THE CIA/NSA RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002400030009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 20, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Approved Release 2004/12/20: CIA-RDP79MO A002400030009-4
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 P79MOO46 42 00030009-4
20 August 1976
2.) Memo from Chairman, 25X1
SIGINT Task Force to Dr. Sayre Stevens,
dated 12 Augrst 1976, Subject: CIA
Analysts and NSA F77 1 25
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Comptroller, Requirements
and Evaluation
SUBJECT The CIA/NSA Relationship
.REFERENCES 1.) Memo from DDCI to dated 25X1.
9. July 1976 7 25
1. Over the past 25 years numerous studies and study
groups have attempted to define and analyze the problems
endemic to the CIA/NSA relationship. These problems are
generally twofold. One is the CIA role with regard to SIGINT
collection vis-a-vis NSA. The other revolves around how
and in what form NSA chooses to publish SIGINT information.
2. In its early years NSA looked respectfully and
appreciatively to CIA for guidance as to what it should
collect and produce. It also depended frequently on the
Agency for support in its annual quests for funds in the DOD
budget arena. As time passed and its budget doubled, tripled
and quadrupled, NSA began to swell its corporate chest and
develop a personality and style of its own. An organization
which began with a serious inferiority complex gradually
developed a feeling that it has `a corner on the market"
in terms of intelligence information fit to print.
3. This new feeling of importance by NSA manifested
itself in various ways such as the installation of a direct
communications link over CIA objections between Ft. Meade and
the White House and the issuance of the SIGINT Summary, a
SIGINT current intelligence publication designed to compete
with the then-Central Intelligence Bulletin. (CIA also
objected, to no avail, to the SIGINT Summary because it
contained then as now gists and summaries of what NSA analysts
consider to be "hot" items of information which were in the
process of being published in individual translation or report
form, but for xhich NSA wanted to get credit in the eyes of
top level intelligence recipients.
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4. NSA's new feeling of importance became evident
in many other ways.such as footnotes to various political
and military NIE's, in public and.not so public forums in
which NSA reps let it be known in-numerous ways that there
was little or no need for "middlemen" such as CIA, DIA, etc.
to chew, digest and regurgitate perfectly good SIGINT data
and provide it to the real intelligence consumers such as
the President, the Secretary of State and the NSC Staff.
5. As a part of its ceaseless effort to assert itself
more vigorously in the intelligence process, NSA began a
policy of "gradualism" with regard to the format and content
of its output. More and more it put less and less data in its
publications, always with the explanation or excuse that it
wanted to improve its or the Community's security and provide
"better service" to its customers. Almost all of these
changes made the SIGINT product less meaningful, and more
difficult for our analysts to interpret. Most such changes
were instituted unilaterally by NSA and announced after the
fact, if at all. In almost all instances, however, consumers
objected, but almost always to no avail. NSA began more and
more to hide behind the "technical information" dodge which
meant that users of SIGINT data had no need for and weren't
really to be trusted with information on intercept positions,
collection capabilities, traffic volume, crypt systems, etc.
Such practices have usually. been at the heart of most-CIA
analyst complaints.
6. During this period (which extends to the present)
CIA representatives at various levels from all Agency
directorates objected to the NSA way of doing business. More
and more as NSA became stronger and more aggressive it be-
came an uphill battle for Agency reps in defense of the DCI's
and Agency's position and responsibilities in the intelligence
business. The increasingly aggressive, determined and
sometimes overbearing policy on NSA's part and the lack of
a steady, coherent, reasoned and positive Agency policy
supported by top Agency management have resulted almost by
default in the emergence of NSA in a Community role in which
the tail too often wags the dog.
7. Another part of NSA's plan to reign supreme is its
sometimes subtle and sometimes not so subtle but never ceasing
efforts to gain control over CIA SIGINT activities. This
effort has many aspects not the least important of which has
been its "backdoor lobbying" with all investigative and
budget groups, including Congressional, OMB and DoD. NSA's
principal argument is that DIRNSA/CSS is the "National
SIGINT Authority" who by definition should have total control
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of all U.S. SIGINT activities, including CIA and the
Service Cryptologic Agencies (Army, Navy and Air Force).
The NSA hardliners define "National SIGINT Authority" as
meaning NSA control of all U.S. SIGINT manning, tasking,
budgeting, programming and output.
8. NSA's almost phenomenal success in achieving
independence to an unprecedented extent and its ability to
frustrate any Community effort, with which it disagrees, to
control and influence it is attributable to at least three
factors. One is the long experience of NSA management in
political infighting and its ability to defend itself through
..obfuscation, specious arguments and, on some occasions, its
steadfast refusal to cooperate with community groups and
individuals whose purpose NSA consider inimical to its own
interests. Actions which NSA sometimes considers inimical
include efforts to provide guidance in the collection and
production of SIGINT, including Agency or Community efforts
to gauge and evaluate the NSA output.
9. A second reason for the present state of affairs
is the lack of a coordinated Agency (not DDI, DDS&T or DDO)
effort to establish and maintain a healthy and viable
relationship with NSA. Too much Agency busines is transacted
with NSA by individuals and components without due regard to
the interests of other Agency components. No consistent
central record is maintained of the multitude of problems
which Agency individuals at all levels have with NSA. This
means that every time a review of CIA/NSA relations is conducted
a poll is taken, either in writing or by personal interview,
usually with the underlying belief by most participants that
nothing will be done to correct the problems anyway. The
principal deficiency, however, has been the general failure
at the Agency management. level to get involved with such
mundane and sometimes too technical problems. The result
has been that no one in-recent years at a sufficiently high
level has gone to the mat with NSA on any issue. For this
reason) many people at NSA have the impression that CIA is
manned by a collection of nice, gentle and toothless pussycats.
10. A third factor involves CIA's failure over all these
years to define clearly legal and defensible Agency functions
and responsibilities in the-U.S.'SIGINT business. NSA keeps
picking, nibbling and lobbying away at CIA SIGINT activities
to the point that members of the C.ongress, their staffs and
OMB are now causing many people in the Agency-to doubt more
than ever before that the Agency has a legitimate SIGINT role
to play. .
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11. There appears never to have been a full apprecia-
tion for or understanding within the Agency of the scope and
importance of -the Agency accomplishments within the SIGINT
field. Recognition should be given to the fact that without
CIA's support NSA's dollar plus effort in many areas
would come to a standstill. When one considers that CIA-managed
SIGINT activities contribute- (directly and indirectly) to about
40 percent of NSA's serialized reporting output with an Agency
SIGINT budget about one-thirtieth the size of NSA's, it be-
comes clear that the Agency has something to be proud of. It
should also become clear that such impressive and valuable
assets should not be removed from the Agency without a great
deal of thought and full consideration of all the facts.
12. The guidelines laid down in the 9 July 1976 memor-
andum to I are an important first step toward getting
the Agency's thinking straight and our own house in order.
A positive and compelling argument in response to the first
question asked by the DDCI (What must CIA do in SIGINT in
keeping with the CIA mission?) is crucial to the Agency's
position. The second question by the DDCI is also on the mark,
but should also address: What has CIA done to help the
Community at large? Whatever the Agency position, an objec-
tive and complete revelation of past Agency accomplishments
is essential and will go a long way toward answering "What
.can the Agency do to help the Community at large in this
same area?"
13. In-the event that the new SIGINT Task Force con-
cludes that the Agency does have an important and meaningful
role to play in SIGINT, it will require vigorous, imaginative
and united action on the part of all Agency components,
especially at the top-, to convince Congressional and other
critics of the rightness of our cause.
25
25X1A
Requirements & aluation Staff
.Office of the Comptroller
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Remarks :
Hank:
This unsolicited piece from
of CGAS is perceptive and
thoughtful in its review of CIA-NSA rela-
tions over the years. =also served a
rotational tour in
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