MODIFICATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION AND DISSEMINATION CONTROLS FOR THE PRODUCTS OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002400080006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 25, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECT REPLY
QISPATCH
INFORMATION
(Security Classification)
No Foreign Di.ccem
CONTROL NO. I
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Controlled Data
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Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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CIA-RDP II100467AO02400080006-2
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FROM
= 2 5 JUN 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community
SUBJECT . Modification of the Classification and
Dissemination Controls for the Products
of Reconnaissance Satellites
1. Attached hereto is the draft memorandum from you to
the President on modification of the classification and dissemination
controls for the products of reconnaissance satellites.
2. This draft was prepared by 1 1 after
considering comments furnished by members of his ad hoc group
studying secrecy and compartmentation.
3. This draft memorandum contains recommendations that
authorize you as DCI to make changes as necessary regarding
classification and dissemination controls for the products of
reconnaissance satellites. One of the controversial aspects of
this paper is the conclusion that the fact of satellite reconnaissance
be reduced from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL.
4. It is recommended that you approve the referral of the
attached memorandum to the NFIB for consideration.
Sl~ G N~D~
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When removed from -ttachment, may
be downgraded to SECRET.
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71/ George Bush
2 8 JUN 1976
Director of Central Intelligence Date
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When removed from attachment, may
be downgraded to SECRET.
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D
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A
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM : George Bush
SUBJECT . Modification of the Classification and
Dissemination Controls for the Products
of Reconnaissance Satellites
1. This memorandum recommends that you authorize the
Director of Central Intelligence to declassify the fact of the existence
of the US satellite reconnaissance program and to make certain
modifications in the existing special security control system that
restricts access to its products. Because the current classification
and special security control system were established by Presidential
directives, any basic changes in them require Presidential approval.
2. The recommended changes constitute an important first
step in implementing one of the duties assigned to me by Executive
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Order 11905. Specifically, Section 3 (d)(1)(viii) states that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall "establish a vigorous program
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to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information as
appropriate,and consistent with Executive Order No. 11652. "
Background
3. In August 1960 shortly before the US satellite reconnaissance
program began producing useful information, President Eisenhower
directed "that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information
of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the product, shall be
given strict security handling under the'provisions of a special security
control system approved by me. " This was at a time when very few
people were aware of the program and even the feasibility of using
satellites for intelligence collection was considered sensitive. As
the program. progressed and produced large volumes of information
useful for a variety of intelligence purposes, tens of thousands of
people were given access to the intelligence within the special security
control system. Concurrently, the fact of the existence of the
photographic part of the program became public knowledge. It also
became increasingly apparent that the special security control system
was inhibiting the full use of the information derived from the program.
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4. As & consequence, in 1973; President Nixon authorized
certain, changes in the classification and access controls regarding
the photographic products of the'program. Now, much of the
photography and almost all of the information derived therefrom
is available to US officials at the SECRET level outside the special
security control system, although the system is still used to protect
the primary film itself and selected sensitive data. This has greatly
increased the use of intelligence derived from the photographic
reconnaissance program. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
the removal of the fact of the program and some of its products
from the special security controls has in any way jeopardized the
ability of the program to continue to provide intelligence.
5. The Presidential decision of 1973 also required that the
fact of the existence of the photographic reconnaissance program be
classified at the SECRET level. The effect of this decision in turn
mandates that any information derived from and attributed to satellite
reconnaissance be classified SECRET or higher. Even though the
1973 decision did increase the usefulness of satellite-derived information,
there is considerable pressure from our military commanders to again
modify the classification of the product and the program itself.
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6. Much has changed since the 1960 decision to classify all
aspects of the photographic -reconnaissance program at TOP SECRET
and within a special security control system. Now, the existence of
the program has become public. knowledge both at home and abroad.
In these circumstances it has become difficult to justify the continued
classification of the fact of the program even at the SECRET level.
7. Continued classification has been argued on the basis of
concern that official public acknowledgment would provoke diplomatic
protests from some foreign governments about US violations of
territorial rights. Some such protests have already been raised
with regard to the NASA programs which are officially announced.
Thus, it is not so much the knowledge of the existence of photographic
satellite reconnaissance or even protests about satellite photography,
but more that an official announcement of the now-classified program
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could provoke new protests or restatements of old ones.
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10. Clearly, the problem is one of balancing the benefits to
be derived from greater access to_the_products of our satellite
reconnaissance program against the need for sufficient security
protection to ensure that the program continues to provide information
vital to US national security. There are serious differences of opinion
about where this balance should be struck.
a. Opponents to change argue that (in addition to territorial
rights presented in paragraph 7 above) declassification of the fact
of the program could cause some foreign countries to refuse to permit
satellite ground stations on their territories. They are also concerned
that changes in the classification and special security control system
could provoke the Soviets to take actions against reconnaissance and
other satellites vital to US national security, action ranging from
passive concealment and deception to direct attacks against the
satellites themselves. These kinds of reactions could seriously
damage our ability to verify present and future arms control agree-
ments. There are some who cite such things as the recent Soviet
anti-satellite activities, current Soviet-American relations and the
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beginning of the operational phase of our new near-real-time imaging
satellites as reasons for this beinga particularly unpropitious time
for making any changes.
b. Proponents for change base their arguments primarily on
the impropriety of the present classification of the fact of the program
and on the need for increasing the use of satellite-collected information.
As to classification of the fact, they argue that there is a fundamental
inconsistency between the SECRET classification of the fact and the
classification criteria and the spirit of Executive Order 11652.
Furthermore, their view is that the declassification of much of the
photography collected by reconnaissance satellites is very useful
for economic planning, both at home and abroad, and would not reveal
sensitive aspects of the US satellite reconnaissance program.
Proponenets for modifying the special security control system realize
that much of the materials collected by satellites should.not be
declassified, but they argue that such materials as are removed
from the special security control system would remain classified
in accordance with the criteria of Executive Order 11652. Military
and other users of intelligence believe that many of the present
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procedures for, removing satellite-collected information from the
special security control 'systemfor handling it at the SECRET
classification are unnecessary and cause delays in the availability
of intelligence and limit the usefulness of the product, especially.
for military planning and at lower levels of command in the field.
To the statement that the present system can be made to work, they
respond that the special procedures and exceptions to the general
rules are too varied and difficult to understand and implement at
lower levels of command in a timely and effective manner.
11. I have considered the arguments for and against change.
The balance I strike between the need for greater access to the
products of satellite reconnaissance and the need for protecting
intelligence sources and methods is in favor of somewhat greater
access as described below.
Conclusions
12. I conclude that:
a. Because we cannot be sure that official public acknowledgment
of the fact that the United. States Government conducts satellite
reconnaissance
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not lead to public disclosure of other aspects of the program and thus
to foreign reactions damaging to the program, the fact should not be
completely. declassified at this time. It would, however, be
appropriate to lower the classification of this fact from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the criteria presented in Executive
Order 11652.
b. There will continue to be a need for the special security
control system for those products of photographic satellites and
certain sensitive data that reveal truly sensitive aspects of the
program. Nevertheless, the objective should be to minimize the
use of this control system by confining its use exclusively to those
kinds of products and data.
c. No changes should be made in the classification or the
system of special security controls presently applicable to the
operational aspects of the satellite reconnaissance program.
d. The classification of all other aspects of the program and
products attributed to it should be in accordance. with the criteria
presented in Executive Order 11652 and no lower than CONFIDENTIAL
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Recommendations
13. In accordance with Section 3 (d)(1)(viii) of Executive
Order 11905 and the spirit of Executive Order 11652, I recommend
that you authorize the Director of Central. Intelligence to:
a. Make any or all changes discussed in paragraph 12 with
due regard for his responsibility--as stated in Executive Order 11905,
Section 3 (d)(1)(vii)--to "ensure that appropriate programs are
developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods, and
analytical procedures.
b. Declassify the fact that the; United States Government
conducts satellite reconnaissance and makes other modifications in
the classification and the special security control system for this
program at some future date when he believes it appropriate.
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_14. It should be noted that I am not recommending that you
approve the, changes outlined above; rather, I am recommending that
you authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to make such
changes along these lines as he may deem appropriate. If you grant
this authority, I assure you that those who have objections to change
will be given a full hearing and that whatever changes I do make will
be consistent with my statutory responsibilities and those provided
in Executive Orders.
- /draft/
George Bush
The Recommendations in Paragraph 13 are approved:
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Distribution: Draft memo .to President from DCI -
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