MODIFICATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION AND DISSEMINATION CONTROLS FOR THE PRODUCTS OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002400080008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 8, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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elease 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79MO~A002400080008-0
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO.
TALENT-KEYHOLE
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
w
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
To~Secret
A roved
(Security Classification)
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~ 8 June 1976
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Working Paver
' MEI1~iOR:4'~T}UR~I FOR: The President
FRO1~7
SUBJECT
0
George Eush
Modification of the Classification and
Dissemination Controls for the Products
of Reconnaissance Satellites
25X1A
.. 1. This memorandum recommends that you authorize the
Director of Central Intelligence to declassify the fact of the existence
of the US satellite reconnaissance program and to make certain
modifications in the existing special security control system that
restricts access to its products. Because the current classification
and special security control system-tivere established by Presidential
directives, any changes in them require Presidential approval.
2. The recommended changes constitute an important first
? step in implementing one of the duties assigned to me by Executive
Order 11905. Specifically, Section 3 (d)(1)(viii} states that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall "establish a vigorous program
to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information as
appropriate and consistent with Executive Order No. 11 &52. "
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Background
3. In August 1960 shortly before the US satellite reconnaissance
program began producing useful information, President Eisenhower
directed "that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information
. that the special security control system was inhibiting the full use of
the information derived from the program. .
4. As a consequence, in 1973, President Nixon authorized the
part of the program became public knowledge. It also became apparent
given access to the intelligence within the special security control
system. Concurrently, the fact of the existence of the photographic
useful for a variety of intelligence purposes, thousands of people were
control system approved by me." This was at a time when very few
people were aware of the program and even the feasibility of using
,satellites for intelligence collection was considered sensitive.. As
the program progressed and produced large volumes of information
of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the product, shall be
given strict security handling under the provisions of a special security
and access controls regarding the photographic products of the program.
Director of Central Intelligence to make modifications in the classification
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mandates that any information derived from and attributed to satellite
reconnaissance be classified SECRET or higher. Even though the
1973 decision did increase the usefulness of satellite-derived
information, there is considerable pressure to again modify the
classification of the product and the program-itself. Our military
commanders claim the SECRET classification, together with the
complex procedures involved in handling the information and the
photography, is unnecessarily restrictive and limits the utility of
1\Tow, most of the photography and almost all of the information
derived therefrom is availak~le to US officials at the SECRET
level outside the special security control system. This has greatly
increased the use of intelligence derived from the photographic
reconnaissance program. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that the elimination of the special security controls on the products
of the program has in any way jeopardized the ability of the program.
to continue to provide intelligence.
5. The Presidential decision of 1973 also required that the
fact of the, existence of the photographic reconnaissance. program be
classified at the SECRET level. The effect of this decision in turn
the product, especially for military planning and at lower levels of
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command in the field. Others claim that the classification of the
fact alone se~Terely limits the potential non-military uses of the
products. ~ here is also general acceptance of the judgment that
much of the photography from this program is not otherwise
sensitive and could be very useful for economic glanrting not only
in the US but more particularly in the Third World.
6. Much has changed since the 1960 decision to classify all
aspects of the photographic reconnaissance program at TOP SECRET
and within a special security control system: Now, the existence
of the program has become public knowledge both at home and abroad.
In these circumstances it has become difficult to justify the continued
classification of the fact of the program even at the SECRET Ievel.
7. Continued classification has been argued on the basis of
concern that official public acknowledgment zvould provoke diplomatic
protests from some foreign governments about US violations of
territorial rights.. Some such protests have already been raised
with regard to the NASA programs which are officially announced.
Thus, it is not so much the knowledge of the existence of photographic
satellite reconnaissance or even protests about satellite photography,
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but more that a:~ official aru:ourcement of the now=classified program
could provoke nes~* protests or restatements of oId ones.
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Furthermore, multiple special security
control systems tend to complicate the handling of this kind of
intelligence and to limit. its usefulness unduly.
10. You should be aware that there are some people in the
United States Government who believe that any changes in the present
system of security protection of satellite-collected intelligence would
jeopardize the program. They argue that the present system can be
made to work. Others, mostly?users of intelligence, believe that the
present system is too cumbersome and causes. unnecessary delays in-
the availability of intelligence, especially for tactical military purposes.
I believe that the changes recommended below would facilitate the
increased use of the less sensitive intelligence collected by the satellite
reconnaissance program. Deputy Secretary Ellsworth and the Joint.
Chiefs of Staff also advocate modifications along these lines.
Conclusions
11. I conclude that the fact, and only the fact, that the United
States Government conducts satellite reconnaissance
can be declassified without
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any public announcements of this fact but should be prepared to
jeopardizing the flow of intelligence from these satellites. Officials
of the United States Government should be instructed not to initiate
12. I also conclude that procedures can be developed tom-reduce
the use of the special security control system now required for
signals intelligence collected by satellites as long as that intelligence
is protected by appropriate classification or by the special security
control system for other signals intelligence.
Recommendations - -
13. In accordance with Section 3 (d)(1)(viii} of Executive Order
11905 and the spirit of Executive Order 11652, I recommend that you
authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to:
acknowledge it when necessary. All other aspects of the progi^am
and its products can be classified and protected in accordance with
the criteria presented in Executive Order 11652. It should. be noted
specifically that no change is to be made in the classification or the
system of special security controls presently applicable to the
operational aspects of the satellite reconnaissance program.
-?-
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a. Declaasif3- the fact that the United States Government
conducts a satellite reconnaissance program, instruct
officials of ttie United States Government to avoid any
official public annou~eement of it, and to acknowledge,
when necessary, only the fact
b. Classify all other aspects of the program and its
product in accordance with the criteria presented
in Executive Order 11652.
25X1
25X1
14. If you approve these recommendations, I assure you that
changes will be made with due regard for my responsibility--as stated
in Executive Order 11905, Section 3 (d)(1)(vii}--to "ensure that
appropriate programs are developed which properly protectintelligence
sources, methods, and analytical procedures."
George Bush
The reccmmendations in P~.ra~raph 13 are approved -
- Date
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r''~itaci~ed is a rc~-ise::i r.:raft of a memorandum from
the rJC? ro the 1'r:~:>ic3~:r:r...~~:~arding the classification and
h?^dlir:?' of satel7_ite r?cc~;nn.:~i ssance products. Please
re~ri~~GV the draft and ,-~rc;~~i:.ie comments to the Chairman
of t~:eSe~.~.iity Com:'*i=.tt~?~ b~~ 15 June.
~'ou wili note that the memorandum recommends
declassif~riny the fact of the program. I am well aware
that Dome of ,you are strongly opposed to this and are
prepared to support reducing the classification to
CONFIDENTIAL. I tivill discuss your comments with
Mr. Bush before preparing a revised draft for circulation
to the NFIB members in advance of placing this matter
on the agenda for a meeting of the NFIB.
_ 25X-1 D
$ 7$ 'O' EOITIONSIOUS
Edward ?l. Proc or
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