LETTER TO MR. RAMSEY FORBUSH FROM GEORGE BUSH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A001300190014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 1, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
1 APR 1976
Mr. Ramsey Forbush
Dear Mr. Forbush:
/~ / S Irv..
Helene Boatner has been kind enough to show me your
thoughts on how National Intelligence should be produced. As
you may know, I have a responsibility to reexamine the system
and make changes if I think them necessary. Since I am approach-
ing the problem cold, the views of those who, like yourself, have
been deeply involved and understand what is required are especially
valuable.
You might be interested to know that I had lunch a few
weeks ago with several of your ONE colleagues, including Sherman
Kent and John Huizenga. They and a number of others have urged
me, as you have, to reestablish an advisory board. I have not
yet decided to do so, but the arguments in favor are strong and
you have reinforced them.
Again, many thanks for your suggestions. Please feel free
to write again. I would like to stay in touch with our distinguished
alumni.
Sincerely,
l_sL Georg e
.George Bush
7176-i9~6
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 Attached is the response you requested
to Ramsey Forbush. I had had a copy of
his paper earlier. Essentially, he wants
to add the old ONE system to the NIO's.
I suspect this is more structure than we
need. 1 --1
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1'111,5.- ~-
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Special Asst. to
Attached 'is another input to the "what to do
about national intelligence" problem. It was
sent to me by Ramsey Forbush. Ramsey, as
you may recall, was the' last head of ONE
(during the months between Huizenga's
retirement and abolition of ONE) and the first
head of OPR. Between retirement and moving
to Santa Fe, he headed the OTR-sponsored.
team that did the study on "CIA Intelligence
Support for Foreign and National. Security
Policy Making. " This one is for you tbo pass
on to the DCI if you. think he be interested. I
am sending a copy to
FORM NO. IOI REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
4- 7/5
DATE)
--15 Mar76
STAT
STAT
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REGRGANIZING TO IMPROVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Recent Congressional cavortings aside, it is a fact that the
performance of CIA and the Intelligence Community in the preparation
of National Intelligence has been extremely uneven during the past
few years. Improvement is both possible and necessary; it must stem
principally from organizational change. For only if there is a more
potent and skillful directing body can National Intelligence become
more responsive to the needs of key policy makers, more supportive
of their difficult tasks, and more anticipatory of emerging problems
which they will have to face in the future.
A new Office for the Production of National Intelligence should
be established, absorbing the effective practitioners among present
National Intelligence Officers and taking on certain functions now
sketchily handled by the Intelligence Community Staff (Which should
be appropriately reduced in sire). This new office should be headed
by a distinguished expert on international affairs who would report
directly to the DC I and, at the same time, maintain close working
relationships with the various intelligence production shops in the
Community. The office itself,would be relatively small but would
command the best talent obtainable.
Responsibilities would include:
1. Preparation of National Intelligence Estimates
of high quality and perceptiveness;
2. Intimate contact with policy makers and the provision
of National Intelligence relevant to their concerns;
3. Looking ahead, independently, so as to identify and focus
attention upon new international problems before they
have fully emerged;
4. Regular review of the intelligence products of Community
elements and the selection of the best for special
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on enhancing performance, eliminating! duplication, etc..
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The main components of the new office would be:
1. Its director and a senior advisory panel of 8 or 10
distinguished intelligence figures who would take
the lead in assuring the quality of National Estimates.,
exercising the independent anticipatory role, and
overseeing the process of broad review;
2. A liaison staff of perhaps a dozen who would keep up
regular, frequent contact with policy makers, faking
sure that National Intelligence was effectively
transmitted -- and responsive as well as responsible;
3. A permanent substantive staff of 20 or 25 middle-grade
intelligence officers, most of whom would be area
specialists, and all of whom would be selected for
perceptiveness of mind, for drafting talents, and for
a bent toward predictive intelligence;
4. A changing cadre of highly specialized expertsi secunded
from other production offices in the Community for such
periods as required to prepare particular National Intelligence
Estimates or to carry through other projects of outstanding
importance.
An office thus designed would be small enough to hold bureaucratic
problems to a minimum so as to devote all its energies to the challenging
assignments it would face. It would have the strength to do a superior
job -- not only through the prowess and imagination of its own people,
but also through its ability to call upon the very best resources available
an where in the Intelligence Community.
It could, I am convinced, do much to overcome some of the most
glaring weaknesses in present intelligence performance.
STAT
Ramsey o h
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CATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFID
EN
TIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING
SLI
W=ft B.
- 17/s-7
TO
NAME AND DDRESS
DA-PE'
I ITIALS
I
Director of Cent Sral Intellige
e
2
3
Mr. , Knoche
4
5
O/Compt
6
ACTION DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
You asked for reorganization suggestions
from anyone with ideas. Here are two from _
Helene Boatner, who has had experience in the
DDI (OER) and ONE and has been detailed twice
to the NIO for special assignments.
to 3: Thought you might wish to see this.
cc.- Richard Lehman (w/attachments}.
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
COi IPT _7.l = %
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFI
John D. Iams, Comptroller
UNCLASSIFIED
't MAR 1976
FORM NO.
237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67 G
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PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE PRODUCTION OFFICES
FACTS: 1. The notion of a geographic, rather than functional,
organization of CIA intelligence production offices
has been discussed often but never tried.
2. We have considerable evidence,(e.g.,
DCI Correspondence, OTR Study of Jan. 1976) that more
cross-disciplinary analysis is desired by consumers.
THESIS: Geographic organization should be tried now.
ADVANTAGES:
Encourage inter-disciplinary analysis.,
Better basic organization for forming temporary task forces.
Provide opportunities for most talented analysts and
analyst-supervisors, whether or not the talent is
divided in proportion to the number of functional
specialists.
Eliminate duplications of production staffs, editorial
reviews.
Reduce proliferation of types of publications and shift
emphasis to publishing: (1) Agency and (2) intelligence
documents, instead.of scientff c, economic, or_military.
documents.
Relate allocation of production resources to intelligence
subjects rather than analytical specialties.
Force a rethinking of the need for every currently existing
position.
Fresh chain of command for all, providing new opportunities
for those who may have potential unrecognized by
current supervisors.
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Substantial discomfort. Most people don't like sweeping changes,
and some employees will feel severely threatened by it.
Probably some initial (and temporary) reduction of output
while changes are being effected.
SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION - MAJOR COMPONENTS
O/DDI -- Management and Executive Staffs
Production Staff
Central Reference Service (ex. Info. Services Group)
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Imagery Analysis Service
Cartography Service (ex. Geography Division)
Experimental Analysis Service -- to include CDAM of ORD
Office of:
*Soviet/East European Affairs
European Affairs
Western Hemisphere Affairs
Asian Affairs
Near East/African Affairs
REMOVED FROM DIRECTORATE:
Operations Center to O/DDCI
COMIREX to IC or S&T
Collection Guidance and
Assessment Staff to O/DDCI (?)
OCI, OER, OPR, OSR,
CRS - Info. Services Group,
OGCR - Geography Division,
OSI, OWI, Life Sciences
*Probably would need specialized military components. Others
probably do not; they need military specialists in the branches.
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Prime Strengths -- Publicity expressed confidence of DCI;
careful selection of top personnel.
-- Emphasis on Community-wide and Agency-wide
contacts.
Role in requirements, collection, etc.
Basic Weaknesses -- Analysts lack responsibility for (and pride-in)
final product. Directorate and component
managers do not "value" it as highly as
their "own" products.
Regular, routine duties compete for attention
of drafters.
Problems approached by narrow specialists and
by the same experts who do the component
publications. Scope is too often single-
discipline and small-region. Few challenges
to conventional wisdom.
Prime Strengths - Analyst/author concern for product from
beginning to end.
Competitive views challenging the conventional
wisdom of other components.
Cross-disciplinary, world-view analysis.
Collective approach minimizing one-person
dictation of conclusions.
Basic Weaknesses -- Lack of special DCI concern or imprimatur.
-- Too Agency-centered.
-- Too production-centered.
-- Too formalized.
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P n,
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1&300190014-3-
A PROPOSAL - THE "OFFICE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE"
SIZE: 75-85 including 8-10 NIO's, plus staffs of
3-6 each and necessary clerical and production
staff support.
PERSONNEL: Largely CIA but drawn also from community at large.
No more than 2/3 of the Agency professionals from
DDI. All initial appointments on 1-year trial --
taken seriously. Normal full tour -- 3 years.
SUBORDINATION: Part of CIA, reporting to DCI on Community matters
and new DDCI on Agency ones. Responsibility vested
in CIA more clearly than ever by Executive Order.
Must have all resources of Agency rapidly and easily
at hand. Must not be subordinate to any Directorate.
PROCEDURES:, ONI staffers to draft most, but not all, papers
and follow them through to completion Other
drafters (CIA and other) move temporarily to ONI,
devote full time and attention to the job, become
temporary members of ONI team, and submit drafts
to NIO, not through parent channels.
All terms of reference and drafts referred to
each NIO for review by each Staff. ONI review
of draft for Community coordination to include
(inter alia) detailed joint review by at least
3 NIO's or their delegates.
ONI to continue all non-production activities
now under NIO purview.
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