CIA SUPPORT OF THE GUATEMALAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A000300050026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 20, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

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 SECRET
ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION OF MAJOR ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED BY IG
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUE 1
~.t has close ties7
What should the USG do in the face of repressive measures . taken' by
a on with h h
II. Political violence in Guatemala, especially during the last decade,
cannot be attributed to insurgent terrorists alone; the extreme Ri
ht
d
g
an
the Government have also contributed. Both political extremes define "enemy"
in very broad terms. For example, the "hard-line anti-communists" within
.the .political support base of the Arana Administration commonl .1 th
u
mp e.so-
called "intellectual leaders" of the extreme Left with th X
e znsuxgent. This
is in part because the former are more identifiable than the shadowy and sometimes
unknown or unlocatable members of the insurgent groups. So broad a target
categorization in the current situation has led to acts of violence and threats
against non-insurgents and contributes to the tendency toward. alienation and
polarization which characterizes the current political atmosphere.
.When terrorist activity increased markedly. in. the Fall of 1970, pressure from
within his political, coalition, the military and the private sector-,forced
President Arana to act, despite his own reservations about the capability of
the security forces to mount a successful, anti-insurgency campaign. It,would be.
extremely difficult for him now to abandon the campaign. short of greater.
successes than he has so far achieved.?During the election campaign, he promised
to "pacify" the country - a promise he, the public and his political supporters
consider a fundamental. pledge his Administration must uphold.
From the outset, the counter-insurgent campaign became more than an attack. onthe insurgents. (In part this can be attributed to the paucity of GOG
intelligence, making it impossible to identify or,locate the terrorists with
accuracy. The broad interpretation of the target group is an equally important
factor.) Individuals within 'the political opposition, the media, organized labor
and the university and intellectual community were threatened or assassinated,
DOS and NSC review(s) SECRET
completed. .DOS AND NSC HAVE
RFVIF\n/Fn
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SECRET..:
-2-
came from. in essence, this .
th
ey based on
in turn affecting the.attitudes _,of the sectors
se sectors, cednotion
has reinforced a stereotype of Arana alreadyhehelattad'incke
his command of Zacapa Brigade in 1966-6 ?an~ olarization increased as did
of GOG credibility within these sectors, p alienated
criticism of Government action.. There ath~te~egGOG wouldespecially permitnfree elections:
opposition political groups, skepticism
in IV J4.
ncy campaign
Government now faces a dilemma. Its all-out counter-insurge has
The ur ents. Terrorist acts in the month of-Febru~Lry,
t re-siege
s
c
Two pr:~ncipa
a regime which has indulged in 9) eressive Guatemalanepolitical institutional development is
-1-nnd croal
onsiderations limit the Closen-,5, wy
~- the USG is left open to
1
of reso.Lve.
insurgent Left also constrains the GOG since, desp ng.losses, it :is able to
.The of its
strike e the Government at times and places
rah-in with
the immed~,a e:; p
hurt but not destroyed the in
1971, for example, are at the same high level as during hts. An estimated five
months. At the same time, it has infringed upon human rig violence.
to seven hundred people may have died since November tnetheapoliticbeenal mostly killed
While this estimate includes the dead of Arty, sides,
Rightist
the eomiasionsionados ados mi mil lritaarress. .
some
by the ases, Government's Rightists settling political security forces, the Arm
or others with closer r or r more tenuous connections scores. They include people
g olitical or personal e
in
and irkcleddd up following
c
killed in gunfights with the insurgents, in Army sweeps, people
lhouse and other searches and some who have been interrogated
common criminals,
inte Lion. Among their number are some of theefnsurgcnts, sideredome-co
and others hers marginally connected with the extreme
The nGovernment remains burdened with its promise to. "pacify" with the same limited
at its disposal to do so. Now committed, it cannot show weakness or lack
means
aomU5 L,y1_ 11___ ability
jeopardized. These impinge on our rovoking a cooler sib relationship terrorism. The Ucby attempti g1totdissuade it from pursuing
relationship with the Arana Government
itS c0 nVFT
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SECRET
-3-
III. Recommendea 1s5uC
(a) The 'USG should exert its influence to convinceVthe GOG toyconcantrate its
efforts s on clearly identified terrorists. The Arana Grnmene
relations with alienated sectors
reduce polarization and re-establish acceptable through continuing dialogue and support and encouragement of the free play of
political forces. These conciliarandeaoliticaludevelopment strains
timatt put e on Guatemalan political institutions P
be less endangered.
o USG influence and advice along the lines
en; (1) it can ride out this period
(b) If the GOG is not recePtide t
p
incumbent Government
three options o
USG has
rd the
already noted, the
ithout a significant change in assistance policy towar
is
~
s
w
ss
while building and maintaining basreduce or
withdraw
tance stitutional
society (see c below) ; (2) it can while continuing in
,"3% +. nar withdraw all .
.assis ance in
assistance
rtunities to convince all
o
(c) In any event, the USG should take suitable opp r anized labor, private
etc.) ), opposition political parties, university, og
ssectors
etc) that hatt while we oppose.terrorism,nwe o not stitutionalndevelopment51OThis will
that we continue in our efforts. to assist in i
time as we continue our on-going relationship with
subtlety,
e
re
,
ca
d have to be done at the sam
uthorities. It will require great
d
a
titute
Guatemala's cons
discretion,and skill.
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S E C R E T
19TEREST:
A;..'AREA'OF CONCERN Stabilit
'th
l'coristru
tl
der
e
a
t of Government to
emocri
Ca acs
political zssent. Guatemala s raga
loons suffered a serious setbac ~hen.theeGthe
traditions in order-to,
.
..The
ment engaged in gross
results of the March 1974
General Laugerud;twhoSwill take'::
Government candidate, Gen
office on July 1; 1974, is faced with,a number,of
rave economic and social problems and will also be; ..`
grave opposition which 'is bitter and di,...
faced with
illusioned at having been robbed of an electoral
victory. There are, neverthelesss$ signs. that
'aaey
in the opposition, even though
planning `to continue to. seek their fobg ecct VeS . . _0
through legal political dissent$ iivetv. that,
.-opportunity. re are also signs that hard-l exud;:
elements within the .forthcoming Laug
right wing Vice-President-elect. administration, elements led by will seek. to m
uzzle
.and MLN Dii ector Mario Sandovali
all serious political dissent through the feat and
use' of terror. Themord the terror,
more likely at. the.
the pol:tical opposit o9 whiat.would;
opposition will itself. turn to violence
bring about sharply increased p
level of violence.
and a much higher
B.. AREA OF.CONCERN: Growth of
PROJECTED CONDITIONS IN FY 76
BY ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS
(July 75 to June 76)
f Political system
meaningfully)
1 Difficult toProject
nce the situation depend
are
heavily on what happens
in FY 75.
Democratic Institutions
and treatment of nlitical parties As FY
T party (DCG)
Mayor Colom Argueta, perhaps the m
capable and charismatic leader of
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Challenge:' If the
Government cancels
the inscription of
the DCG, there will
be.a serious re-
striction of.legiti
mate political
dissent in Guate-.
mala which is
likely to bring
about a destabilize
situation.
Opportunity: Use
discreet influence
as opportunities
arise to convince
GOG that its long-
term stability will
be improved by
allowing legal
operation of its
opposition...
0 ortuniy: Use
influence as oppor-
tunities arise to
discourage opposi-
tion parties from
resorting to
violence.
LEVEL OF..
CONCERN
FY 75 FY 76
EXPLANATION OF ASSIGNED LEVEL OF CONCERN
A serious restriction of the oppos,ition's abilit
to operate legally.will increase the likelihood
of illegal opposition. and a new spiral of'politi
violence. This in turn could. complicate our:,abi
to maintain assistance programs.,
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INTEREST: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GUATEMALA
ECRE.T
PROJECTED CONDITIONS IN FY 75 BY ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS
.(July 74 to June 75)
s the only party which is in clear opposition to the
of he:
overnment, since tine 31u%-1 v -- j
de cle
n
evolutionary Party has ma
and.,.
e
Thereshaveebeen
t
.
ooperate with the Governmen
right -win MLN.
from
iii continue, to be:pressures
tion of. the DCG, which
i
p
inscr
ircles to cancel the ..,;;-1,n ,1t any truly
ould leave the body pol16l'- ?? -_ -- -- '
ppositionist legal force. Cancellation of. the DCG
.. s.$ in%rwnuP.s of legitimate
ould seriously rc~~?y~~ which would li
i kely
olitical dissent in Guatemala
tuation.
ring about a distaD1i~.Zing
C. AREA OF CONCERN:
of illeal
a
n
h
ts
e have no.accurate me
surlluse
against insurge
iolence the Government wl 'minais.. In the.
i
nlit-ical opponents, or common cr
Aither. effected
ast month, we uelieve
r condoned the assassination osocietyaandaa`leftist
ead of. a university. g
.
d
r
?
m
a
oioCe
violently anti-Government
onsoredkillings
s
have also been a number of. p p
killings carried outunder.the
of .habitual criminals," w,- 'believe that. there wi11
d
cover of a "death squa
. this type of..v.iolence at a
e pressures to maintain
l
.
elatively.high leve
PROJECTED CONDITIONS IN FY 76
BY ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS
(July 75 to June 76)
t .:
the Left: today, who will probably take.
-'a long. leave of. absence in Italy, primar.
for.fear of being. assassinated, may -retu
to Guatemala, ...If he does, he will prob-,
ably seek to re=establish a base of
power and may-once again seek inscriptio
of his FURD. The Government is likely t
frustrate the inscription of the FURD
whether: or not;the.-legal requirements ar
met..
fbr Human Rights
1, Not possible to predict accurately:
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hallen e: The GO(
ermit widespread 1
he political oppo
robably produce a
.ized political si
.mpede Guatemala" s
levelopment.
ortunit
may engage in or.
se of terror agains'
ition:. This.would
seriously distabi'
uation which would'
economic and social
Use
iscreet influence;
s opportunities
rise to persuade
OG that. its short-
.nd long-"term
.nterests will be
seriously damaged
Lf terror is used
o muzzle the
pposition.'. .
rhallen e: Resort-
legal 'violence
stabg
stically,
lackens Guate-
ala's image abroad
nd could lead to
econsideration bf
ur.assistance to
he GOG. '
ortunit': Use
is et nfluence
oint but the
o p
L
lack of necessity
EXPLANATION OF ASSIGNED LEVEL OF CONCERN
If the GOG engages in or permits widespread use of
terror against its political oppo sitiooln,.iticthis would
al viole
very likely trigger a new spiral of p This
1 znc.reasedpolitic.al polarization.
and sharpy: t,f t
devel,ome would be a serious impmdcmand, social structurenino
amore equitable e.cono nificant cutback i
Guatemala and could lead..to a sig
'the levels*: of U. S. ;assistance... This in turn would
elations
'r
S
ration
he, board with harmfuleffects for almost a]
cause.a ,deterio across the,-board'
U'. S. interests inGuatemala.
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I
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INTEREST: S E C"R E
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GUATEMALA'-FY:-7'5
COURSE OF 'ACTION BY GOAL & ' OBJECTI VE
.`Promote Long-Term Political Stabily -.
A-1 Convince COG that resorting to terrorist tactics to subdue its political-~
opposition will pro a 1 increase its insurgency_ problem.....
1-1 Encourage:President-elect: La ugerudto minimine:.the:use.of.political
violence by his administration, and to control`as much as possible
the use of radical violence by. right`-wing` elements--in his -adminis
1-2 -Encourage selected Army officers. to seek.to dissuade the GOG from
.using violence to subdue its political., opposition.
1-3 Encourage other GOG officials and political.leaders along the: lines
1-4 Carefullymoni.tor the level of Government-induced or tolerated'
terrorism-against political.opponenLs.
l-5 Consider a reduction in levels of..U.S;'assistance, particularly
military assistance,, if actions. mentioned; in.1-1, 1-2 ;nd 1-3:do
tration.
SECRET
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not seem.to.have any effect..
2 Convince GOG that cancelling DCG'inscri inscription will.. robabl? encourae
political dissidents to turn to violence.:
2-i Encourage President-elect Laugerud.not. to: -permit. .,cancel lat ion: of
2-2 Encourage'.selected Army officers.to counsel. against cancellation
of DCG's inscription
2-3 Encourage'appropriate KILN/PID political figures-along line of2-1..
T
r ICT
CTJ
Estin
,FY
Resot
(OC
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S
U.S. INTEREST: .. ... C R
FY 75
Eliminate Use of Illegal Repressive Actions Against Insurgents and Common
Criminals
B-1 Convince the GOG to reduce the .use or toleration o# illegal
repression to a minimum.
i-i Encourage President-elect Laugerud.to curb illegal. repressive
activity
1-2 Make known selectively to subordinate officials our difficulty:
in supporting a government which engages._in illegal repression.
1-.3 Carefully monitor level of Government-induced or tolerated
illegal violence.
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Est
,r?
Res
E
 SC-b /AR
?DOS and NSC review(s)
completed.
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The overriding United States interest in. Guatemala is;in assuring that it does not become hostile and
4w.7:......4. .,....reeeinn anAlTlC4- 14-
p
i
the implementation of basic.economic and:sociai reforms together an acc
of development programs,.
p
o
t
interrelated interests:. the progressive strengthening.of democra c ns a u
lementation
th lerated'im
Will not peLiuLL 1LJ LCi.L.J. uV ..-
neighbors or the United States. .This. interest.: is best served by.a Guatemalan government which maintains
stability through respect for constitutional-procedurese. more equitable. distribution of national
income, and accelerated economic growth, :,, Our 'principal: interest- is' based therefore, on two subordinate,
ractices? and
ns and
i t ti
o
reducing the act. vi ies e..
of its development program and the cooperation of the private sector in the development process depends
upon the government being able-to keep the upper hand in its struggle against the extreme left. For
this purpose it needs. to continue?to develop its capabilities to maintain internal security.
law into their own hands and respond with-..counter-terrorism. While the government as ,.ucc e e
f the PGT/FAR and FAR the level of violence remains a problem. The success
' 't'
h s o
block t e proces p
tactics. Elements of the extreme`right'which:.frequently are the target, of these activities, take the
h a ded in
n
r
basic reforms it-does not impinge sufficiently on e
trigger their oppos'itipn. The extreme left (the PGT/FAR and the-FAR), on the other hand., seeks to
f eaceful change and to overthrow the government through terror and guerrilla
'rne ,ai ii vUvca,luuca4N. 4,41A .0 &L&?M- - - - --.?-- ----- ,---d - - - -
looks to"improving the standard of living.of the..rural population. Since the plan'does not contemplate
ests o# the coriservative.elemen`ts to
te
th i
.
and in the economic wealth of the.country;will Guatemala remove L. e un er y g
ever-increasing measure of participation in the-political process
only by providing the people with an.'
h d 1 in causes of instability
modern agriculture and to raise the effectiveness of the rural family t roug ea
programs. The main thrust. of our aid program is in agricultural development and in rural education,
hztherto marginal r ra popu
the campesino has the . wherewithal to apply the techniques, to provide the infrastructure necessary for,
h h h 1th and educational
development plan. T is p an
t lation to modern agricultural techniques, to make credit available so that
pursue- (b) through a well-balanced AID.program which meshes closely wit a go
h' 1 is a com rehensive effort to introduce a substantial portion of the
using discreet persuasion where this is.advisable, and promoting istitution-bui ing progr
h th vernment?s five-year
s
o
as long as the Governmen . w g
continue our support. We pursue (a) by maintaining contact with.a;broad spectrum of political elements,.,..
ld' ams We
e
d t
Progress will a mi e y
'a williri ess'and. the, ability,:to pursue these':two..objectives. we should,
h
t
pL UGCUULCJ,
slow iven the present strength of elements opposed to basic change.. But
t dl b
The main thrust of United.'States programs in.Guatemala is to assist the government.in achieving
continued stability by: (a) discreetly supporting. respect for democratic practices and constitutional
health and community development..,,
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 e.nli kEf~.~? ;v 'ri~ v 1
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tance to the security forces. (armed forces and police) finds its justification exclusively
i
s
U.S. ass
accept
as a supplement to U.S. efforts in the political, economic and social fields. It is designed
to achieve two purposes:, (1) to assist. the armed. forces and police to develop as rapidly as possible Arguet
internal security, capabilities sufficient to deal'with the threat posed by vio3;ent opposition from and de
the left; (2) to enable the United States to maintain influence-in the military establishment which of.the
occupies such an important position within the political structure of Guatemala. threat
Guatemala faces national elections in March 1974. How the elections are handle ..by the Arana adminis-One fa
tration will determine the.course of 'Guatemalan political stability and economic and.social development . and it
over the next five years. Because of Guatemala's_preponderant'position in an already weakened CACM, I -Lauger,
the impact will also bd:reflected in the Central American integration process. Guatem
retrac
President Arana during his almost'three years in office has made substantial progress in reducing. the
level of violence and getting his ambitious development programs underway. But. he considers what What s
he has accomplished as unfinished business. This is why he wants a successor who.will continue his that w
program and, secondarily, assure his personal.security so that he can stay in Guatemala and not leave might
the country as other living ex-Presidents have had to do. practi
President Arana seems determined to have his hand-picked candidate, General Kjell Laugerud, succeed
him. I believe his intent is to. accomplish this by fair means, using his substantial prestige, the
.accomplishments of his administration and, the advantages inherent in being in power to win a plurality
if not a majority. But there are two imponderables in this situation. One is that Laugerud is not
a charismatic figure and simply may not. wash with the electorate. The` other is that the opposition,
at this writing'so deeply- fractured,.:may pull itself, together behind, an attractive combination which,
.capitalizing on the. Guatemalan voters' natural proclivity to vote the "ins" out, may outdistance
campaign. ..How.Arana handles such an eventuality will determine the
the coalition slate in an open
.
course of Guatemalan politics in the coming years.
A Laugerud victory fairly achieved willresult,in a continuation ofthe`Arana program with respect to
internal security, economic and social development, Central American integration and relations with
the US. There may be changes of emphasis, such as a stronger nationalist flavor and a modest start
at some basic structural changes, but. the thrust of a'.Laugerud administration will be 'about the same
as Arana's. With continued stability under Laugerud and the prospects for continued high prices for
Guatemala's basic products, Guatemala could then look forward to another four years of increasing tran-
quility and growth.
A victory by any of the foreseeable opposition candidates would meet with varying degrees of unhappineg
and opposition on the part of President Arana and his supporters. This would range from probable
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',lusively,
!d
possible
)n from
t, which
9ucing the
rs what
inue his
not leave
.succeed
ige, the
a plurality
is not
position,
ion which,
tance
ine the
respect to
ons with
st start
j., the same
rices.for
easing tran-
unhappine?
H~1~H5JHUUK'J UVtKVitW
les to refusal to accept a victory by Mayor Colom
r Paiz
ora
acceptance of persons like Sagastume o
Argueta. An opposition triumph would, depending.on how the new government handles the security
and development/reform issues, result in varying degrees of instability determined by the reaction
of the Army and the influential upper. classes. The U.S. is not likely to find its basic, interests
d f the residency
threatened by a victory of any of the present, opposition conten ers or p
n._ L_..i.... I\w1AYRCC r.lcarly i-hrnnrrh all the-..uncertainty which now surrounds. the, electoral campaign
'Lauaerud victory,, and particularly if physical::intiml:aati.on. is, useaaagaaii5L.:yNNuS~~~~,a.
instability and
nce
d
i
l
,
e
v
o
Guatemala will very likely move back into, another cycle of increase
retraction as spelled out in the analysis of.-major issues.
United States as the electoral campaign unfolds?. There is very little
f th
l
e
e o
What should be the ro
that we can or should do. Our influence is marginal. But as opportunities arise-where this influence
might be brought-to bear, I' believe it should be judicially used in support of respect for democratic
f our basic interests in Guatemala.
t
. o
practice and constitutional procedures, and hence in suppor
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tax revenue rather than from debt. The self-help problem thus can only be successfully attacked
if all donors approach the GOG with a uniform position. Such a united donor stance can only
be achieved at the Washington level. Naturally, the Country Team will complement such efforts and
that seek to increase the fiscal self-help level. Given the fact of an electoral year in Guatemala,
our immediate, effort should concentrate on forming the Consultative Group and preparing it for
STATEMENT OF.ISS.UE #2'
What role can the U.S. play to foster a climate conducive to orderly political. social. and economic)
development? Should the U.S. seex in particular to assure a peaceful, free presidential election
and change of administration? If so, how?
IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
1.
the Government's downfall, but will retain a capacity to create political turmoil.
2. Over the past year the GOG has succeeded in further weakening the insurgents
This success has
.
f
been accompanied by a reduction in levels of political violence attributable both to the insurgents
and the Government. s
---~- -??------- -.?1 vvrva.uu~?u .. .7 W111111 C~11G DJ
to allow the free play, of democratic forces leading to the March 1974 elections and to
t
h
respec
t
e
results of those elections. The PGT,' and to some extent the FAR, are presently inclined to seek the:.,t
..goals bypromoting unity, among non-.violent,. political:. groups opposed, to. Government rather than
If
reso
stro
-- -
a
m
h
d
h
r r.? ?,
g
----' -~_
et
ALL
o
-
s o
arass dnd
intimidate the l gal opposition, ' the ` insurgents, will capitalize on the discontent 'so enge tie
ed ,,.,
r
proscribes. legitimate leftist parties, some members of these parties can be expected ~to+join ~thevrank
of the violent opposition and also trigger increased terrorist activities by the PGT/FAR and PAR. t
r
i
d
"Al env
onment, con
ucive to .political and economic development; but our continued help will be com-
promised if the GOG in effect triggers a, new cycle of violence by interfering in the electoral
process.
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Communist-inspired insurgents, if contained at present levels, will not be able'.to bring about'
 cr ruP. m
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ISSUE ANALYSIS
and
GOG
tala,
.tain
om-
ence the Guatemalan political process is marginal and much less than Guate-
fl
i
u
n
5. Our ability to
dencies believe it to be.
ll t
en
malah political leaders of a
ISSUE RESOLUTION
Recommendation:
pro
s in order to
th"A public
a
fety
s
U
anse
h
n
a
help the GOG in its effort to contain communist-supp
At the same time we should discreetly use our influence at all
,
and rapport with Guatemalan leaders
appropriate' levels to encourage the GOG:to allow the free-play:of democratic
iforcesaleadingmtoethe
March 1974 elections and to encourage the Army not.to block accession
elected President. Following the elections (i.e.. innt year's
(a ' the ASPneed ) for should
such reexamineth
nd~an
premises of our grant military assistance in the light ex ante in
relation to the level of insurgency, and (2) the impact which the electoral process may.
the insurgents.
Reasons for Recommendations:
mharP is a direct relationship between-the GOG?s ability tocontrol{insurrgennccysaand ndothe possibilities
-k- n
for healthy political, economic ana social ucvcwr+,~..,.? statement, the latter is in our interest and it is, therefore, worthwhile for us to contribute to zne
former.
f GOG vention in the electoral process s ch
intervention
elections raise the,possibility o
The forthcoming
ibilities a
e
might set off a new wave of terrorism. Three. electoral poss
blatant interference during
(2j
election as occurred in 1966 and 1970Ywith I]eTwinner parpquItscomecout as.the GOG wants with the
h risk of a new wave'of political violence; or
hi
tat th dgers
T believ
e
T
t
ti
g
process which also carries a.high:risk of..renewed .terrorist aac
C
h
eso ud ial
y.
vi
and t q
e a have
fl
__ __-__
uenc
that we should use what limited in
recognizing that we may have to accept possibilities 2 and 3.
With respect to the possibility th any military coup might be xefbrmist and in the USG formist and wouldlnot pre -at thelrationaleyofotheke
would not be reform
f
rame
place within the GASP time
lections and the outlook on the insurgency
h
e e
By this time next year we will know the outcome of t
curate assessment of what we should do in subsequent
. These two factors will permit a more ac
front.
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?iyya 'fit ~,, y.,Vk ~, q.~ ~n8,
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years with respect to grant military materiel assistance. 'Our public safety program will by then
have helped the GOG to reach self-sufficiency on the equipment side. It may be advisable to move
in the same direction on grant materiel for the armed forces.
We do not deceive ourselves' about the extent of USG influence in'such important'and sensitve arez,.
as election politics. But given the tendency of political leaders to seek the views of the Embassy
there is a circumscribed. opportunity for discreet influence in support of the GOG respecting Guate_t
mala's newly established democratic; traditions.:' It. is in our..i;nterests to use those opportunities.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE #3
How should the USG'deal with the continuing serious threat to the security of its personnel?
During the past twelve months the GOG has. 'succeeded in further reducing the operational capabilities,
of terrorist groups.... However,-these-groups still retain the capacity to strike when their interests
so dictate. The danger.'for official Americans,' therefore, remains and may increase if the electoral.
campaign. triggers a. recrudescence of political violence. ". The. Country. Team in the 1973 CASP analyzed
the issue'.,of affording; maximum practical protection to US personnel. Reiterated in last year's CASP;.'
the recommendatioXi'remains, valid and necessary. The NSC-IG/ARA decision reads: "to utilize the
present protective forces more effectively,
obtain additional manpower' as necessary, and attempt to
,
,
assure that the GOG recognizes its pr'imary.-responsibility for protecting our personnel."
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Hoi
tii
me;
Th'
NSi
Am
del
thl,
of
co
STi
Ho
UK
Thl
app
.ne
an
 W
riON
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Guatemala,,
Attached is the/Country Analysis
for FY 1975-1976.
.CLASSIFIED
t to
Subjec
f E ec tive Order
Schedule o
11 Dow raded at T
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Automatic-
Year Interval DeclassifiYed
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o
recent political developments deter us from seek ng our ,~g g
SECRET
AMBASSADOR'S.OVERVIEW
that it maintains its friendly posture towards
i
nsure
The basic U.S.. interest in Guatemala is to
the United States, a posture which has in. recent years.:.benefi.ted.the whole gamut of specific
U.S. interests. Among the more important of. these specific interests.. are: continued assurance
overnment hostile to us;:continued
d b
y any g
that Guatemala will not allow,its territory to.be use
the vast majority of.issues confronted in
support for U.S;'positions in international forums on
citizens and corporations; and
f U
S
nt
t
.
.
o
me
these forums; continued nondiscriminatory.-trea
increased trade and investment opportunities.
but any one of them could be
t
rm
h
e
,
e near
None of these interests is in serious jeopardy in t
government truly hostile to the U.S.
A
.
severely prejudiced by the advent of a hostile government,,,;
olitical upheaval. A domestic
t socio-
l
i
f
t
'
p
en
o
.a.v
. o
as the resul
is likely to take power only.,
climate conducive to,orderly political, economic, and-socialedevelopmentacontains tt ieibest hh ope
of minimizing the poss7.bility- of such Lw, upw.;avai. U 1--. r- o - -
while we seek at the same time
limate
h
-
,
:a c
of. suc
therefore designed to, assist in. the creation
-Guatemalan relations which
S
U
dl
f
i
.
.
y
en
r
to maintain and strengthen on a day-to-day basis the
have existed on all. fronts in recent years.
orderly development, our two princi
ward-moving
f
i
,
or
eve a
In seeking to assist Guatemala to ach
la?s
h
ow
d
i
cratiC
of irate
gile d
r
t
a
^gr
nuee
pal: objectives have been: to encourage .the~cont
-d
elo
a
eform
ar
nificant step backward when the Government
d a si
ff
g
ere
Progress toward our first objective su
refused to accept its widely though unofficially recognized defeat in the March 3 national elec-
- c,,,. ;+c .,rcc;r~anr;ai candidate, General
tions, and used massive. rraua to zat~lca~c a -C, J:
rnment Coalition would control the next Congress. In
v
G
h
e
o
e
Kj ell Laurud : a1~, .to insure that t
olitical murders which we believe
uent
b
l
p
seq
su
the light of these developments. and of severa
of adopt
ssibilit
g
h
d
a.cool and distant
o
y A
e po
a
t
were sanctioned by the Government,,we,considere
ant
ific
e- nTnTn
stance towards the present UUV'ecWLL11.1_ all,, ~1s
ce We decided against this because we believe. that
,. , ___,_ _r ?
i
t
ass
s
an
m
t
~?? --___
p
there i4 a fair chance 'that the incoming Laugerua regime will, in .tact, a~~e
-term chances for a violent upheaval
r . t_ .._? , +1,e on
g
he
f
o
disappointment over the lacy, of respeI
~ ?rm oa1s Our attitude on this
' l
 LU a L LGiIL}) 1, l.V --.----
political opposition.
process and institutions. As part of this program, we will u s e . 'ln uen
and tarrnr against its
a
policy of maintaining contact MJ
to use these contacts discreetly to. attempt to.promote a.renewed respect for the. democratic,
h fl ce as we have
political process over the next few years. We therefore an o con
lI 1e itimate elements of the political spectrum and
'th
has been influence to a eg y
making the best of an unfavorable. situation and to be planning to participate in the
1 t tinue our present
d 'd ree?b the fact that opposition' elements themselves seem.to.be:
A, t a "ait and see" attitude regarding military.and economic
l
aloo pos ure an
t
violence against its 'political: opposition or if:itshould demonstrate no real commitment to
U
and military assistance programs, -I also believe that we shoul stan rea y p
d.to'curtil our assistance'programs if the GOG should engage in wide-scale
f
y a op ing .
we are concurrent
assistance to the Laugerud administration Given the very important role of the Guatemalan
Army in national life, we plan to maintain,a modest level of military assistance with,
concentration on training in the U.S. in order to preserve our influence within the Army.
As for economic assistance, we plan to be ready to help the Laugerud regime if that regime
seems truly committed to meaningful economic and social reform, including specifically
taking steps to.increase tax revenues. The forms of assistance we have in mind are fully
in keeping with guidelines set forth.in the 1973 Mutual.,Assistance Act
While I believe that under present circumstances it is in our best -interest to maintain
continuing correct and harmonious contact with the GOG and,. to look forward to modest economic
d d to ado t a more
meaningful economic and social development
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ISSUE: ANALYSIS
IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
social an economic development? Specifically how;can-.the U;S..seek to minimize the possibility
that the GOG will use or permit :the use of violence. and terror against its political opposition?
What role. should the U.S. play to,assist in fostering a climate conducive to' orderly political,
g ,
peaceful. political dissent' despite its' disillusion over the results o g
f the 1974.national elections.
2. There.are elements within President-elect Laugerud's forthcoming administration which are.:..
advocating the threat and use of terror to muzzle all serious political.dissent,
1. Much of the GOG'spolitical 'opposition is.. disposed to continue to seek its oals via 'e a1
the more likely that opposition is to turn to violence itself, and the more likely that-Guatemala
will enter intoa new period of substantially , increased. violence,
4. It is in the U.S. interest.to`avoid a new spiral of. political violence and counterviolence.
3. The more terror is used or-acquiesced'in by'the'Government against its. olcal n osition
5. Our ability to influence the Guatemalan political process is at best marginal. What influence
est i n the lim
n -..
ithin
we have i s probably stron
on __
g
y
w
s it
ISSUE RESOLUTION
problem with Prdsident-elect'Laugerud andd?withkey elements in the Army. We should-continue to
fund modest military assistance. programs to preserve and enhance our influence within the military
on this and other questions affecting U.S, relations. However, if there'is a continued use of
political terrorism by the GOG against its political opponents, we should consider reducing the
e
1 1 f
That the U.S. seek every appropriate opportunity to influence Guatemalan leaders not to use
Recommendation:
political violence.to muzzle their'opposition. This should include discussin the otential
ve o our military assistance and/or the size of our military presence here.
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f
i arm ul effects for almost all U.:S..interests
in Guatemala. It is in the. US. interest ~rn. a~rn; *U4,
.
,
in all levels of U.S.. assistance to Guatemala.eaThis'inrturnswouldt.leadotoaasdeteriorationtin
U.S.-Guatemala relations across the board w'th h
Reasons for Recommendation"
A new spiral of terror. and,counte'rterror would . seriously'impede..Guatemala's political, social
and economic development
and would robabl l d
We recognize. that making the overtures we re
m
d
co
men
runs the risk of offending those we
approach. This would certainly be true as far as the hard-line MLN.leaders who may be advocating
violence are concerned. _It might also offend Presid
ent-elect Laugerud and/or Army leaders. We,
therefore, gave serious consideration to the advisability,of keeping out.of the line of fire and
hoping for the best. We concluded ho
wever, that the possibility of our influencing the GOG
to curtail the use of political.vinlence ;C
h
,__
wort
the
How should. the U.S. plan, to respond to_the.newly,emergent;.challenges and opportunities that con-
front our interest in assisting in the acceleration of the.economic and social development of
Guatemala? Specifically, what action can betaken;to.make more effective the GOG's commitment
(which we expect. the new Government to h
STATEMENT OF ISSUE #2
nationa~ life, recognizing on the one hand rthat the.GOGahastrecently, addressedcmore forththe
rightly the need to mobilize an adequate level of domestic resources in support of its programs
and on the other that its ability tn -'1-
'nte ti
xt'ic.economy
and about the repercussions ofis action in the1
11
Hl
l
g
h
r
ne
unsett
ed
poli
cal
conte
year's.CASP. The NSC-IG/ARA a roved +1, resolution of the fzscal self-help issue in last
The Country Team--,analyzed and recommended
directed that. in the FY 1975-FYp197b CASPt
b
is
o
m
su
m
sion
.the Country
Team should discuss the endorsed
AID lending level 'in light, of likely fiscal self-help actions. by the new. Guatemalan administration.
That instruction has proven timely:in view.of.recent developments.
In CY 1973, the GOG made significant strides in the area of tax administration improvement. For
the first time in recent years'Central Government tax revenue grew faster than current price
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YSIS AND RESOLUTION OF MAJOR ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED BY'IG
ANAL
zv l~~
threat
How should the USG deal with the serious
during FY 1973?
roups to threaten USG
ability of terrorist g Tanned courses
II, - We project ar continued cap y although we have p
personnel during the period under review,
to reduce it (see I.C.),.. Our efforts to. advance other U.S.
of action
interests places constraints upon the number of personnel who we believe
Personnel levels will be held to-
the.
the be withdrawn from the country. pThe USG's view that held
the minimum consonant with rour espon objectives
fore the providing of our
bears primary sufficient
pehosrstonnel, country coupled with the problem the GOG faces in diplomats,
protection to U.S. Missiori'~'personnel as well as to other foreign P ecial problem,
make personnel security in Guatemala a Special
USG
.In the manpower made available for the protection orof USG
pe Guatemalan terms, and some resistance to p
equipment r salaries for the men as
ment or salaries them the GOG espouses
peequate el transportation, boortation,ee u sigeed to
p
protect Mission personnel.. The widely held belief
a no ransom-or-exchange kidnap policy adds to the threat to USG personnel's
The sketchy information available echnicallytsimpterrorists are
lives. Ter assassination
at present res Thent more inclined to plan for the t licated kidnap. And if the terrorists
attempt rather than the a?Mission member, we have- little reason to
did successfully kidnap d if the GOG refused to negotiate.
believe his life would be spare
Weof thet USG
Local public opinion concerning terrorist activities and therole
with the Administration will o form another constraint. Although
themselves will change-their attitudes about the
ts
ri
s
believe that the terro
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_2_
USG and the role of our programs and personnel in Guatemala, it is clear
that they make some distinction between those whom they believe to be
combatants and leaders . 25X1
(Ambassador ana onsu an While the Sean
Holly kidnapping.makes clear that the terrorists will strike at a target
of opportunity, his debriefing indicated that they felt particular rancor
against the first two groups. The insurgents' lack of accurate intelligence
about the structure of the Mission was also noteworthy. The effect of public
opinion upon the terrorist milieu is not clear. It is reasonable to expect,
however, that insurgents would believe USG personnel made more attractive
targets if public opinion linked the U.S. with repressive measures of the
Arana Administration.
III. At present, Mission policy is, to provide protection to all personnel within
the constraints of resource limitations. Known targets receive special
protection.. Except for the top officials and known targets, protection
is predicated primarily upon defending against vehicular attacks,
particularly while personnel are on scheduled home-office-home moves.
To improve this system, additional manpower and equipment would be required.
The Mission proposes to utilize the present force more efficiently and seek
or contract further manpower as practicable and necessary. We would attempt
to assure that the GOG recognized its primary role in-,protecting our personnel
and that it would provide the necessary resources to do so. However, we
should keep clearly in mind that the gap between resources provided by the
GOG and those required must be filled by the USG.
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u
ment Denied
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 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79M00467A000300050026-6
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence memorandum
Guatemala: No End to Violence?
Secret
A-
29 July 1971
No. 1721/71
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United Status, within the meaning of Title
18, sections '493 and ;94. of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROLP I
6%CLL'DCn /FCV ..c?rov..r:c
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
. 29 July 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Guatemala: No End to Violence?
Summary
President Arana's first year in office, espe-
cially since he imposed the continuing state of siege
last November, has been marked by a no-holds-barred
campaign against Guatemala's decade-old insurgency.
The extension of the security operations toinclude
collaborators, leftists, and miscellaneous trouble-
makers has affected a significant portion of the
very small group in Guatemala that participates in
the national life.
The guerrilla-terrorist organizations have taken
serious losses and have managed to maintain only a
low level of activity over the past several months.
In the past,. the terrorists' most notorious and
daring acts, including the murders in 1968 of the
us ambassador and two US officers in the military
mission, have occurred when the insurgents were
feeling the pinch of security operations. The
terrorists may believe that the time is again ripe
for a spectacular act that would retaliate for their
losses and symbolize their continuing "revolution."
The high incidence of violence attending the
effort against the insurgents, particularly the in-
clusion amdng the victims of a few very prominent
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and was coordinated within CIA.
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Mores
.Francisco
Vela
Huehuetenano
San
M3rCns l ~.
O'
El Est.,.
Izabal
GUATEMALA j
>, '.Zacap~ .
El Progreso. ( -"
Chigmmula
_ `~ ~ t lalaoa
caeca+t,uwu
~` !1 Escuintb
San Jose"
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SECRET
persons (a congressional deputy, a labor leader,
several university professors and journalists),
is adversely affecting the prospects for politi-
cal stability. The progressive hardening of at-
titudes may have removed all chance for eventual
accommodation between. the left and the right. As
the opposition's grievances against the incumbent
government grow, it is increasingly unlikely that
those now in power would risk the accession of
the leftists.
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Introduction
1. Violence and polarization are continuing
in Guatemala in spite of hopes that the unprecedented
transition from one government to another in elec-
tions last year might presage institutional stability
and new opportunities for sociopolitical development.
Within the generally poor, illiterate, and backward
society, only a small segment consciously shares in
the national life, and that group is torn by civil
strife unrelieved by any sign of compromise. Indeed,
the. refusal of Guatemalan politicians to seek a
mutual accommodation is so ingrained that virtually
all doors to dialogue, moderation, and constructive
action seem closed. The general acceptance of ex-
tremism from both the left and the right has reached
the point where even excessive violence is greeted
with-apathy.
"Politics" Today
2. The administration of General Carlos-Arana
Osorio, completing its first year this month, is
pledged to the pacification of Guatemala. Arana?s
background as the army zone commander who cleared the
guerrilla-terrorists from their long-time safe haven in
the eastern hills earned him, along with a strong man
reputation, the sobriquets of "Lion of Zacapa" among
his admirers and "Butcher of Zacapa" among his de--
tractors. His presidential campaign for the 1970
elections was based on the caudillo appeal and won
him more than 40 percent of the valid vote, a plural-
ity that beat two candidates politically to his left.
3. Arana, perhaps sensitive to his position as
a minority president,. immediately upon assuming of-
fice dedicated his term to improving the lot of the
"marginal".,Guatemalan through socioeconomic reform.
He also promised to exercise restraint in the security
field.., His exaggerated efforts to erase the picture
of Arana "the assassin," such as publishing poetry he
had written to his daughter, produced a round of criti-
cism, cruel jokes, and new epithets. Nevertheless, his
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seeming sincerity in wanting to turn the country
around, to end political violence, and to help all
his countrymen won him at least an open mind and a
hearing from the legitimate opposition. Soon, how-
ever, Arana's own supporters convinced him of his
own lack of political expertise and lobbied for a
no-holds-barred counterterrorist campaign. The ac-
tive insurgents, who had been thrown off balance by
Arana's initial reformist rhetoric and insistence
on legality in dealing with subversion, reverted
to their position that a repressive government best
serves their purposes and set out to invite repres-
sive action. They resumed terrorist activity, con-
centrating on murdering easy targets such as minor
police officials.
4. Continuing terrorism and the fear that the
insurgents would attempt major violence on their 10th
anniversary led the government on 13 November 1970 to
impose a state of siege whose severity was unprecedented
in Guatemala. This move signaled an assault on the
subversives, using all resources and methods. The
security forces and allied rightist terrorist squads
have probably accounted for most of the 150 political
deaths a month, but many of the violent incidents in
Guatemala cannot be surely ascribed to any particular
group.
5. Among the dead are about 15. high-level mem-
bers of the major terrorist groups. Security opera-
tiorls have also resulted in the discovery of numerous,.
safe houses and arms caches, and of documents useful
for information on the insurgent organizations. In-
telligence sources confirm that the terrorist groups
have been seriously affected by the loss of personnel,
.security, and contacts, and that psychological damage
has occurred, too. Distrust between and within the
terroristigroups has mounted, and the insurgents have.
accounted for a much smaller portion of the violence
this year.
6. Some of the victims of the security opera-
tions were targeted on the basis of their political
opposition to the groups in power or because of their
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association with the revolutionary governments dur-
ing 1944-54. A few had been very prominent in pub-
lic life and were representative of the most articu-
late elements in society--a congressional deputy, a
labor leader, and several university professors, radio
commentators, and journalists. Dozens of students and
others from the "intellectual community" are missing
and presumed dead at the hands of army assassination
squads. The assault on this very vocal segment has
evoked bad publicity at home and abroad and.spr_ead
a general sense of. insecurity to those usually pro-
tected by name, connections, positions, or wealth.
7. Many of the mutilated bodies that have been
discovered in rivers and ravines, along roads and in
other places that have become standard disposal sites
for corpses probably are miscellaneous "troublemakers."
For example
army operations in the western department of
San Marcos had eliminated 200 "insurgents and bandits"
in the seven weeks since the state of siege had been
imposed. The idea of by-passing the ineffective ju"
dicial system by eliminating habitual delinquents and
criminals appears to have fairly widespread acceptance
.:x~ ..>a:~.s,taaa#eYa... ~;s;srw~ $>?.x.c.,:4a..zr