence officer, or
2) The substantive and resource management respon-
sibilities are to be split, with the DCI being re-
placed by two senior officers; one charged exclu-
sively with resource management and the other with
substantive responsibilities.
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If the latter decision is made, one of these of-
ficers would be concerned with broad management prob-
lems in the Intelligence Community but not with sub-
stantive support to high-level consumers. He might
be called the Intelligence Comptroller and would be
provided strong authority over resource matters. Funds
for all Community programs would be appropriated to the
Comptroller; he would use an Executive Committee ar-
rangement to seek Community guidance and counsel, and
to arrive at major policy decisions on programs. The
DCI would remain the senior substantive officer.
The principal advantage of this approach derives
from the division of responsibility for the management
and substantive functions. The responsibilities of each
position would be spelled out in law. A Comptroller
would find it easier to be impartial in the Community,
since it could not be argued that he was favoring his
own production components, or the collection systems
which support them, at the expense of others. Further-
more, a full time resource manager could give more at-
tention not only to problems within the Intelligence
Community but also to the presentation and defense of
that Community's budget before Congress. Finally, fill-
ing these positions would be simplified since there
would be no need to find an executive who could dis-
charge equally well both sets of responsibilities.
There are, however, major disadvantages. This
approach would create two Community leaders. Conflict
between them would be inevitable as they tried, from
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the quite different perspectives of substance and re-
source management, to influence major decisions within
the Community. Although this conflict might help il-
luminate the issues surrounding major policy questions,
it would crystallize over the issue of who was the
Government's principal intelligence officer: the Comp-
troller or the DCI. Which one would be a member of the
NSC or attend its meetings? Would both? The Comptroller
would have little to contribute to substantive NSC delib-
erations; but his position would be undercut if the sub-
stantive officer (the DCI) attended NSC meetings and he
did not.
Furthermore, without substantive background or his
own substantive staff, the Comptroller would be ill-
equipped to evaluate the qualitative contribution of
analytic approaches or collection systems competing
for scarce resources, or to adjudicate disputes over
such issues between Community components with sub-
stantive responsibilities.
Any Comptroller would be strongly tempted to de-
velop his own substantive capability in order to do
his resource job, a temptation to which some Comptroller
would be bound to succumb, thus starting down the slip-
pery slope of redundant duplication.
The basic problem is that the intelligence process
is seamless, and divorcing resource questions from sub-
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stance does inevitable damage to the adequacy of the
Community's response to both. There are better ap-
proaches, outlined below, which will achieve the ad-
vantages of this concept while minimizing its in-
escapable costs. It is worth noting that our conclu-
sion here supports one of the most fundamental conclu-
sions of the 1971 Schlesinger study -- the need to combine
responsibility for leadership on both substantive and re-
source management issues within the Intelligence Com-
munity in one individual.
For these reasons, we believe the path of separating
the substantive and resource responsibilities of the DCI,
divesting him of the former so that he may better dis-
charge the latter, is a blind alley -- temptingly simple
on first inspection but leading to a situation even
worse than that which now exists and which clearly de-
mands fundamental improvement.
If we stay within?our third basic approach but
follow the path of keeping substantive and resource
management responsibilities combined, there are two
broad options for restructuring the office of the
DCI. They would lead to two quite different DCIs in
the future.
The first option contemplates a DCI with line
responsibility over CIA and a staff role with respect
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to the balance of the Intelligence Community, as now.
In appearance, this would much resemble present arrange-
ments, but it would differ from them in several signifi-
cant respects. This DCI's ability to influence decision
making on certain important issues would be enhanced by
creation of an Executive Committee, under his chairman-
ship, for the Consolidated CryptoZogic Program, along
the Lines of the present arrangement with respect to
the NRP. His Line responsibility for management of CIA
would be reduced somewhat by creation of a statutory
civilian deputy director charged with this responsibility.
This approach is discussed as Option One below.
The second option would eliminate the DCI's direct
responsibility for day-to-day management of the CIA but
materially enhance his authority over the allocation of
resources to all elements of the Intelligence Community
and give him a much stronger voice over the Community
as a whole.
Under both options we propose that the DCI be
made a member of the NSC. This would reconfirm his
position as senior advisor to the President on major
intelligence issues and increase his stature vis-a-vis
the Secretaries of State and Defense.
Implementation of the first option would require
relatively minor adjustments to the current structure.
These could be carried out with only slight modifica-
tions to existing legislation. Achievement of the
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second option would require considerable effort; it
involves fundamental change, and would require a major
revision of the intelligence portions of the National
Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949.
This option is based upon the premise that it is
not feasible to increase substantially the DCI's legal
authority with respect to resource matters within the
Intelligence Community, but that steps can be taken to
improve his ability to exercise the Community aspects
of his responsibilities and to clarify responsibility
for management of the CIA. The following steps would
strengthen the system at the points we believe are
weakest:
-- Adapt the Rockefeller Commission recommendation
for a deputy director of CIA responsible for line manage-
ment by amending the Act to provide the DCI with two
deputies, a civilian to run CIA and a military officer
to preside over the Community. Make the DCI a member
of the NSC. Amend the 1947 Act to clarify the DCI's
responsibilities within the Intelligence Community, and
to establish the new Deputy DCI's management responsi-
bilities for CIA. These changes would strengthen the
DCI's hand in exercising a staff role with respect to
resource issues in the Intelligence Community, and it
would help to ease the management problem. within CIA
presented by a DCI who personally wears two hats.
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-- By statute, specify the relationship between the
NSC.and the National Command Authority.
-- Charge the DCI with providing the President each
year an evaluation of the contributions made by various
collection systems to the solution of intelligence prob-
lems. This proposed annual evaluation would supplement
the report to the President required under the November
1971 letter calling for an independent DCI recommendation
on the overall Intelligence Community Budget.* Include
language in the amended act establishing the DCI's staff
responsibility to the President for Intelligence Community
resource matters. This point is discussed at greater
length in Annex G.
-- Create an Executive Committee for overall policy
direction and budgetary oversight of the Consolidated
Cryptologic Program, the largest and most important Com-
munity program in which the DCI now has no formal manage-
ment role. As in the case of the NRP, the DCI should
chair the ExCom, but final decision-making authority
would of course be retained in Defense. White House and
JCS representation on the ExCom would be highly desirable.
-- Form a National/Tactical Planning Committee
chaired by the DCI's military deputy with appropriate
* It would have the effect of suggesting to Defense and
to the President (0MB) the desirability of certain de-
cisions about Intelligence Community resource matters
without, however, significantly extending the DCI's
direct role in decision making.
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Defense representation. Charge it with considering
how to make better use of centrally-managed national
collection to support tactical requirements and with
developing plans for the transition of the national
intelligence system from peace to war.
-- Establish an Intelligence Coordinating Committee
to deal with problems between the Intelligence Community
and the Department of State other'than in the production
area. This Committee would be chaired by the DCI and
would include a senior State Department officer at the
Under Secretary level. Here too a White House presence
would be desirable.
-- Retain the USIB, under the DCI, for national
intelligence production and for such other functions
of USIB as are not assigned to the other bodies pro-
posed in these recommendations. Re-examine its mem-
bership in the light of these changes.
-- Make the DCI Chairman of the National Security
Council Intelligence Committee. The DCI needs consumer
reaction and no consumer has ever systematically provided
it.
Under this option, the statutory relationship of
the DCI to CIA would remain unchanged, but he would be
freed to the extent he permitted himself from his re-
sponsibility for administering CIA. The DCI would be
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given a modest increase in authority within the Commu-
nity, he would be provided better machinery for coordi-
nating community activities, and he would be given an
opportunity to increase his influence in the management
of the CCP.
Implementation of this option would improve in im-
portant ways the overall management arrangements which
currently exist within the Intelligence Community. We
are convinced, however, that the changes needed are more
fundamental than those reflected in this option, and that
an opportunity for effecting such basic changes now exists.
Our suggestions for more of these basic changes are
spelled out, in considerable detail, in our second op-
tion.
This option is based on the premise that it is
feasible to make major changes in the DCI's legal authori-
ties and, hence, to consider steps -- more drastic than
those outlined above -- which would get to the root of
the problems and structural weaknesses that now inhibit
the effectiveness and efficiency of the US Government's
intelligence system.
Necessary Conditions
If the DCI is to have the authority he needs, there
are three necessary conditions.
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The first is delicate and double-edged. The DCI
must have, and be known to have, the President's con-
fidence and support. He should have, and be seen to
have, regular, frequent access to the Oval Office.
While it is essential that a DCI have the President's
continuing confidence and support, it is equally im-
portant that the DCI's office neither be, nor appear
to be, politicized. The institutional organization
and physical location of his office should be fixed
in a way which emphasizes that the DCI supports the
Office of the Presidency.
Secondly, the scope of the DCI's authority should
be defined in statute. Even if the DCI does enjoy the
relationship with the President described above, it is
reasonable to expect that the Secretaries of State and
Defense will also have the President's confidence and
even greater access to him. If this is indeed the
case, they will readily outweigh the DCI unless his
position is buttressed by a stronger framework of
statutory authority than that which now supports him.
The main girder of this framework should be resource
management. The stronger the DCI's voice in the al-
location of funds, the easier it will be for him to
impose rationality on other aspects of his job.
Thirdly, our intelligence system must meet not
only the national level requirements of the President
and the members of the NSC, but also the departmental
requirements of the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
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and Defense, the other principal officers of state,
and their staffs. The relationship between the head
of the Intelligence Community and the Secretary of
Defense is of particular importance. Their respective
interests must be, and be seen to be, congruent rather
than competitive or divergent. This relationship should
be set forth in a statute which clarifies their respec-
tive roles in the management of intelligence and en-
courages their subordinates to cooperate rather than
compete.
After carefully considering other alternatives,
we are convinced that the best answer to the problems ad-
dressed by this study lies in making certain major
changes in the nature and functions of the office of
the Director of Central Intelligence. For the purpose
of this paper, we propose to call this new officer the
Director General of Intelligence, or DGI.* We would
put him at the apex of a framework which provides him
with stronger statutory authority over the Community
than that of the present DCI but which places him at
The best title for this officer would probably be the
Director of National Intelligence. That title, however,
was used in the 1971 Schlesinger Report to Zabel a con-
cept different from that which we are here proposing (and,
in fact, one we specifically recommend against adopting,
for reasons explained on pages 55-56). Hence to minimize
the risk of confusion between our recommendation and that
of the 1971 report, we Zabel our concept with the dif-
ferent title.
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a greater distance from CIA. The DGI approach (Op-
tion Two) entails:
-- A new concept for the funding of most intelli-
-- A new concept for the DGI's role in relation
to the Intelligence Community;
-- A new concept of the DGI's relationship to the
Department of Defense and to major collection programs;
-- A new concept of the relationship between the
DGI and the CIA.
In carrying out his responsibilities, the DGI would
be supported by a substantive staff and by a staff to
assist him in the critical functions of comptrollership,
collection management, and performance evaluation. This
last function is of particular importance since regular
careful review of the Intelligence Community product and
its responsiveness to consumer needs is central to effective
community management. The evaluation function would also
extend to the effectiveness of the various community ele-
ments in contributing to the product, particularly the
expensive and complex technical collection systems.
We also propose that the DGI have a strong in-
spectorate with access to the entire Community. This
organization would put the DGI in a position to exercise
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effective internal oversight, in cooperation with what-
ever external oversight organs are created.
In resource management, our concept is simply
stated, although we are fully aware that it is a major
step. It is that the bulk of the intelligence budget
now appropriated to Defense and CIA be instead appropriated
to the DGI for further allocation to the various existing
program managers in the Community.* At the same time,
the present DCI's responsibility for direct management
of the CIA would be eliminated. New legislation would
of course be required. This legislation should provide
for the DGI,in handling these larger funds, as much of
the fiscal flexibility given the DCI by the CIA Act of
1949 as politically feasible if the major technical
collection programs are to be efficiently managed.
The DGI and the Community
This option would not involve placing operational
control over all Community programs in the DGI or, in
the case of most Defense programs, moving those programs
out of the Department. As noted above, the concept of
* Such an arrangement has' been effectively employed before.
During the 1960s, for example, certain funds were appro-
priated to the Director of the Office of Economic oppor-
tunity but then delegated to the Department of Labor for
actual program operation.
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A CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
DGI:
Collection
Management
DGI:
Allocation
DGI:
Coordination
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a unitary command structure for intelligence, either
under an independent office or within Defense, has been
considered and rejected. Rather, in this new concept,
the DCI would exchange his present powers (variously to
command, advise, and persuade) for the DGI's more effec-
tive and Zess conspicuous management powers at key points
in the structure.
As noted above, there are various "communities"
of resource managers, collectors, producers, and users
of intelligence. In the simplest terms these communi-
ties are inter-linked as follows: funds flow from re-
source manager to collector and producer; finished in-
telligence flows from producer to user; the user then
determines whether his needs have been met and states
new needs to resource managers and producers; and,
finally, producers state new requirements to collec-
tors, or resource managers provide funds to develop
new collection capabilities.
Under this option, the DGI would provide policy
direction and would work to ensure an efficient, produc-
tive and coordinated community program. He would pursue
this objective without exercising direct line manage-
ment over any of the operational elements in the com-
munity, but instead indirectly, by regulating the
linkages among these elements (see sketch), largely
through chairmanship of several boards and committees.
The DGI's control over the allocation of funds would
ensure that the decisions of these boards were implemented.
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The DGI's Relationship to the Department of Defense
A proposal to transfer substantial funds and author-
ity from Defense to the DGI will no doubt meet resist-
ance. The success of this approach will depend upon the
establishment of a new relationship between the DGI and
the Secretary of Defense, based on a recognition of the
impact of planning for war on intelligence operations
in peacetime. As has been noted, the failure to deal
with this problem has frustrated the creation of a truly
national intelligence system for almost three decades. We
propose now to turn the question upside down, to consider
the question from the wartime end rather than, as we have
since 1947, from the peacetime one. The inherent con-
flicts in the current structure might be resolved by
new legislation as follows:
The DGI shaZZ be a member of the National Secu-
rity Council responsible to the President, ex-
cept that in the event of major hostilities
he shall be responsible to the President through
the Secretary of Defense, unless the President
directs otherwise. When he is subordinate to
the Secretary of Defense, he shall retain the
right to render substantive assessments inde-
pendently to the President.
Such a formulation would help to cause the interests
of the Secretary of Defense and DGI to converge where
they are now adversary. The Secretary would be more
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interested in seeing that the DGI built a strong in-
telligence system in peacetime, while the DGI would be
more concerned that the system be designed to meet De-
fense's needs in.peace or war. The DGI would be de
facto a part of the National Command System, and his
relationship to the National Command Authority would
be clearly established. In the event of war the entire
system, including the DGI, would theoretically move under
the Secretary of Defense's authority as a unit with
less disruption of internal command mechanisms than
would take place under such understandings as now exist.
Much more important in today's world, this formula-
tion would help open the door to development of a more
coherent overall intelligence system, with a unitary
budget, in peace. This should, over the long run, make
possible improvements in the ultimate quality of the
intelligence product at lower overall cost. At the same
time, the Congress could be assured that the peacetime
DGI was in fact independent of departmental interests.
This arrangement would work to Defense's net gain.
The same disagreements that have prevented development
of a truly national intelligence system have also handi-
capped development of the military intelligence system.
With the DGI clearly responsible both for wartime sup-
port of the military and for effective organization of
that support in peace (in collaboration with Defense)
a serious problem for military planners could be reduced.
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Defense could also expect national intelligence produc-
tion to be more responsive to its needs.
The extent to which the intelligence structure can
be rationalized and its management strengthened depends
directly on the degree to which the DGI-Defense rela-
tionship can be clarified and made compatible. Improve-
ments in this relationship should ultimately be reflected
in the final product of intelligence.
Specific Problem Areas
We have discussed above the broader question of
the DGI's relations with Defense. There remain, how-
ever, more specific questions relating to the two major
technical collection systems under Defense management.
National Reconnaissance Program. A DGI armed with
budgetary powers and a better defined relationship with
Defense will be in a position to manage technical col-
lection more efficiently, to make more sensible choices,
and to respond more flexibly to new requirements. Bet-
ter arrangements will be needed, however, to link him
with technical program managers. The current operational
structure for the National Reconnaissance Program is the
National Reconnaissance Office. The NRO in its current
form is an anomalous patchwork originally constituted
in a period of bureaucratic strife. Competition within
the NRO will not be as useful in the future as it has been
in the past, and the coordination problems within a
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structure designed to accommodate competition are be-
coming increasingly difficult. More important, the need
for military commanders to derive direct support from
satellite collection resources is becoming increasingly
important, and it is questionable whether the current
NRO organization, with the Under Secretary of the Air
Force as director, is well suited to meet this problem.
An alternative to present practice would be to re-
constitute the NRO as an integrated, operational organ-
ization jointly staffed by elements of the Department
of Defense and CIA. In this arrangement the D/NRO would
become the line manager of the various NRP programs.
This would create an organization in some ways analogous
to NSA, which has under NSCID 6 a clear line of command
over the CCP. This organizational structure for the NRO
has appeal from the point of view of streamlined management
and tight, coherent program direction. It would cer-
tainly meet the increasing insistence of Congress on
efficient use of resources and elimination of needless
duplication. It would also be well suited for dealing
with the increasing complexity and growing diversity of
consumers, which is likely to occur as direct support to
military commanders becomes more substantial.
However, an integrated operating organization of
this type raises the problem of appropriate organiza-
tional location. Such a structure would probably be in-
appropriate, if not totally infeasible, as an element of
the Secretary of Defense's staff. For different rea-
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sons, establishing such an organization within one of
the three Services would pose a number of serious prob-
lems. If the role of the DCI were to be changed sub-
stantially and the Intelligence Community restructured,
a better location for the NRO might be found.
tion and expenditure of NRP funds is both a unique and
In considering the future organizational location
of the NRO, an important problem associated with the
funding of the NRP should be discussed. The appropria-
an anomalous process.
There would in fact be serious penalities in flex-
ibility, dollar efficiency, and ultimately, performance
if this privileged status of the NRP were not preserved.
On the other hand, it seems extremely unlikely with the
current mood of Congress that such arrangements between
a few key senators and congressmen and certain Executive
Branch officials will be allowed to continue outside the
normally applicable statutes. Thus, in addition to find-
ing a proper home for the National Reconnaissance Or-
ganization, a means for appropriating funds for the NRP
must be established outside the normal Defense appro-,
priation process if an aggressive and effective National
Reconnaissance Program is to be continued. This problem
would obviously be solved by appropriating funds to the
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DGI proposed under this option, if the DGI retained the
flexible funding authorities given to the DCI by the
CIA Act of 1949.
Consolidated Cryptologic Program. As noted, NSCID
6 gives the Director, NSA authority over the national
SIGINT system. This provides strong management for NSA
and protects it from many of the bureaucratic pressures
that affect other organizations of the Community. It
also tends to isolate it from the Community, however,
and to make it in a number of ways difficult for a Com-
munity manager to handle.
-- NSA with its control over the service crypto-
logic agencies is virtually self-contained, and physi-
cally separated from the rest of the Community. This
makes NSA the hair shirt of any DCI seeking to measure
its effectiveness or to form balanced judgments as to
its responsiveness to national needs.
-- For reasons valid in the past but less so today,
NSA continues to be dominated by the military. It is
controlled by Defense and most of its intercept work is
still carried out by the service cryptologic agencies.
Overall military influence is declining,
I Nonetheless NSA remains more respon-
sive to military requirements than to the growing po-
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litical and economic needs of national intelligence.
A continued strengthening of civilian influence is
desirable if these latter demands are to be met.
-- On the other hand, this process cannot go too
The DCI here, as in the reconnais-
sance program, must balance national and tactical
needs, a task complicated by his difficulties in ob-
taining information.
-- The DCI has at least some voice in the manage-
ment of all major collection programs except the Con-
solidated Cryptologic Program. His instruments of
influence over NSA are limited to the IRAC and the
SIGINT Committee of USIB. The latter is able to es-
tablish priorities for NSA, but for reasons stated
above is unable to monitor adequately NSA's performance
against them.
If a DGI is to develop a coherent national intel-
ligence structure to serve both national and tactical
needs, he must find ways to integrate NSA and the ser-
vice cryptologic agencies more fully into that struc-
ture. To do so, he will need a strong voice in estab-
lishing requirements for NSA and the ability to measure
its performance against those requirements, and this
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cannot be obtained without much greater access to the
details of its operations.
It seems unlikely that the DGI can succeed where
all DCIs have been frustrated unless he acquires a
major voice in the management and funding of the CCP.
In the context of the other arrangements proposed in
Option Two, it seems logical to give him such a voice.
Under this option the CCP as well as the NRP would be
funded through the DGI, and we propose that the respon-
sibilities of the NRP EXCOM, chaired by the DGI, be
extended to cover the CCP. If the DGI had these powers,
information and responsiveness would follow.
The DGI and the CIA
In recommending a greatly increased role for the
DGI in Community matters, we also recommend a major
change in his relationship to CIA. In fact, we propose
a statutory separation.
Divesting the DCI of direct management for CIA
has been suggested before and rejected, largely because
of arguments such as the following:
-- The National Security Act would have to be
changed.
-- The President could no longer look to one man
for both intelligence and covert action support.
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-- A DCI, separated from the resources of CIA,
would need a substantial staff.
The first of these reasons is no longer valid since
the National Security Act may be revised in any event.
The second is not necessarily true. The third has merit,
but it is not by itself a fundamental argument for main-
taining the status quo.
On the other hand, there are strong reasons for
separating the proposed DGI from the CIA:
-- The DCI has important responsibilities for
managing the whole Intelligence Community, responsibili-
ties which would be increased under the DGI concept.
The DCI's ability to exercise his Community responsibili-
ties has long been complicated by his concurrent role
as the administrative head of CIA. Within the Commu-
nity itself, he is seen as the head of one Community
component with its own vested interests in certain
programs and policies. Furthermore, the time and at-
tention the day-to-day management of CIA inevitably
requires detracts from the time available to the DCI
for concentration on Community problems. In point of
fact, no DCI over the past 28 years has been able to
do full justice to both sets of responsibilities.
-- If the new DGI's overall management and budgetary
role is to be considerably larger than that of the present
DCI, his management span must be reduced in other ways.
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-- The CIA itself has become the subject of wide-
spread criticism. Separating the new DGI from direct
management responsibility for CIA (or its successor)
would enable him to concentrate on his new responsibili-
ties without encumbering legacies from past controver-
sies or the political onus of being the nation's chief
"spymaster."
In light of the above, under this option the DGI
and CIA would be separated by law, and the CIA would be
renamed the Foreign Intelligence Agency* -- a piece of
symbolism designed to stress the break with the past.
Its operating head, the Director of the FIA, would be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
By increasing the DGI's power over the Community
while divesting him of operating responsibility for the
FIA, we believe greater efficiency and political ac-
ceptability can be obtained. Two issues however im-
mediately arise:
-- To whom should the Director of the FIA (D/FIA)
report; specifically, should he report directly to the
NSC (as does the present DCI), or should he report to
the NSC through the DGI, himself a member of the NSC?
-- The DGI's staff must include a substantive
group essentially similar to the present NIOs. Should
Hereafter, in speaking of the future, we will use the
term DGI and FIA; in speaking of the present and past,
we will use DCI and CIA.
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Schematic Sketch of Option Twos Four Variants
A 8
NSC
CIAs
Human
Collection
Covert
Action
NSC
DG
D/FIA
CIA's
Analysis
Technical
Collection
Proc mas irs
CIA'*
Pr~oduc4ion
Analysis
NSC
Human
Co I leci+ov-
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Ae+ian
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cws
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oollee+ian
Co var+
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S
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Ool Ioction
Prnceraira
A a//lour vopy;ro ~ die OQ/~:s o ~eyr~,6e ro~i~ic NSC.
CIA-
I{umck n
Col (!coon
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DGI
CIAts
Technical
Co iIec}io~n
A
Rrocesein9
DGI4
CIA's
TechniCa1
Collect; mA
Prous.~
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it also include the production elements of CIA's DDI
and DDS&T, on which the NIOs now heavily rely, or
should these remain in the new FIA?
These two questions may appear to be separate,
but they are actually intertwined. As stated, they
may seem of small consequence, involving only niceties
of bureaucratic subordination or protocol. This is
not the case; for wrapped up in them are organizational
and functional considerations of major importance.
There is no set of arrangements which will perfectly
accommodate all of these considerations. The choices
involved can be most clearly distinguished by permuting
the two variables.
-- Variant A: D/FIA subordinated to DGI; DGI
acquires CIA analytic and production capa-
bilities.
-- Variant B: D/FIA subordinated to DGI; D/FIA
retains CIA analytic and production capabilities.
-- Variant C: D/FIA subordinated to NSC; DGI ac-
quires CIA analytic and production capabilities.
-- Variant D: D/FIA subordinated to NSC; D/FIA
retains CIA analytic and production capabilities.
In our view, only two of these four theoretical
choices are viable. The arrangement under Variant A,
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if the DGI were given the funding authority and other
enhanced powers we propose, would approach the "mono-
lith" we have already outlined and rejected above. The
DGI of Variant D, on the other hand, would be too weak
to be effective. A D/FIA with control of intelligence
production and of clandestine operations, who was not
required to report through the DGI to the NSC, could
easily come to rival the latter as the Government's
principal foreign intelligence officer.
Variants B and C, however, are better balanced.
They both provide workable, although quite different,
structures for the DGI-D/FIA relationship. Under
both, the DGI would have the personal staff discussed
on page 72 above, including an entity with responsi-
bilities similar to those of the present group of Na-
tional Intelligence Officers.
Variant B. Under Variant B, the D/FIA would be
subordinate to the DGI and report to the NSC through
him. The D/FIA, in turn, would have direct control
over all line functions of the present CIA, including
its analytic and production elements.
This variant places major emphasis on effective
management. It divests the DGI of responsibility for
the day-to-day direction of the FIA and fixes that
responsibility squarely on a separate official who
would be accountable for the efficacy and propriety
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of the FIA's activities.* At the same time, it pre-
serves for the DGI a clear line of authority over the
FIA, and hence over covert action, retains the present
DGI's ability to respond to NSC requests, and minimizes
the risk of the D/FIA's becoming a rival to the DGI.
Moreover, it keeps intact and independent the closely
integrated collection, processing, and production capa-
bilities that make CIA an important national asset.
The DGI's impartiality on substantive and resource
issues would be less open to the challenges levied
against the present "two-hatted" DCI. In the substan-
tive sphere, however, the DGI would need to draw heavily
on FIA's production resources, both to develop positions
independent of departmental views and to make informed
decisions on resource issues.
But this would create problems. It would re-raise
the question of his partiality, unless he significantly
augmented his own staff's analytic and production capa-
bilities, a move that would undercut the rationale for
maintenance of the FIA's production organization.
Moreover, this DGI would have difficulty providing
current intelligence for the President and the NSC.
There is a significant difference between national esti-
* In effect, the DGI becomes Admiral of the intelligence
fleet and the D/FIA Captain of its flagship. If the
flagship runs aground or goes off course, that is pri-
marily its Captain's responsibility.
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mative assessments and national current intelligence,
even though they serve the same customers, deal with
similar questions, draw on the same intelligence ma-
terials, and are closely linked. Estimates can be
produced by a small coordinating staff, drawing on
contributions from throughout the Community. Current
intelligence, however, requires a large integral or-
ganization, complex procedures, and considerable physi-
cal support. The NIOs supervise the production of esti-
mates for the DCI, but he needs the full analytic re-
sources of the DDI and DDS&T to produce current intel-
ligence. Variant B would split these functions or-
ganizationally, making it difficult for the DGI to keep
them in step.
Many of these problems would be eased if the DGI
and the D/FIA were co-located at Langley. The DGI
could operate with a much smaller personal staff. His
immediate subordinates could draw on the talents and
resources of FIA analysts in the same building, and
there would be minimal.need for duplicative overhead
support.
There are, however, at least two flaws in this ar-
rangement. Having the DGI and his staff in the same
building would make it difficult for the D/FIA to run
his own ship. The more serious objection is that it
would not appear to be much of a change. The statutory
separation would be seen by many to be cosmetic, pre-
serving, in effect, the present DCI's relationship to
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CIA while greatly increasing his authority in other
areas. This would especially be the case if DGI and
D/FIA were both resident at Langley. Despite the ac-
tual significance of this variant's changes, its ap-
pearance of similarity to present arrangements might
not make it politically acceptable at this time.
Variant C. Under Variant C, the D/FIA would
report, as does the present DC'I, directly to the NSC
(of which the DGI would be a member) not to or through
the DGI. CIA's present analytical and production capa-
bilities would be incorporated into the office of the
new DGI. The FIA would be explicitly limited to tech-
nical and human collection, related processing, re-
search and development and support -- and covert ac-
tion. It would have no production role. The D/FIA
would not usually attend meetings of the NSC or its
major subcommittees.
This variant places major emphasis on political
acceptability. It has two major advantages. First,
it represents a clearly recognizable change: the
increase in the DGI's powers over the Community in-
herent in Option Two is balanced by an obvious re-
duction in his authority over CIA. Second, it provides
the DGI with the substantive staff he needs to meet
his responsibilities as the President's senior intel-
ligence officer and to assist him in his resource al-
location and collection management responsibilities.
Moreover, his responsibilities for current intelligence
could readily be met.
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Under this variant, however, the DGI could not
easily contend that he was impartial on substantive
issues. The rest of the Intelligence Community would
see the DGI's analytic and production components as
a closed corporation that paid little more than lip
service to their views and their dissents. (As noted
in Annex D, other elements of the Community do not
accept CIA's present production as having more "na-
tional" standing than their own.) In fact, however,
the DCI or the DGI will have to rely primarily on
analysis that is not prepared for departmental pur-
poses. This means the DGI must be "partial" to the
independent organization created for his support.
Variant C would frankly recognize that this partial-
ity is necessary, its impact on the other agencies
of the Community somewhat mitigated by their right to
dissent. At the same time, the DGI and his substan-
tive staff would be fully separated from the interests
of the D/FIA as well as other Community managers,
and hence free to be genuinely impartial with respect
to resource issues, the most important of which re-
late to collection and processing. This change might
be recognized by grouping the FIA's program with the
NRO and the CCP under EXCOM management.
A major disadvantage of this variant would be the
danger that the D/FIA might become a competitor to
the DGI. The DGI's membership on the NSC, his control
of funds, and the status and access conferred by his
position as the nation's principal substantive foreign
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intelligence officer would put him in most respects
in a dominant position over the D/FIA, but the latter
would not be formally subordinated to him. Despite
the DGI's formidable powers, the D/FIA's position
as the nation's covert action officer would generate
strong temptations to by-pass the DGI, especially in
crises or on ultra-sensitive matters. The relation-
ship between the DGI and the D/FIA under this variant
would therefore be messier. It would, however, be
more politically acceptable than that under Variant B.
There is another serious risk. If this variant
is adopted, the present organizational integrity of
CIA would be ruptured. It could then be argued that,
with the independent production elements of CIA al-
ready transferred to the DGI, the formation of FIA would
be unnecessary. The collection and processing elements
of DDS&T could be transferred to Defense and the Clan-
destine Service to State. We believe there would be
serious damage to important national assets-if this
occurred. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, har-
nessing long range R&D and technical collection sys-
tem development and operations to important intelli-
gence needs is a fundamental problem. DDS&T has
been and is a strong positive force in this regard.
Consolidating all technical collection in Defense
would be a step backward, leading to substantial
long range losses and inefficiencies.
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The Three Basic Approaches
Indepen
it Monolith National/Departmental Balance All Undq~N Defense
The Divergent Paths
Separate ficers for Resources and
Resource nd Substance Substance Combined
The Two Options
D/FIA
to DGI
CIA an
ducti
is and pro- analytic and production CIA analytic and D/FI retains
bilitiec capabilities production capa- CIA n ytic
bilities an pro ction
c abilit'es
Option . Limited
AdditioAkl Powers for DCI
Option Two:I Strong
DGI, Separate FIA
The Four Variants
B C D
i
ub dinated D/FIA subordinated to D/FIA subordinated D1IA s/ordi-
CI acquires DGI; D/FIA retains CIA to NSC; DGI acquires nat to NSC;
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For the reasons outlined above on pages 43-49,
we consider the arguments against placing the Clan-
destine Service under the Departments of State or
Defense to be compelling.
We believe that the best approach to correcting
the Intelligence Community's present structural flaws,
and simultaneously solving other current problems,
is to be found in Option Two, under either variant B
or variant C. Each of these, however, has great ad-
vantages and serious shortcomings. Which is the
better choice, more likely to contribute to the net
national interest of the United States, is a judgment
call. How that call is made hinges on the relative
weights one assigns to the numerous considerations in-
volved.
Before proceeding to the specific recommenda-
tions needed to implement Option Two, we believe it
would be desirable to recapitulate the complicated
argument which brings up to it. The sketch on the
facing page is a road map for the reader.
If fundamental change could be at least contem-
plated in 1971, it is a central issue in 1975. Current
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political developments suggest that the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 will be rewritten; our analysis of the
Act and the intelligence structure it established con-
vinces us that it should be. It is not an exaggeration
to observe that we are fast approaching an historical
moment and associated unique opportunity to charter
the Intelligence Community to meet future needs for ef-
fective intelligence support. It could be another 25
years before events provide another President with a
comparabl opportunity.
On both substantive and tactical political grounds,
we suggest consideration of legislation to establish
the arrangements envisioned under the Option Two above.
This proposal could serve as a point of departure for
constructive debate within the Executive Branch and
ultimately the Congress on the future legal and politi-
cal basis for the conduct of American intelligence.
In summary, we recommend the following steps:
-- New legislation to create a DGI separate from
the FIA and to establish a working relationship between
him and the Secretary of Defense. Make the DGI a mem-
ber of the NSC.
-- Provide the DGI with a staff capable of perform-
ing the substantive, coordination, resource management,
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and evaluation functions outlined above, i.e., the Na-
tional Intelligence Officers and the Intelligence Com-
munity staff, reconstituted and strengthened. Under
Variant C, the production elements of CIA/DDI and DDS&T
would be included as well.
-- Charge the DGI with preparation of a total na-
tional intelligence budget covering the FIA program,
NRP, CCP, and portions of the GDIP. Appropriate'funds
for the programs covered by this budget to the DGI for
reallocation, according to detailed procedures to be
developed. Provide for DGI staff review of other De-
partmental intelligence expenditures. Retain IRAC to
advise the DGI on resource matters.
-- Charge the DGI with responsibility for better
support of the needs of Defense in peace and especially
in war through use of centrally coordinated collection
programs, and with planning for the transfer of intelli-
gence assets to the-Department of Defense in time of
war. Charge Defense with cooperating in this endeavor
by providing access, staff support, and quality person-
nel. Charge the DGI with establishing a National/Tactical
Planning Committee, on which the JCS would be represented
as the regulating mechanism for this program.
-- Create a new Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA)
with a Director appointed by the President and confirmed
by Congress. Place under him the present CIA minus the
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DGI's staff. Under Variant B, he would be respon-
sible to the NSC through the DGI. Under Variant C,
he would be responsible to the NSC collectively.
-- Reconstitute EXCOM with the DGI in the chair
and appropriately senior White House and Defense De-
partment officials as members, including the Chairman
of the JCS. Charge it with broad budgetary and policy
guidance over the NRP and the CCP and, under Variant
C, over the Foreign Intelligence Agency program.
-- Reorganize the NRO as an integrated organiza-
tion jointly staffed by FIA and Defense.
-- Make the DGI Chairman of NSCIC, as in Option One.
-- As in Option One, establish an Intelligence Co-
ordinating Committee to regulate relations between the
intelligence system and'State (except for substantive
production).
-- Lastly, as in option one, retain the USIB, under
the DGI, for national intelligence production and for
such other functions of USIB as are not assigned to the
other bodies proposed in these recommendations. Re-
examine its membership in the light of these changes.
These changes add up to a relatively clean ar-
rangement, given the complexity of the matters involved.
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We believe they would greatly improve the management
of US intelligence. We are fully aware that these
recommendations are revolutionary as change goes in the
bureaucratic world, and that they will meet strong re-
sistance in many quarters. In particular, the ability
of a DGI to meet military needs has not been tested
and will be suspect. Nevertheless, these are traumatic
times. They create both the need and the opportunity
for fundamental improvement.
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACSI -- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Army)
AEC -- Atomic Energy Commission
AFIN -- Air Force Intelligence
ARPA -- Advanced Research Project A
ASD(I) -- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
CCP -- Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CEA -- Council of Economic Advisors
CIAP -- Central Intelligence Agency Programs
CIEP -- Committee on International Economic Policy
CIG -- Central Intelligence Group
COMINT -- Communications Intelligence
COMIREX -- Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
CS -- Clandestine Service.(CIA)
DDI -- Deputy Director for Intelligence (CIA)
DDO -- Deputy Director for Operations (CIA)
DD/R&D -- Deputy Director for Research and Engineering
(Department of Defense)
DDS&T -- Deputy Director for Science and Technology (CIA)
D/FIA -- Director, Foreign Intelligence Agency
DGI -- Director General of Intelligence
DI -- Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DIA -- Defense Intelligence Agency
D/NRO -- Director, National Reconnaissance Office
DO -- Directorate of Operations (CIA)
DO/MBO -- Directorate of Operations/Management by Objectives
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ELINT -- Electronics Intelligence
ENMCC -- Extended National Military Command Center
ERDA -- Energy Research and Development Administration
EXCOM -- National Reconnaissance Program Executive Com-
mittee
FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS -- Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FIA -- Foreign Intelligence Agency
FIR -- Foreign Intelligence Report
FIS -- Foreign Instrumentation Signals
FSO -- Foreign Service Officer
FTD -- Foreign Technology Division (Air Force)
GDIP -- General Defense Intelligence Program
ICBM -- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INR -- Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department
of State)
IRAC -- Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee
KIQ -- Key Intelligence Question (Derived by Director
of Central Intelligence, in consultation with
the United States Intelligence Board, to identify
key national-level intelligence questions to
serve as a focus for the Intelligence Community's
collection and production activities.)
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 MBO -- Management by Objectives
NCA -- National Command Authority (A single chain of
command reaching from the President through
the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.)
NIE -- National Intelligence Estimate
NIO -- National Intelligence Officer
NMIC -- National Military Intelligence Center
NPIC -- National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO -- National Reconnaissance Office
NRP -- National Reconnaissance Program
NRP
EXCOM -- National Reconnaissance Program Executive
Committee
NSA -- National Security Agency
NSC -- National Security Council
NSCIC -- National Security Council Intelligence Committee
NSCID -- National Security Council Intelligence Directive
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OMB -- Office of Management and Budget
ONE -- Office of National Estimates
ONI -- Office of Naval Intelligence
OPC -- Office of Policy Coordination (CIA)
OSO -- Office of Strategic Operations (CIA)
OSS -- Office of Strategic Services
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PFIAB -- President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
R&D -- Research and Development
SAFSP -- Secretary of the Air Force, Special Projects
SALT -- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIGINT -- Signals Intelligence
USIB -- United States Intelligence Board
WFTU -- World Federation of Trade Unions
WSAG -- Washington Special Action Group
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ANNEX A
The United States Government has an intelligence
structure whose shape and functions have been dictated
more by pragmatism and accident than by conscious de-
sign. This structure is sometimes called the "Intel-
ligence Community," a term that is elusive, means dif-
ferent things to different people, and is a fertile
source of confusion. In the broadest sense, the Ameri-
can "Intelligence Community" encompasses those com-
ponents of the US Government responsible for the col-
lection and processing of intelligence information,
the production of finished intelligence, the provision
of various kinds of intelligence support to the Execu-
tive Branch (including, for example, covert action),
and some measure of support (largely in the substantive
field) to the Congress. It is not easy to specify,
however, precisely what components of the US Govern-
ment are, or ought to be, considered part of that
"Intelligence Community."
There is a common notion that the Intelligence
Community can be defined by the membership of the
United States Intelligence Board, but the apparent
simplicity of this approach is illusory. In pur-
suing it, one immediately has to face the question
of whether USIB consists of its full members (CIA,
NSA, DIA, State/INR, and the Treasury, plus ERDA and
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the FBI); or these plus the three military services'
intelligence components, which are technically only
observers at USIB; or this larger group plus those
other entities which from time to time attend USIB
meetings.
Attempting even the more limited task of trying
to define the intelligence production community also
quickly leads one into a swamp. There is general
agreement that the principal producing organizations
are CIA, INR, DIA, and the Service intelligence agen-
cies -- plus ancillary entities such as the Air Force's
Foreign Technology Division, the Army's Missile Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Naval Intelligence Support
Center. After this point, however, distorting anomalies
emerge.
NSA, for example, is a major collector and proces-
sor of intelligence information and has an associated
analytical capability. The latter, however, is not
applied to an "all-source" environment since NSA is
primarily keyed to signals intelligence. The rest
of the Community, therefore, does not regard NSA as
a producer of finished intelligence in the political
and strategic areas, though NSA is an important pro-
ducer of tactical intelligence for the three military
services.
ERDA (formerly part of AEC) is unique in a dif-
ferent way. Though a full member of USIB, ERDA neither
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collects intelligence nor has a significant analytical
effort. It owes its Community membership to the fact
that it represents a unique and exclusive body of nu-
clear information and to the language of certain pro-
visions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
The FBI is considered a member of the Intelligence
Community, and of USIB, by virtue of its counterintel-
ligence, counterespionage, and (to a lesser extent)
law enforcement responsibilities in the national secu-
rity field. The FBI does not perform any meaningful
substantive intelligence analysis, however, nor does
it play a major role in collecting positive foreign
intelligence.
Defining the Defense Department production com-
munity poses other problems. One set lies in the na-
ture of the relationship of DIA to:
-- The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman,
JCS. (Opinions differ on whether the Director, DIA,
is equally subordinate to both or subordinate to the
former through the latter.)
-- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelli-
gence), who sits at the USIB table but whose right
to sit there is debated.
-- The three Service intelligence components
(the Office of Naval Intelligence, Assistant Chief
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of Staff, Intelligence (Army), and Air Force Intel-
ligence).
Though Treasury is now a full member of USIB,
many do not regard it as a member of the Intelligence
Community. Primarily a consumer of intelligence,
Treasury has become a member of USIB by virtue of
its increasingly important requirements for intel-
ligence support. Though Treasury does both collect
and analyze information in the course of its business,
opinions differ on whether what Treasury does is "in-
telligence." With the rising importance of economic
considerations as matters of intrinsic intelligence
concern, as well as key ingredients of many military
and political intelligence judgments, this whole area
is now in a process of transitional flux.
The Department of State adds its own complexities.
it is represented on USIB by its Bureau of Intelligence
and Research. INR, however, is not regarded by many in
State as being within the main stream of the Depart-
ment, though the current head of INR happens to be a
trusted, valued member of the Secretary of State's per-
sonal staff and plays a key role in assisting him in
his dual capacities as Secretary of State and as Presi-
dential Assistant. Also within the Department is the
Foreign Service. The Intelligence Community regards
the Foreign Service as a prime collector of political
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and economic information; but many Foreign Service of-
ficers would be aghast at being included in anyone's
definition of the "Intelligence Community."
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Council (IRAC)
includes another set of entities which are clearly part
of the intelligence process and, therefore, merit con-
sideration as members of the Intelligence Community,
even though IRAC's primary focus is resource manage-
ment, not production or collection.
IRAC is chaired by the DCI and includes among its
formal members the DDCI (representing CIA), the Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), OMB's Associate
Director for National Security and International Af-
fairs, and the Department of State's Director of INR.
The NSC Staff's Director for Intelligence Coordination,
the Director of DIA, and the Director of NSA also at-
tend IRAC meetings but as observers, not full members.
In addition, others -- including the Director of NRO --
also usually attend the.IRAC meetings. Collectively,
those who attend IRAC meetings control almost all of
the personnel and dollar resources associated with the
United States intelligence establishment.
IRAC also has links into the R&D community, an-
other heavy consumer of intelligence-related resources.
Under the chairmanship of the Department of Defense's
DD/R&D, IRAC has established an Intelligence Research
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and Development Committee whose members include the
heads of the principal R&D organizations represented
on IRAC, the Service Assistant Secretaries for R&D,
the Director of ARPA, and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Telecommunications. Though these entities
certainly fall outside usual definitions of the "In-
telligence Community," it is nonetheless clear that
there is a strong bond of common concern and technical
affinity tying these entities into that Community.
The above considerations demonstrate that there
is not any single intelligence community easily defina-
ble as such. Instead, we should recognize and frankly
acknowledge that there are at least four "communities"
with intelligence-related responsibilities and inter-
ests, all of which interlock and overlap. These include:
a. The collectors of intelligence information
and providers of intelligence services. This commu-
nity would include CIA's Directorate of Operations
plus the-CIA Office of ELINT and the Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, NSA, the NRO, members of
State's Foreign Service officer corps, Treasury, Agri-
culture and Commerce attaches, the military service
attaches, elements of DIA, plus elements of ACSI, ONI,
and AFIN (and of other DoD entities -- to the extent
that they run collection operations), and the FBI.
b. The analysts and producers of substantive
intelligence. This community encompasses CIA's Direc-
torate of Intelligence and certain parts of its Di-
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rectorate of Science and Technology, elements of DIA
and the three service intelligence agencies, other
Defense Department components (e.g., FTD), NSA (some-
times in some fields), State/INR, and occasionally
ERDA and the Treasury.
c. The resource managers. As a starting point,
this community can be defined in terms of the whole
IRAC family, a family with its own branches and sub-
ordinate clans reflecting varying degrees of kinship.
d. The consumers. The consuming community is
itself complex and has several distinct components
within the Executive Branch.* These include the Pres-
ident, the members of the NSC, and their senior staff
and subordinates. They also include the Secretary of
the Treasury, and, to a lesser extent, the Secretaries
of Commerce and Agriculture and their senior staffs
and subordinates, as well as the economic policy com-
munity (CIEP, CEA, the Special Trade Representative,
Governors of the Federal Reserve, Chairman of the Ex-
port-Import Bank., etc.)
The above are primary (and primarily) consumers of
national intelligence. The consumers of tactical intel-
ligence (primarily military) constitute an additional
galaxy or, actually, series of galaxies.
* There are also, obviously, additional groups of consumers
in the Congress and -- some would argue -- outside the
Government as well, e.g., in the academic world, the print
and electronic media, and among the whole body of voting,
tax-paying citizens. This study focuses on the Executive
Branch and does not address Congressional (or Judicial)
consumers of intelligence, nor does it address the ques-
tion of consumers outside the Federal Government.
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COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
One of the central problems of intelligence com-
munity management is that of establishing mechanisms
and processes for insuring the efficient and effective
allocation of collection resources -- i.e., collection
management.
Collection management has as its objective the
matching of collection capabilities to intelligence
problems. Collection management, therefore, deals
with the communications process between the managers
of collection systems and the intelligence production
community. The critical feature of this process is
the translation of intelligence problems into specific
requests for information. To be successful, this
translation must put the information requests in a
form (or format) on which collection managers can
take action. While clearly related to resource manage-
ment, collection management concerns itself with
existing resources and their best use to collect data
to solve a given problem. (Resource management per
se is not the subject of this Annex and will not be
further addressed in it.)
The Principal Sources
Current collection programs can be classified
into seven categories, covering information or data
obtained from:
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(1) Human Sources;
(2) COMINT (communications intelligence);
(3) ELINT (electronics intelligence);
(4) Foreign Instrumentation Signals (principally
telemetry);
(5) Optical Signatures;
(6) Imagery; and
(7) Open or unclassified sources, such as published
literature, the press, and the monitoring of foreign
radio, television and news circuits.
Human Sources collection is concerned with people
getting information from other people, or with covert
technical collection systems which have to be emplaced
and/or serviced by humans. Dominant in this category
is the CIA's Clandestine Service. Defense attaches and
the Foreign Service are primarily concerned with the
overt gathering of information, although the military
services do a relatively small amount of clandestine
collection.
COMINT, ELINT and Foreign Instrumentation Signals
fall under the general heading of SIGINT (signals in-
telligence). SIGINT is collected from ground, aircraft,
a large number of civilian
and military organizations. The National Security
Council (in NSCID 6) has given NSA the leading role
in the tasking of all SIGINT resources and the process-
ing of SIGINT data 'for dissemination to all consumer
organizations. NSA has the paramount role in the col-
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lection of COMINT since all the Service Cryptologic
Agencies are under its direct control.
NSA also plays a major part in collecting and
processing ELINT, although several other organizations
also do one or the other, or both. The Assistant Secre-
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At one time aircraft were the sole platforms used
for imagery -- principally photographic -- reconnaissance.
Now most -- though not all -- photography of strategic
importance comes from NRO operated satellites. Excep-
tions are the regular U-2
and, to a lesser degree, the SR-71
There are also six SR-71s in the Air Force inventory
which have been used for coverage
Finally, there are
available a variety of tactical aircraft equipped for
photographic reconnaissance -- e.g., RF-4s -- but these
are normally useful only in specific localized applica-
tions, such as tactical intelligence support to forces
in combat.
Collection from open literature (books, magazines
and other periodicals) is done by the simple expedient
of buying books or periodicals of interest. CIA has
the primary responsibility in this field, discharging
it as a central service of common concern. Reporting
on the press is done by the State Department's Foreign
Service, by the Defense attaches and through regular
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monitoring of foreign wire services
The Four Budgets
Another way of looking at collection resources is
through the four major intelligence program budgets:
the CIAP, CCP, GDIP, and the NRP.
The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)
funds the Defense attaches and a number of aircraft
activities. I
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The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) is de-
voted exclusively to satellite collection
photography
The table on the facing page relates the prin-
ciple collection categories to the principal intelligence
budgets. In the body of the table, "Primary" indicates
that the principal collection assets are funded and
managed within the indicated budget. "Contributory"
indicates collection assets within that budget which
make a substantial contribution. "Supplemental" in-
dicates collection resources which make a useful,
but not necessarily unique, contribution.
F They
include a worldwide network of human beings focused on
intelligence collection and covert action. They also
encompass a technology that puts almost every conceivable
sensor on every possible kind of platform. The collec-
tion manager tries to orchestrate these diversified
resources to gather data on important intelligence
problems quickly and efficiently. In the course of
doing this, he often has to decide where, and how,
more than one collector can make a contribution. This
task is complicated by the need to bridge the gap be-
tween collector and producer, who view the problem in-
volved from different perspectives and, hence, are
likely to see them in different ways.
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The Communications Problem
At the current time there is no single, simple
channel that connects the analyst with the processor
and the collector. At the one extreme are operational
managers of specific collection assets who are tied to
the production community through relatively formal
mechanisms which have evolved over the years, several
of which have reached a high degree of elaboration --
e.g., COMIREX in the imagery field. At the other ex-
treme are operational managers who direct day-to-day
operations, many of whom know little about their con-
sumers and may or may not have an up-to-date under-
standing of today's real intelligence problems. In
between these two extremes there is a potpourri of
formal. and informal arrangements.
At the formal end of the spectrum are the Key
Intelligence Questions (KIQs). These attempt, at the
highest level, to coordinate and to rank by priority
the most important Community intelligence problems.
Although new, the process of generating KIQs shows
signs of being an effective mechanism to facilitate
communications between collectors and analysts. From
the point of view of the collection manager, however,
this is only a first step. He does not "collect" the
accuracy of the SS-19 ICBM or the projected yield of
the Soviet wheat crop. He collects raw data or infor-
mation to which other data may be added from sources
outside his own collection responsibility. Any such
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requirement must thus be further translated into
specifics for collection.
The COMIREX Solution
COMIREX is the single most elaborate and formal
mechanism that attempts this translation. COMIREX re-
duces general requirements for imagery into detailed
statements in terms of geographic coverage, image
quality, and frequency of coverage
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The SIGINT World
The process of generating requirements and detailed
tasking for the SIGINT machine has some parallels with
the photographic community but is very different in its
essential elements. There is a SIGINT Committee roughly
analogous to COMIREX.
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While NSA has a clear charter and direct authority
over money and people, it nonetheless must oversee a
vast worldwide empire not easily coordinated. More-
over, the COMINT collection process is complicated by
difficulties in evaluating results. There is no gen-
eral methodology for measuring the value of raw COMINT.
In the past ten years, NSA has recognized that
there is more to SIGINT than COMINT and has focused
its resources more sharply on.ELINT and Foreign In-
strumentation Signal collection and processing. His-
torically,,the intelligence establishment has performed
poorly in collecting critical ELINT on a timely basis.
ment and slowed down the development of countermeasures.
However, these problems are slowly yielding to better
I I This has delayed proper assess-
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SIGINT as managed by NSA exemplifies the collec-
tion program which has a well defined mission but
which operates on the basis of general statements of
needs and priorities issued by those whom NSA is charged
with supporting. In principle, the CCP is the resource
with which NSA must fulfill intelligence needs. NSA's
principal feedback comes via two routes: first, direct
feedback comes from those agencies and organizations
which get SIGINT support; second, a different sort of
feedback comes through the budget review cycle, as
NSA recommends and defends its specific operating pro-
gram. In principle, one man -- the Director of NSA --
is charged with a job and given resources to perform
that job. There are mechanisms, more or less formal,
for feeding back to him some indication of how well or
how poorly he is performing. He has under his control,
again in principle, the right set of people, authorities,
and responsibilities to discharge his tasks. In many
ways this is theoretically an ideal arrangement. In
practical fact, however, there are a number of problems.
Unlike COMINT, NSA is not the sole collector and
processor of ELINT and FIS. There are a number of
Service programs which are only loosely coupled to
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NSA. Additional programs are managed within the GDIP
and still others are under the management of the CIA.
The Human Sources World
Human sources are an important and in many cases
a unique source of information. Even more than in the
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case of COMINT, it is difficult to devise a quantita-
tive measure of value. Nonetheless, human sources
make major contributions to most categories of impor-
tant national intelligence, particularly on issues
dealing with the plans and intentions of foreign gov-
ernments (as opposed to their physical capabilities).
The human sources collection manager is concerned
with the long-range development of human sources of in-
formation by country and by general area of intelligence
interest. It is almost impossible for him to predict
the degree of success that will be achieved or the
amount of time required to develop a given level of
coverage. While he can improve his chances of acquir-
ing suitable sources, he is usually at the mercy of
circumstances beyond his control because human behavior
is unpredictable and because many target countries
restrict opportunities for contact with potentially
knowledgable sources and can easily discourage such
sources from establishing relationships with American
intelligence officers. Unfortunately, the higher the
priority of a target country and subject area gen-
erally the more difficult it is to conduct human col-
lection.
As in the case of COMINT collection, it is seldom
possible (or reasonable) to ask human sources collection
managers to produce a given piece of information at a
given time, for there is seldom any way in which the
collection manager can be sure that at some given
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moment there will exist a source who can answer a
specific question of interest to the production com-
munity.
The Clandestine Service of CIA is predominant
in such clandestine collection from human beings.
Its collection activities are structured through a
management-by-objectives system which includes the
requirements of the Community. Formal Community mech-
anisms, such as KIQs, play an important role, but the
main concern of the manager is to allocate resources
by country and by intelligence problem area to the
development of sources with long-range potential. Ad-
ditional supporting insight flows to him through nu-
merous informal contacts with the production community.
State Department Foreign Service Officers also have
functions which can be classified as human collection.
At least officially, however, FSOs are concerned only
with overt collection. In addition to the collection
of information, FSOs often are called upon to perform
other duties and therefore are not usually fully dedi-
cated to the collection of information. The FSO, under-
standably, responds more to State Department requirements
for information than to the requirements of the Intelli-
gence Community.
The DIA attache system is a third component in the
human sources area., The attaches are managed by DIA but
are generally responsive to national priorities, parti-
cularly at posts in countries such as the USSR where in-
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telligence collection is the most important aspect of
the attaches' duties.
While in some broad sense USIB has the responsibility
for defining collection requirements for human sources,
USIB has not until recently made any systematic approach
to this function. At this writing the USIB's relatively
new Human Sources Committee is still in the process
of defining exactly how to get on with its assigned
tasks. At best, applying the collection requirements
approach to the human sources category of collector will
be difficult, and it remains to be seen whether the
mechanism of the USIB Committee will serve a useful and
constructive function.
Two Management Models
To examine the relationships of the collection com-
munity to the production or analytical community is to
uncover the diversity and casualness of these relation-
ships. Nonetheless, two basic approaches are evident.
One of these can be called the "NSA model" and the other
the "COMIREX model." The NSA model is characterized by
a tightly structured management chain with a single
senior individual, Director/NSA, responsible for a large
collection and processing resource and who operates with
only general guidelines for collection. The COMIREX
model focuses in a committee which is a creature of the
production community and which concentrates on developing
extremely detailed tasking of appropriate collection sys-
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tems. In these terms, the two somewhat idealized models
represent two extremes as mechanisms for relating in-
telligence problems to collection resources.
The NSA model has several positive features: (1)
its tight, highly integrated management control has the
potential for flexible resource trade-offs and respon-
siveness to changing intelligence needs; (2) feedback
from processing and preliminary analysis to operations
is closely coupled and within a single organization.;
and (3) authority for decisions can be distributed through
the total organization and, in principle, be established
at appropriate points. On the other hand, there are sev-
eral weaknesses: (1) NSA is exclusively concerned with
SIGINT and finds it difficult to judge when SIGINT is
the most efficient collection resource for a given prob-
lem, as opposed to other collection resources; (2) this
management approach tends to develop a large monolithic
organization which becomes a closed community; and (3)
because of its closed community character, there is a
tendency.to relate more to the resource manager in De-
fense than to the intelligence production community and
USIB.
The COMIREX model also has pluses and minuses. On
the plus side: (1) the COMIREX product is a specific
detailed set of tasks which are easily understandable
by, the collector; (2) structures of this type are in
principle closely coupled to the requirements of intel-
ligence production; and (3) there is total production
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community involvement in the evolution of specific col-
lection tasking. On the other hand: (1) because of the
many and diverse interests in the production community,
a "committee" approach is inevitable, which in search of
consensus and a common denomination, tends to defocus
important issues; (2) there is an endemic and perhaps
fundamental problem in establishing and holding a high-
quality staff; and (3) it is virtually impossible to es-
tablish responsibility for collection performance.
The Requirements Issue
A pivotal issue in the consideration of collection
management and the relationship between collection as-
sets and the user of the collected information is the
meaning of the term "requirements." An essential ques-
tion that needs to be answered is whether the process
is best served by (a) a definition and prioritization
of intelligence problems by the user community with ac-
companying tasking, or (b) by providing collection guid-
ance in.the form of detailed, highly structured state-
ments of the particular elements of information which
the collector should try to provide. For either approach,
the minute-by-minute operation of technical collection
systems requires in the end specific and detailed guid-
ance.
The question is: who is in the best position to
work from general problems and priorities to the specific
and detailed tasking statements needed to drive the col-
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lection machinery? In the case of technical collection,
if users are to perform this function, the user community
must have a detailed understanding of the characteristics
of the technical devices and devote the appropriate tech-
nical and analytical resources to the task. Mechanisms
must be identified to ensure that the user community has
a current and detailed understanding of the collection
environment which, in many circumstances, is changing
rapidly.
On the other hand, if collection managers are to
start with statements of intelligence problems, the
collection manager must have a staff which understands
intelligence and has experience in intelligence analysis
and production. In this case the collection manager
must be responsible for, or at least work closely with,
the data-processing function so that he has a detailed
and current assessment of the quality and utility of the
collected information, In examining the best way of
bringing together the collectors and the users of data,
a number of practical considerations must be examined.
The character of the various segments of the user com-
munity are of critical important in this matter. For
example, the military commander by the nature of his
organizational structure is in a poor position to have
a sufficient understanding of technical collection as-
sets to deal effectively in terms of detailed require-
ment statements. He perforce must resort to general
problem statements and encourage collection managers
and processors to deal with him on these terms. How-
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ever, in other segments of the user community other ar-
rangements are feasible, at least in principle.
Also, the specific characteristics of the collection
asset must be considered. In collection system dealing
in a real-time, dynamic environment, where feedback of
collected data to operations must occur on a timely
basis to ensure efficient collection, the collection
manager must understand the user community and have the
capability to deal with more general problem statements.
Certain collection operations must by their nature op-
erate with broad statements of intelligence problems and
broad guidance or priorities and cannot deal with detailed
specifics. The best example of this class of collector
is covert human sources collection. On the other hand,
some collectors can function equally well with detailed
tasking statements or with broader intelligence problems
and priority statements.
In any case there is always the difficult problem
of cross tasking. This is the process of allocating
collection resources against a given intelligence prob-
lem where more than one resource can provide useful in-
formation or data. Here the problem is particularly
acute when efficiency or cost effectiveness issues are
involved. These problems by their nature cannot usually
be resolved by the managers of particular collection
systems and must be addressed at the highest levels of
Intelligence Community management.
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The Evaluation Dialogue
A key element which is required at a high level in
the Community, independent of the specific management
patterns for relating collection resources to users, is
evaluation. Collection assets and collection managers
need to be regularly examined to assess efficiency and
effectiveness. This function is important both to pro-
vide feedback so that improvements can be identified and
to provide a continuing measure of the utility of col-
lection assets to support resource allocation decisions.
By the same token the performance of the user community
in articulating information needs requires review to
ensure that collection guidance is being properly formu-
lated and prioritized. Again, both feedback to the per-
former -- in this case, the user community -- and evalua-
tion information for Community management are important.
It is this evaluation process which relates the day-to-
day process of collection management to the larger prob-
lems of resources management.
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The current National Reconnaissance Program or-
ganization is based on a Memorandum of Agreement dated
August 1965 between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. That agreement was born out of strife
between the CIA and the Department of Defense over the
future shape of the NRP. The strife centered at that
time on two proposed new programs:
(1) the desirability, technical feasibility and
program management responsibility in one case; and
(2) the requirement for, the configuration of,
and the management of an improved satellite photo-
graphic search system in the other case.
Although these two program issues were the focus of
the strife, there were more fundamental issues.
Defense.at that time was striving to achieve total
control over satellite reconnaissance. However,
history to that date (1965) had suggested that
Defense was both unwilling to give proper weight
to national intelligence needs and unable to effec-
tively carry forward large, high risk programs.
The then DCI felt that he needed a measure of
control over a program as essential to intelligence
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as the National Reconnaissance Program. To achieve
this objective, he felt that CIA must have direct,
operational participation in the NRP. He was strongly
supported by the White House, in particular the
President's Science Advisor. It was generally
agreed, at least outside Defense, that CIA expertise,
both technical and managerial, was an essential in-
gredient to assuring a satellite reconnaissance pro-
gram capable of meeting perceived intelligence
needs. Although many of the particulars of the 1965
agreement have been set aside by subsequent events,
it remains the chartering document for the NRP.
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At the same time, the growing convergence of mili-
tary and national intelligence needs has introduced new
and as yet not fully understood factors in program and
resource management. In the future, military field
commanders will need direct support from intelligence
satellite programs.
This has generated increasing pressure from the
Services for participation in satellite programs. The
Navy wants more of the satellite action; the Army wants
to establish a degree of equity in satellite collection;
and the Air Force wants a larger and different role. The
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regular Air Force in particular has never liked the Special
Projects organization and the associated strong civilian
direction of NRP programs and would prefer to "normalize"
the organization, with the Air Force established as the
developer and operator of satellites through their line
organizations to meet all intelligence as well as other
Defense needs. However, it is impractical for each mili-
tary service to have its own satellite collection capa-
bility as each has in the past had its own aircraft and
ground based collection capabilities.
In important respects, the factors which shaped
the NRP agreement between Defense and CIA, and dictated
the structure of the National Reconnaissance organization
in 1965, have been replaced by another set of problems
and issues in 1975. The atmosphere of conflict and dis-
agreement between CIA and Defense which was a major issue
in 1965 is not the dominant factor in 1975. The problem
in future years will be to insure that collection re-
sources needed to meet evolving national requirements
are maintained, while at the same time essential support
to the various military services, particularly military
field commanders, is provided. The most serious conflicts
are likely to arise in defining the realistic needs of
military field commanders, allocating collection resources
to military field commander requirements, and developing
effective tasking and product dissemination arrangements
for these users.
These new factors are likely to require a restructur-
ing of the National Reconnaissance Program, as well as the
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National Reconnaissance Organization. The NRP EXCOM will
continue to be an essential high level policy and major
program decision body, preserving the strengths and ad-
vantages of the current arrangements. However, the mem-
bership of the EXCOM should be examined. Consideration
should be given to re-establishing a senior White House
EXCOM member. In the past the President's Science Ad-
visor was such a member, but when his position was
abolished in 1972 no White House replacement was iden-
tified. Particularly in view of the growing require-
ment for military use of satellite collected data, a JCS
representative should also be considered. Depending upon
other organizational changes and their impact on the
DCI, reconsideration of the appropriate Defense member
of the EXCOM may also be desirable.
The Under Secretary of the Air Force is likely
to find it increasingly difficult to fill both his Air
Force and his Director, NRO role. As the senior operat-
ing official responsible to the EXCOM, he is charged with
preparing program recommendations and carrying out EXCOM
decisions. At the same time he is a senior official
of the Department of the Air Force and therefore must
concern himself with Air Force equities and requirements.
As satellite reconnaissance becomes increasingly important
to the Air Force mission, it is likely that these two
roles will generate real conflicts of interests. Inter-
service rivalries, where satellite reconnaissance issues
are at stake, may produce strong pressures in support of
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Air Force views on specific issues to the detriment of
the NRP.
In anticipation of this problem, at various times
in the past there has been serious discussion of re-
establishing the NRO outside the military services.
Most recently during Dr. Schlesinger's brief tenure
as DCI, he considered several proposals, one of them
generated by the PFIAB, which would have placed the NRO
reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. However,
draft NSCIDS which would have rechartered the NRO and
readjusted its organizational placement were not carried
forward.
There are two options for the restructuring of the
NRO. First, earlier proposals which would have the NRO
reporting to the Secretary of Defense could be reconsidered
and adjusted so as to be pertinent to today's needs. Any
such arrangement would no doubt need to provide for more
direct involvement by the Army and perhaps expanded in-
volvement by the Navy.
ould need to be
continued in something like their current form. Also,
an appropriate position for the D/NRO would need to be
created.
A second option would be to reconstitute the NRO
as an integrated, operational organization jointly
staffed by the three military services, CI
In this arrangement the D/NRO would become the line
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manager of the various NRP programs. In addition to
program management resources, the NRO would require a
full range of contracting, security and administrative
support services. This organizational structure for
the NRO has appeal from the point of view of stream-
lined management and coherent program direction. It
would help meet the increasing insistence of Congress
on efficient use of resources and elimination of needless
duplication. It would also be well suited for dealing
with the increasing complexity and growing diversity
of consumers, which is likely to occur as direct support
to military commanders becomes more substantial.
However, an integrated operating organization of
this type raises the problem of finding a workable or-
ganizational location. Such a structure would probably
be inappropriate as an element of the Secretary of De-
fense's staff. For different reasons, establishing such
an organization within one of the three services would
pose a number of serious issues as discussed above. If
the role of the DCI is changed along the lines of Op-
tion Two as discussed elsewhere in this paper, and the
CIA were correspondingly renamed and rechartered, the
NRO could be placed within this structure. On the
other hand, there is considerable doubt as to whether
Defense could accept this arrangement.
In addition to the issues surrounding the organiza-
tional placement of the NRO, there is another serious pro-
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blem associated with the funding of the NRP. The appropri-
ation and expenditure of NRP funds is both a unique and
anomalous process. To date the NRP budget has bee
but use of the funds has
been governed by a series of essentially undocumented
understandings with senior members of the relevant
Congressional committees. These arrangements have
made possible a degree of flexibility and efficiency
for the NRP which could not be achieved if the normal
requirements applying to Defense appropriations were to
be required. Some legislative provisions covering the
expenditure of Defense funds have been waived in these
various informal agreements and understandings.
it seems extremely unlikely, however, with the
current mood of Congress, that these private, informal
arrangements between a limited number of senators and
congressmen and certain Executive Branch officials will
be allowed to continue. Thus, in addition to finding
a proper home for the National Reconnaissance Organiza-
tion, consideration should be given to developing a means
for appropriating funds for the NRP which will both meet
evolving Congressional moods and the requirement for a
flexible and effective National Reconnaissance Program.
This issue needs further study; there is no immediately
obvious solution. One suitable arrangement would provide
for the appropriation of such funds to the DGI developed
under Option Two.
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ANNEX D
PROBLEMS IN THE PRODUCTION
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
When Congress conceived a central agency devoted
to final "correlation and evaluation," it expected some-
thing small and simple. The reality is large and complex.
Congress did not give the DCI the tools he now needs
because it could not foresee that he would require them.
he has improvised some from the vague wording of other
authorities in the Act or the language of such documents
as NSCID's'; he has simply done without others.
Because correlation and evaluation are by statute
the DCI's primary duty and the one most specifically
directed by law, there is in fact a formal working mech-
anism, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), for
producing coordinated national estimates. Through it,
the bulk of the information and expertise available to
the federal government is assembled and weighed. Conclu-
sions are drawn, dissents are included when appropriate,
and the results are forwarded to the President and the
NSC. Similar mechanisms, less structured, govern to
varying degrees the issuance of less formal monographs
and the production of current intelligence. On the sur-
face, the mechanism appears to be precisely what Congress
wanted, and it seems to work.
The appearance is deceptive, however; the DCI in
fact suffers from having responsibility without authority
as much in production as he does elsewhere. The USIB
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production machinery works, but it does so in part
oecause the participating agencies know they need
not be inhibited by it when they do not want to be. A
uCI who independently has access to the President can
extract a serious product from USIB and personally ensure
that this product will be read by the right people.
Simply being named DCI does not give him this standing;
he must have earned it elsewhere.
The fundamental weakness of the DCI's statutory
position shows up across the whole range of his pro-
duction responsibilities, but most seriously in his
inability to establish the primacy of national products
over departmental ones. On the other hand, the depart-
mental agencies are unable either to compete with or
to contribute fully to the national product. Finally,
USIB itself. is a hybrid body not particularly well
configured for handling production.
The DCI's Production Responsibilities
If one looks at what a DCI needs to correlate and
evaluate -- i.e., to provide a comprehensive, accurate,
coherent flow of policy-oriented intelligence reports
and assessments to the national policy officer -- one
sees how inadequate today are the tools Congress gave
him. To do the job the DCI needs:
-- Independence, to prevent the warping of in-
telligence by policy concerns.
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-- Feedback, so he can be aware of policy con-
cerns and actions and can judge the quality of his
output.
-- Access to all pertinent information available
to the federal government.
Analytic resources on which he can draw to do
the final stage of the job.
Independence. Congress, by making the DCI and CIA
subordinate to "the NSC," intended, as is clear from the
legislative history, to make them independent of State
and Defense. In practice, the DCI within the bounds of
discretion has been able to maintain his independence, al-
though no DCI can or should be totally independent of
the President.
Feedback. Feedback is of two kinds: information
on,policy concerns and consumer reaction to the product.
-- The DCI keeps track of policy through his parti-
cipation in meetings of the NSC and its subcommittees,
through his access to cable traffic, and through his
personal dealings with senior policy officers. In fact,
his participation in meetings is virtually complete, but
his freedom to share what he learns with his subordinates
is limited. His access to cable traffic of State and
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Defense, especially concerning sensitive policy matters,
is intermittent and invariably spotty. For these rea-
sons, in many matters of greatest national concern,
national intelligence is not privy to the policy con-
text in which it must assess the capabilities and
actions of other states.
-- Theoretically, the DCI receives consumer reaction
through NSCIC, created by the Presidential directive of
1971. NSCIC has met twice since that time.
Access. The Act specified that the DCI was to
have access to all intelligence held by other agencies,
and indeed his right to it has generally been observed.
There have been important exceptions, however, especially
in intelligence contained in Foreign Service reporting
("not intelligence at all"), in some NSA materials ("tech-
nical information"), and in certain naval matters ("op-
erational information"). Beyond the DCI's right of access
to existing intelligence, however, he has other infor-
mational needs for which he lacks explicit authority.
-- There is, for instance, other intelligence that
the DCI believes is needed and that can be collected
by existing means if they are properly targeted. Thus
he must be able to translate feedback into requirements,
and requirements into tasking of systems to meet
these requirements; he should be able to enforce this
tasking, in other words to manage collection.
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-- The legislative history of the Act shows that
Congress probably intended that the DCI could collect
(under "services of common concern") as well as evaluate,
and of course he has done so when other agencies have
not.
-- Finally, there is other intelligence that is
needed but that cannot be acquired by existing means.
To obtain it the DCI must develop or stimulate the
development of new collection systems and methods.
The Multiple Channels Problem
The most serious problem in the production of national
intelligence is the DCI's inability de jure to force his
message home. Although the Act is explicit that CIA (un-
der the DCI) is to be the central mechanism, DCIs have
been somewhat ambiguous about it, and other agencies
tend to reject the notion altogether. Moreover, the
DCI has a dilemma. The more the DCI uses CIA as his
substantive staff, the more he is seen by the other
members of the Community as short-changing their in-
terests, and the more they feel justified in pleading
their views through other channels.
National vs. Departmental. Channels free of the
DCI are readily at hand. The doctrine that has developed
under the Act calls for the DCI to deliver neatly packaged
national intelligence, complete with dissenting views,
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to the NSC. The Act also authorizes, however, the
continuing production and dissemination of departmental
intelligence. Thus the DCI is responsible for intel-
ligence support of the Secretaries of State and Defense
as members of the NSC; but, INR and DIA are, properly,
responsible for support of the secretaries as their
respective department heads and thus have a channel for
direct dissemination of their product to the White
House. Moreover, while both agencies insist that
CIA's national product be coordinated with them and
exercise vigorously -- as they should -- the right to
dissent, neither hesitates to issue uncoordinated views
in conflict with a national intelligence position. The
result is a flood of overlapping papers, of varying
degrees of validity, unleashed on the policymaker. No
DCI has felt strong enough to bring a halt to this prac-
tice, or even to offer his services in bringing coherence
to it.
. "Just Another Agency." The policy officer is not
acutely aware of the delicate but important distinction
between national and departmental products. To many,
a National Intelligence Estimate is simply a CIA paper,
with no more standing than one from DIA. This attitude
is reinforced by the ambiguity of the DCI-CIA relation-
ship and encouraged by bureaucratic opposition to CIA's
claim to a first-among-equals role. CIA, in turn, has
been able to establish that role only by the recognized
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excellence of its product in the competition of the
marketplace. But because that product does not carry
the necessary bureaucratic cachet, it often does not
reach many of the consumers who could use it best.
The intelligence agencies of Defense, for instance,
feel no requirement to distribute the CIA product to
policy officers within the department.
Competition
As noted, there is a tendency for departmental agencies
to seek independent channels for their own views. These
views obviously overlap broadly with what is considered
national intelligence. Thus CIA, DIA, INR, and to some
extent other agencies produce intelligence that is often
duplicative or competitive. Obviously, sheer duplication
is to be avoided (must every intelligence organization
have a current intelligence/briefing shop?), but com-
petition is something else again.
The normal tendency in reorganizing government is
to decide what group is best equipped to do a particular
job and then assign that job to that group alone. This
should not. apply to intelligence production. Intelligence
analysis seeks to know the unknowable and penetrate the
impenetrable. When evidence is insufficient or ambiguous
or absent, the more minds and the more lines of analysis
pursued the greater the chance of approximating the truth.
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Each organization is stimulated by the critical work of
others; none can afford to stand pat on the conventional
wisdom. Moreover, analysis is cheap relative to the
other costs of intelligence.
CIA. Of all US intelligence agencies, CIA has the
broadest range of analytic capabilities. Its resources
are too thin to provide comprehensive coverage, however;
on some topics of lesser importance it relies totally
on other agencies. Nonetheless it is able to produce
in depth on all questions that are of major importance
to US policy (in some cases with the aid of contractors).
Because CIA is able itself to produce on these questions
as well as to evaluate and correlate a national product,
it is also able to check the production of other agencies.
It can goad them out of long-held positions and into new
lines of attack on stubborn problems. To get the best
national product, however, it is necessary that the com-
peting analysis centers be strong enough to play the
game and to keep CIA on its toes. At present, neither
DIA nor INR is strong enough.
DIA. This Agency has many problems. DIA is handi-
capped by the division of its production elements between
Arlington Hall and the Pentagon, and it has never been
able fully to solve the problem of combining a military
command and staff system with high-quality civilian
professional personnel. Its greatest problem, however,
is its dual mission. It is responsible for support both
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of the Secretary of Defense and his office and of the
Joint Chiefs and their field commanders. The require-
ments of these two sets of customers are not the same,
and they add up to considerably more than DIA can ef-
ficiently accomplish. In his dealings with the DCI, the
Director of DIA represents two masters; his efforts to
serve the national authorities represented by the Secre-
tary of Defense often compete with the need to meet the
tactical requirements of field commanders and the stra-
tegic ones of the JCS.
INR. INR has for many years been a stepchild of the
Department of State. Prior to the present Director, INR's
appointment, State was on the verge of eliminating it as
an intelligence production organization (but not as its
voice in other intelligence matters). The DCI took the
position that he preferred a strong INR as a counter-
balance to DIA in the production field and as a poten-
tially useful national analytic center but noted that
CIA if necessary could pick up some of its load.
The Service Intelligence Agencies. To some these
agencies appear to be vestigial and duplicative, but
they do useful work that contributes to national intel-
ligence. As long as this work is done by them or by
DIA, whether they continue to exist or not would appear
to be a departmental problem for Defense, not a national
one.
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.USIB as Regulator of Production
The DCI's role as correlator and evaluator is mani-
fest in his chairmanship of USIB. As noted above, the for-
mal mechanism under USIB works reasonably well, but the
DCI's real authority is measured by the closeness of his
personal relationship with the President and the degree
of his access to inner policy circles. To the extent
he can use such access to gain acceptance for USIB's
product as the voice of national intelligence, the other
members will take him, and their work there, seriously.
As noted in Annex A, USIB has other problems stemming
from the effort to combine in one board too broad a range
of responsibilities. For production matters, CIA, DIA,
and INR are the primary players, and all are present.
But so are the service agencies, ERDA, Treasury, FBI,
NSA, and sometimes ASD(I). The service agencies are
classed as observers, and do in fact make useful contri-
butions in areas of their specific technical competence.
ERDA is a member, but makes an even more limited contri-
bution than the services. Treasury is primarily a con-
sumer. FBI has no role in production matters. NSA and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(ASD(I)) are special cases discussed below.
NSA's problem as a producer is that national intel-
ligence is all-source, and NSA is one-source. Occasionally,
for operational use or for highly specialized analysis
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problems, NSA's product can stand by itself, but NSA
has neither the analytic resources nor the access to
information that would put it in a class with the three
primary producers. On the other hand NSA is more than
a collector and processor; in this its situation is not
unlike that of the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC). The traditional view of producing
analysts in CIA, DIA and INR has always been "just give
us the facts. NPIC is to count
things. We will integrate these into an order-of-battle."
Under budgetary pressure, however, and faced with ever-
larger amounts of data, analysts have given way and
are in fact looking for help. They are now encouraging
NSA and NPIC to go much deeper into such subjects. More-
over, they are coming to recognize that a NSA analyst
develops a feel for his source that enables him in a
fast-moving and complex situation to draw useful intuitive
conclusions that are beyond the competence of an analyst
further removed from the communications traffic.
ASD(I) was invited to USIB primarily because of
his responsibilities in the resource field and in NRO
matters generally. He has no role in production. But
ASD(I)'s experience is instructive in any reconsideration
of the DCI's responsibilities. To handle his resource
decisions he finds he needs substantive capabilities,
and as these grow he finds himself running athwart DIA.
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The major problems in the production of national
intelligence are external to the production process it-
self. To belabor the point again, the more powerful
the DCI is in real terms and the more he is perceived
to have the President's ear, the better the process will
work, and the less weight will be put on uncoordinated
departmental views. Making him more powerful, however,
can be accomplished only by extending his authority in
other fields; his nominal authority over production
already exists. A DCI who has the strongest voice in
resource management, in collection management, and in
production management could use the interplay among them
to produce better national intelligence, perhaps at less
cost.
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THE NATIONAL/TACTICAL PROBLEM
Until recently the general view has been that
a useful distinction could be made between national
intelligence and tactical intelligence. At the na-
tional level the interest in military intelligence
was primarily strategic in character. The President,
policymakers, and planners were and are concerned
with long-range weapon systems, the effectiveness of
weapons, weapons research and development, overall
force structures, and military budgets. A separate
category of intelligence information, called tacti-
cal, although not well defined, was presumed to be
primarily of interest to military commanders.
Although a meaningful distinction between national
or strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence
no doubt did exist in the past, it is no longer a use-
ful distinction. The military commander, faced with
sophisticated modern weapon systems needs equally so-
phisticated intelligence support. He needs a current
and detailed understanding of the fighting capability
of the weapon systems arrayed against him. He needs
to know the disposition of opposing forces, and he
must have a good understanding of the vulnerability
of these forces. The long range and flexibility of
modern weapons make warning of the imminence of hos-
tilities both more important and more difficult to
achieve. Once hostilities have commenced, the military
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commander needs to have the means for following the
rapid course of battle. His intelligence must be
as close to "real time" as feasible so that he can
make both offensive and defensive command decisions.
These requirements for military commander intelli-
gence support all demand a level of collection and
analytical sophistication which historically has
been associated primarily with national strategic
intelligence.
The distinction between national and tactical
intelligence has been further blurred as the perspec-
tive from the national viewpoint has changed. Even
the most minor military skirmish has the potential for
rapid escalation into an exchange of strategic nuclear
weapons. Heightened military tension can be of great
political significance. The President must have timely
and accurate intelligence covering activities which in
the past would have been considered purely tactical in
character and therefore of little interest at the high-
est levels of government.
The table on the following page outlines three
major categories of intelligence which are relevant
in the current and future time frame: National Intel-
ligence, Military Departmental Intelligence, and Mili-
tary Commander Intelligence Support. For purposes
of this paper the emphasis i.s on military related sub-
jects, so the several categories of non-military na-
tional intelligence are suppressed. There are a range
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CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Military Departmental
Non-Military Military Intelligence
Adversary Military Detailed Weapons Per-
Policy & Budgets formance
Adversary Military Vulnerability
Capability
Adversary Force Doctrine
Structure and
General Deploy-
ment
Strategic Weapons
Counterforce Weapons
Military R&D
Crisis Management
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Military Field Com-
mander Intelligence Support
Opposing Deployment
i
Readiness Status
Operational Capability
Reliability
Logistical Status
Reserve Status
Operational Plan
Warning
Combat Support
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of subjects which are military and have high national
interest and priority. These include the major stra-
tegic military questions having to do with threats
against the United States and the planning for the US
military capability needed to maintain an acceptable
defense posture.
In addition to these national level military in-
terests, there is a range of departmental military
interests. These include many of the same subjects
that are of interest at the national level, but also
include more detailed issues. At the departmental
level, intelligence supports systems design for both
offensive and defensive weapons. Intelligence is
also important in developing military doctrine and
tactical plans, such as electromagnetic countermeas-
ures'and force deployments.
The military commander is, in the end, the bene-
ficiary of much of the national intelligence, and,'in
principle, of all of the departmental intelligence
since this intelligence influences the design of new
weapon systems and the theater force structures. On
the other hand the military commander has a number of
special requirements having to do with the nature,
structure, and status of the military forces deployed
in direct opposition to him. His intelligence support
requirements in the face of present and future weapon
environments far exceed the traditional boundaries im-
plied by the term "tactical intelligence." The unique
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intelligence requirements of the military commander
need to be carefully defined and placed in proper
perspective with respect to national and military
departmental requirements.
In the past, theater intelligence has been largely
in the hands of the theater commander. He has acquired
his information through aircraft, foot patrols, forward
radar installations, and in more recent times, COMINT
resources under his direct command authority. Intelli-
gence derived in this manner was (and is) called "tac-
tical intelligence." Because of the relative simplicity
of the opposing weapons, the field commander's need for
strategic intelligence support was not critical.
The term "tactical intelligence" is still in common
use, but the situation facing the field commander has
undergone important changes. Tactical aircraft support-
ing military ground operations are equipped with guided
weapon systems and have an operating radius of hundreds
of miles. Accurate ballistic missiles are a key element
in the opposition force structure. These "tactical"
ballistic missiles have ranges from a few tens of miles
to hundreds of miles. Helicopters have enhanced mo-
bility and changed combat tactics in important ways.
Man-carried guided weapons are altering the once domi-
nant character of armored vehicles, particularly tanks,
in the fighting force. This vast array of complicated
and flexibility weaponry has in turn impacted the mili-
tary doctrine and fighting strategies of opposing
forces.
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Most of the important weapon system characteristics
are not derivable by the military commander using re-
sources under his control. This factor places a heavy
demand on strategic and departmental intelligence if
effective and timely countermeasures or counterforces
are to be available when needed by commanders, and wise
long range weapon system development decisions are to be
made. Strategic intelligence, including detailed weapon
system characteristics, is derived from national stra-
tegic collection resources, such as photographic satel-
lites, COMINT, and human sources using
sophisticated analytical methodologies. With the evolving
effectiveness of modern weapon systems, the need for stra-
tegic intelligence has been well understood and generally
well served by the Intelligence Community.
.Recently, however, it has become clear that the in-
telligence support to the military commander falls far
short of the capability required if he is to effectively
deal with active hostilities where modern weapon sys-
tems are employed. The intelligence resources under
his direct control remain essentially as they have been
for many years. The intelligence support, derived from
the national community has been useful but limited. Na-
tional intelligence frequently has not focused-on the
weapon systems characteristics and vulnerabilities of
most interest to a commander. His limited collection
and analytical resources cannot provide him with good
measures of opposing force deployment and status or
warn him of, impending hostilities. There are serious
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questions about the military commander's ability to
track events after the outbreak of hostilities and
to couple this intelligence to his own tactical de-
cisions.
In response to this intelligence gap, two things
have happened. First there has been increasing priority
placed on real time collection resources. This is par-
ticularly true of SIGINT, where there is currently a
substantial effort under way to integrate SIGINT col-
lection resources, and provide
processed information directly to military commanders
at the theater level and below. These requirements are
supported by a rapidly developing technology, particu-
larly in communications and data processing. As a con-
sequence of the "new" intelligence needs of military
commanders and the evolving capability of strategic
intelligence collection resources to support military
problems, the distinctions among strategic, tactical,
national, and military commander intelligence have
virtually vanished. Within the next five.years, all
critical collection resources which are essential to
support national intelligence will have capabilities
which are useful to and in some cases essential to
field commanders.
The implications of this suddenly changed situation
are profound. Resource decisions and collection manage-
ment in the future will be more complex because of the
broader range of needs which are competing for atten-
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tion. New factors must be considered, such as the
vulnerability of collection systems and the rapid for-
warding of intelligence information to those who need
it. The field commander can no longer be regarded as an
independent entity who must and can have his own self-
contained intelligence apparatus. Complicated weapon
systems and associated doctrine and tactics require
equally. complicated and effective intelligence apparatus
if the nation is to maintain a viable military capability.
Intelligence can no longer be left in the hands of mili-
tary officers primarily trained for conduct of military
field operations. The disciplines of modern intelligence
are becoming increasingly specialized and complex. There-
fore intelligence must rise above its historical second-
class status in the military establishment.
All of this implies that, as leader of the Intel-
ligence Community, the DCI,must deal with a broader
range of intelligence problems and requirements than
have been of concern to him in the past. Questions of
tasking national systems in support of military command-
ers and questions concerning real-time forwarding of.
information are critical questions which are extremely
important from a military force standpoint but can only
be addressed and resolved at the national level. While
the Department of Defense and the Military Services must
play a key role in providing intelligence support to
military commanders, many relevant resource and sub-
stantive issues cut across a far wider range of con-
siderations. Further, because of the deep substantive
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background which is available in the Intelligence
Community at large, the DCI is in a key position
.to guide and influence the improvement of military
intelligence. However, if the DCI is to play the
key role which he must in these matters, it is es-
sential that he take steps to provide himself with
the background and support which he will require.
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The Directorate of Operations (DO) is the Clandestine
Service (CS) of the CIA. The CS has two roles: clan-
destine collection of information and covert action.
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As it is difficult to define covert action pre-
cisely; it is equally difficult to define just where such
action oversteps the mark. The key appears to-lie in
establishing an appropriate oversight capability which
has the confidence of the American people and the sup-
port of all three branches of our government. Such
oversight can ensure that covert action is used only
in those situations in which it reflects the consensus
of US Government opinion, but is nonetheless available
when needed.
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ANNEX G
A PRODUCT REVIEW CONCEPT OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In conjunction with option one the Product Review
approach would involve making some organizational,
procedural, and other changes to provide the President
each year an evaluation, based on the knowledge availa-
ble to production elements, of the contributions being
made by various collection systems within the Community
to the solution of-intelligence problems. In concept
this approach would draw heavily on the present Key
Intelligence Question concept and associated evaluation
process. This annual evaluation would supplement the
report to the President required under the November 1971
letter calling for an independent DCI recommendation on
the overall Intelligence Community budget. It would
have the effect of suggesting to Defense and to the
President (OMB) the desirability of certain decisions
about Intelligence Community resource matters without
significantly extending the DCI's direct or line role
in decision making.
Under this approach, we would expect the DCI, with
the aid of an independent product review group in con-
tact with CIA and other production analysts, to supply
to the President around July of each year a report iden-
tifying those collection assets in the Community which
have contributed in important ways to the solution of
problems in the past year and identifying systems or pro-
grams with great potential for solving future problems.
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This report would be made available to Defense and
OMB, and they would use it as a tool to help shape
resource decisions relating to various intelligence
programs.
This approach would raise fewer troublesome
questions about direct involvement of the DCI in De-
fense decisionmaking than does the present approach.
That role would be reserved to the Department itself
and to OMB which has recognized legal responsibilities
in assisting the President to develop his overall
budgetary strategy.
The DCI's focus in this evaluation would be essen-
tially limited to collection programs for which he has
the best substantive information base. As these include
the most costly activities in the Intelligence Community,
this approach is reasonable. On the other hand, there
would be many resource issues within the Intelligence
Community on which the DCI would have no basis for effective
comment. He would not, for example, using this approach,
be easily able to comment on the numerous important re-
source issues which arise within the various expensive in-
telligence-processing or support programs in the Community.
The issues which arise between CIA and Defense in'
the processing area need attention. They are among the
more complex and difficult problems which confront us
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jointly. On the other hand,.one can question whether
resource issues in the support area ought to be his
responsibility in any event. During consideration of
the 1976 budget, for example, there was much discussion
as to whether the DCI should support DIA's attempts to
fund a new DIA building. It is unclear, however, whether
a DCI view on an issue of this kind is of any real
consequence to Defense, the President, or Congress.
There are other difficulties inherent in this "product
review" approach which can be most graphically illustrated
in the Comprehensive Cryptologic Program (CCP), although
they can be seen in some measure in other programs as
well. In the case of the CCP, if the DCI determined in
any given year that five particular facilities made an
outstanding contribution to the solution of certain in-
telligence problems, this would in all likelihood not con-
stitute any effective basis for making decisions about
resource levels for those or any other CCP. It is ex-
tremely difficult to tell when, or if, any particular
CCP facility will make a contribution in a given year.
Also, so often the CCP contribution on a given problem
results from the combined efforts of a number of facili-
ties over a period of time, each piece of raw data being
important but none being essential.
The fact is that with respect to both the CCP and
the DO, no one can predict which of many facilities
(and the people in them) will yield the hoped-for re-
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suit. The nature of the problems which become important
at a given time tends to determine which particular
installations make a noteworthy contribution in any
given year. For this reason resource decisions for
these programs tend to be dictated by the desirability
of maintaining the existence of an overall apparatus
or capability as conditioned by cover, working en-
vironment, and other shifting concerns, and the "product
review" approach would be of little real value. How-
ever, there are judgments that may be made from year to
year or over a longer time on which country or area
may become more or less important to US policy. From
these qualitative assessments, some resource decisions
are possible.
On the other hand, on some of the largest issues
which face the Community, the "product review" approach
could enable the DCI to develop a coherent view for
implementation by others. For example, it is possible
that in coming years new overhead reconnaissance systems
may substantially change the need for analysts and
theater commanders for the kinds of COMINT information
which have been supplied in the past by CCP assets.
Such a long-term trend ought to be discernible under
the basic approach outlined in this option, and thus
the DCI would be able to comment that new assets have
made a large portion of an existing program irrelevant.
It is also true, however, that such a conclusion could
be reached by others.
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Carrying through this approach would suggest changes
in the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff to emphasize
the "product review" function. It would also suggest
development of procedures requiring production components
within CIA to report periodically on the contributions
being made by various collection systems to the solution
of intelligence problems. Finally, there would need
to be improvements in the flow of information from
collectors as to which programs provided which infor-
mation. The latter may be difficult to achieve, parti-
cularly in the case of NSA and the CIA Operations Direc-
torate, which have strong traditions of resistance to
this basic approach.
We believe the "product review" function would need
to be carried out by an organization separate from the
production components. This would help overcome the
proclivity of analysts to continue to require all in-
formation, no matter how marginal, on problems of interest
to them in the belief that such information may some-
day prove essential. Such an organization would also
include a small group to investigate major issues of
the type suggested above.
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