THE NEXT 200 YEARS A SCENARIO FOR AMERICA & THE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A000200150019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 285
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 1, 1976
• Content Type: PAPER

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DRAFT
THE NEXT 200 YEARS
C.,i4 Scenario for America c8, the World
HERMAN KAHN
WILLIAM BROWN LEON MARTEL
with other
Hudson Institute Staff
Hudson Institute
O
N 0 5 2 0
N E W Y 0 R K 1 0
E W Y O H K 1 5 2
t ^
POLICY RESEARCH
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
To Be Published by William Morrow $ Co., Inc.
May 1976
(Not to be duplicated or reproduced in any manner without per-
mission of Hudson Institute and William Morrow $ Co.)
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with other
Hudson Institute Staff
1976 by Hudson Institute
Copyright
Uft.
Not to be duplicated or reproduced in any manner
without permission of Hudson Institute, Inc. and
William Morrow & Company, Inc., Publishers
HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC.
Quaker Ridge Road
Croton-on-Hudson,
New York 10520
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ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: PUTTING GROWTH IN PERSPECTIVE. . . . . . . 1
The Current Malaise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Hudson Study and the American Bicentennial. . . . 4
Four Characteristic Views of Two Basic Images . . . . .
of the Earth-Centered Perspective . . . . . . . . 10
Watersheds of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CHAPTER 2: TURNING POINTS IN THE GROWTH OF POPULATION AND PRODUCT. . 25
Population in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Demographic Transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Economic Growth, Yesterday and Today . . . . . . . . . . 36
The Economic Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
GNP per Capita--The Transitions Combined . . . . . 60
CHAPTER 3: ENERGY: EXHAUSTIBLE TO INEXHAUSTIBLE . . . . . . 65
Future Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Fossil Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Fission Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
The Transition to Long-Term Sources . . . . . . . . . 76
Solar Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Geothermal Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Nuclear Fusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Energy.Systems of the 22nd Century . . . . . . . . . 88
Efficient Use of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
CHAPTER 4: RAW MATERIALS: THE END OF THE BEGINNING. . . . . . . . . 97
The Long-Term Perspective for Resources . . . . . . . . . 102
Near-Term Import Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Mutual Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Future Long-Term World Demand and Supplies. . . . . . . . 117
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i i i
CHAPTER 5: FOOD: SUPPLYING DEMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
125
Future Directions in Food Production . . . . . . . . .
..
130,
Nutritional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
132
Increasing Food Production: Myths and Realiities. . . .
.
134
Scenarios for the Next 200 Years . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
144
The Special Problem of India . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
160
CHAPTER 6: THE NEAR-TERM ENVIRONMENT: CLEAN AIR, CLEAR WATER
AND AESTHETIC LANDSCAPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
165
A Perspective on the Current Issues . . . . . . . . . .
.
165
Some Consequences of Environmental Regulation . . . . .
.
171
. . . . . . . . . .
Environmental Economics . . . .
.
175
J id
Technology: Force for Good or Evil? . . . . . . . . .
Technology:
.
178
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Land-Use
.
187
Future Environmental Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
190
CHAPTER 7: THE LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENT:
MAINTAINING EARTH'S FRAGILE ENVELOPE . . . . . . .. . .
.
193
One Problem: Mistakes of Omission or of Commission?. .
.
1914
Some Difficult and Relatively Emotional Issues. . .. . .
.
2011
CHAPTER 8: FROM PRESENT TD FUTURE: THE PROBLEMS OF
TRANSITION TO A POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. . . . . . .. . .
.
217
3asic Current Directions and Context . . . . . . . . .
.
217
The Erosion of Traditional Societal Levers . . . . . .
.
229
How Sate Will the World Be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
232
Transitional Problems of Morale, Attitudes and the
Quality of Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
234
How Likely are Democracy and World Government? . . . .
.
241
CHAPTER 9: THE TASKS AHEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . .
.
45
The First Task: A Realistic Image of the Future . . .
.
246
overcoming the Known Problems of the Near Term . . . .
.
248
Coping with the Unknown Problems of the Long Term . . .
.
262
Thinking About the Postindustrial Era . . . . . . . . .
.
265
SELECTED READINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
269
LIST OF MEMBERS OF HUDSON INSTITUTE'S PROSPECTS
FOR MANKIND ADVISORY BOARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
272
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Figure 1: The Great Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2: Population Growth - 1750 to Present . . . . . . . . . . 27
Figure 3: Rate of Growth of World Population . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 4: Population Growth Rate in Long-Term
Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Figure 5: Gross World Product per Capita 1776-2176 . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 6: Projected Cost Ranges for Several Types of
Solar Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Figure 7: Import Dependence in Selected Industrial Raw Materials . 1111
Figure 8: Nutrient Film Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Figure 9: A Reasonably Optimistic Scenario for Equivalent
Grain Production 1976-2176 For Feeding the
World's Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Figure 10: Pollution Control Costs as a Percentage of the
U.S. Gross National Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Figure 11: Combined Indices of Air Pollution for Selected
National Air Sampling Network (NASN) Sites,
National Population-Weighted Averages . . . . . . . . 186
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Table 1: Four Views, of the Earth-Centered Perspective. . . . . . . 12
Table 2: United States Shares of Employment and Gross
National Product by Sector, Selected Years
and P ro i ec:tec to 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Table 3: Estimates of World Energy Consumption . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 4: Resources of Principal Fossil Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 5: Anticipated Initial Cost of Synthetic Fuels
From Various Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 6: Summary of Global Energy Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Table 7: Principal Suhs-_itutes for Materials . . . . . . . . . . .101
Table 8: How "Known Reserves" Alter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
Table 9: Oil Prophecies and Realities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Table 10: Metal Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
Table 11: Price of Minerals Relative to Average Cost of Labor . . .118
Table 12: Relative Consumption of Important Industrial
Metals (19681 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 13: Some Comparative Land and Sea Resources . . . . . . . . .. Z2
Table 14: Prices For Urea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,38
Table 15: Some Sources or New Agricultural Land . . . . . . . . . .l' 46
Table 16: Automobile Emissions, 1957-67, and under
Federal Standards, 1970-75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .!idl
Table 17: 1985 Technological Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Table 18: Some Failures of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Z38
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We would like first to express our gratitude to those who have
contributed generously to the research that has made this book possible:
T. Roland Berner through Community Funds, Inc.; William B. O'Boyle;
Raytheon Company; Henry Salvatori; Scaife Family Charitable Trusts; and
the Alex C. Walker Educational and Charitable Foundation.
At Hudson Institute the authors have been most notably aided in
their work by the research and analysis of the following staff members:
Paul Bracken, Marylin Chou, Mary Esbenshade, Patrick Gunkel and David
Harmon, In addition, special thanks are owed to our two 1975 Summer
Interns: Owen Astrachan and Felicia Candela. We would also like to
acknowledge our debt to Robert Panero, whose valued insights are sprinkled
throughout the volume, to Marvin Gustavson for his contributions to
Chapters III and VII, to Charles A. Zraket, Richard S. Greeley and Robert
Pikul of the Mitre Corporation who assisted us with Chapters VI and VII,
and to Uno Svedin who did research and analysis in support of Chapter VII.
We are all in agreement that this book has benefited greatly, both in
form and substance, from the fine editorial hand of Arnold Dolin
and the editorial work of Ernest E. Schneider of the Hudson staff. We
also want to express our appreciation to Ruth Ann Crow, who has drawn the
graphics, and to our Librarian, Mildred Schneck, and her assistant, Ruth
Paul, who have located numerous references, tracked down elusive citations
and helped prepare our list of selected readings,
Our greatest thanks go to Maud Bonnell, Elaine Shelah and Josee
Laventhol, each of whom has labored long and diligently to translate our
often disparate and rambling thoughts into cogent manuscript. We would
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like to acknowledge also the tireless efforts of Vivian Hilldebrandt,
who has supervised typing of the manuscript, ably assisted by Kathleen
Dymes, Louise Horton, Ann E. Marsek, Rose Marie Martin, Betty McRobbie,
Mary Mitchell, Maureen Pritchard, and Carolann Roussel.
the distinguished members of our Prospects for Mankind Advisory
Board we would like to express our appreciation for reading and commenting
on earlier versions or portions of the manuscript. Particularly, we would
like to express our gratitude for written comments on the. first chapter
by William W, Kellogg, Senior Scientist of the National Center for Atmos-
pheric Research, and Paul Weidlinger, of Weidlinger Associates. We also
want to acknowledge our debt to those before us who have written about
the postindustrial society and its implications, especially to the out-
standing works of Daniel Bell, Colin Clark and Peter F. Drucker.
'hese, and many others who have assisted our work and encouraged our
forts, merit our gratitude for helping make this a better book., but we
a.ore bear full responsibility for what finally meets the reader's eye,
A list of the members of this Board appears at the end of this book..
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viii
PREFACE
This short book is a partial report of work in progress at Hudson
Institute on crucial issues of population growth, economic development,
energy, raw materials, food and the environment that currently are the
focus of attention for governments, academic institutions, private cor-
porations, news media and concerned citizens all over the world. While
we do not ignore the short and medium terms, our focus in this book is
on the long term--and we consider most of the immediate and medium term
issues that do arise as transitional phenomena. Rather than trying to
solve the practical problems raised by these issues or even to predict
the actual course of events, we have written a scenario for America and
the world for the next 200 years which puts these issues in a new per-
spective. This scenario does, however, demonstrate that there are, in
principle, solutions.
The American Bicentennial provides a unique opportunity to make such
an examination, for it is a propitious occasion to assess where we have
been, what the current situation is and where we are likely to go. There
is an inherent human interest in seeing oneself, one's nation, one's time
This work originated in research initially undertaken for The Mitre
Corporation Symposium on Energy, Resources and Environment (ERE), 8-9
November 1971, McLean, Virginia. Subsequent presentations were made at
the First General Conference, Phase 11, of Hudson's Corporate Environment
Study, 9-14 January 1972, Venice, Italy and The Mitre Corporation ERE
Symposium of 14 April 1972, McLean, Virginia. Studies currently in prog-
ress at Hudson are expected to yield three additional books which will
supplement and complement this volume. One will deal with the new environ-
ment for development; a second will focus on the next decade (1977-1986);
and the third will continue our examination of development and the prospects
for mankind.
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in the perspective of what has passed, and there is an equal interest in
investigating the future--and these interests are enhanced at a time of
historical commemoration. It is our hope that the thought and ideas
growing out of this investigation will influence current public policy
both directly and indirectly, and thus have an enduring impact.
Often contemporary issues are not fully understood until they have
become history and can be seen in a historical context. To some degree
futurology can furnish such a context by giving us now an artificial
vantage point from which to look backward; examined in this long term
perspective, current issues look quite different and can be better
comprehended. Even if the actual future turns out to deviate from the
one projected, the exercise will prove worthwhile for the new insights
it provides.
.,uch an effort seems particularly appropriate today, at a time when
much popular and widespread discussion indicates that the prospects for
mankind are very dim. We w 11 not attempt here to rebut this view
systematically (others, including ourselves, have already undertaken that.
task in general and in deta'l). But we will try to show a contrary
scenario, one that if riot correct in all of its particulars is still,
we believe, much more likely to occur or to be relatively representative
of what does occur.
Aside from the doomsday literature, we find little in the current
discussions that looks much further ahead than ten or twenty years. We
will try here to adopt the perspective of our grandchildren and our great
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grandchildren and represent--however inadequately--their interests and
their needs. Mankind is now operating on such a grand scale that many
current activities and programs raise issues that--at least conceptually--
can be dealt with only in a much longer time frame. There is an obligation
for all--but especially for the most advanced nation on earth--to define
the problems of our future and suggest the means for dealing with them.
In effect we are suggesting that both public and private institutions
try to act as an early warning system and as a lobby for the medium and
long term future; for we believe, to rephrase Santayana, that those who
neglect the future risk losing it.
We have deliberately kept this report of work in progress as brief
and non-technical as possible because we want wide circulation and reader-
ship. This means that our evidence is often more suggestive and heuristic
than sufficient, that our arguments are foreshortened and that our conclu-
sions will sometimes appear to be didactic and dogmatic. There may also
be errors of both commission and omission. These we will attempt to deal
with through further analysis and revision arising out of the program of
specialized studies we currently have under way.
Beyond this we offer no apologies. Mostly we are trying to examine
some very important but basically simple issues. Our interest is as much
in opening discussion as in closing it, in asking questions as in answer-
ing them, in raising issues as in settling them. However, we do speculate
on solutions and conclusions as far as our courage and judgment will
allow us to.
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We often find that what is well known is poorly understood, and
what is taken for granted is taken without thought. We allso disagree
with much of the thinking and discussion in academic, intellectual, and
literary establishments today. Therefore, for both the common and
academic wisdom we offer uncommon analysis. The exercise may please
some, jar others and perhaps upset more than a few. But we are confi-
dent that it will open a new perspective on the issues we discuss. For
America and the world--in this anniversary year--we could hardly ask
more or offer less.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION: PUTTING GROWTH IN PERSPECTIVE
The scenario presented, elaborated and tested in this book can be
summarized with the general statement that 200 years ago almost everywhere
human beings were comparatively few, poor and at the mercy of the forces
of nature, and 200 years from now, we expect, almost everywhere they will
be numerous, rich and in control of the forces of nature. The 400-year
period will thus have been as dramatic and important in the history of
mankind as was the 10,000-year period that preceded it, a span of time
that saw the agricultural revolution spread around the world, giving way
finally to the birth of the Industrial Revolution. The midway mark
of this 400-year period has seen the initial emergence, in the most
advanced countries, of superindustrial economies (where enterprises are
extraordinarily large, encompassing, and pervasive forces in both the
physical and societal environments), to be followed soon by postindustrial
economies (where the task of producing the necessities of life has become
trivially easy because of technological advancement and economic develop-
ment). We expect that all countries eventually will develop the charac-
teristics of super- and postindustrial societies.
It would be well to establish definitions of key words like
"l" "institutions," ''culture" and ''society''
economy, at the outset. We
distinguish among them as follows: "economy" denotes economic and tech-
nological activity; "institutions" the laws and organizations; "culture"
the style, values, national character and attitudes; and ''society"
refers to the whole.
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The Current Malaise
or the past several years many concerned, intelligent people have
developed strongly pessimistic feelings about the evolution of economic,
technological and industrial development. At first these feelinqs
focused on glaring--and often growing--disparities in maternal well-being,
not only between rich and poor nations, but within the rich nations them-
selves. More recently, rising concern about pollution and the possible
exhaustion of many natural resources has increased the already serious
doubts about the continuation of this "disproportionate" consumption--
doubts often expressed as Questions about the moral right: of the rich to
use up so many "nonrenewable" or scarce resources and at prices that
.ire considered unfairly low.
On the other hand, concern is also growing about the possibility of
a new economic order in which resource-rich nations of the Third World
would combine in cartels to set high commodity prices. By thus pre-
tempting for themselves much of the surplus available in the production
process, they might permanently diminish the prosperity of the wealthy
nations and make life intolerable for the resource-Door nations or those
Anable to join a cartel.
Added to these feelings is a pervasive loss of confidence in the
ability of national leaders in almost all developed countries to deal with
the problems that beset the world today. Domestic political scandal and a
decade of futile combat in Southeast Asia have eroded the leading
position of the United States in international affairs; worldwide infla-
tion, accompanied by a major downturn in economic growth, has called
into question the international economic institutions created In the
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wake of World War II. Bureaucracies have proliferated everywhere, while
the services they offer have often declined as the number and cost of
personnel have mounted alarmingly. To many it seems that the resources
of the productive and fortunate are being increasingly drained without
the lot of the less productive and less fortunate being measurably
improved. Widely publicized ferment, agitation and so-called "liberation"
movements among young people, women, and minority groups have signaled
to some the imminence of possible revolution. French President Giscard
d'Estaing's remark that "we can see that practically all these curves are
leading us to disaster"* accurately encapsulates this current mood of
malaise.
Indeed, a consensus is emerging among many scholars and journalists
that a turning point has been reached in world history, one that portends
either a much more disciplined and austere--even bleak--future for mankind,
or a dramatic and revolutionary change in domestic and international
society, or perhaps both. These observers argue that contemporary
trends--and the increasing threats that appear to accompany them--rule
out any realistic possibility, through current or even reformed institu-
tions, of continued worldwide economic development. Indeed, they tend
to view further development as endangering the prospects for mankind,
and they conclude that technological, economic, political and moral
imperatives require a basic change in the emphasis of mankind's activi-
ties--from seeking growth to slowing growth, from affluence to austerity,
from conspicuous consumption by the few to equitable distribution of a
limited and finite product among all.
*In press meeting, Paris, October 24, 1974, Press and Information
Service, Embassy of France, Washington, D. C.
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Hudson Study and the American Bicentennial
The Hudson institute has been engaged for some time in the first phase
1Yf a major attempt to examine and analyze these issues in world develop-
rnent, and our preliminary findings suggest that the views described above
may be based to a large extent on a misreading of certain current reaiities
end their implications for the future. In fact, while Hudson's examina-
Lion of these problems in historical perspective does reveal serious and
~aotentially disastrous future possibilities, it also shows that many of
them are more the growing pains of success (often accentuated by ill-timed
bursts of mismanagement as well as the needlessly dire prophecies of doom-
sayers) than the inevitable precursors of doom.
In our view, the application of a modicum of intelligence and good
management in dealing with current problems can enable economic growtri
to continue for a considerable period of time, to the benefit, rather
than the detriment, of mankind. We argue that without such growth the
disparities so regretted today would probably never be overcome, that
no growth" would consign the poor to indefinite poverty and increase
the present tensions between "haves" and "have-nots." Nevertheless,
we do riot expect economic growth to continue indefinitely; instead, its
i_)resent exponential rate will probably slow gradually to a low or zero
rate. Our differences with those who advocate limits 1.o growth deal
less with the likelihood of this change than with the treasons for it.
As part of our study we have developed two perspectives on the future
which many might judge to be optimistic but which we consider quite
realistic. (While events may not follow either of these two perspectives,
we do think they provide good ways to examine current trends.), One
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perspective, which we call "earth-centered," assumes that for the next 200
years the vast majority of the human population will continue to inhabit
the earth and that extraterrestrial activity will be limited to explora-
tion and modest levels of exploitation. While important, these space
activities will not significantly affect human population growth rates,
nor will they entail radical shifts in the rate of growth of gross world
product (GWP). Our second perspective, styled "space-bound," assumes a
much more vigorous effort in extraterrestrial activities early in the
21st century, including the eventual establishment of large autonomous
colonies in space involved in the processing of raw materials, the pro-
duction of energy and the manufacture of durable goods--both for indige-
nous consumption and as exports back to earth or to other solar-system
colonies. Such developments would involve substantial migration from
earth and could eventually create very new and different patterns of
population and product growth, all quite beyond any projections made
from a basically earth-centered perspective.
For the purposes of this book--to present a plausible scenario for
a "growth" world that leads not to disaster but to prosperity and plenty--
we have focused on our first perspective. By doing so we are making what
is in effect an a fortiori argument, asserting that the transition we
foresee (and the resolution of many current problems) can be accomplished
by what is available to us here on earth, in terms of both living space
and resources. It is possible that our second perspective will turn out
to be closer to reality, and if so, then it is clear that the growth pro-
jections of our 200-year scenario will be more than fulfilled. Thus,
although personally we are somewhat more inclined toward the second
perspective, it is on the first that our case rests. It should be noted
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chat even if the second perspective turned out to be more difficult to
dc:hieve than we now believe, the fulfillment of the first perspective, with
is enormous economic development and technological advancement:, would
create a potential for the allocation of resources to space that could
?ontriibute to the eventual successful development of the second perspective.
Figure 1 sums up our first perspective (with parenthetical remarks
For the last three sets of dates indicating plausible events in space
,associated with our second perspective). Here we argue that. the growth
First of population and later of GWP will approximate a flattened S-
shaped, or logistical, curve, passing from an earlier era of slow growth
through the present period of exponential growth to a final leveling-off."
(If we were to focus on the second perspective, we would argue that a new
-shaped curve may start sometime in the 21st century, representing the
>>(3lonizing of the solar system and eventually generating growth rates
that we would not even try to estimate; perhaps later, when this transi -
=:ion was near completion. yet another curve would begin, representing
the colonization of interstellar space, a task that may be as open-ended
.is the galaxy, or for that matter the universe.)
The earth-centered perspective assumes that the world population
flattens out at 15 billion people, give or take a factor of two (that is)
.The current year is depicted as the inflection point of the curve,
it once both its moment of maximum growth and therefore the beginning
=)f slower growth. In reality, following current UN data and projections,
we expect to witness the inflection point in rate of population growth
luring the period 1976 to 1980; for reasons to be explained in the
following chapter, we believe that the inflection point in rate of growth
of GWP will lag about a decade behind that of population. While both
)redictions are far from certain, the second one is much less certain
than the first.
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F I GURI 1
THE GREAT T'11ANS I T ION
A BirentonrriuuI end/or i (;aI isti (_ Perspective on
Prospects for Wink 'in d
(I n fixed 1975 do I I are.
'176:
I`.) b i I I ion people
$',OC)triIIion GWP
$:1,000 per capita
I()/( : 4. 1 u l I I ion people
$5.5 billion GV1P
$ 1300 per (capita
1776: 1-
7 `-) m i l l i oon p.,._~p
$ I`>r) b i I I i o n
S7i)0 p'~r capi to
Before 1776
1776
- 1925
1926
- 1955
1956
- 1995
BREAKING THE
BACK OF THE ?-
JOB
1996
- 2025
2026
- 2175
EVENTUAL
INTERIM
GOAL OF
MANKIND
All societies are pre-industrial
150 years for initial industrialization of
'Europe, Japan and North America
Three decades for initial steps toward worldwide
industrialization and emergence of mass consump-
tion societies in Europe, Japan and North
America
Four decades of worldwide and rapid economic
and population qrowth; initial emergence of
superindustrial economy, technological crises
and many other historic transitions, e.g.,
inflection points in world population and
perhaps gross product curves. (First steps
into space)
Another three decades for initial emergence
of postindustrial economics in European and
non-Communist Sinic cultures--perhaps also
U.S.S.R. Full development of superindustrial
societies and cultures in advanced countries.
(First serious move to colonize space)
150 years for emergence of postindustrial
economies almost everywhere on earth. (The
establishment of an independent dynamic
solar system society)
Full development of postindustrial institutions
and cultures almost everywhere on earth. (Man
After 2176 turns his attention to the creation of such
societies everywhere in the solar system and
perhaps to the stars as well)
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a range of 7.5 to 30 billion); the percapita product at $20,000, give:
.)r take a factor of three; and the GWP at about $300 trillion. give or
take a factor of five. The absolute range of variability is, of course,
larger than the one we have given, but we find the above quite plausible.
If our basic assumptions are correct, then the metaphor of exponen-
tial growth during the next century will be increasingly misleading.
Moreover, assertions that an impending dramatic collision with physical
limits will force a c;noice between a policy leading inevitably to
:atastrophe and one of no-growth (or even a forced low-growth) are, in
our view, based on highly implausible assumptions. Indeed, Hudson
,rojections based on current trends point to the conclusion that growth
is likely to continue for many generations, though at gradually decreas-
ing rates which we expect to result more from a slowing pace of demand
We have chosen to use "gross product" and "per capita product'' as
basic variables, despite much current criticism and even disillusionment
with these concepts. There are many problems associated with the concept
of GNP defined as the total amount of goods and services produced, but
some of the criticism is not relevant. It is certainly true that it does
not necessarily measure welfare, progress, quality of life, true wealth,
power, strength or desirability, but then it's not supposed to. Nor does
the fact that many consumer expenditures can be thought of as operating
costs and not income chance the utility of the concept.
In any event, for our purposes here, we have adopted the simple,
common-sense and largely reasonable approach 'that dollars tend to measure
opportunity costs and that gross product tends to measure the total heft
of the economy and indicate the limits of what can or cannot be done with
the resources of any particular economy.
It should also be noted that here and throughout the book, all
dollar figures are in fixed, constant 1975 equivalents, with inflation
discounted.
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9
than from increasing difficulties in obtaining physical supplies. Accord-
ing to this analysis, the gradual leveling-off tendency will be a social
consequence of the proliferation of such factors as modernization, literacy,
urbanization, affluence, safety, good health and birth control, and govern-
mental and private policies reflecting changing values and priorities
(accompanied by the increasing desire of vested interests to protect
their status quo from external pressures for expansion). Although the
possibilities of overcrowding, famine, resource scarcity, pollution and
poverty cannot be dismissed, they should be seen as temporary or regional
phenomena that society must deal with rather than as the inevitable fate
of man. In this context, one of our main concerns is that beliefs and
attitudes that create resistance to economic growth will impede the re-
solution of our current problems and perhaps even lead to the kind of
disasters we all want to prevent--that they will become in effect, self-
fulfilling prophecies.
America's first 200 years have both mirrored and driven the age of
industrialization. The year of the start of the American Revolution,
1776, also witnessed the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations;
it is therefore a convenient benchmark for the beginning of the Indus-
trial Revolution. These two revolutions marked the onset of a unique
era in world history: It was the Industrial Revolution that spurred
unprecedented productivity and economic growth, and it was America that
came to play the leading role in that development. It thus seems both
fitting and opportune that the American Bicentennial should almost coin-
cide with the turning point in what can be mankind's great transition to
a world which, without being a utopia, can create both the opportunity
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and the foundation for an environment of relative peace and prosperity
for nearly everyone, and hopefully one of relative joy and fulfillment:
as we i l .
["our Characteristic Views of Two Basic Images
of the Earth-centered Perspective
There are two basic and totally different images (or models) of the
earth- centered perspective? which we have labeled the neo-Malthusian
dud technology and grc*ith. The first is a modern version of the analysis
of the 19th-century English economist Thomas Malthus, who argued that
population would eventually grow faster than food supply, thus implying
tt~hat starvation would soon become mankind's perennial companion, at
:east for the poor. The opposite image stems from the premise that in
4:rie next 100 years material needs can be met so easily in the currently
developed world that the more advanced nations will develop superindus-
j:r-ial and then postindustrial economies, and that the rest of the world
will soon follow. Obviously these two basic images encompass a range of
differing views and concepts, so to represent them fairly and without
exaggeration, we have developed two detailed views for each of the two
models--one of which in each case is a relatively extreme position, the
other a moderate one. Thus, the neo-Malthusian model includes the view
of a strong neo-Malthusian and the view of a moderate neo-Malthusian
.advocate (that is, a guarded pessimist); and for the contrasting model
w;ve describe the position taken by a moderate (or guarded optimist) and
scholarly integrity and concern for the somewhat maligned memory of
Malthus compel us to note that this best-known conclusion of his was an
=arty view which he tempered and amended in his later work. We are
rateful to Roger Revelle for pointing this out to us
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11
and an enthusiastic advocate of technology and economic growth. Both of
the moderate positions argue that we can expect serious problems in energy
shortfalls, resource scarcities and food distributon. Both also raise
the real possibility of cataclysmic or irreversible environmental damage.
But both hold open the possibility (in one case barely and in the other
relatively clearly) that with technological progress, wise policies,
competent management and good luck, mankind can deal with these problems
and survive into a future where, at the least, opportunity is not foreclosed
and disaster is not foreordained. The guarded optimist's view goes even
further, holding that we may still avert ultimate disaster even if the
policies are not so wise, management not so competent, and luck not so
good, but the worse the policies, management, and luck, the greater the
potential for tragedy along the way and even for final cataclysm.
These four views, as they relate to ten different issues, are
summarized in Table 1. Columns A and B list the typical neo-Malthusian
concerns about the limited potential of the earth and the likelihood of
greatly diminishing returns on future investments, rapid depletion of
resources and uncontrolled exponential or cancerous population growth.
In this image, innovation and discovery are seen as traps and further
industrial development is expected to hasten the approaching disaster;
growth of either the population or the economy is considered anti-
thetical to a high quality of life. In short, the long-term outlook is
grim. The two views of the technology and growth model, listed in columns
C and D, argue that because of the evolution of knowledge and technology,
resources are increasing rather than fixed; more technology and more
capital are vital; decision-making will probably rise to the occasion,
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CONVINCED
NEO-MALTHUSIAN*
).. BASIC WORLD MODEL
Finite Pie. Most global non-renewable
resources can be estimated accurately
(within a factor of 5 or 10) to demon-
strate the reality of the running out
phenomenon. Whatever of these resources
is consumed will forever be denied to
others. Current estimates show we will
be running out of many critical resources
in the next 50 years. The existing
remainder of the pie must be shared more
fairly among the nations of the world,
the rich and the poor, and between this
generation and those to follow. Because
the pie shrinks over time, any economic
growth which makes the rich richer can
only make the poor poorer.
2. TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL
Largely Illusory or Counterproductive.
Proposed technological solutions to
problems of pollution or scarce resources
are short-sighted illusions that only
compound the difficulties. Even on a
moderate scale this approach would only
further deplete crucial resources while
avoiding the real problems and prolong-
ing the poverty of the LDCs. Any future
economic development should be restricted
to the Third World and should include
some transfer of existing capital assests
from the over developed nations. A
completely new approach is needed for
the long term.
3. MANAGEMENT AND DECISION-MAKING
Failure is Almost Certain. The complexi-
ties, rigidities and ideological differ-
ences among nations and their institutions
make it inconceivable that present human
organizations, even with computer assis-
tance, could sufficiently comprehend and
effectively act to solve our most impor-
tant problems. A drastic redesign is
needed to circumvent the thrust toward
bigness; to permit much more local and
decentralized decision making; to live
and work on a manageable human scale--
more emphasis is needed on the community
and regional level--much less on big
business, big government, and big organi-
zations generally.
FOUR VIEWS OF THE EARTH-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE
B, GUARDED PESSIMIST C. GUARDED OPTIMIST
Uncertain Pie. The future supply and
value of both old and new materials is
necessarily uncertain. Past projections
of the future availability of materials
usually have been gross underestimates--
one can concede this could happen again,
but current estimates seem relatively
reliable. Current exponential growth
clearly risks an early exhaustion of
some critical materials. Prudence re-
quires immediate conservation of remain-
ing resources. Excessive conservation
poses small risks while excessive con-
sumption would be tragic.
Growing Pie. Past technological and
economic progress suggests that increas-
ing current production is likely to
further increase potential for greater
production and that progress in one
region encourages similar developments
everywhere. Thus as the rich get richer
the poor also benefit. Higher consump-
tion in the developed world tends to
benefit all countries. Excessive caution
tends to maintain excessive poverty.
Some caution is necessary in selected
areas but both the "least risk" and the
"best bet" paths require continued and
rapid technological and economic develop-
ment.
Unlimited Pie. The important resources
are capital, technology and educated
people. The greater these resources, the
greater the potential for even more.
There is no persuasive evidence that any
meaningful limits to growth are in sight
--or are desirable--except for popula-
tion growth in some LDCs. If any very
long term limits set by a "finite earth"
really exist, they can be offset by the
vast extraterrestrial resources and
areas which will become available soon.
Man has always risen to the occasion and
will do so in the future despite dire
predictions from the perennial doomsayers
who have always been scandalously wrong.
Mostly Diminishing Returns. Generally, Required For Proress. Despite some
despite many exceptions, the future will dangers only new technology and capital
bring diminishing marginal returns from investment can increase production; pro-
new investments and the effort required tect and improve the environment; hold
for economic gains will increase dramati- down the cost of energy, minerals, and
cally. The technology, capital equip- food; provide economic surpluses with
ment, and other efforts required to which to improve living standards in the
obtain minerals and food in increasingly LDCs; and prepare prudently for any
marginal situations will accelerate the potential unexpected catastrophes. We
approaching exhaustion of many resources must be alert for problems resulting
and substantially increase pollution and from inadequately understood innova-
shortages--possibly to lethal levels. tions, inappropriate growth, and/or
Until practical solutions to these prob- natural causes. However, we should
lems have appeared, we must turn away proceed with energy and confidence even
from technology and investment. while exercising great caution and con-
stantly reassessing future risks and
benefits.
Likely Failure. The rapidity of change, Moderately Successful. Systematic inter-
growing complexity and increasing con- nalization of current external costs and
flicting interests make effective manage- normal economic mechanisms can make most
ment of resources, control of pollution, private organizations adequately respon-
and resolution of social conflicts too sive to most problems. A practical
difficult. Some slowdown and simplifi- degree of public regulation and a low
cation of issues are imperative--even if degree of international cooperation can
it requires drastic actions. If we don't handle the rest, if somewhat awkwardly.
reform voluntarily, more painful political~Outstanding management is rare but usually
and economic changes may be imposed on not essential as most institutions learn
us by the catastrophic events made inevi- from experience--if often slowly and pain-
table by failure to act soon. (Note fully. (But good management can reduce
there is a wide range of attitudes here the number and intensity of painful expe-
toward central planning and toward local riences.) Except for wars, shocks as
decision making, but almost all of them great as the oil shock and other 73/74
include mistrust of the current "unfree experiences are rare and yet existing
market.") systems reacted adequately--and survived.
Solves Almost All Problems. Some current
problems have resulted from careless
application of technology and investment
but none without a remedy. It is not
paradoxical that technology which caused
problems can also solve them--it only
requires mankind's attention and desire.
There is little doubt that sufficient
land and resources exist for continual
progress on earth. Most current prob-
lems are the result of too little tech-
nology and capital, not too much. In
any case man's desire for expansion into
new frontiers will lead eventually to
the colonization of the solar system and
effectively unlimited lebensraum.
Not a Serious Problem. We flatter our-
selves that current issues are more
important and difficult than ever. Actu-
ally there is usually nothing very special
happening. Mankind always has faced
difficult and dangerous problems; poor
solutions resulted in high costs. Some-
times there is even a Darwinian selection
--the successful surviving and the fail-
ure disappearing. Progress has made the
stakes today less dramatic. Modern commu-
nication and information systems and
sophisticated organizations provide a
capability for rapid adjustments to
reality whenever changes are required
and government interference is not
counterproductive.
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4. RESOURCES
Steady Depletion. Mankind is steadily,
and often rapidly, depleting the earth's
potential resources for foods, fuels,
and minerals, and overwhelming its capa-
bility to absorb or recycle pollutants.
Catastrophic results for some of these
resources may be postponed until the 21st
century but food, energy and some
minerals already appear to be critically
short for the near term. All signs point
to catastrophe for the medium and long-
term future.
5, CURRENT GROWTH
Carcinogenic. Current population and
economic production are akin to a
spreading cancer. They are already more
than the earth can sustain in a steady
state. Future economic or population
growth will hasten and increase the magni-
tude of the future tragedy. The current
demand for continued economic growth and
the likelihood of a greatly increased
world population only imply a steady
worsening of the present extremely dan-
gerous conditions.
6. INNOVATION AND DISCOVERY
A Trap. New discoveries of resources,
new technologies, and new projects may
postpone immediate need for drastic
actions, but not for long. Such post-
ponement will make eventual collapse
earlier and more severe. Prudence
demands immediate restraint, cutbacks,
and a basic change in values and
objectives. The time for short-run
palliatives is past.
Continual Difficulties. The basic prob- Generally Sufficient. Given slow but
em o limited resources may be insoluble. steady technological and economic prog-
Even when sufficient resources exist, ress and an ultimate world population
politics, incompetent management, poor below 30 billion, it should be feasible
planning and slow responses make effec- to attain economic living standards
tive solutions difficult under conditions markedly better than current ones. With
of exponentially increasing demand. Where rapid progress and good management gener-
resources are becoming scarce and unrelent- ally even higher economic levels and an
ing demands for growth are coupled with outstanding "Quality of Life" become
incompetence, intolerable pressures are
generated and disaster becomes probable.
A more cautious approach to growth seems
clearly desirable.
Large Potential for Disaster. Even if
roughly current levels of production
could be indefinitely sustained, con-
tinued exponential growth in population
and production eventually must lead to
exhausted resources and hazardous exces-
sive pollution. Few positive human
values would be served by continued
mindless growth. We must learn that
demand is not need. Unless drastic
voluntary reforms limit future growth,
catastrophes stemming from limited
resources and high pollution levels are
likely before long to make these reforms
mandatory.
Increasingly Ineffective. The basic
solution is to increasingly limit
demands, not to encourage a desperate
search for new inventions that might
suffice temporarily but would increase
long-run problems by increasing environ-
mental damage and depletion of resources,
while encouraging current growth and
deferring hard decisions. Although
technological solutions may buy some
time it has become increasingly impor-
tant to use this time constructively
and avoid the undue economic expansion
that new discoveries encourage.
possible. Economic success enhances
national capabilities to resolve special-
ized resource issues as they arise. How-
ever, the tendency towards cartels
coupled with political conflicts could
create occasional short term problems
in maintaining adequate supplies at
reasonable prices.
Probable Transition to Stability.
Although current projections are uncer-
tain, social and cultural forces inher-
ent in both developing and affluent
societies appear likely to limit the
world population to about 3 times the
current level and average per capita
production to about 2 or 3 times the
current level. There seems to be more
than enough energy, resources and space
for most populations, assuming that a
relatively small number of people put
forth the necessary efforts and the
others don't interfere.
Usually Effective. New resources, new
technology and economic growth often
produce new problems, but they still do
solve current problems, improve effi-
ciency and upgrade the quality of life.
Also, they increase the toughness and
flexibility of the economy and society
(i.e., provide insurance against bad
luck or Incompetency). With good
management they also can help to re-
duce population growth, conserve ex-
pensive minerals, improve nutrition
within the poorer countries, and
generally improve future prospects.
Economics and Technology Can Provide
Superb Solutions. The earth is essen-
tially bountiful in all of the important
resources. Large sudden price fluctua-
tions tend to be "self-correcting" within
a few years although they can be misin-
terpreted as basic shortages (as in 1973-
74). Near-term prices are certainly
important but we have often lived with
short term problems. Trust in the eco-
nomics of the market system, confidence
in emerging technological solutions and
a little patience will remedy the current
resource issues just as they have in the
past.
Desirable and Healthy. No obvious limits
are apparent. Even with current tech-
nological potential, growth (except per-
haps in a few of the poorest nations) is
and will be purely a matter of human
choice, not of natural limitations. Prob-
lems always exist but solutions always
emerge--often as a result of the dyna-
mism of growth. We do not know man's
ultimate fate, but truly fantastic eco-
nomic and technological capabilities
are likely to be included as both a
means and an end (e.g. they probably
include self-reproducing automation and
space colonization in the next century).
Mankind's Greatest Hope. New and improv-
ing technologies ronomy, electronics,
genetics, power generation and distribu-
tion, information processing, etc.) aided
by fortuitous discoveries (e.g., ocean
nodules) further man's potential for
solving current perceived problems and
for creating an affluent and exciting
world. Man is now entering the most
creative and expansive period of his
history. These trends will soon allow
mankind to become the "master" of the
solar system.
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A, CONVINCED
NEO-MALTHUSIAN*
7. INCOME GAPS AND POVERTY
Destined to Tragic Conclusions. The
major consequences of industrialization
and economic growth have been to enrich
the few while exploiting and impoverish-
ing the many. The gap between rich and
poor as well as the total misery in the
world are at all time highs--and grow-
ing. Meanwhile natural resources, the
heritage of the poor countries, are
being consumed by the rich, thereby
denying the poor any real hope for bet-
ter living conditions--even temporarily.
S. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMErT
A Disaster. Further industrialization
of the Third World would be disastrous
and further growth of the developed
world even worse. The rich nations
should halt industrial growth and share
their present wealth with the poor.
The poor nations should husband their
precious natural resources, selling
some of them only at prices much higher
than those prevailing today.
9. QUALITY OF LIFE
Ruined. Through excessive growth man-
kind has become the most destructive
species in history and may yet increase
the extent of this damage many-fold.
Indeed a point of no return may have
been passed already, mostly because of
the persistent and growing potential
for nuclear warfare. In any event the
values which lead toward a satisfying
and wholesome life have already been
largely destroyed in the developed
nations.
10, LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK
Bleak and Desperate. Unless revolution-
ary changes are soon made, the 21st
century will see the greatest catastro-
phe of history resulting from large-
scale damage to the environment and to
the ecology of many areas. Billions
will die of hunger, pollution and/or
wars over shrinking resources. Other
billions will have to be oppressed by
harsh authoritarian governments. Grave
and even draconian measures are justi-
fied now to alleviate the extent and
intensity of future collapse.
Increasing and Threatening. Income gaps
have been increasing and may lead to
dangerous responses. A drastic decrease
in income among the poor may even be
likely soon. Worldwide class warfare
may emerge following a series of desper-
ate political crises. These are not
only possible but may be imminent as a
consequence of the gaps and the exploit-
ation of the mineral resources of the
LDCs. A more equitable income distri-
bution has become a most urgent matter.
A Step Backward. The LDCs should avoid
the mistakes of the developed nations.
They should instead seek smaller, more
human and more community oriented enter-
prises appropriate to their needs.
They would be better off preserving
their cultural environmental and ecolog-
ical values than entering head-long into
destructive polluting industrialization,
sacrificing thereby both their current
values and any long-term potential for
a peaceful world.
In Conflict with Much Growth. Continued
economic development or population growth
might well mean further deterioration of
the environment, overcrowding, suburban
sprawl, and a society suitable more for
machines than human beings. Priorities
must change; market demand is not the
same as need; GNP is not wealth; high
technology not the same as a good life;
automation and appliances do not neces-
sarily increase human happiness.
Contingent Disaster. Although it is not
possible to predict which disaster is
most imminent many possibilities exist
even if we are careful and prudent today.
Unless we take drastic actions soon,
mankind may be overwhelmed by climate
changes, destruction of ocean ecology,
excessive pollution or other disasters.
Society must not challenge the environ-
ment and ecology so recklessly any more.
We must also manage our resources and
population more prudently--at least
after the next disaster if not before.
Declinin Absolute Poverty. Worldwide,
the threat of absolute poverty (i.e.,
possible large scale famine) is likely
soon to be forever abolished. Some
income gaps may increase during the next
century but some will decrease. Gen-
erally incomes of both rich and poor
will increase. Both the gaps and
improving technology will tend to accel-
erate development in poor countries.
Attempts to force a rapid equalization
of Income would guarantee only failure
and tragic consequences.
Should Continue. Industrialization of
the LDCs should and probably will con-
tinue.. The rich nations will probably
help with technical assistance but would
be unlikely to share their output to the
extent of serious deprivation. Also the
natural resources of the LDCs are at
most of limited benefit even to those
richly endowed. Their only real hope
for affluence lies in economic develop-
ment.
More Gains Than Losses. If environ-
mental protect on, health, safety, and
other considerations are neglected
growth would be accompanied by an
unnecessary destruction of Important
values. However, much of what some
elites claim to be destructive others
consider constructive (e.g., a pipe-
line). With adequate internalization
of the appropriate costs (by society's
criteria) complaints from unhappy
factions might still be loud or visible
but would be generally inappropriate.
Guarded Optimism. The 21st century is
likely to bring a worldwide post-indus-
trial economy where most problems of
poverty will be largely solved or allevi-
ated. Most misery will derive from the
anxieties and ambiguities of relative
wealth and luxury. Some suffering and
damage will mark the historical transi-
tion to a materially abundant life, but
the ultimate prospect is far superior
to a world of poverty and scarcity.
D. TECHNOLOGICAL AND GROWTH
ENTHUSIAST
A Misformulated Problem. Western civil-
ization required about 200 years to
change from general poverty to general
affluence. Because of their success
and continuing advances in technology
many of the current LDCs will be able
to make a similar transition within 50
years. All countries can be expected
to become wealthy within the next 200
years. Any lesser scenario would be
unreasonable or simply an expression of
some exceedingly bad luck and/or bad
management. The gap issue is a false
issue possibly conjured up by neurotic
guilt.
Necessary for Wealth and Progress.
During the last 200 years progress has
been identified mostly with technolog-
ical innovation and economic development.
Despite the current outcries this view
is and will be substantially correct.
All those who wish to, can and should
share in the benefits offered by modern
civilization.
A Meaningless Phrase and Issue. Dis-
gruntled or unhappy people often oppose
real progress for romantic, class, sel-
fish or other reasons. They are not
representative of the nation and need
not be taken at face value. In a
changing world some elites may not bene-
fit much or may even lose somewhat.
But most do benefit and gain expectations
for an even better future.
High Optimism and Confidence. We cannot
know mankind's ultimate goals but they
include a solar civilization and a utopian
notion for the quality of life on earth.
The potentialities of modern technology
and economic progress are just beginning
to be visualized. Dangers exist but they
always have and always will. There is no
need for faint heart. Man should face the
future boldly and openly because the
future is his to determine--and to enjoy.
Postindustrial society and culture could
be close to a humanistic utopia, by most
historical standards.
A Convinced Neo-Malthusian envisages an inevitable catastrophe as occurring in the relatively near future. A Guarded Pessimist agrees that this
will occur, unless something is done. But he believes that there are feasible policies which will prevent or alleviate the foreseen catastrophe. The
Guarded Optimist considers the possibility of catastrophe to be high enough to worry about, but argues it is relatively unlikely, and would be relatively
limited if it does occur. All agree that "nothing lasts forever" but the Guarded Optimist is not sure.
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despite some incompetency or bad luck; enough resources will be available
at reasonable costs so that reasonable rates of growth can be achieved;
current exponential population growth will make a natural transition to
stability; innovative discoveries will yield great improvements; and
although absolute income differences could increase for a while, current
levels of absolute poverty will decrease almost everywhere (the rich will
not get richer while the poor get poorer, but both will become richer).
Thus, in this view, all things considered, the long-range outlook is
quite good.
In this study we are more interested in the differences between B
and C than in the gross differences between A and D, even though B and C
come rather close to merging on some issues. Current advocates of Column
B (formerly closer to A) originally emphasized the sheer physical impos-
sibility of the earth's supporting 10 or 20 billion people and often
stated this claim in an extreme form. Today many of them take a rela-
tively moderate position, but one still strongly colored by their past
beliefs. Rather interestingly, many of the followers of these less
extreme advocates have not shifted with them and talk as if those they
support still hold A rather than B beliefs.
B and C advocates represent two of many possible middle positions.
They project that in some places and at some times there will be too many
people for available food supplies and that considerable suffering will
result, but in the long term they see the rate of population growth slowing
and world population eventually stabilizing--but for different reasons.
The B position is remarkably close to the C position, but it tends to
emphasize conscious and drastic efforts to reduce demand as the basic
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method of solution rather than major efforts to increase supply. Indeed
1 advocates argue that unless there are very intense and dramatic
rrograms to cut demand and limit it permanently, the situation will turn
:)ut much as anticipated in Column A. Those who favor C, on the other
hand, see the situation as rather close to the view in Column 1). However,
they also believe that there are both more natural limitations to demand
and more dangers in growth than the D people usually concede. The C
people also depict some few resources as fixed, limited and nonrenewable,
but they argue that the growth of knowledge and technology will normally
:Make available--though not always without problems and difficulties--new
sources and substitutes. Acknowledging that there will be incompetency
and bad luck, causinci serious problems, they doubt that these will be.
fatal. They visualize much more demand than A and B believe can be
tolerated, but not so much more that it could not be met, even if it
required expanding supply capabilities somewhat.
in the last several years, the neo-Malthusian attitudes outlined in
Columns A and B have gained great influence. Not too many years ago--
Snot more than a decade--most educated Americans would have placed them-
-elves in Column C, leaning toward D. Today they tend to be in Column B
and leaning toward A, and many unreservedly support that column's full
neo-Malthusian conclusion. It has become increasingly fashionable,
especially among intellectuals at prestige universities and among
spokesmen in the most respected newspapers and journals as well as
on television, to attack economic growth, capitalism, industrialization,
the consumer society ana related values. Casual references are made
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to our vanishing resources, the end of the "energy joyride," our increas-
ingly "suicidal" pollution, our "self-destructive materialism," the
poverty of our emotional and aesthetic lives, the disease of "consumeritis"
and the need to "kick the energy habit." The United States is usually
singled out as the prime culprit in this indictment: it has only one-
sixteenth of the world's population, yet with incredible selfishness and
shortsightedness, it has been allocating to its own use about one-third
of the world's nonrenewable resources.
We believe that the movement toward Column A--propelled by a
combination of compassion and guilt for the plight of the world's poor
and the coincidental occurrence of worldwide crises in the supply of
food and energy--has gone too far. Spurred now by well-publicized
studies, it has acquired a momentum of its own which, if continued, will
only deepen the malaise it depicts and make longer and more difficult ,
the recovery that is required. We believe that plausible and realistic
scenarios can be written consonant with a view that sees the world
moving from column C toward column D. We argue that there is both need
and opportunity for growth, and that because America and the rest of the
,nations of the developed world do use resources so intensely, there will
be stimulation, not depression, for the economies of the less developed
countries. In fact, as we will discuss in the next chapter, the clearest
moral and political argument for further growth in the developed world
(and against artificial and forced limitation) is that it aids the poor
both within and outside the developed countries.
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Desoite the confident tone of these last few pages and some of our
.+ariier discussion, we would like to stress that in no sense do we wish
co play down the importance of the issues raised by the neo-Malthusians
-r to assert that there are no serious problems. While we generally
tend to be optimistic about many of them, we recognize that very unpleasant
,ituations can arise---possibilities which must be dealt with competently
end responsibly. We also believe not only that this can be done, but
that is many cases it already is being done. Finally we feel that even
though the costs and risks are great, the effort to achieve a postindustrial
,ociety in on balance a worthwhile one; and further, that priorities which
,mphasize technological advancement and economic growth, but with prudence
nd care, are likely to be acceptable and beneficial.
taus our disagreement with advocates of the limits-to-growth posi-
Lion sometimes is that they raise false, nonexistent or rnisformulated
issues; equally often, it is not that the problems they raise are unreal,
out that we believe rather straightforward and practical solutions can
be found in most cases. In fact, it is one of the main purposes of this
Volume to set out at least a fortiori solutions to many of these tl1in-
s:oluble11 problems. In our view, the more intractable and basic diffi-
culties usually lie much less in the nature of things than in recent or
current policies, in unnecessarily poor administration or sometimes in
dust plain bad luck. Most important of all, if successful programs are
devised to deal with old problems, then inevitably new problems are
rncovered and new goals are set; to those who take the initial success
bor granted, it may then seem as if nothing has been accomplished.
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Watersheds of History
The two great watersheds of human history (excepting religious
events) have been the agricultural revolution, which started in the
Middle East's Fertile Crescent some 10,000 years ago, and the Industrial
Revolution, which began in Holland and England about 200 years ago. In
much the same way that the agricultural revolution spread around the
world, the Industrial Revolution has been spreading and causing a
permanent change in the quality of human life. However, instead of
lasting 10,000 years, this second diffusion process is likely to be
largely completed within a total span of about 400 years, or roughly by
the late 22nd century. What we call the superindustrial and postindus-
trial economies will be emerging during the late 20th and early 21st
centuries, to be followed eventually by corresponding changes in insti-
tutions and culture until a new and appropriate society has been
developed. `
In order to characterize the nature of these changes, it is useful
to distinguish four kinds of economic activities: primary, secondary,
tertiary and quaternary.t
Primary economic activities are extractive--principally agriculture,
mining, forestry and fishing. One can think of the corresponding society
Various authors have developed and expanded notions of postindus-
trial economy, institutions and culture. Preeminent among these in the
depth and sophistication of their analyses are Daniel Bell's The Post-
Industrial Societ : A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic
Books, 1973) and, with a very different manner and emphasis, Peter
Drucker's The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper 6 Row, 1969).
tThe terms "primary," "secondary" and "tertiary" were first used in
this sense by Colin Clark, Research Fellow at Monash University, Melbourne,
Australia. "Quaternary"-is used at Hudson Institute to describe the post-
industrial era activities.
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.tnd culture as being organized to "play games with and against nature'
tnd 1-or protection against "barbarian" invaders and raiders; in such a
oc: i ety the ratio of rural to urban dwellers is in the range of twency
to one, with the former supporting the latter by some kind of primary
activity.
Secondary economic activities have to do with construction ana manu-
facturing. The corresponding society and culture, primarily urban, are
organized mainly to "play games with and against materials, as well as
:against nature," and the other major activity tends to be organized war-
['are, both offensive anc a efensive.
initially the emerging postindustrial economy will be characterized
by a service economy., empi-tasizing what are called tertiary economic
activities--services that support primary and secondary activities, such
as_ transportation, insurance, finance, management, many governmental
activities, much education and training. Nature becomes a relatively
controllable variable aid constraints set by materials become less and
less important as technology and affluence increase. This results ire a
society and culture, probably more suburban than urban, whose major
activity is "games with Find against organizations," and which is charac-
terized by a structural society which emphasizes organizational and
professional pluralism in the distribution of power and prestige.
Knowledge rather than experience becomes the major asset and there is an
increasing problem of "educated incapacity." Wars no longer "pay" and
By educated incapacity we mean an acquired or learned inabilityl.o
understand or see a problem, much less a solution. Increasingly, the
more expert, or at lea?>t the more educated, a person is the more likely
he is to be affected by this.
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21~
the recourse to large-scale organized violence becomes restricted
generally to defensive situations or attempts to preserve some aspect of
the status quo.
Eventually, in the 21st century, we should expect a transition to
a different kind of service economy, to what we term a quaternary,
or truly postindustrial, economy. Here the primary, secondary, and
tertiary activities will constitute only a small part of human endeavors;
more and more people will do things for their own sake, and even more
than today ends will become more important than means. Indeed there will
be a tendency to choose means which are also ends, and at the same time
in many situations the distinction between ends and means will gradually
disappear. This attitude is also often found in a primary or pre-
industrial society, and there are, in fact, great similarities between
our view of a likely postindustrial society and many pre-industrial
societies. This quaternary society can be characterized as emphasizing
people "playing games with and against themselves, with and against
others, and with and against communities." We hope that the emphasis
will be more on "with" than"against," but both will be clearly possible.
At first sight the problem of war appears anomalous in this context, but
there may well be possibilities for both offense and defense; there will
certainly be issues of the use and control of violence. The major
quaternary activities--often constituting what we now more or less
consider leisure activities--could include the following:
Ritualistic and aesthetic activities (perhaps creating special
structures and environments), including the evoking of images
or feelings of splendor, pride, pomp, awe, and communal, ethnic,
religious or national unity or identity; oneness with nature
and the universe, and various "explorations in inner space."
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he creation of taboos, totems, demanding religions, traditions,
arid customs; arbitrary pressures, constraints and demands;
iiioral and social eouivalents of war; some other pressures and
risks, including those involved with some of the more bizarre
forms of "discretionary behavior."
eading, writing, painting, acting, composing, musicianship,
arts and crafts--particularly if done for their own sake.
lourism, games, contests, rituals, exhibition and performances.
ourmet cooking and eating, an aristocratic and formal style
of' life, epicurean and family values (including visiting,
=intertoininq and "tocietherness").
Hunting, fishing, hiking, camping, boating.
improving property (roneconomically motivated), such as by
rlardeninq, upkeep, irterior decorating and the use of home-
maiade artifacts.
Conversation, discussion, debating and politicking.
Many other cultural and social activities.
Most welfare and social security functions.
Other "recreation," including the search for change., broadening
,.xperiences, adventure, excitement and amusement.
Many public works and public projects (e.g., some space activi-
.ies, some underseas exploration, most protection or improvement
of the environment. monumental architecture).
the transition to a society principally engaged in quaternary activi-
Lies--a transition likely to be well under way in the next century--will
mark the third great watershed of human history. Future ages will
indoubtedly look back at what happened in these four centuries of economic
development and technological advancement as mankind's most effective and
pervasive transformation--from a world basically inhospitable to its few
dwellers to one fully commanded by its expanded multitudes.
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23
Of course there will be problems. Some of them are likely to be:
wishful thinking, illusion, decadence, educated incapacity and a kind of
violence prone boredom. Furthermore, we suspect that, even if the society
were to work as we outline in this image of the future, many of our
readers will be somewhat unhappy with the prospect and wonder whether
mankind really wishes to "stagnate" in such a total quaternary society.
We believe that at least for a time most people would generally enjoy
this postindustrial society, but there would be many who would not. For
them it simply would not be exciting and challenging enough; indeed it
might be rather boring for many ambitious, advancement- and achievement-
oriented people (though there will be many fewer such people). We
rather suspect that space will be the major focus for many of these
people, and that the existence of such a frontier--as a locus of dynamism,
initiative, and entrepreneurship--will be very healthy for the quaternary
society that is developing on earth.
None of this should be taken as denigrating the possibilities that
actual income and resources from space could be important to the earth,
that space could generate many economically and technologically profit-
able activities, and that exploitation of space could serve as a major
positive economic and technological influence on our earth-centered
perspective. But our point is that mankind will seek to explore and
exploit space not just for its economic and technological reasons, but
because it will be seen as a psychological and moral frontier. There
will always be some for whom even the most utopian society on earth will
be an empty or inadequate achievement; for many of these, space will not
be the last frontier, it will simply be the next frontier. Thus the
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,volution of a postindustrial society on earth need not be the end of
.can's future, but a beginning--a base from which to start the journey
,cross yet another great watershed in human history.
We believe that many well-intentioned people are being distracted
prom mankind's real future problems and possibilities by issues that
ippear central today but are in fact largely temporal, peripheral or
badly formulated. We are presenting here a scenario for America and the
world that sees the dominant issues of today--population., economic growth,
energy, raw materials, food and pollution--as basically solvable or
aesolvable in the near- and medium-term future, transitory issues of a
dransitory era, the problems of a time between world penury and world
,prosper i ty.
We further suggest that many fashionable concerns of the day
;encourage the self-defeating belief that our present problems are either
hopeless or that efforts to solve them by expanding supply will only make
them worse. We, of course, believe that available skill, sound manage-
meet: and sensible policies can transform most of these issues into
memories, and that by coping with them successfully we will gain the
incentive and the morale needed to face the real issues of tomorrow.
All problems will not be solved or avoided, but the human costs involved
in oettinq from here to there can be significantly reduced, and every
=ispect of the trip can be facilitated. And the prospect of doing all
:his should help to alleviate many current problems of morale and commit-
went, of direction and purpose.
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25
Chapter 2
TURNING POINTS IN THE GROWTH OF
POPULATION AND PRODUCT
A basic assumption underlying our 400 year earth-centered scenario
is that the rates of world population and of economic growth are now
close to their historic highs and will soon begin to slow until roughly
100-200 years from now, they will level off in a more or less natural
and comfortable way. Such an evolution obviously must have a very
different impact upon the prospects for mankind from that of the scenarios
currently forecast by many advocates of the limits-to-growth position, who
often assume that growth rates will be exponential until limited by physical
barriers. Some of these advocates have argued that exponential rates
would not only exhaust the earth's resources but produce--after a number
of doublings--a population covering the Planet's surface and expanding
away from it into space. But in any perspective there must eventually
be limits to population growth which obviously must occur long before
such growth would result in a compounding calamity of scarcity, famine,
pollution and accompanying social disorder.
Our perspective, consequently, foresees a gradual slowing--in per-
centages but not necessarily in absolute terms--of these rates in a world
of growing prosperity, which may be the main reason for the reduction.
That is, a reduced or leveled-off demand rather than inadequate supply will
drive the transition. In our view, the resources of the earth will be
more than sufficient--with a wide margin of safety--to sustain, for an
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.finite period of time and at high living standards, the levels 01
.,:spulation and economic growth we project. In this chapter we will
,~r-esent evidence and analysis, first, for a turning point in the rate of
world population growth, perhaps during the American Bicentennial year,
=rid second, and less convincingly (but we believe still persuasively),
for a relatively early turning point in the rate of world economic growth,
erhaps in a decade or two.
=opulation in Perspective
The picture of world population growth that exists today in the minds
i most informed persons resembles the one shown in Figure 2--that is, with
?~opuiation rapidly accelerating from the beginning of the Industrial Revolu-
tion to the present, where exponential rates would nave it doubling in less
than 35 years. With this curve rising ever more steeply, it seems clear
prat history's course car lead only to disaster.
Figure 3 presents a snarpiy different perspective. In the diagre;in
pan the left, three 60?year population growth-rate curves are, i l iustra Uei,
?3c:h of which reaches a naximum within the next few years. the slowest
i these (A) is based on the United Nations Population Bureau`s "medium"
,ariant projection; tie second (B) assumes higher rates and is used it
:rsany Of our surprise-tree" projections; and the third (C), with sti l l
higher rates, is used in some of our a fortiori projections.'
Hie "surprise-treel ;projection is one that assumes inrovation and
irogress that would riot he surprising in the light of past trends and
,urrent developments----that is, it is based on extrapolations of current
:rr emerging:: tendencies and expectations.
a Pur L for i iDro iect i on used here is one that is mostly based on
urrent--ur near current--Lechnoiogy and avoids the assumption of gre,:t
+ui_ure improvements ike those that have characterized past historicai
-xr:)erience.
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POPULATION GROWTH - 1750 TO PRESENT
POPULATION
-GROWTH RATE
------------------------
1850
SOURCE: Adapted from Ansley J. Coale, "The
History of the Human Population,"
Scientific American, September 1974,
p. 42.
20 ^?o
z
15 w
a
O
Figure 2
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_p
2 . L
t _ _ _! LT~_
05'` 196o 1970
.It
1776 1800 1900 2000 2100 2176
,HUDSON HIGH (A FORTIORI)
A.. .UN MEDIUM/HUDSON LOW
B...HUDSON MEDIUM (SURPRISE-FREE)
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.2
1.776-21.76
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29
Seen in this perspective, the problem of exponential population growth
appears almost to be solving itself. There can, of course, be no certainty
that these projections will prove to be accurate, for we have only the
available data and demographic theory on which to rely. But these consti-
tute a historical basis for forecasts and strongly suggest that fears of a
population explosion should disappear within the next half-century. By
then, if these projections are reasonably correct--and we have deliberately
avoided centering our argument on the most optimistic of these (A)--the
population worries and alarmist exhortations of the 1960's and 1970's may
well be recorded as an amusing episode in human history.
The diagram on the right in Figure 3 extends population growth rates
to plot a forecast for our 400-year transition scenario. This time frame
shows even more clearly the rapid rise in population growth rate and its
anticipated fall; and when one looks backward from 2176, the temporary
nature of the current population phenomenon becomes very obvious.
Finally, in Figure 4 we present a much longer time perspective on
population growth--16,000 years--in which current rates.of growth appear
as a momentary spike, or blip, in an otherwise smooth line. It is, of
course, a blip that has created a vast change in the nature of the world,
and it appears especially meaningful to us since we are probably living
at its very apex. The clear message of this last perspective..is that
despite--or perhaps because of--the anticipated twentyfold Increase in
world population over the 1776-2176 period, any expectations of exponential
population growth continuing over appreciable periods of time can only be
a delusion, at best a rather naive extrapolation of an unusual human
experience into the indefinite future without a real understanding of the
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z
u
U
W
d
0000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8c'10
R R ! n n
Source: Adapted from Ronald Freeman and Bernard Berelson,
"The Human Population," Scientific American,
September 1974, pp. 36-37.
Figure 4
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31
dynamic forces involved. To those who cry out that this exponential growth
must stop, the answer is that it does in fact appear to be stopping now,
and not for reasons associated with desperate physical limitations to growth.
Therefore, except for some particular problems in certain geographic areas,
our attention can be more profitably placed on the attending social changes,
the time scale of the process and the special problems raised along the
We would like to add one further point that could carry the problem
of population growth quite literally into another realm and which may strike
many as fanciful or even absurd. It is our strong feeling that we
may have oversimplified the discussion by ignoring potential future tech-
nological developments that could provide new solutions as well as encour-
age new cycles of growth. One such development--which seems entirely
feasible during the next century--is the construction of ocean-based facil-
ities, especially, very large, partially submerged, but floating industry
oriented complexes. Current studies and some actual construction indicate
that these structures can be substantially less expensive than comparable
land installations when the ratio of volume to area is sufficiently large.
(Some major savings occur because the structures are invulnerable to
earthquakes and high winds.) With modular designs, such structures could
be made quite large--approaching the size of a small city. We can only
guess at the impact of such a development, but we do know that the useful
area that oceans can provide for such ventures is large and often strate-
gically situated.
John P. Craven, The City and the Sea" (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii, Marine Programs, rev. February 12, 1975).
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Another likely development to be considered is the previously diis-
cussed possibility of migration to outer space. Speculation on such
activity is still greeted by most observers as the stuff of far-out
fantasy; yet within the past two years a growing number of serious
scholarly studies have not only asserted a technical feasibility for
colonization in space but: have also indicated an economic viability as
well. Were such an event to begin and be successfully maintained, it could
conceivably lead to a massive migration over a century or more and, as with
major migrations of the past, initiate a new--and desired--cycle of popu-
lat ion growth.
These are only two of numerous possibilities; technological progress
during the next fifty years will bring forth many more scenarios that
simply would not be taken seriously at this time. The total effect of
new technology on future population growth can only be guessed. Instead
Of the desire for more living and working space, an unknown potential
for a better quality of life may turn out to be the major incentive for
the creation of such "new worlds" in oceanic and/or outer space. In the
past such an incentive has been powerful and a spur to population growth.
However, none of this speculation is vital to this chapter, though
exactly such developments could dominate the future.
For example, Gerard K. O'Neill, "The Colonization of Space," Physics
Today, September 1974, pp. 32-40; Krafft A. Ehricke, Exoindustrial Piroduc-
tivi ty; the Extraterrestrial Imperative of Our Time (El Segundo, Calif...
North American Space Operations, Rockwell International Corporation, May
1975); and T.A. Heppenheimer, "R&D Requirements for Initial Space Coloniiza-
:iion," Astronautics and Aeronautics, December 1975.
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33
It should be noted that there is plenty of room in almost all coun-
tries for everybody to have a suburban lifestyle. For example, in such
places as Holland, Bermuda or Westchester County (all of which are con-
sidered almost ideal areas in which to live) we find that population densi-
ties range between 1,000 and 2,000 per square mile. This means that in
10 percent of the United States we have enough room for from 300 to 600
million people, and thus we have 90 percent of the land left over for
recreation, agriculture, industry and various other purposes. This con-
clusion even applies to the more populated countries in Asia, where the
population densities are not unduly high (about 500 per square mile in
India).
We also believe that comparison of the results of experiments on
high density caged rats to modern urban life is completely misleading; the
real issue is not really one of raw population density but one of floor-
space and structured community. Cities of the future will not be as
crowded as were those of the ancient world, where people lived clustered
within protective walls.
The Demographic Transition
The anticipated reduction in the rate of worldwide population growth
is best explained by referring to what is known as the "demographic transi-
tion," which we do not consider a hard-and-fast theory but a description
of historical experience, replete with exceptions, anomalies and occasional
reverses. For our purposes it depicts the change that has occurred, and
that seems likely to occur in the future, in population growth rates
during the successive stages from pre-industrial to postindustrial society.
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In the pre-industrial stage annual birth rates were about 40 per
;thousand, a rate determined largely by the maximum number of children
anat. could be born under prevailing local conditions. There were
:.undoubtedly wide fluctuations in local populations as death rates were
iffected by sporadic calamities (wars, famines, plagues, floods and
other natural accidents). but overall these kept pace with birth rates,
)ermitting only a slow, almost imperceptible rate of population growth.
Then, as the process oof economic and technological development
qathered momentum, following the onset of industrialization, productivity
increased and food distribution was regularized--reducing famines and
-Famine-induced disease--and more resources were devoted to improvements
in public health and safety. The consequent decline in death rates--
with birth rates rema~ininq high--caused a rapidly increasing population.
As industrialization matured in the developed nations, a third stage
was reached when parents began to have fewer and fewer children,
prompted by the reduced value of children as economic assets combined
with the increased cost of rearing them and the erosion of traditional
religious and social pressures for large families. The result, co-
existent with a leveling of the death rate, was a decreasing rate of
population growth. Finally, as the world moves into the super- and post-
'industrial stages, birth and death rates have both been leveling off, the
world eventually will again reach an equilibrium in population, similar
to that of the pre-industrial stage. However, we still expect short-term
Fluctuations in birth rates triggered by transitory events such as wars,
depressions or unusual prosperity.
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Many demographers and economists now believe that this transition
will occur, or is even now occurring, in the less. developed countries
just as it has in every country of the developed world, and that the
process is in fact accelerating. Historical evidence seems to support
this conclusion that the demographic transition is compressing. The time
required for the transition to very low growth rates in Western
Europe and North America was 150 years (1775-1925), for the Soviet Union
it was 40 years (1910-50), and for Japan it was only 25 years (1935-60).
The most recent estimates show a definite decline in crude birth rates
in the 1960's for 15 developing nations and a probable decline for
eight more. Since these figures represent all major world regions
except sub-Saharan Africa, it is possible that the 1960's marked the
beginning of a worldwide decline in the fertility of developing nations.
None of the above implies that a continued drop in world population
growth rates is inevitable, but our "surprise-free" projection is that
the world's population is on the verge of passing through the inflection
point of its growth and that in 200 years it will total approximately 15
billion, give or take a factor of two. Nonetheless, for the purpose of
this book--setting forth a scenario showing the feasibility of high
standards of living in a future world with a large population--we could
have projected a population of 30 billion, retained the earth-centered per-
spective, and still made our case. In order to demonstrate the enormous
leeway we believe will be available to a population as large as 15 billion,
we now set forth our explanation of why we expect most of the world's
developing nations to achieve rapid and sustained economic growth.
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s c.onomt o
Growth, Yesterday and Today
In the nations of Western Europe and North America, where industri-
..aiization began, economic growth was a slow and extended process of
acquiring capital, resources, learning and technology. Invention to
-application, as well as investment to return, were activities that spanned
decades. In the United States, for example, it took about 200 years to go
from $250 to about $7',000 In per capita GNP; the process went much faster
in Japan, but still it took more than a century to go from about $100 to
about $4,000. Today we would expect the process to go much more rapidly
in many of the developing nations, the central reason for this being the
#?:xistence of the gap between the developed and the developing that many
deplore as the source and cause of underdevelopment. In the following
pages we will describe ten forces that will aid this growth, each unique
to the developing nations and each taking advantage of the gap between
them and the developed nations.
3ut before going on to examine these positive factors, we must first
note that there are many aspects of the current world e:nvi ronemnt that. do
riot facilitate development--that is, ways in which the developed nations
might actually impede or even reverse progress in the developing nations.
Some of them are: excessive destruction or damage to indigenous social
structures, morale, or traditional beliefs and character; the generation
of excessive expectations; harmful or excessive exploitation by foreigners;
political and social unrest and other strains caused by the foreign
,aresence itself; misolaced benevolence; and harmful fashions or ideologies.
Probably most important among these are the many effects that can
'es:,it from the impact of two cultures on each other--particularly when
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one of the cultures is more modern and powerful, or at least is judged
to have many features that seem worth adopting. The impacted culture
can develop a rather severe inferiority complex or other pathology. Many
experts once considered this desirable in that they saw the goal of
development as the breaking apart of the old society and the rebuilding
of a new society more or less along Western lines. But this view has
generally been replaced by the belief that there should be mutual adapta-
tion. The Japanese, and to some degree the Chinese, have shown us that
it is often very worthwhile to save much of the old society, to attempt
to reform, modify and adapt the new techniques, technologies and institu-
tions so as to fit them into the existing framework--and, of course, vice
versa. It now seems likely that each society that successfully modernizes
will find its own way to industrialization and then eventually to a post-
industrial society. Thus, this process may be analogous to the perspec-
tive common to Asian religions in which there are "many mountains up to
God and many roads up each mountain."
Keeping in mind these problems posed by the West for the developing
world, let us return now to our examination of the ten forces we see as
making possible an acceleration of economic growth in most of the under-
developed nations.
1. Availability of capital, markets and technology
We begin with the Middle East as the most spectacular example.
There may be more than a trillion barrels of recoverable oil buried
beneath the sands and waters of the Middle East, particularly around the
Persian Gulf. Civilized people have lived there for almost 10,000 years;
yet this treasure was practically unused until quite recently. At
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:urrent prices (roughly $12 a barrel), the nominal value of Middle
~:ast: oil is $12 trillion, or twice the total real tangible wealth of the
United States. This is misleading, though, since the oil is buried and
mostly not available--or usable--for a long time to come. For a fairer
:omparison, one can think of the oil as generating an income stream of
about $50-$100 billion per year over the long-term. If this is dis-
counted between 5 and 10 percent a year, it implies a total present
value between $1 trillion and $4 trillion, or, roughly speaking, about:
a third of the real tangible U.S. wealth.
What created this wealth? First, of course, it was nature; second.
And almost more important, it was the fact that the developed countries
0)f the world were not only eager to buy and use this oil, but were able
.ind willinq to furnish the wealth, capital and technology necessary to
'Find and exploit it. The Middle East countries had to be able to strike
.i bargain for their share of the income, and it is true that for many
,sears they got relatively little ("relatively little'here means about
$10 billion a year).
With full credit to nature and to the governments and people of the
Middle East, we think it fair to say that it was the existence of the
Yieveloped nations that made most of the difference between the value of
hat oil 50 years ago and its value today. Of course the developed world
did not create this wealth in the Middle East out of altruism. Neverthe--
e_ss. the fact is that the industrialized world needs huaae amounts of raw
iiat:erials and other products and has the capital, technology and institu--
,ions necessary to help utilize almost every kind of resource in the
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developing world. Therefore, almost anywhere in the world, if a country
has anything usable at all--from a minimally decent labor force to almost
any kind of minerals or tourist attractions--these resources can usually
be identified and then exploited to the mutual benefit of the host
country and outside countries. There is often an initial need for help
from outsiders, but even then, within a decade or two (if appropriate
policies are in effect), indigenous personnel can take over the day-to-day
operations, become first professional workers, then managers and finally
owner/operators. Further development can then generally be carried
through with largely indigenous means, or at least with the host nation
and/or its nationals clearly in the driver's seat. It is also worth
noting that even if the task of development has to be shared for a while
with outsiders, which may often include transnational companies, this
mutual effort usually involves less cost and in some cases even less
exploitation than would have occurred with any comparable process in the
past.
We are not, of course, arguing that the West can create anywhere
else in the world the kind of overnight rags-to-riches story that the
Middle East has seen. What we are saying is that analogous, though more
limited, events are going to occur in many developing nations, and we
can already cite the examples of Malaysia and Indonesia with tin and
rubber, and Zambia and Chile with copper. At first this will involve
mostly the so-called "coping" nations (those which have developed useful
resources and have been able to utilize the income from them to acceler-
ate their per capita economic growth), but eventually even many of the
non-coping will be more or less pulled forward because of the gap between
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them and the more developed nations--because of the reduced competition
from the now relatively developed coping nations.
Export of labor
From 1960 onwards Spanish emigration grew rapidly and reached an
annual level of around 100.000--representing 10 percent of the entire labor
Force. Most of these were "quest laborers" in other European nations
(that is, migrant workers). Not only did they send home! substantial earnings,
but they also saved money, most of which they brought back when they returned
to Spain. They also picked up important skills while away. This process by
itself has been sufficient to greatly facilitate development, not only in
Spain but in all of southern Europe from Portugal to Turkey, in some parts
of North Africa, in much of Latin America, to some degree in South Korea and
to a lesser extent in Taiwan. It may soon be an even more important factor
;ri some of these nations and also could occur in many other parts of the
world; in fact, it might be very important to try to stimulate wider partici-
pation in the future on both sides by both the senders and receivers of
{,uch labor.
one conclusion of our present studies is that, once the current
recession is over, a pressing problem of the next decade or two will be
an enormous labor shortage in the developed world, particularly in jobs
a:hat can usually be found at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
Citizens in the developed countries no longer wish to perform these tasks
-.ince they have many better opportunities. This labor shortage will co-
+'.xi5t with an even larger labor surplus in the developing world. It is
~j course difficult to brinq these two needs together, because many
;.ountries--for clearly stated reasons--do not wish to follow a policy of
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relatively unrestricted migration. Therefore, we do not expect an
acceleration of the movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
there were perhaps twelve million legal and illegal guest laborers in
Europe, and perhaps three million illegal Latin American immigrants in
the United States. But it ought to be possible to organize a systematic
movement of temporary labor, combined perhaps with some kind of education
or training, in which workers will be exported from the Third World to
developed nations, where they will reside for periods varying from six
months to three years and then return to their own country with capital
and skills. In order to ensure their return, it might be possible to
have the host government pay part of the earnings after the guest laborer
returns home. Potential problems with labor unions might be alleviated
if the guest laborers contribute modestly to union dues or even to their
pension programs, ensuring that indigenous union members would gain from
the use of guest labor. (Both might even be employer contributions).
Many might call this indentured labor or exploitation, but not the
laborers themselves, who would be able to earn perhaps ten times the
wages in their own countries (where many are grateful to have any kind of
job at all) and to pick up useful skills and experience as well.
There is,of course,a problem with the poor in the host country.
some countries, particularly the United States, there is some competition
for these jobs at the bottom of the economic ladder (particularly at times--
like the present and recent past--of persisting unemployment). It would
be wrong to introduce this process too early and on too large a scale;
but in many more homogeneous countries this problem hardly exists at all.
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Import Ot export-oriented industry
;t-iny European businessmen (and some Americans), rather than use
u st laborers, have found it more desirable to move their labor-
nLensive ractories ro a deveiopinq country and use its indigenous labor.
1, many ways this is both less expensive and more convenient than moving
he iaoor to the work. Of course, an important condition is the belief
at the financial and oolitical milieu is, and will remain, stable. It
refiner interesting that this movement has spread to Eastern Europe.
ai en via the mechaniism of the joint enterprise, as well as elsewhere in
3:he world. The most spectacular examples have been the Japanese in
1.niw._in and South Korea. and, to a lesser but still important degree, the
ill -d States in both East and Southeast Asia; and Mexico has the so-
.,.3iied "border industries,' which--often at distances many miles from
:)e border -can import parts and materials from the United States and
4--e:; port finished products, paying U.S. import tax only on the. value
added by the Mexican -Factories.
this kind of ooportunity can be made more generally available, it
".? =ill probably do more to expedite development and increase the standard
of living in both the developed and the developing nations than almost
any other sinqle proq-am we know of. To be sure, such a program
rust be designed with care and carried through with some intelligence
and iexibi l ity to prevent either excessive dislocation or excessive
dependence in both the developed and the less developed worlds. There
.,ould have to be. on the one hand, protection of certain important
;reustries and hedoing against activities, like those of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), perceived as ''hostile'' and, on
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the other hand, protection against instability and excessive influence.
For example, it would not be in the interest of the United States to
"export" 90 percent of its steel and automobile industries, an unlikely
but possible outcome if this process were allowed to continue for decades
without controls. However, the gradual export of about a third of these
industries would probably be viable.
4. Tourism
Two decades ago tourists traveling to Spain numbered about 5 million
a year. Today Spain receives about 35 million foreign visitors a year
(about 10 percent more than its population), who spend on the average
about $100 each. Most countries do not have that many tourists, but in
some the amount spent by each tends to be higher. In Spain's case the
$3.5 billion it derives from this source is sufficient almost by itself
to guarantee successful development. Tourism also plays and important
role in Portugal, Greece, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Italy,
much of Southeast Asia, North Africa and many parts of Latin America.
In fact, in many of the coping countries tourism is doubling every two
or three years and soon may reach quite high numbers.
It seems reasonable to assume that by the end of the century tourism
will be one of the largest industries in the world, if not the largest.
As closely as we can estimate, it should continue its current tendency
to increase by 10 to 20 percent a year until about the year 2000, when
the familiar S-shaped curve might start operating here also.
It is easy to see why this should be so. People seem to have an
almost insatiable desire to travel; and for increasing numbers the money
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ind time available for travel have beer, growing, while the facilities
-or traveling have become more convenient and less expensive. Today few
American tourists would find themselves dominated by cost or time consid-
.y rations in choosing between a trip from New York to Seattle and one from
,Jew York to Copenhagen. This attitude may eventually be held by tens of
millions of people for almost any place on earth. While much of this
recreational traveling will go from developed countries to developed
.:ountries--or, increasingl'j, from developing to developed--in enough cases
,:he main recipient of the income will be the coping countries. Being
cost to hordes of tourists is not necessarily a pleasant way to facili-
at:e economic development, but for those who wish to develop rapidly, or
,given slowly, many sacrifices may be required, of which playing host to
Tourists could be one of tie least onerous.
j Technology transfer
Until about the time of World War 1, it was almost impossible to
Transfer moderately complicated technologies to other than Western
uropean and North American countries, Japan or Russia. One reason for
i s was that because the technology itself was both complicated and
unreliable, its maintenance and operation were prohibitively difficult
rnd expensive, even in those settings where the technology and scientific
technology are very easily transferred.
One of the most startling examples of the new technology is the rapid
growth and proliferation of hand-held calculators and computers. The most
advanced of these--priced well under $1,000 and getting cheaper all the
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time--are fully programmable, with ten computation-capable memories and a
capacity for a hundred orders. Indeed, in many important ways these
computers are as capable as machines that less than two. decades ago would
have occupied 2,000-5,000 feet of floor space, cost over $1 million and
required a staff of five to ten persons to operate. Today more and more
advanced technology is available to every country in the world. Each nation
can now buy this technology, install it and expect reasonable operation for
many years without extraordinary effort or training. The products are not
restricted to producer goods, but also include many kinds of consumer goods
which can make life happier, more convenient, and healthier--transistor
radios, television sets, other appliances, home telephones, antibiotics
and X-ray machines.
But perhaps most important, we now know how to transfer highly produc-
tive agricultural technology. It is true that in many cases it is not
possible to transfer such technology directly from the developed world to
a specific developing country. Indigenous research must first create
the various inputs needed for local agriculture, and the country must
also construct adequate infrastructure and institutions. At the same
time we do have the ability to design the necessary programs, at least
for most circumstances and places.
6. Availability of useful examples,
institutions and individuals
In some ways the most important achievement of the Western nations
was to blaze the trail of development. Now, however, much more has been
done. There are so many developed countries today, providing a wide
range of examples of how to do it--and even more countries that provide
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examples of how not to do it. There are also many institutions facilita-
ting growth in the developing countries. These countries are learning
from those institutions, and from various experiences both at home and
abroad. Why does the developed world not make greater efforts to transfer
those institutions and knowledge? The most obvious answer is that
exchanges already occur quite efficiently and effectively at the private
level, mainly through schools, journals, books, sheer visibility, actual
work experience, and various other contacts and experiences. Most prob-
lems that do exist, with the exceptions noted later, are with the students,
not the teachers--though clearly the teachers could do much more, and to
an increasing extent many of the academic and international organizations
seem to be teaching wrong or irrelevant lessons.
To some degree, if a developing country lacks sufficient indigenous
;kills or organizations, it can hire them or persuade the developed world
to supply them. This is very useful, particularly if it is recognized
as being a temporary or interim arrangement. Sometimes the pride of the
developing country or of individuals there impedes such arrangements,
particularly if the outside institution or individual comes not from an
industrialized nation but from another Third World country. Yet ofter,
the most suitable and appropriate help can come from another nation at.
.about the same level, or one just a little more advanced than the country
being aided. Sometimes special arrangements can De made to make this
',rind of aid acceptable--especially if it is a commercial arrangement, which
is indeed one of the grea: virtues of commercial arrangements.
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7. Importation of "pollution"
and "menial" activities
It is common today to sneer at the concept of shifting polluting
and annoying activities to the developing world, as if it were unfair or
even immoral to do so--a particularly reprehensible exploitation of the
Third World. Practical people understand that this is not so. The poor
and the untrained have always done the dirtier and less pleasant work,
and this is true among countries as well as withinthem. In fact,
one of the main opportunities for the poor and the untrained is to under-
take those activities which the affluent and well-trained no longer wish
to do for themselves or can no longer find local people willing to do.
Of course one must be reasonable. We do not expect poor and un-
trained people to accept risky or unhealthy occupations, and there is no
reason why a country should do the same--for example, no country should be
willing to import dangerous kinds of heavy-metal pollution, at least not
under normal circumstances. On the other hand, some erosion of clean air
and pure water standards is almost inevitable if there is going to be
rapid development. But since many new antipollution technologies are now
readily available, the sacrifices that may be made here are going to
be much less than those already experienced by the developed countries.
There is no particular reason why one should look askance at this process
or feel in any way uncomfortable about it. In much of the Third World,
the greatest pollution is poverty, and it is worth making very great sacri-
fices indeed to reduce that blight rapidly and effectively.
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119p!? r.tsubsti tution
fften various industries in the developing nations buy many
Of their inputs--?of both labor and materials--from abroad at ]past
initially, and this can result in real aggravation in the host country.
in addition, the host country must pay a price that is a drain on its
foreign exchange when it imports products for indigenous use. However,
>nce these markets have been established, it is frequently an easy matter
for the importing country's suppliers and manufacturers (and manpowerl
to compete effectively with the overseas exporter. Sometimes this compe--
tition is greatly aided by government acts that encourage or force pur-
chases from local suppliers and/or the hiring of indigenous labor. These
reguiations can be justified by the argument that it takes time to develop
:.one's own production facilities and skill and that such encouragement
!nd protection by the government help to reduce the time needed. But
this argument can be pushed too far. Often industries or individuals
protected by their governments are simply not able to develop a competii-
Live capability, and the country is thus saddled with expensive supplies
(or labor) which actually impede development rather than facilitate it.
While it is easy to see the benefit of such encouragement, it is
difficult for people to envisage or measure the many activities that
have been discouraged because of the existence of such a program; often
the second consideration swamps the first, but the activity that failed
to materialize because it was discouraged is not represented by any
lobby or interest group--or even noticed.
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One way to prevent excesses in this direction is to assist a local
project solely through a tariff (or special tax on foreign'
labor) rather than using quotas or other compulsory measures. It is thus
possible to measure clearly the advantage being given to the local sup-
plier (or indigenous labor), and furthermore, if he cannot "make it"
behind the shield offered by a high tariff (or tax), the country is not
saddled by ridiculously high-cost and/or low-quality goods (or labor).
If the outsider can manage to meet the local competition, even though it
is protected by a tariff, he probably deserves to get the business, not
so much as a moral or ethical issue but for the greater good of the
country imposing the tariff.
9. Existence of a high order of
external stability
We have already mentioned the fact that the Middle East is probably
worth at least several trillion dollars. Rather remarkably,considering past
history, it appears that if the various OPEC nations behave reasonable well,
they are likely to be allowed to enjoy their wealth more or less undisturbed
for some time, perhaps forever. True, some of them are spending billions of
dollars for national defense, but in many cases they are more concerned about
each other or internal security than they are about the outside world.
What we have here is actually an unprecedented situation in world affairs.
Let's look at the example of Libya, which currently enjoys an income of
$7.5 billion a year from oil exports. While it is now estimated to have
only 21 billion barrels of oil (worth at current prices, about $250 billion),
if properly explored it would probably soon yield much larger reserves.
Despite the fact that Libya has acted provocatively and irresponsibly in
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supporting a number of extremist groups--Arab and non-Arab--we would hazard
x; guess that Libya is quite safe from attack, although it has been esti-
mated that a very small number of battalions of moderately well-trained
and equipped Western troops could probably take over the country. The
neighboring Egyptians, who could certainly make good use of the revenues
Irom Libya's oil, have suf'ricient military power, and in many ways the
rulers of Libya have gone to considerable trouble to antagonize the
Egyptian leaders. Still it would appear that Libya is reasonably safe
m an Egyptian or other army's attack and subsequent occupation and
.wnnexation.
It is true that 'there is continuing interference in the internal
.affairs of many developing nations--including much subversion and corrup-?
..:ion by developed countries--and that other difficulties are created as
1iy-products of this "cold war." However, in comparison with any earlier
period, the developing nations are relatively safe from military threats
)y the developed world (and in most cases from their neighbors as wel
ven vulnerable countries can now go to rather remarkable lengths in
provoking the industrialized world and still feel a rather high degree. of
safety. The most extreme case in recent history was, of course, the
Vietnam War, in which extraordinary amounts of explosives were detonated,
but with a greater degree of restraint than in World War II. Though the
tonnage of bombs dropped was larger, there was nothing in North Vietnam
remotely like the damage clone to Rotterdam or Hamburg--and the vital
canals were safe from all but accidental bombing.
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Some years ago Costa Rica disbanded its army (though not its police
force), arguing that its security was not dependent on having such a
force. While few countries would do likewise, it is still true that for
most nations, particularly many of the less developed countries, the
burden of providing for the national defense has never before represented
such a small portion of the national economic and human effort.
10. Foreign aid
This factor is placed at the end of the list because for the most
part foreign aid seems likely to play a relatively small role in the
future, even smaller than it has in the past. We say this because unless
foreign aid becomes a much larger and more productive force than expected,
the nine other factors will tend to make its role relatively small.
There is also a counterproductive aspect of foreign aid in that it is
often given not to help the poor nation but to salve the conscience of
the rich donor nation.
Aid motivated by this kind of guilt can result in the misformula-
tion of issues and attitudes on the part of the donor that force or influ-
ence the receiving country into counterproductive programs (for example,
furnishing expensive social services it cannot afford or trying to make
the development process much more uniform than is practical). This is
not to say that attempts to make development more uniform or increase
social services are always wrong; but it is quite easy for a wealthy
country to overestimate needs and to suggest a new emphasis that can
turn out to be self-defeating for the developing country. The example
of New York City is revealing. One could argue that almost all of its
programs were perfectly reasonable; the city is rich and could afford
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substantial social services, welfare, and many other burdens. The problem
is that New York did riot make selections but chose to pursue all programs
simultaneously--a course which no city can afford today. The same is
often true of poor developing countries: they must choose very carefully
among available goals and options.
We hope we have now made plausible our belief that the coping poor
nations will soon grow more wealthy. The mix of economiic forces varies in
different countries, but the overall direction is the same--toward rapid
economic growth by taking advantage of the gap between the developing and
a__
j:he developed nations.* We do not necessarily expect that the noncoping
-It is interesting in this connection to reread Karl Marx, who fully
tlinderstood how effectively the capitalist system had spread as a result of
its very dynamic nature; except for the personal hostility that shows through,
his description is vivid and apt:
The bourgeoisie... has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian
pyramids, Roman aqueducts and Gothic cathedrals....
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market
given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in
every country. To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has
drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which
it stood. All old-established national industries have been
destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by
new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death ques-
Lion for all civilized nations, by industries that no (longer work
up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the re-
motest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only
.at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old
wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new
wants requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant
lands and climates. In place of the old local and national
!seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every
direction, universal interdependence of nations....
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of
production, by the immersely facilitated means of communication,
draws all, even the most: backward, nations into civilization.
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with
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53
poor will grow economically as rapidly in the near future, though this
could happen; but we do believe that as the coping nations become rich
then the.ir present place in the industrial hierarchy will be taken by
the currently noncoping. This is roughly analogous to the situation in
New York City, where Puerto Ricans have taken over many jobs given up by
Blacks, who in turn had taken over jobs earlier held by other immigrant
groups.
We therefore argue that by the year 2000 perhaps a quarter of man-
kind will live in emerging postindustrial societies and more than two-
thirds will have passed the level of $1,000 per capita. By the end of
the 21st century almost all societies should have a GNP per capita greater
than $2,000 and be entering some form of postindustrial culture. The
task is not to see that these societies proceed along the same path
as Europe, North America and Japan, but rather that each should find its
which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the
underdeveloped nations' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners
to capitulate. It compels all nations on pain of extinction to
adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to intro-
duce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world in its
own image....
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarcely one hundred years,
has created more massive and more colossal productive forces
than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of
nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to
industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric
telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canali-
zation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground--
what earlier century had even a presentiment that such produc-
tive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1964), pp. 62-66.
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own way. However, even in the year 2100 there may be large income gaps.
odav per capita GNP ranges from about $100 to $10,000, and it would not
:it all surprise us if the range at the end of the 21st century were still
ather large, perhaps from a basic minimum of a few thousand dollars to
maximum of 10 to 20 times greater. As far as we can tell, arithmetic
differences (as opposed to ratios) in per capita product will generally
ncrease for the next 100 years, with (of course) many exceptions. But
!..his should not be disastrous either morally or politically since there
,are very few peasants, workers or even businessmen in developing nations
;,ho care much about gaps (whether arithmetic or geometric), no matter how
;very intellectuals, academics and some businessmen may profess to. The
6najor objective of most people is to increase their own safety and improve
Their own standard of living and their own capabilities. When they make
comparisons, it is usually with others at their socioeconomic level or
pith those who have recently been at their own or a lower level.
the Economic Transition
Now let us look at the other side of the coin. Why is it that we
do not expect the developed world--and the coping and noncoping nations,
once they have developed--to continue growing at high rates more or less
indefinitely? Those who take a limits--to-growth position tend to argue
very strongly that there are limits to supply, that available sources
of energy, raw materials and food will run out, and that this exhaustion--
along with overwhelming pollution--will inhibit and eventually halt further
economic growth. While some of this may occur, we believe that because
of the flexibility of modern economies and the huge surplus of room,
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energy and resources available, the limitations set by scarcity should
not usually prove dominant. We emphasize instead the demand side of the
equation. We argue that once worldwide development has essentially been
completed, economic growth rates will slow and finally many economies
will achieve a more or less steady state. There are, we believe, several
reasons--together cumulative and accelerating--why this is likely to
happen.
First, since we project that the rate of population growth will
slow and that eventually total world population will reach a more or
less fixed number, it is clear that there is an implied upper limit on
economic growth. Still, without additional dampening effects, economic
growth might continue at a rapid rate for a long time. We believe that
our additional points below show what some of these dampening effects
will be.
We see as a second reason for the slowing down of economic growth
in some developed nations the diminishing returns from increasingly costly
factors of production (often known as the Ricardo effect, from the studies
of David Ricardo, the early 19th century English economist). This will
be especially true for fixed factors, land in desirable locations being
the best example. But we believe it will also be true for variable factors
and substitution no longer will be able to reduce costs proportionate
to the investment made in them. Increased investment, technological
progress, and other innovations so often reverse this effect that we do
not believe it will ever be a dominating factor for society's prospects--
unless none of these developments takes place.
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r, 0i
Third, we believe that with the advance into the superindustrial era
there is likely to be a diminution in the marginal utility of wealth and
,rroduction. With insurance, social security and welfare for all, there
Arili be protection against most of the vagaries of life, and this should
;)roduce a shift in priorities and values. Something like this has already
)een seen in the upper middle-class of Japan and what we call the "Atlantic-
'rotestant culture area" (Scandinavia, Holland, England, the United
Cates, Canada and Australia) where there is a growing denial of the impor-
tance of wealth. While the "flower children" of the 1960's have faded,
the fact remains that a change has occurred and our culture has taken some
ateps away from the work and advancement ethic and probably will not
return to anything like its earlier state.
Fourth, and closely related to this third reason, is that many
vested interests exist which oppose either growth itself or the changes
accompanying growth--an opposition that need not be unworthy or self-
,ervinq. it seems likely that there will be an increasing desire to
leave things as they are, for as people get richer they tend to be satis--
Tied with their quality of life, with the status quo. As the number
and the influence of people who want to change their standard of living
or raise their status decrease, the balance of political and economic
forces will change. At the moment this shows up most dramatically in
the phenomenon we call "localism"--the tendency of people in a community
to halt its further development (as in Aspen, Colorado) or to prevent
the incursion of new industry even though it might bring jobs and supply
important needs (as in Durham, New Hampshire, where plans to locate a
refinery were successfully resisted by upper-income residents).
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This phenomenon will surely increase and prove an important check to the
economic growth of affluent societies. In general, economic and technical
efficiency will be given much less weight as first the new affluent values
and then the similar postindustrial values gain in strength and pervasive-
ness.
It should be noted that in many countries, at something like $1,000-
$2,000 per capita, the upper middle class tends to fare worse as the
country as a whole does better. In other words, while the standard of
living is improving, the quality of life may be deteriorating for some
groups. For example, if one compares upper-middle-class people in south-
ern Europe, East Asia, or much of Latin America with those living in Scandi-
navia or the United States, one finds that the former live in larger houses
(construction costs are very low), often have the traditional three live-in
servants (cook, maid and gardener), have a certain status and various perqui
sites, and can satisfy many desires that simply cannot be served in the Scandi-
navian or North American context. (The noted economist Joseph Schumpeter
once said, "one good maid is worth a household full of appliances," and
this is still true.) We believe that one of the major reasons for the
objections to growth by the elites arises directly out of this class
interest, but we find it difficult now to judge just how important this
particular class interest will be in slowing down growth.
Finally, we believe that economic growth in the super- and post-
industrial eras will slow and stabilize--at least as faras;the use of
physical resources is concerned--because of the nature of the growth
process itself. This is best explained by thinking of production as
divided into the four sectors or types of activities previously described:
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primary (extractive), secondary (industrial), tertiary (services to
)rima ry and secondary) and quaternary (services for their own sake). As
cations grow economically, the characteristic pattern of change these
iec:tors have experienced (in terms of labor participation and shares of
total product) is somewhat as follows: in the pre-industrial era the
)r'imary sector (largely agriculture) is paramount, there is some secondary
.Activity (mostly construction) and almost no tertiary and quaternary
activity. During industrialization the primary sector's share grows
smaller relative to that of the secondary, which enlarges rapidly.
The service sectors also grow, especially in the superindustrial stage,
when their rate of growth outpaces that of the secondary sector. Finally,
in the postindustrial era, the primary and secondary sectors' shares of
total product will be very small compared to those of the tertiary and
especially the quaternary, which we estimate will have the largest share
of both labor participation and total product. (Trends in this direction
in the United States are shown in Table 2, which presents recent and pro-
jected changes in the percentage of persons employed by sector, and
sector shares by GNP.)
~'t. is clear front Table 2 that it takes fewer and fewer people in
the primary and secondary sectors to supply all of the goods we need. It
is precisely this increase in the productivity of the primary and secondary
sectors that drives growth initially. Later it is the transfer from low-
paid jobs in the primary and secondary to high-paid (or productive) :'obs
in the tertiary and quaternary that drives growth. When these two are
used up, many economists believe that the future increases in productivity
will be small. Actually there are some activities of the tertiary sector
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Table 2
UNITED STATES
SHARES OF EMPLOYMENT AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR,
SELECTED YEARS AND PROJECTED TO 1985
(IN CURRENT DOLLARS)
1929
1945
1955
1965
1972 1985
SECTOR
EMPL. GNP
EMPL. GNP
EMPL. GNP
EMPL. GNP
EMPL. GNP EMPL. GNP
PRIMARY
27.6% 16.6%
19.2% 12.3%
11.1% 8.1%
6.7% 5.7%
fi
4.8% 4.8%1 2.4% 3.0%
SECONDARY
29.2 35.9
34.0 36.9
31.7 42.0
30.2 39.9
27.8 37.4 126.6 36.9
SERVICES
43.2 46.3
46.8 50.6
57.1 51.8
63.2 54.8
67.5 56.4 71.0 59.8
"Sectors are comprised as follows:
Primary: Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Mining
Secondary: Contract Construction and Manufacturing
Services: Transportation, Communication and Public Utilities,
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate, Services and Government
Sources: U.S. Department of Circe, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1966, 87-th Edition (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Govern t Printing 0 fice, 1966); U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1974, 95th Edition Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974); and U.S. Department of Labor,
The U.S. Economy in 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1974). Because of rounding, not all percentage
totals equal 100.
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(trade and banking, for example) that have had, and are still likely to
gave. enormous increases in productivity. But we believe! that the eventual
ominance of relatively non-productive quaternary activities--combined
with the other reasons set forth above--will ensure the transition to a
iostindustriai era of slowing and finally stabilized economic growth.
P per Capita--The Transitions Combined
if we now combine the 200-year projection of population growth rates
with our examination of economic growth in the developing and developed
,ations, we can arrive at our surprise-free projection of gross national
,roduct per capita for the world as a whole and its current economic
roupings. Such a projection is illuminating for it provides us with a
'tardstick for measuring individual economic well-being throughout the
)eriod of our 400-year scenario. Consider, for example, the perfectly
-easonable (but clearly not certain) expectation that India will grow by
in average of 2.3 percent a year in per capita income between now and
the year 2176, and therefore by then should have a per capita income
100 times its present income, or about $10,000. (Even a mere I percent
rowth per year would result in a per capita income of $750.) Such a
projection makes clear that the issue is probably not whether India will
levelop, but how rapidly and with how much difficulty. In this context
it is instructive to note that it took the United States 200 years to
rise from about $250 per capita to $7,000 per capita (in constant 1975
)rices) and that India may easily do as, well or even better. In this per--
;pective the future of India--beset today with agonizing political and
conomic problems, and a fitting subject for Cassandra-type prophecies--
looks very different indeed.
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In making our projection we have divided the nations of the world
into four economic groups, based on their current development and income.
The first group comprises the world's developed nations, including the
industrial nations of Western and Eastern Europe, North America, certain
countries of the British Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand and the
white portion of South Africa), Japan and Israel and the wealthy Persian
Gulf countries. The second group consists of China, North Korea, and
the four nations of the former Indo China. The third is the group we
call the coping nations--those with annual per capita incomes over $400,
or those which are resource-rich though not necessarily industrialized,
or those which are growing at the rate of more than 5 percent a year.
The fourth group, the noncoping, corresponds roughly to the International
Monetary Fund's designation of "Most Seriously Affected," nations that
all have per capita incomes below $400 and generally suffer from adverse
terms of trade (their imports cost more than their exports earn). In all
cases, the noncoping had a projected balance-of-payments deficit for 1974
and 1975 not smaller than 5 percent of imports. (These criteria for
grouping nations, of course, will not hold true for each nation for the
entire 400-year scenario, but for simplicity we will keep the membership
of each group fixed, to show what has happened and will happen to these
groups as they are now structured.)
Our projections for these four groups of nations are set forth in
Figure 5, within the framework of our previously projected growth by 2176
to a world population of 15.'billion people with a $300 trillion GWP,
yielding $20,000 per capita. In this projection it is the developed
nations that continue to drive economic growth, though their rates do
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GROSS WORLD PRODUCT PER CAPITA
1776-2176 (IN 1976 DOLLARS)
--7 $511,000
$10,000
$1,000
DEVELOPED
COMMUNIST ASIA
COPING
NONCOPING
$1 oL_. j -..___1_.....
1776 1800 1900
Figure 5
$10o
$10
2176
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63
slow down at a faster rate than that of the rest of the.world. The coping
nations start below the average GWP but grow quickly and pass through it
early in the 21st century; communist Asia achieves the world average
somewhat later, then stays close to it; and the noncop.ing nations,starting
much later, undergo their maximum growth only late in the next century.
One consequence of this surprise-free projection is that the current
100-1 ratio of per capita product between the wealthiest 10 percent and
the poorest 20 percent of the world population could shrink to about 5-1
after 200 years, give or take a factor of two or three. If, however, our
projection is incorrect and, for example, many of the developing countries
continue to grow in population with much less economic growth than pro-
jected, then a similar 100-1 ratio might persist. But even in this case
we would expect their absolute standard of living to reach or exceed
that of lower European standards today (for example,Spain or Greece).
Although many. people presently believe that only relative Income
Is Important, we think that this view is clearly In error. For
a struggling nation to move from $100 to $1,000 in per capita product
removes it from desperate poverty to current lower-middle-class standards,
a much more impressive and important change than an increase in a developed
country from $1,000 to $10,000 per capita, equivalent there to a move
from largely lower-middle to largely upper-middle-class standards.
Certainly one of the most important implications of our projection
is that it would be very difficult to construct a plausible scenario that
inevitably leads to famine or other extreme hazards great enough to cause
a major world tragedy in which a large portion of the population is lost.
We do not deny that many tragedies can result from various deprivations
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rssociated with poverty, but we are asserting that over the longer term--
ghat is, within 200 years--the likely economic outcome is not between
)overty and desperate poverty as some pessimists have suggested, but
rather between failure and success, in which "failure" means an annual
jer capita product of $500 to $2,000 for the poorer countries and "moderate
success" means a rangee of $3,000 to $10,000.
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65
Chapter 3
When primitive man learned how to make fire, he had discovered con-
trollable energy, which then became a "servant" destined to perform an
endless series of tasks, beginning perhaps with simple cooking. This
discovery may have been the single most vital factor which allowed man-
kind to develop modern civilization. Indeed early fuels also enabled
man to find new and more abundant sources of energy in ever increasing
amounts; thus he progressed from wood to coal to petroleum to hydro- and
thermoelectric power, and most recently to nuclear power. Because even
these resources are somewhat limited, he is now prepared to utilize
the best tools from the most recent technology in the development and
exploitation of several new alternatives that are known to constitute
essentially eternal sources, from which man should be able to extract
as much energy as he is ever likely to require on earth.
The commercial tapping of these eternal energy sources may initially
cost the consumer somewhat more (perhaps twice as much) per unit than
currently, but in time, the costs can only decrease in real terms. The
real cost of energy supplies has almost always dropped over time; the
price of energy, however, fluctuates around this general downtrend
according to market conditions. Despite the activities of OPEC and the
current pessimism about the extent of petroleum reserves, we believe
that energy costs as a whole are very likely to continue the historical
downward trend indefinitely.
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66
The data required to support the above thesis about: the long-term
supplies and costs of energy are the heart of this chapter. We hope they
are presented In sufficient quantity and are of sufficient quality to
make clear to the reader just how we were able to justify our optimistic
concIusIon.
There is certainly no question that mankind's future well-being is
intimately linked to the prospects for an abundant supply of energy at
reasonable prices. The recent fuel crisis spread concern throughout the
world that energy supplies were short, and would remain so for a long
time, quite possibly worsening.
While understandable, this reaction was rather paradoxical. There
was almost no substantive basis for It since there was no physical short-
age of oil, only a cartel that succeeded in forcing at least a temporary
increase in the price of the commodity it controlled. One effect of
this action was to increase the rate at which new energy came on the
market and to decrease the rate at which energy was used--that Is, the
cartel's moves actually decreased the possibility of future energy
shortages.
There is general recognition that the oil crisis and subsequent
events represented an energy watershed, but it was not a watershed from
abundance to scarcity, or even from cheap to expensive, but rather from
cheap to inexpensive. That Is, many in the industrialized world will
continue to drive large cars If they like them, live in big houses,
overheat and over-air-condition their homes, expand suburban sprawl,
use electric signs and street lighting lavishly, and continue other
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67
high-energy-consumption activities. But it also seems quite clear that
from now on more care will be exercised. Some will switch to smaller or
more energy-efficient cars, homes will be better insulated, more efficient
lighting, heating and cooling systems will appear almost everywhere, and
so on. Thus the functions that used energy so lavishly in the past will
continue to be performed with relatively little change, but there will be
considerable change and improvement in the efficiency of the means of
performance.
While what happened was fairly straightforward, the historical signi-
ficance of the OPEC embargo has been largely misread in public discussion.
For 50 years oil had been eating into the market once supplied by coal
because oil was cheaper and more convenient. As long as oil sells for
less than $5 a barrel, it must largely displace coal; but once it goes
to twice this price (or more), there should be a major shift to coal, and
there is plenty of coal to last for a very long time indeed. It should
be noted, however, that in fact in the U.S. the shift to coal has been
slow, one reason being that it takes about 15-20 years'to amortize major
new coal investments if they include much infrastructure such as ports
and railroads. It doesn't seem likely that oil prices will stay very
high for more than 5 or 10 years, and possibly even much less,; they might
easily return to something like $3-7 in the Persian Gulf long before
the new coal infrastructure has been amortized. This kind of practical
uncertainty can be very important in modifying the speed and effectiveness
of an adjustment, but it has very little to do with the scarcity of
resources. In fact, just the opposite is the case. If the oil in the
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68
Persian Gulf were to disappear over the next 10 years, the relatively
immediate and obvious need for coal would dictate that the adjustment
be made swiftly and effectively.
Perhaps the most important point to be made here is that despite
the sudden quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973-74, it is clear that
there will be an adequate adjustment to the new price well within a
decade even if it does stay high. No doubt the world will face many
other economic shocks in the future, but surely few will be as great as
that of the oil crisis. Even so, and while the adjustment has unques-,
tionably been quite difficult, and almost catastrophic iin some local
areas, life and progress do continue. (The comment that the poor suffer
much more from events like the oil shock than do the rich is so obvious
that one hesitates to make it. Yet the fact that this is one of the
best possible arguments for being rich, that it tends to insulate one
?om this kind of problem is one of those self-evident truths that often
floes unrecognized.)
In an effort to keep energy costs within reasonable bounds. over the
next few decades, the industrialized world is now vigorously and simul-
n:aneously tackling the energy problem on many fronts. We expect this
activity to continue until indigenous supplies and competitive sources
:ire built up to a level where utilization of OPEC sources becomes a
r?iat.ter of preference rather than necessity; when this occurs, the price
Of fuels will be much closer to the marginal costs of production than
hey are today.
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69
Conservation is obviously the quickest way to reduce dependence on
foreign oil, unpalatable though it may be to people who have long enjoyed
being able to use oil freely. The pressures have not been strong enough
yet in most countries, and changes do not come about easily in deeply
ingrained habits--nor should they necessarily occur, given current uncer-
tainties. Indeed, the OPEC cartel can now produce about a third more
oil than it can sell at current prices, and the margin is. increasing.
While the rest of the world is trying to.assure access to energy sup-
plies, OPEC's main impact will probably be on prices rather than availa-
bility. Although another oil embargo cannot be completely ruled out,
this possibility appears somewhat less ominous as time passes, and the
tactic is not likely to be effective when there are relatively large
stocks and large excess production capability.
An appropriate near-term solution would probably involve some
increase in petroleum inventories and stocks and, more importantly, a
substantial increase in domestic and non-OPEC world production capacity
over a reasonable time. But important as this is for today, it has
little to do with the long-run future.
Future Demand
Table 3 shows in condensed form our estimates of the amount of
energy the world will need during the next 200 years, given our popula-
tion and GWP projections.' This table assumes that a new energy
k
For convenience, we have adopted a system used in the tables and
throughout this chapter in which energy units are ex ressed in quads (q)
or quints (Q). A uad represents a quadrillion (1010 BTUs; a quint is
a quintillion (101 ) BTUs. A billion barrels of oil contain about 6q
(or .006 Q). Qe refers to quints of electrical energy.
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Table 3
ESTIMATES OF WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION
~F,.... Q = 10 11 BTU)
(a) GWP (a)
I
GWP/CAP(a)
EFF.(b) ANNUAL
CUt4t!LATI'i
CONSUMPI'ION
YEAR
POP
1'RIL.
(BIL.)
CONSUMPTI ON
FROM 1075)
1975
4.0 5.2
1,300
1.00
1985
5.0 8.5
1,700
1.15 .35
3 Q
2000
6.6 17.2
2,600
1.4 .60
10
2025
9.3 52
5,600
2.0 1.2
30
2.076
14.6 152
10,400
3.0 2.4
115
2126
15.0 228
15,200
3.5 3.2
240
2176
15.0 300
20 , 000
4.0 3.16
400
a) Hudson Institute studies.
b) Relative overall efficiency assumed for production, conversion, and
utilization of energy compared with 1975.
Table 4
RESOURCES OF PRINCIPAL FOSSIL FUELS
(Q = 1018BTU)
PROVEN RESERVES I POTENTIAL RESOURCES
OIL a
NATURAL GASa
COAL(INCL. LIGNITE:)b
CONSUMPTION AT
C-,) Ford Foundation, The Energy Policy Project, Ex lorin~nergy Choices:
A Preliminary Report, Washington, 0. C., 197
b) Brobst, D.-A. and Pratt, W. P., Eds., U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Mineral
Resources, (Washington, D.C.: U.5.6overnment Printing Office, 1973 .
r;) National Research Council, Committee on Resources and Man, Resources
and Man, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1969).
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71
consciousness in the world, coupled with advancing technology, will
gradually increase the efficiency of production, conversion and utiliza-
tion of energy. Energy demand therefore increases less quickly than the
GWP; after 200 years projected increase of energy demand is by a factor
of 15, while the GWP is larger by a factor of almost 60. Note that this
probably underestimates the likely reduction in use of energy because it
ignores the shift to services and to much modern technology. We expect
this increased efficiency to.be motivated by economic considerations
rather than by energy shortages as such. Nevertheless, total energy use
may ultimately be limited by environmental considerations that cannot
be foreseen today--for example, the long-range effects upon regional and
global climate.
It is quite reasonable to ask how this huge projected global demand
can be met without great concern about the wells running dry or the bio-
sphere becoming excessively polluted. To respond, we will first look
at the energy reserves and resources that are familiar and upon which
we will depend most for the near and medium term; we will then examine
new, alternative sources of fuel and power that might lead eventually
to an energy system that would depend only upon more or less eternal
sources.
Fossil Fuels
The world's known reserves and potentially recoverable resources
of petroleum and natural gas are shown in Table 4, and Table 5 con-
tains cost estimates for some fuels which can be extracted from
coal, from oil shale and from tar sands. Allowing for the
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Table 5
ANTICIPATED INITIAL COST OF SYNTHETIC
FUELS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES
(Hudson Institute estimates)
S/MILLION BTU
FROM COAL (DELIVERED PRICE)
.4 to 1.0
SYNCRUD
E (SYNTHETIC CRUDE)
2.1; to 4.0
SYN GAS
(SYNTHETIC GAS)
3.5 to 5.0
'_W/INT
ERMEDIATE BTU GAS
2.0 to 3.5
SHALE OIL
3.0 to 5.0
TAR SANDS:
SYNCRUDE
2.0 to 4.0
growth of energy demand estimated earlier, we conclude that the proven
reserves of these five major fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal, shale
oil, and tar sands) alone could provide the world's total energy requlire-
ments for about 100 years, and only one-fifth of the estimated aotentiial
resources could provide for more than 200 years of the projected energy
needs!
Hudson's estimates suggest that potential U.S. resources of oil,
gas, and coal are sufficient to supply the energy needs of this country
for more than 150 years, given our projected GNP growth. Furthermore,
once an effective process for the extraction of oil from shale is
developed, the total available supply of fossil energy could be more
than quadrupled.
In commercial practice, the chosen form of fuel is usually the rrKast pro-
fitable one. For our purposes, it suffices to establish that, at various con-
version prices (which appear in Table 5 to be tolerable), the preferred
proportions of the solid, liquid or gaseous forms are it matter of choice.
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Within the decade or two needed to make the appropriate industrial
changes, complete substitutability could be accomplished by
absorbing the conversion costs.
The development of facilities for the conversion of coal'to liquid
and gaseous fuels and for the extraction of oil from shale and tar sands
is now vigorously under way in many different programs in many countries.
At this time, there is little question about the ultimate technical feasi-
bility of these processes; the real difficulties lie in their near-term
economic viability, optimum rates of development, and associated environ-
mental, land use and water allocation problems. We expect all of these
concerns eventually to be resolved, but they will seriously affect the
prices of the fuels produced and will probably dominate discussion of these
potential energy sources for the balance of this century.
At a cost of $12 per barrel of crude oil (that is, $2 per million
BTUs for all fossil fuels), current levels of energy usage would absorb
about 10 percent of the GNP of the United States. Nevertheless, we
believe that the world can successfully adjust to fuels at this price if
need be, and particularly as it becomes more affluent and as energy is
used more efficiently. Actually, however, we believe the price of oil
has already peaked, in real terms, or soon will.
We wish to make clear that the exact cost of commercial extraction
oil from shale is still quite uncertain. Except in a few of the best loca-
tions, this process may well not be competitive with other alternatives
for decades. Thus, if most of the oil from shale could be extracted only
at costs exceeding $25 per barrel, it might be a long time before it
became a major commercial resource. However, the development of a rela-
tively inexpensive in situ extraction process cannot be ruled out; it is
now under active research and development by private companies and by
government-sponsored efforts. Such a process might be quite inefficient
initially, perhaps extracting only 20 percent or so of the potential fuel
(although recent pilot-plant operations suggest that a 40-50 percent recovery
rate is feasible). Even 20 percent might constitute a very useful beginning,
however, considering the vastness of the resource base. Costs from such an
i n s i tL FOOreRg sret2dolfO& 6ro lA- 741 4 t0u2 ~-fint retort-
ing process.
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Untill the development of eternal power sources has been accomplished
on a large commercial scale--which will probably occur by the middle of
the next century, if not sooner--the world's best hope lies in the use
of the solid fossil fuels, especially coal. They will be our best insur-
ance against any unexpected serious reduction in estimates of the world's
potential oil and natural gas resources (which alone, it is. comforting
to note, are sufficient to supply the world's energy requirements for-
about 50 years--see Tables 3 and 4). The only other major technology
currently being developed commercially that is likely to have real
:impact upon energy suppiles during the next 50 years or so is the nuclear
fission reactor.
Fission Power
Until the last few years, nuclear fission was generally considered
to offer the best hope for an escape from dependence upon fossil fuels.
Recently, however, this form of nuclear energy has come under growing
attack by consumer and environmental groups, abetted by adherents of
the no-growth philosophy. Their major arguments merit some serious
attention. They point out that in the event of a serious accident or
sabotage, nuclear power plants might contaminate large areas with radio-
activity, especially if deadly plutonium aerosols escaped from a damaged
reactor. Furthermore, they argue that the problems of handling huge and
ever-growing quantities of long-lived radioactive wastes, including
plutonium, have not been satisfactorily solved. They also contend that
reactors contain large quantities of fissionable materials from
which nuclear explosives can be made, thereby creating an enormous
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potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for the theft of
fissionable materials and, perhaps most frightening, for the eventual
control by terrorist groups of clandestine nuclear weapons.
The resolution of these issues is so much in doubt that there is
serious possibility of a moratorium one day being placed upon the con-
struction or use of nuclear energy plants, at least in the United States,
but this need not seriously affect future growth possibilities. It is
precisely because there are other alternatives available that a case of any
kind can be made against nuclear power. We will not pursue this debate
now, but an examination of the potential for nuclear power development
should illuminate what it is that may have to be stretched out, postponed,
or given up.
The total free world's resources of yellowcake, uranium ore (U308),
are generally taken to be about three times those of the United States.
Even then, the available uranium can probably be considered no more than
an interim supply unless (a) the breeder reactor becomes commercially
feasible and politically acceptable,.(b) the extraction of uranium from
the sea becomes practical, or (c) an efficient nuclear reactor becomes
available.* It should be pointed out that the current (hi'gh) cost of
uranium, about $20 per pound, translates to about 1 mill per kilowatt-
hour of electricity (KWHe). If the price eventually rose to $100 per
pound, the fuel would cost about 5 mills per KWHe, which still would not
be large compared to today's cost of power production from conventional
sources.
*An advanced design of the Canadian heavy water reactor (CANDU)
suggests a potential ten-fold increase in fuel efficiency.
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Without a much more efficient commercial reactor or an economically
viable seawater-extraction technology, the electrical energy available
through current technology, from uranium-235 burned in light water reac-
tors (LWRs), may be between 5 and 15 Qe for the noncommunist countries.
This represents a respectable amount of energy--comparable, in fact,
to that of the world's total oil resources (see Table b). To the extent
that LWRs participate in power production during the next several decades,
they would certainly help to cushion possible uncertainties about future
fossil fuel supplies. And in the not unlikely event that breeder reactors,
advanced CANDU reactors, or, extraction of uranium from seawater or low-
grade shales become practical and acceptable, the fission process could
provide a very large part of the world's electric power for centuries.
The Transition to Lonc-TermaSources
The world is at the beginning of a transition from fossil fuels as
the primary energy sources to the phasing in of long-term alternatives--a
transition we expect to be largely completed about 75 years from now.
Thus, by 2050, a major part: of total energy supplies should be emanating
from such eternal sources as solar, geothermal, fission and fusion reactor
installations. By 2076, the U.S. Tricentennial year, we expect fossil
fuels to be used principally as basic chemicals. During this transition
period, the world is likely to lean increasingly on the solid fossil fuels
(coal and shale), with nuclear power as a possible important adjunct.
We anticipate that by the year 2000 coal, shale and lignite will be
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converted on a large scale to relatively clean-burning fluids, because of
the convenience of handling as well as the need to reduce air pollution.
Moreover, the price of imported fuels, at least in the United States,
is apt to be kept relatively high by tariffs and quotas in order to pro-
tect domestic producers of synthetics. Present expectations are that
various synthetic fluids from coal and oil shale will be commercially
available in 10 to 15 years at costs equivalent to $5 to $20 a barrel
(depending upon successes in in situ extraction and other developments).
Variation between these extremes will depend upon such factors as the type
of synthetic fuel, the price of coal, the distance of the user from the
mines or conversion plants, and technological improvements over time.
While the political battles associated with nuclear fission are being
resolved, coal and oil-shale mining are expanding, and commerical con-
version facilities for them will be developed during the next quarter-
century; meanwhile, the funding of research and development for the long-
term renewable and/or essentially inexhaustible energy resources will
also be growing quite dramatically. The main entrants in this race are
solar, geothermal and fusion energy.
Solar Energy
Broadly defined, solar energy is available in a large number of
forms. The sun's energy drives the wind, grows all the plants, and warms
the oceans, thereby enabling man, in principle, to extract energy from
these sources as well as from the direct radiance itself. Even the
fossil fuels are stored solar energy, technically speaking, as is hydro-
electric power, and the vast energy of ocean currents and wave motions.
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We limit ourselves, however, to the six solar alternatives which now
are most promising, discussed in the order in which they are expected
to achieve substantial commercial production:
1. Wind Electric Power--to be obtained from strategically
placed arrays of large modern windmills.
It may seem strange i:o go back to a power source which is thousands
of years old. However, the new technology available for generating and
storing power from windmills makes this an attractive and economical
power source for regions where the wind blows rather steadily or at a
higher than average speed, or both--for instance, the Texas Gulf coast,
the Aleutian Islands, the Great Plains and the Eastern Seaboard of the
United States. A U.S. government program is under way to determine the
optimum locations and test various windmill systems. The current expec-
tation is that the first commercial systems will be installed during the
early 1980's, and the cost will probably be less than that of most current
conventional sources (see Figure 6).
2. I3io-Conversion (BC)--energy obtained by converting organic
materials, especially wastes, to fuels or electric power.
This is a catchall term for processes that can convert organic
matter--including all organic wastes from cities, industry and agricul-
lure--to fuels or power. Furthermore, selected crops or trees which
are the most efficient converters of sunlight might be grown for their
energy potential, or for dual purposes (for example, sugarcane for
food and energy, hemp for fiber and energy).
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Although the concept of growing crops for energy (hence, "energy farms")
is in an early stage of investigation, various processes for the conversion
of dry organic wastes into energy are reasonably well developed. If appro-
priate credit is granted for the cost of waste collection and disposal--
which is required in any event--several BC alternatives are expected to
become commercially feasible before 1980. These include: (a) the direct
burning of wastes as a fuel; (b) pyrolysis, the conversion of organic material
to oil and gas through heating in an oxygen-free atmosphere; and (c) hydrogen-
ation or chemical reduction, which, through the use of a heat and pressure
process, can convert most organic materials to oil and/or gas. Many other
promising BC alternatives will be evaluated during the next decade.
3. The heating and cooling of buildings by the direct
use of solar radiation as a heat source (HCB).
This is probably the best-known form of solar energy. The concept
is as ancient as civilization, but has been less than completely satis-
factory because of the intermittent nature of sunlight. At present a
substantial research and development program is being devoted to this
process, which some experts predict will become standard in new struc-
tures in the United States during the next decade or two. Indeed, some
solar systems for homes are already on the market and many large corpor-
ations are studying HC'B's commercial potential.
At current energy prices, HCB systems are considered to be competi-
tive in some parts of the country--particularly, of course, in those
regions with more than the average amount of sunshine. If the price of
fossil energy climbs further and the technology of HCB improves, the
incentives to install these systems in new structures, or even to retro-
fit existing ones with them, can be expected to grow rapidly.
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Photovoltaic: Power (PVP)--the conversion of sunlight by
solar cells to obtain direct-current electriciity.
As a consequence: of the use of silicon solar cells on space vehicles,
this technology is now one of the promising approaches for utilizing solar
energy. Because current solar cells are too costly for commercial use
by a factor of about 500. a big effort is under way to produce them
inexpensively. Several developments already suggest that this goal
could be met before the end of this century, and possibly much sooner.
One advantage of the PVP approach is that it directly converts sun-
light into electricity at an efficiency that is expected to be about 20
percent of the total incoming radiation. Sophisticated designs may be
able to use much of the remaining 80 percent for heating or cooling, or
perhaps for generating solar thermal power (STP). Estimates of the PVP
potential are enormous: it might conceivably supply the world's total
energy needs at prices comparable to or less than those of today's con-
ventional sources. (Figure 6 shows the projected economic viability.)
Ocean thermal paver--electric power derived from the
sun-warmed surface waters of the ocean.
This method offers an inexhaustible and huge potential for electric
power. Within about 1,000 miles of the equator the upper layers of the
ocean are about 35?(fahrenheit) warmer than the deeper waters. This temper-
ature difference in principle permits floating (or shore-based) generators
to operate continuously, extracting electrical power at a practicaleffi-
ciency of perhaps 2-3 percent, about one-third of that theoretically pos-
sible. If these systems become economically competitive (the "fuel" is
free), they would be able:, eventually, to produce more. electric power than
the world would need 200 years from now.
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The Energy Resource Development Administration (ERDA) is sponsoring
a research program to test this approach, with pilot plants now under
construction. Although preliminary engineering estimates suggest that
competitive power appears feasible, the development to prove its validity
will clearly require another 10 to 20 years.
6. Solar Thermal Power (STP)--the direct conversion of solar
radiation to heat, probably in the form of steam, to
drive electric power generators.
Solar radiation is easily converted to heat, merely by allowing it
to strike a blackened surface. Again a major problem is created by the
intermittent nature of sunshine, and several technical problems must also
be solved before even the sunniest desert areas could be used for STP
installations. Efficient methods must be developed for the installation
and maintenance of solar collectors over very large areas. Ways must be
found to heat and transport hot water or steam efficiently from the col-
lectors to central power plants. And relatively inexpensive energy
storage systems large enough to keep power plants operating when sun-
shine is not available will be needed.
If these rather formidable problems are overcome, STP alone would
be capable of supplying all of our future power needs. At a 10 percent
overall conversion efficiency, l percent of the world's land area used
for STP could provide the world's total energy needs in the year 2000.
While the subject is controversial, conservative estimates suggest
that STP will not become commercially competitive until well into the
next century, if then (see Figure 6), but many think it will be much
earlier. However, technical breakthroughs or the use of hybrid systems
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(for example, combining STP with
heat) could affect the economics
One oversimplified image of
large part, perhaps one--third,
solar power production.
considerably.
a future world energy economy visualizes
of the Sahara Desert being devoted to
-heoretically, at 20 percent efficiency such a
system could produce abou: 4 Qe
projected world needs 200 years
be transported to the principal
pollution-free hydrogen.
We are not suggest
per year, which is enough to supply the
from now. The energy presumably would
consumers in the form of clean-burning,
nq that this system would be desirable; on the con-
trary, even with hybrid designs it would probably be relatively expensive
and entail other potential disutilities. Nevertheless, we want to stress
that this one alternative could meet all of the world's energy needs with
almost no pollution, and although economically problematical now, the cost
probably would become tolerable during the 22nd century. Thus this hypo-
thetical system constitutes an a fortiori argument for the future availa-
bility of sufficient nonpolluting energy.
Geothermal Energy
The heat contained within the earth is so enormous that in principle
it could be tapped to produce more than 1 billion Qe. Moreover, more
heat is constantly being generated within the earth by radioactive decay
processes. Although most of this heat is presently too deep for commer-
cial exploitation, the amount within reach is large and should increase
rapidly during the next several decades as drilling technology improves.
The upper layer of the earth's crust is sufticiently irregular that,
over geological ages, many "hot spots" have been created that are within
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current drilling range (about 25,000 feet); some are only a few thousand
feet from the surface. These hot spots are often hundreds of square
miles in area and probably of great or even unlimited depth. A few of
them, probably much less than 10 percent, contain strata of porous rock
filled with hot water, some of them so hot that the water they contain
exists as high-pressure steam. (One such region is the site of the well-
known California Geysers.) Geothermal reservoirs are customarily clas-
sified as vapor-dominated (dry steam), liquid-dominated (hot water), hot-
dry-rock, and the magma itself, the molten,rock beneath the
earth's crust. In addition, many geopressurized zones have been found
(mainly along the Gulf coast of the United States) in which hot water
mixed with methane and other gases is trapped at very high pressures,
but the water temperature is generally not sufficiently high to produce
much steam.
Rough estimates of the amount of energy available from some of these
resources indicate that, although the more desirable dry steam formations
may be quite scarce, liquid-dominated reservoirs in the United States
alone probably have a much greater energy content that the total esti-
mated petroleum and natural, gas resources of the world. The really
large geothermal reservoirs, however, are those classified as hot-dry-rock;
in the United States, the amount of energy of this type available within
30,000 feet of the surface has been estimated as sufficient to produce
4,000 Qe, and might be even 10 times more.' Thus a geothermal resource
A. H. Ewing, "Stimulation of Geothermal Systems," in P. Kruger and
C. Otte, Eds., Geothermal Energy (Stanford:. Stanford University Press,
1973), pp. 217-22.
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base exists in the United States which, without our having to use the
magma itself, is theoretically sufficient to provide the entire world's
energy needs for far more than the next 200 years.
Current cost estimates for producing geothermal power from the hydro-
thermal reservoirs suggest that it may become one of the least expensive
sources of power, but early estimates of this kind are often overoptimis-
tic. Since almost no interest has previously been shown in this option
(except for the scarce dry steam fields--and even the geysers, the only
commercial U.S. project, have only been operating since 1960), the tech-
nology required for each kind of reservoir must be developed from scratch.
Although Federal funds for research and development in this area have
expanded rapidly, the fiscal 1976 budget request was still less than S30
rnllion. Nevertheless, the appeal of the geothermal potential is rapidly
spreading, and we believe it may well be the first of the eternal sources
to achieve large-scale power production--though we concede great uncertainties.
Indeed, estimates of the rate at which geothermal resources might.
be developed have varied widely. Although most have been conservative,
at least oner prestigious group of experts (the W. J. Nickel Conference
on Geothermal Energy in 1972, sponsored by the University of Alaskal,) were
surprisingly optimistic. Practical results will depend upon such basic
factors as the difficulty of the problems encountered, funding for
research and development, and exploration. In addition, favorable
Federal policies for leasing prospective geothermal areas and for
See the Conference's Special Report, University of Alaska, Fair-
banks, Alaska, 1972.
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providing reasonable economic incentives during the early development
period will be needed. Also the exploration companies will need assis-
tance in making appropriate arrangements with electric power producers
(the latter operate as a regulated monopoly and there is little tradition
or experience in forming such associations). Until these institutional
factors are resolved, progress will be difficult and uncertain. But if
there is genuine merit in the concept, there is probably more than enough
time to phase in this enormous resource well before fossil fuels become
very scarce.
What are some of the disadvantages of geothermal energy? For one,
the best U.S. geothermal reservoirs known are located in Western states,
often far away from major population centers. This creates a potentially
serious transmission problem--except to the extent that major power users
would gravitate to the regions., Second, the area required for each geo-
thermal field may be very large, perhaps 100,000 acres or more. Although
this would preclude many types of residential or commercial development
within such areas, it should not excessively hamper agricultural or
industrial development since the wells generally would be spaced far
apart. The connecting pipelines would require little acreage and could
be buried if necessary. Third, as is true for every new energy develop-
ment, there will be some environmental problems, varying in different
locations and of magnitudes not easily assessed at this time. Nevertheless,
those who have examined these potential problems have tended to conclude
that they would be much less difficult than those associated with coal
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or oil-shale mininq and conversion, and that, where needed, solutions are
available or can be made within current technology at reasonable cost."
17inally, and most important, we have little idea today of the many possible
probiems and associated costs that can arise durinq development of this
resource.
Nuclear Fusion
The search for a means to control fusion began shortly after nuclear
mission began to be considered as a commercial competitor with conventional
rower. The technical difficulties that must be overcome have been numerous
+nd complex, but many observers believe fusion research is on the verge of
demonstrating technical feasibility. The possibility now exists of
achieving commercially viable fusion power in each of three distinctly
different approaches, known technically as closed toroidal machines, open
magnetic wells and laser implosion systems. In each case, first-generation
designs are based on the so-called D-T (deuterium-tritium) reaction,
which requires a minimum temperature of about 100 million degrees to
,,tart the fusion process. Once started, the reaction becomes enormously
energetic in terms of the energy-mass relationship. The fusion of one
pound of a D-T mixture releases about the same amount of energy as fis-
=.ioning three pounds of U-235, the energy equivalent of about 10,000
tons of coal.
The consensus among scientists today is that the commercial feasli-
hility of one of the magnetic fusion systems (probably the TOKAMAK, based
R. G. Bowen, "Environmental Impact of Geothermal Development," in
Kruger and Otte, Eds., Geothermal Energy, pp. 197-216; also Joseph
tarnea, "Geothermal Power," Scientific American, January 1972, pp. 70-77.
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87
on a Soviet design) is likely to be established by the early 1990's. A
practical laser fusion process is not apt to become operational before
early in the next century. Which of the successful alternatives proves
to be the most successful over the long term is still an open question,
and there is actually no assurance that any will be commercially competi-
tive; as always, the uncertainties are simply too great.
The principal advantages of fusion over fission reactors are that:
(1) the associated radioactive hazards are anticipated to be smaller by
several orders of magnitude; (2) the threat of a runaway process or
explosion does not exist; and (3) the inherent temptation for theft or
sabotage would be much smaller. In other words, nearly all of the grim
scenarios conjured up in connection with fission reactors disappear, or
are very much reduced, with nuclear fusion. Although it does present
some risk of tritium leakage, this potential danger not only can be
minimized by reactor design, but can be continuously monitored. For-
tunately, tritium is one of the mildest radioactive Isotopes, but
it must be treated with great caution because of the relatively high
quantities involved (about two pounds per day for a 1,000-megawatt
plant). One problem with fusion reactors is that they could become a
source of cheap neutrons--a possibility with many implications for arms-
control negotiations, since in principle these neutrons can be used to
make explosives for nuclear weapons. It is possible to imagine circum-
stances in which this could create worse problems than those from the cur-
rent reactor program--although the scenarios involved might not appear
to be very probable.
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Energy Systems of the 22nd Century
Iwo developments are likely to occur during the next 100 to 200
years which will prepare the way for what we think will emerge as a more
or less steady state in energy production and distribution. regardless
which long-term energy sources become commercially dominant.
here is little debate about the first--that most of the energy
produced on a large scale will be in the form of electric power. Thus,
most present concepts tor major long-term energy sources (solar, geo-
thermal, fusion) are based upon electric power production at central
plants.
The second major development is the prospective use of hydrogen
as both a basic fuel to replace natural gas and as part of a general
system to convert, store and/or transmit electric energy over long
distances. For energy storage and the long-distance transmission and
distribution of energy---especially f rom desert solar power "farms,"
ocean-based generators or geothermal power centers--it might be practical
to convert the generated Sower into hydrogen which could easily be piped
i.o the distribution centers. At these centers the hydrogen could either
be reconverted to electricity by fuel cells (which are expected to become
80-90 percent efficient after 50-100 years of research and development)
or it could be used directly as a fuel for commercial, industrial or
transportation purposes.
In producing hydrogen from electricity, the theoretical maximum
Lificiency is about 120 percent, the extra energy coming from the environ-
ment. In practice, prototypes have reached 85 percent, and 100 percent
r, deemed a reasonable goal for future commercial operations.
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89
Hydrogen can be stored as a pressurized gas in underground caverns, above
ground as a liquid (at very low temperatures) or as a solid in the form of
hydrides, compounds formed by the diffusion of hydrogen gas into metals.
As a gas it can flow through pipeline distribution systems cheaply, much
as natural gas does today. As a liquid it can be stored above ground in
bulk, perhaps in 10-million-gallon tanks. As a hydride it would consti-
tute a source of hydrogen gas, which could be used as a portable tank
of fuel in conjunction with either large engines for mass transportation
or smaller ones for personal motor vehicles. With relatively nonpolluting
electric power from any of the eternal sources and clean-burning hydrogen
in an intermediate role between power plant and consumer, the overall
impact on the environment--especially on air pollution--could clearly
Although hydrogen seems likely to play a major role in the future
as a form of energy transport and storage, other processes may also be
useful, at least during the transition period, and in certain locations
may be preferable for reasons of efficiency or safety. Here we note
only two possibilities, the first of which, flywheels (wheels which can
store energy through the speed of their rotation),looks very promising.
The second, batteries and fuel cells, represents one of the main candi-
dates for widespread use in the 21st century.
The only pollutants from burning hydrogen in air are the nitrogen
oxides. Even these would be much less than the amounts released in using
gasoline in an auto engine, however. In an external-combustion mode,
these oxides can be eliminated almost completely by using lean mixtures,
especially with catalytic burners, or by burning with pure oxygen.
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i'LyweeIs: It appears to be feasible to construct flywheels of
almost any needed size that would be efficient converters (93-?95 per-
cent) in first storing and then releasing electric power. Moreover,
the kinetic energy of rotation is readily converted to alternating
electric power, an important feature. Theoretical analysis has shown
-chat flywheels made of modern materials may be able to store energy at
densities comparable to or better than the most promising batteries.
Furthermore, they could absorb or deliver electric power at rates as
fast as or faster than almost any competitive system. But the engineer-
ing is at an early state of development, and a decade or more may pass
before this potential can be reliably estimated.
Batteries and fuel cells: Some of the many batteries being develloped
today look quite promisincg. Within a decade or two, a battery-operated
electric auto might even become competitive with today's vehicles, at
least for drivinq ranges Lip to 200 miles. An electric automobile would
be pollution free, and would probably be more energy-efficient than the
internal-combustion engine (even after allowing for conversion losses in
obtaining the electric power from a fossil fuel source). It almost cer-
tainly would be much quieter and require less maintenance. Also, because
,:)f their efficiency in DC electric systems, batteries could be used for
electric energy storage in conjunction. for example, with photovoltaic,
iystems installed either at large central power plants or in individual
structures.
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A fuel cell (which may be considered a hybrid battery) with about
40 percent conversion efficiency is expected to enter power production
on a substantial scale within about five years. Unlike steam-powered
generators, which are efficient only in large sizes operating at design
capacity, fuel cells can be made large or small and their efficiency in
operation is essentially independent of the loading. Thus they may avoid
most of the distribution costs of electric power as well as provide pol-
lution-free power and offer substantial opportunities for utilizing the
"waste heat" effectively. As we proceed further toward electric and/or
hydrogen-electric power systems, the electric conversion efficiency and
potential for use of fuel cells can be expected to increase substantially.
Efficient Use of Energy
To an observer looking back from the 21st or 22nd century, today's
use of energy will probably seem inefficient in many respects. In oil-
fired electric power generation and transmission, for example, about 70
percent of the energy in the fuel is lost before the user receives the
power. Autos generally deliver, as motive power, only about 10 percent
of the energy in the original petroleum. Conservation advocates have
frequently advised that buildings be better insulated; they also point
out that most industrial processes are far from optimal in energy utili-
zation. These inefficient systems have developed during recent decades
A battery stores electricity and delivers it on demand. A fuel cell
creates the electricity from fuels such as natural gas or hydrogen. Like
a battery, it also can be run In reverse--that is, electricity will create
fuel.
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when technology was lin its infancy and energy has been relatively cheap.
but future trends are apt to change this. Our projection (see Table 6)
:assumes that worldwide efficiency in energy extraction, conversion, and
utilization will improve overall by a factor of 4 during the next 200
years. For example, we expect that soon after the year 2000 improved
methods of generating electricity from fossil fuels could provide an
overall efficiency of about 60 percent, compared to today's 35-40 per-
cent. The electric engine or other substitutes for today's internal-
combusion engines could quickly double, and eventually more than triple,
present automobile energy efficiencies. Better insulation and design of
buildings could reduce heat-transfer losses by a factor of 2 or more.
Electric-powered heat pumps, theoretically much more than 100 percent.
efficient, undoubtedly will be increasingly phased into the economy--
especially as the efficiency of electric power production increases.
Also, electric power transmission losses can be cut by 50 percent or
more by use of properly shielded higher-voltage overhead lines, more
modern underground systems, and DC power. The current incandescent bulb
will probably be replaced by other forms of lighting which will be 10
times more efficient.
Finally, we expect new power-generating systems to emerge that will
utilize the waste heat which today is about two-thirds of the total energy
input and is not only dissipated, but is also considered a pollutant.
Large capital investments are therefore necessary to dispose of it in
gays which are less environmentally disturbing; this solution is not only
costly but often unaesthetic (cooling towers are an example). Waste heat,
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Table 6
SUMMARY OF GLOBAL ENERGY RESOURCES
SOURCE
EST.
LONG-TERM
POTENTIAL
1ST
COMMERCIAL
FEASIBILITY
(EST.)
PROBLEM
AREASa
HYDROELECTRIC
.1 Qe/yr.
CURRENT
C
OIL & NATURAL GAS
30 Q
CURRENT
E
TAR SANDS & OIL
SHALE
30-2,000 Q
1985
C,E
COAL & LIGNITE
200 Q
CURRENT
E
U-235 (FREE WORLD)
15 Qe
CURRENT
E
U-235 (OCEAN)
3,000 Qe
CURRENT
C,E
URANIUM FOR BREEDERS
100,000 Qe
1995
C,E
Li-6 (D-T FUSION
REACTOR)b
320 Q
1995-2005
C,E,T.
DEUTERIUM (D-D FUSION
REACTOR)
)1 billion Q
2020-2050
C,E,T.
SOLAR RADIATION (1%
OF SURFACE ENERGY)
30 Q/yr.
1980-2000
C,T
OCEAN GRADIENTS
20 Qe/yr.
2000
C,T
ORGANIC CONVERSION
1.2 Q/yr.
1975-1990
C
GEOTHERMAL--MAGMA
)1 billion Q
?
C,E,T
HOT DRY ROCK
100,000 Qe
1990-1995
C,E,T
LIQ. DOM.
1,000 Qe
1980-1985
C,E
DRY STEAM
I Qe
CURRENT
aC = cost, E = environment, T = technology
bLi-6: The lithium isotope used to breed tritium in
first-generation fusion reactors. World
resources might be 10 times greater than shown.
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4
however, has many potentially useful applications. Although there has
e een little incentive for utilizing waste heat until recently, it has a
demonstrated practicality depending, of course, upon such variables as
design, season and location. Widespread commercial applications probably
will not come rapidly, because they often require complex integration
Into new systems on a large scale--ana retrofitting can be very costly.
However, we expect that during the next 200 years heat sinks for waste
energy will increasingly -3chieve a utilitarian role, thereby reducing
society's overall energy requirements, and that eventually issues of
?'waste energy" projects will be viewed as a relic of the 20th century.
Table 6 offers an estimate of current major energy resources, as well
cr`_i the potential capacity of new contributors to meet the world's future
demands. As we compare fable 6 to Table 3, which projects the world's
energy requirements, the prospects appear quite encouraging. Indeed, we
expect that all but one of the sources listed in Table 6'will be commer-
cially feasible before 2050, and most of them by the year 2000. We can
now only guess which of these alternatives will emerge as the principal
commercial competitors; the eventual outcome will be a matter partly of
institutional and environmental developments and partly of technological
change.
We do not mean to imply that the path to abundant energy will be
smooth. Future energy projects will tend to become increasingly immense,
and costly mistakes may create serious temporary local or regional supply
.1 The exception is geothermal energy directly from deep molten rock
(magma).
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95
problems lasting perhaps 5 to 10 years, higher costs, rationing, brown-
outs and similar troubles. In retrospect, the developed world's present
vulnerability to OPEC appears to be attributable to a mistake of this
kind. We find it hard to visualize, however, that the effects of such
a mistake in the future could last for as long as 20 years, and usually
it will be for much less time; too many options for new supplies already
exist and they will increase over time. Even with lead times of 5-10
years for major facilities, very large changes in production capacity
can be made within 20 years. We therefore might characterize future
complete energy systems as relatively inflexible within a decade,
flexible over 20 years and potentially revolutionary within a half-
century.
The basic message is this: except for temporary fluctuations caused
by bad luck or poor management, the world need not worry about.energy
shortages or costs in the future. And energy abundance is probably the
world's best insurance that the entire human population (even 15 to 20
billion) can be well cared for, at least physically, during many centuries
to come.
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I-iguru 6
PROJECTED COST RANGES FOR SEVERAL TYPES OF SOLAR ENERGY
1985 2000 2010 20.20
Source: Adapted from data given by the Mitre Corporation/
Batelle Columbus Laboratories; Report MTR-6513,
December 1973.
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97
Chapter 4
RAW MATERIALS: THE END OF THE BEGINNING
Most Americans believe we are facing the prospect of a basic short-
age of minerals in the world, according to a Harris poll taken in Novem-
ber 1975. A majority of the respondents to the poll (64 percent versus
29 percent) anticipated that a reduction in future living standards would
result from continued "wasteful" consumption; they also believed (by 55
percent to 30 percent) that the disparity between the size of the U.S.
population and its relatively high per capita consumption of minerals
(about s.ix times the world average) was harmful to the welfare of the
rest of the world. As a consequence, 50 percent of those polled were
concerned that a continuation of this trend would turn the rest of the
world against the United States.
These views, which surely, wwere not generally held 10 years ago,
presumably were created and/or enhanced by the phenomenon of the limits-
to-growth, or neo-Malthusian, movement, as well as by recent shortages.
Among the more deleterious effects of some of the limits-to-growth con-
cepts may be the sense of guilt or unworthiness it encourages in the
industrialized world, and the sense of having been shortchanged that it
encourages in spokesmen for the developing countries. (For some, the
initials GNP have increasingly been interpreted as representing "gross
national pollution," and more and more references are made to the "efflu-
ent society" and "mindless growth" as though industrial production were
worse than meaningless, as though it generated garbage rather than use-
ful and desirable products.) Both attitudes are unhealthy, particularly
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98
since they are based largely on misformulations and misinformation, pro-
duce unnecessary confrontation and endless irrelevant rhetoric, and
create an unfortunate diversion of attention from real issues.. If the
neo-Malthusian view of the world as a fixed pie were correct, if every
nonrenewable resource any nation used diminished the amount remaining
for the rest of the world and future generations, then the world might
properly be labeled as wicked and unjust. Under these circumstances, our
encouragement of increased production and our attempts to facilitate
the greater use of raw materials by all, including the rich of the c:ur-
vent generation, could be considered "criminal." But, as already dis-
cussed, while the fi'xed-pie metaphor may be very persuasive to some
people, our analysis finds it completely misleading. The major theme
of this chapter is that there is an abundance of raw materials for
future generations as well as the present one, and that the more we de-?
velop economically and technologically, the more there will be for all
of humanity.
Generally speaking, while modern societies might appear to be quite
vulnerable to a sudden severe shortage of energy or food, they have al-
most never been desperately vulnerable to shortages of raw materials.
For example even during wartime, when blockades cut off' normal sources
of supply and the manufacturing and construction industries were redi-
rected to the needs of a wartime economy, civilians usually have managed
to fulfill their vital needs surprisingly well for long periods of time
(although there were annoyances in terms of their creature comforts, such
as having to maintain their cars or houses a little longer, fix broken
appliances more often, and repair frayed clothing or shoes). In this
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context it would be possible for a modern society to live for years, if
necessary, with its existing structures and stocks of manufactured
products.
This is not to say that the lack of adequate raw materials might
not have an extraordinary effect on the business cycle, for it could
easily mean the difference between prosperity and depression, between
winning and losing a war. It is only to say that mineral shortages are
unlikely to have an immediate impact upon survival expectations. Not
only is it a fundamental law of science that no elementary substance
(except radioactive ones) can be used up, but, except for fuels in a
modern society, most of the resources which have been extracted from the
earth generally exist above ground somewhere and thus can be reclaimed and
recycled, provided only that sufficient energy is available. Indeed, given
the potential of future technology to recycle, to conserve energy and
materials, and to accomplish more with less resources, it does not appear
unreasonable for the long-term future to imagine an expanding economy
operating largely on recycled materials, should any become relatively
scarce.
Finally, we should realize that, in principle, no industrial society
can be dependent in the long run upon any single critical industrial
mineral. This should be obvious because if such a mineral had never been
discovered, industries would have developed around the minerals we did
know about, and we would not be aware of our loss. The only raw material
The noted economist Wilfred Beckerman is fond of pointing out
that civilization has failed because his uncle forgot to invent
"Beckermonium," just such a "critical" material, one that would now
be dominating society if only his uncle had invented it (Wilfred Becker-
man, In Defense of Economic Growth [London: Jonathan Cape, 1974]).
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that might, cause one to question this statement even momentarily is iron
because the widespread availability and utility of iron ore have led to
our steel-based civilization. Obviously, every society becomes dependent
upon its traditional raw materials and would find it difficult to make .a
relatively rapid change if a sudden unanticipated shortage appeared. But
that is to take a short-term view.
Over the long term we have projected world population growth to 15
billion and GWP to 5300 trillion by 2176, with an abundance of energy at
roughly today's prices (or at least not more than triple). Under these
circumstances the world's annual requirement for raw materials, if linear
with GWP, would be about 60 times that of today (although a factor c1 15
or less might be more reasonable because of the expected relative increase
in services over production, the lower relative value of raw materials in
a more highly technological society and the reduced requirements antici-
pated for maintenance and replacement). Yet even with a factor of 00,
we would reject out of hand the notion that we could run out of any
really critical material resource, one that would prevent the growth we
envisage from actually occurring.
It is our view that very few important materials in the world--per-
haps none--will become unduly scarce, although the distribution of the
prime sources of many of them often is so uneven that unless we are care-
ful cartels might occasionally be able to extract higher prices than
usual from consumers, thus causing local needs for conservation, substitu-
tion and redesign. (It the price set by a cartel has been high for
decades, then there usually is not a problem because the user has
not become excessively dependent.) Gold and silver are high-priced
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metals mostly because they are naturally scarce; consequently we use
them less than we otherwise would and have never become dependent on
them. For example, we make most electrical wire out of copper though
silver would be better; and when the price of copper gets too high, as
it occasionally has, aluminum can take its place for most present uses
(although this does force adjustments that may be temporarily incon-
venient). The same considerations apply to all metals--indeed, to almost
all materials. Table 7 lists some potential substitutes for metals in
common use. It should be noted how frequently plastics appear. The
increasing utility and versatility of plastics. and other new materials
(such as high-strength fibers and composites) reinforce the general argu-
ment, even though it may not need reinforcing.
PRINCIPAL SUBSTITUTES FOR MATERIALS
MATERIAL PRINCIPAL SUBSTITUTES
Aluminum ore/bauxite Kaolinite, dawsonite, alunite,
anorthosite, nepheline syenite,
saprolite, coal ash
Chromium Nickel, molybdenum, vanadium
Cobalt Nickel
Copper Aluminum, plastics
Lead Rubber, copper, plastics,
tile, titanium, zinc
Molybdenum Tungsten, vanadium
Tin Aluminum, plastics
Tungsten Molybdenum
Zinc Aluminum, plastics
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In a hypothetical world in which all materials would be sold at
approximately their marginal cost of extraction (or production), the
possibility of any shortages because of exhaustion could be anticipated
for decades and gradual adjustments made to avoid undue economic stresses.
In the real world sudden or very rapid changes in supply or demand can
occur and create temporary economic anguish. The rate of growth in GWP
increased by about 40 percent during 1973 (and into 1974) and at the same
time there was an unusual degree of inventory accumulation accompanied
by considerable speculation in commodities. As a result, prices sky-
rocketed and we were informed that "everything was scarce" in 1974. But
only a year iater, "nothing was scarce." How easy it was for panic to
take hold when the 1973-74 commodity price fluctuations followed the
energy crisis. That "everything scarce" phenomenon quickly became a
permanent theme about a growing resource dilemma of the world, even
though many commodity and resource prices returned to "normal" levels
after about a year. In any event, the possibility of mineral resources
being depleted over the course of the next century or two needs to be
examined carefully and thoughtfully if the argument that an expanding
demand will soon exhaust the supplies of a finite earth is to be refuted.
The Long Term Perspective for Resources
In a recent work, one of the leading neo-Malthusians, Dennis Meadows,
listed 19 principal mineral resources in use today, with estimates of
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their reserves and their potential resource base. In each case it
appeared that the mineral was "soon" to be exhausted if the projected
worldwide growth in its use continued, with estimates ranging from a
low of 6 years to a high of 154 years before exhaustion. Therefore,
the inescapable conclusion, based on the data presented by Meadows,
was that the world must reverse its economic growth tendencies.
Since our view of the future of mineral resources so directly con-
tradicts that of Meadows and his colleagues, we find it necessary to
explain the huge gulf between the two points of view. First, consider
the three energy minerals--coal, oil and natural gas, the most impor-
tant energy sources today. We have already analyzed alternative energy
POTENTIAL EXHAUSTION OF SELECTED MINERALS
Average Annual
Years Remaining-
Resource
Growth in Use (%L
Low High
Aluminum
6.4
33
49
Chromium
2.6
115
137
Coal
4.1
118
132
Cobalt
1.5
90
132
Copper
4.6
27
46
Gold
4.1
6
17
Iron
1.8
154
n.a.
Lead
2.0
28
119
Manganese
2.9
106
123
Mercury
2.6
19
44
Molybdenum
4.5
65
92
Natural gas
4.7
19
58
Nickel
3.4
50
75
Petroleum
3.9
23
43
Platinum
3.8
41
49
Silver
2.7
15
23
Tin
1.1
62
92
Tungsten
2.5
27
n.a.
Zinc
2.9
76
115
Adapted from Dennis L. Meadows et al., Dynamics_of Growth
in a Finite W,o,ld (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, Inc.,
1974), pp. 372,,73.-
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esources in some detail and found that with very little doubt we could
expect essentially an eternal abundance of energy, the only requirements
being that the sun keep shining and modest technological progress con-
linue for a few years. But one would be forced to an opposite conclusion
if Meadows' data were the sole source of information. We do not have the
space to deal with each of the remaining 16 minerals he lists, but we
will discuss aluminum, iron and mercury in some detail and the rest with
more general observations.
Except for silicor ;a semimetal), aluminum is the most abundant
metal in the earth's crust, which contains about 8 percent aluminum., or
roughly 2 million trillion tons. Can that much metal (or even .0001 per-
cent of it) be used up in 49 years, the high side to Meadows' estimate?
The resolution of the apparent confusion lies in Meadows' footnotes, where
he explains that he has counted only the aluminum in known reserves of
bauxite. In other words, if we ignore every possible source of alumi-
num except known high-grade bauxite deposits, we will come up with his
numbers. Or will we? No, not even then. For even though he states in
a footnote that unless otherwise specified he will use data from the
1973 U.S. Geological Survey document, U.S. Mineral Resources, in the
case of aluminum there is another footnote explaining that he has
taken the estimate of aluminum reserves instead from the earlier U.S.
Bureau of Mines report Mineral Facts and Problems. 1970, which happened
to use a 1965 estimate that was less than half the one given in the 11973
document. Moreover, the later volume unambiguously tells us in a sum-
mary statement that "...the nation has virtually inexhaustible potential
resources of aluminous materials other than bauxite," and it proceeds to
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describe 10 of them in illuminating detail--including the fact that one
U.S. deposit of oil shale (250 square miles in surface area) contains
19 billion tons of the mineral dawsonite (about one-fifth pure aluminum)
which is available as a by-product of extracting shale oil. This single
small area contains more aluminum than Meadows' estimate for total known
world reserves plus potential future resources.
As for iron, the world's most important metal, Meadows tells us that
we may have reserves enough for only 154 years, and regarding potential
resources says "no estimate available." This is true--sort of. The
Geological Survey does assert, however, that "Because of the great amounts
of identified iron-ore resources, no attempt is made to estimate quanti-
ties of hypothetical iron-ore resources beyond stating that they are
enormous." How could they be otherwise when iron constitutes about
6 percent of the earth's crust?
Mercury, like gold and silver, is relatively scarce--or perhaps it
would be more accurate to say that it is hard to find. Therefore, if
we continue to use it at increasing rates, there might be no more avail-
able after 44 years (Meadows' high-side estimate). How do we handle this
problem, assuming that the estimate of supply is valid (although we will
even question this later)? To answer, we look at the principal uses of
mercury and consider the possibility of other solutions. The fact is
that there are substitutes available for each of the major uses of mercury,''*
* U.S. Geological Survey, U. S. Mineral Resources (Washing-
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), P. 301.
H.E. Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg, The Age of Substitutability,
Eleventh Annual Foundation Lecture for presentation before the United
Kingdom Science Policy Foundation Fifth International Symposium - "A
Strategy for Resources" - Eindhoven, The Netherlands, September 18, 1975.
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Indeed, some of the former uses are now banned because of the extremely
poisonous nature of mercury compounds. While some of the suggested sub-
stitutes might be more expensive, up to 44 years are available to find
better ones; if this fails, then extra costs might have to be paid. But
cif some of the substitutions are successful, that would give more time to
work on the others--and, indeed, more mercury might also be found.
It should also be pointed out that Meadows' estimate for
mercury resources must be naccurate since good data are simply
-ot available. The Geoloq',cal Survey report says: "At most mer-
cury mines, no effort has been made to ascertain the ultimate reserve
of the deposit in advance of exploitation, and at few mines is enough
ore blocked out for more than one year of operation."" Indeed, Meadovws'
estimate, given under the heading "Hypothetical plus Speculative Resources,"
is, as he states in a footnote, for "mercury recoverable at $1,000/flask"--
that is, it is an estimate of low-grade identified reserves and does not
include hypothetical or speculative resources at all.
The fact is that known reserves for most minerals tend not to exceed
a few decades of demand, for obvious economic reasons. We would not be
surprised to learn, for example, that if the lead industry had proved
reserves sufficient for 30 years at anticipated demand, they would be
only mildl' interested in searching for new reserves. Since anything
found today probably could not be sold for 30 years or so, it would
hardly be a fantastic, investment opportunity. Indeed, great success by
several companies in locating new reserves would put severe pressure on
current prices. Consequently, if new lead mines are found in the next
U.S. Mineral Resources, p. 408.
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few years it is more likely to be a fortuitous discovery than the result
of a concerted exploration for the mineral. Thus far, capital spending
in the mining and primary metals industries has remained unchanged from
1967-68 levels, which would not suggest that any uncommon shortages in
reserves are being felt by them.
World reserves of many minerals have actually grown so rapidly,
as Table 8 shows, that if further exploration were encouraged it would
be more for reasons of national security or fear of excessively high
prices from foreign cartels than from a concern about fundamental short-
ages. If the estimated recoverable zinc resources are sufficient for
at least 1,000 years at current demand rates, as they are, who, would be
interested in exploring for more now? On the other hand, if current ore
reserves were down to 10 years or less, then the marketplace would reflect
that condition with increased prices until new mines are opened and
reserves are expanded to higher levels.
Because of these economic considerations, there is little reason for
known reserves to exceed the expected demand by more than a few decades.
It does happen occasionally, but not -because shortages have prompted a
search for additional supplies. Thus, if we have stumbled upon coal
reserves sufficient for more than 200 years and iron ore for more than
1,000, we can hardly expect private investors to be excited about a pro-
posal to look for still more. As a result, those who make conservative
predictions about the future availability of materials based upon such
data naturally tend to underestimate future production capability. The
literature is full of such predictions. As one example, the prestigious
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Table 8
KNOWN RESERVEST KNOWN RESERVES j PERCENTAGE
ORE
IN 1950 (1,000 IN 1970 (1,000
METRIC TONS
)
METRIC TONS)
l
.
_
-u-
IRON
19,000,000
251,000,000
1,321
MANGANESE
500,000
635,000
?7'
CHROMITE
100,000
775,000
675
TUNGSTEN
1,903
1,328
- 30
COPPER
100,000
2 79 , 000
179-
LEAD
40 , 000 86,000
115
ZINC
70,000 113,000
61
TIN
6,000 6 , 600
10
BAUXITE
1,400,000 5,300,000
279
POTASH
5,000,000 118,000,000
2,36o
PHOSPHATES
26,000,000 1 1,178,o00,000
4,430
OIL
75,000,000 455,000,000 507
Source: Special R'.port. Critical Imported Materials, Council
on International Economic Policy, Executive Office
of the President, December, 1974 (page 14).
WJashinoton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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log
Paley Report of 1952 stated that by the mid-1970's U.S. copper production
would not exceed 800,000 tons; in fact, it was 1.7 million tons in 1973.
The report also said the maximum lead production would be 300,000 tons';
yet in fact it exceeded 600,000 tons.' This tendency to underestimate
future production is so strong that similar mistakes are made over and
over again, as Tables 8 and 9 vividly illustrate.
The tendency to confuse temporary shortages with permanent ones can
be caused by various factors. For instance, a cartel, while it is suc-
cessful, deliberately creates a shortage of supply sufficient to increase
the price of its controlled commodity substantially. During the height
of the cartel's success there is a tendency to believe that the induced
shortage can become permanent. Historically most such cartels have failed.
OPEC, which has had a phenomenal recent success, is now being tested by
the economic reactions to the threat that it poses. But the main point
U.S. President's Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952). For the 1973 figures, see
Statement of Simon D. Strauss, executive vice-president, American Smelt-
ing and Refining Company, "global Scarcities in an Interdependent World,"
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, Ninety-Third Congress, May 1974, p. 121.
*
In this connection, the following is presented as an amusing .a fortiori
scenario about possible developments with a copper cartel:
In response to certain events that occurred before January 1985 (the
activities of an effective international copper cartel, depletion of Ameri-
can copper resources during the prior decade, and a doubling of demand for
the metal after energy became cheap again and worldwide industrial growth
boomed), the price of copper rose rapidly within several months from $1
to $10/lb. and hovered there after May 1985. The following facts were
recorded:
1. The U.S. had "consumed" about 90 million tons. of copper, most of
which still existed in various forms within structures or equipment. As
the value of scrap copper increased from .70 to $9/lb. during the 1985
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Table 9
U.S. Oil
Production
Rate (Billion
Date Bbls/Yr)
L PROPHECIES AND REALITIES
1866 .005 Synthetics available if oil
production should end (U.S.
Revenue Commission)
1885 .02 Little or no chance for oil
1" California (U.S. Geologi-
C"f Survey)
1891 .05 Little or no chance for oil
:" lansas or Texas (U.S.
Geological Survey)
1908 .18 Maximum future supply of 22.5
pinion bbls. (officials of
Geological Survey)
1914 .27 Total future production only
y billion bbis. (official
of L.S. Bureau of Mines)
1920 .45 U.S. needs foreign oil and
=_.yithetics: peak domestic
production almost reached
(t?irector of U.S. Geological
survey)
1931 .85 Must Import as much foreign
oil as possible to save
domestic supply (Secretary
at the Interior)
1939 1.3 U.S. oil supplies will last
nr.ly 13 years (radio broad-
casts by Interior Department)
1947 1.9 Sufficient oil cannot be
found in United States
(Chief of Petroleum Division,
State Department)
1949 2.0 End of U.S. oil supply
almost in sight (Secretary
of t*e Interior)
Reality
In next 82 years the U.S.
produced 37 billion bbls.
with no need for synthetics
8 billion bbls. produced in
California since that date
with important new findings
i , 1948
14 billion bbls. produced
in these two states since
1891
35 billion bbls. produced
since 1908, with 26.8 billion
reserve proven and available
on January 1, 1949
34 billion bbls. produced
since 1914, or six times
this prediction
1948 U.S. production in
excess of U.S. consumption
and more than four times
1920 output
During next 8 years imports
were discouraged and 14
billion bbls. were found in
the U.S..
New oil found since 1939
exceeds the 13 years'
supply known at that time
4.3 billion bbls. found in
1948, the largest volume in
history and twice our
consumption
Petroleum Industry demon-
strated ability to increase
U.S. production by more than
a million bbls. daily in the
next 5 years.
Source: Presidential Energy Program, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
House of Representatives. First session on the implications of the
President's proposals in the Energy Independence Act of 1975.
Serial No. 94-20, p. 643. February 17, 18, 20, and 21, 1975.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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is that unless the cartel slows down research and exploration, techno-
logical progress, and/or economic development, its actions will cause
price rise, metal dealers realized that existing U.S. copper was now worth
about $1.7 trillion, an average of $6,000 per person:--almost equal in
value to a third of the prior wealth of the country (estimated in 1984 at
about $5 trillion). Needless to say, a rush developed to locate old brass
beds, brass handles, copper pots, lamps, locks and all other copper scrap--
and 65 billion pennies were suddenly worth a nickel each at the scrap
dealer's.
2. Utility companies went into a crash program to substitute alumi-
num for copper in transmission lines, engineers began designing copperless
heat exchangers, many raiant-heated:floors and walls were ripped open to
get the copper tubing, and plumbers were in great demand to replace copper
pipes and tubing in homes and buildings.
3. CBS News reported one engineer's calculation that copper could be
profitably extracted from many of the above-average grades of igneous rock
at a cost of about $4/lb. At $6/lb. profit from the copper, the higher
grade volcanic rock in the U.S. was now worth about $5/ton (net profit),
and the engineer estimated the total value to be more than $1,000 trillion
for rock within 100 feet of the surface. The next morning there was a
stampede at every mining claims office in the world.
4. It was reported that people were lined up in long queues with
barrels full of copper and brass artifacts at every scrapyard"in the
developed world, waiting for their turn to sell.
5. Before the year was up, nearly everything that had been made of
copper had been redesigned to use other metals. Where used at all, copper
was applied in only very thin films, as in electroplating.
6. It was on November 1 that quotations on copper futures first
started to plummet, and they fell the limit every day for 38 days. By
year's end copper was once again $1--a month later it was only .50/lb.
Some of the new alternatives were found to have unanticipated advantages
over the original copper construction, many substitute projects were al-
ready under way, and manufacturers were loath to risk using copper again.
7. The copper affair sent shock waves throughout world economies;
some organizations went bankrupt, and many people who had bought copper
futures at $8-10/lb. were ruined.
1. Copper is a renewable resource. Mining and smelting just change;
it from a low-grade ore below ground to a very high-grade ore above.
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he resource to last !longer than it otherwise would have.
Near-Term Import Dependence
'he Third World, generally speaking, is poor, not rich, in the raw
materials used by modern society. Most of the world's current known
eserves of raw materiials belong to the developed nations--80 percent
n Canada, Australia, the United States, the Soviet Union and South Africa.
i'dut perhaps these reserves are "known" precisely because these countriies'
cnowledge about their actual mineral resources is far more advanced than
hat of the Third World.
Although it is a major producer of raw materials, the United States
Depends upon imports of certain important metals or their ores--totally for
=__obalt, chromium and manganese, between 80 and 90 percent for tin and
bauxite, and between 60 and 70 percent for nickel and zinc. All in all,
however, the United States is extraordinarily well situated in terms of
2. The above-ground reserve is scattered but easily collectible?
when the price is right.
3. There are now about 80 million tons of copper in the U.S.--above
!round.
4. At about $4/lb. the amount of copper available from ores becomes
essentially unlimited.
5. Nothing made in quantity from copper today is critical. The
electrical and heat-conduction properties of copper are excellent, but
substitutes are available and some may even be cheaper once the capital
is invested.
6. The price of copper will be limited in the long-term future by
the cost of mining it from lower-grade ores or extracting it from marine
sources. Either source, if needed, is likely to come in at much less
than $4/lb. throughout the next century.
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industrial raw materials. Although it is not self-sufficient, its depend-
ence., upon Imported materials is much less than that of Western Europe or
Japan, as Figure 7 shows.
How are these dependency figures to be interpreted? For the near
term, the figures can be taken literally, but for the medium term or beyond,
they tend to become meaningless--at least for the United States. Most ores
or metals are imported because it is the cheapest way to obtain them. If
the current import sources become exhausted or uneconomical for
various reasons, then lower-grade ores can be mined elsewhere or other
materials might be substituted to a significant extent. Given 10 years
or more to anticipate a particular problem,,it is hard to imagine a mineral
that would cause a severe industrial crisis because of a constricting
supply from present sources.
Mutual Dependence
If the producers of copper, cocoa, tin or any other commodity de-
cide unilaterally to impose a large increase in the price of their
product, usually there is no automatic corrective mechanism in the short
run. In the medium run everything depends upon what action is taken by
the buyers of the commodity and their governments. We have already seen
examples of this in bauxite and phosphates: Jamaica recently increased
its bauxite prices; Morocco, which produces the majority of the phosphate
used in Europe, has increased its price by about three times. The first
set of prices has remained firm and perhaps could be increased again;
the second has already begun to fall dramatically. But neither of these
actions should constitute any major threat to the industrialized countries,
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i miport Dependence in Selected Industrial Raw Materials
1 (~,; llllllllllll INLII1V!;It1CSC 11
2( itlllllllll{'l 3NILk l
3 ('01), it ql'how!1111'2S 10
4 ('i1i)iIt'C 10 1 Ill
5 ~1l)il t~[ 11 ((1111LSicl)
6 1.t'i(i 12 LAIC
L'Uropeall Community
Ii111ut1s IS ;t 11CCL t:t)hu''~ 01 Coils iml)(iutt
Source: Hudson Research Europe, Ltd., The Hudson
-t.Ler, Special Report, Industrial Raw
terials The Outlook Paris: Inter--
?)atic'nal Herald Tribune, 1975).
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assuming that these countries formulate appropriate economic and techno-
logical policies. In both cases new investment is now being directed
toward breaking the monopoly of the producers, though the effort has not
gone very far.yet.
Among commodity producers, the copper-producing countries have been
successful recently in banding their Interests together. CIPEC,' the
producers' association formed by the main copper-producing nations--Chile,
Zambia, Peru and Zaire--was modeled after OPEC in an attempt to maximize
revenues from copper production. Since the amount of primary copper pro-
duced by these four countries, as a fraction of total primary copper pro-
duction, is only about 10 percent less than the comparable figure for
crude petroleum produced by the Arab members of OPEC plus Iran, there
appeared to be a prima facie case for the success of such an association.
But when the demand for commodities began to falter in 1974, the pressures
from substitutes and recycling (and the dumping of Japanese stockpiles of
copper) almost completely negated the cartel's program.
The fact Is that the real prices of many important raw materials
were about constant or declined between the early 1950"'s-and-191-1, as
shown in Table l0. :Where the revenues of the producer countries increased
over the period, it was principally through increasing volume and higher
productivity. A recent study has also shown the trend of declining real
commodity prices since 1900, noting the ratio of the price of some of
the most Important minerals to the price of labor in the United States.
Conseil Intergouvernmental-des-Pays Exportateurs de Culvre.
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116
fable 10
METAL PRICES
,Vl _b
ALUMINUM
COPPER
LEAD
YEAR
CURRENT
CONSTANT
CURRENT
CONSTANT CURRENT
CONSTANT
PRICES
PRICES
PRICES
PRICES PRICES
PRICES
1946
14
14
13.8
13.8
8.11
8.1
1948
14.7
11.9
22
17.8
18
14.6
1950
16.7
13.5
21.2
17.2
13.3
10.8
1952
18.4
13.5
24.2
17.8
16.5
12.1
1954
20.2
14.5
29.7
21.3
14
10
1956
24
17.2
41.8
30
16
11.5
1958
24.8
16.8
25.8
17.4
12.1
8.2
1960
26
17.1
32
21.1
12
7.9
1962
23.9
15.4
30.6
19.8
9.6
6.2
1964
23.7
14.9
32
20.2
13.6
8.6
1966
24.5
14.7
36.2
21.8
15.1
9.1
1968
25.6
14.4
41.8
23.5
13.2
7.4
1970
28.7
14.4
57.7
29
15.6
7.8
1972
26.4
12.0
50.6
23
15.0
6.9
1974(MAY
331.5
IN
130
53.5
32.5
13.4
19750M
40
11 6
56
20.5
2C __
7.3
for constant: prices is 1946.
Metal Statistics (Frankfurt-on-Main, Metallgesellschaft
Aktienaesellschaf,, 1973), for current price data through
1972; The New York Times for 1974 and 1975 current price
da ta.
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-117--
The examples of copper, iron, zinc, aluminum and crude petroleum are
given in Table 11.
This continuous decline in the cost of minerals relative to labor
over the last 70 years came to a dramatic halt during 1973-74, when the
commodity boom saw most raw material prices doubled or tripled, even
without cartels. But then, in the recession in the major consuming
countries during 1974-75, the majority of raw material prices fell, some
by more than 50 percent.
We expect that in the medium term average prices will be somewhat
above the depressed pre-1973 levels. Over the long term the fluctuations
of the commodity cycle will undoubtedly continue, around a slowly changing
trend line, which is much more likely to be downward- than upward-sloping.
Future Long-Term World Demand and Supplies
If we look at the principal metals used in the world (Table 12), we
note that over 95 percent of the world demand Is for five metals which
are not exhaustible. The least abundant of these is titanium, which
constitutes about 1 percent of the earth's crust and which eventually,
as technology improves, may become one of the world's most important
metals because of its light weight, strength and excellent corrosion
resistance. We therefore need be concerned only about the other 5 per-
cent. Moreover, as we find after digging deeply enough into the spe-
cifics related to each of the next seven metals in Table 12 (including
new discoveries, new sources, advancing technology and the potential
for recycling, substitution and functional redesign),our future prob-
lem can be reduced at most to worrying only about the remaining ones
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'RICE OF MINERALS RELATIVE TO AVERAGE COST OF LABOR
Iy00
1920
1940
1950
1960
1970
COPPER
785
226
121
99
82
100
IRON
620
287
144
112
120
100
!INC
794
400
272
256
126
100
ALUMINUM
3,150
859
287
166
134
100
CRUDE PETROLEUM
1,034
726
198
213
135
100
Source: W.G. Nordhaus, ''Resources as a Constraint on Growth,''
American Eccnom i c Review, May 1974.
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RELATIVE CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTANT
INDUSTRIAL METALS 19
U.S.
WORLD
CLEARLY INEXHAUSTIBLE
IRON
85.70%
89.83%
ALUMINUM
8.22
4.47
SILICON
1.05
.71
MAGNESIUM
.21
.09
TITANIUM
.02
.01
SUBTOTAL
95.20%
95.11%
PROBABLY INEXHAUSTIBLE
COPPER
1.38
1.35
ZINC
1.23
.97
MANGANESE
1.19
1.76
CHROMIUM
.50
.45
LEAD
.25
.20
NICKEL
.15
.09
TIN
.03
.03
SUBTOTAL
n.,,4.73%
ti, 4.85%
99.93%
X99.96%
Source: Goeller and Weinberg (1975) derived these data
from Mineral Facts and Problems, 1970, U.S.
Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 650. Washington, D. C.
Government Printing Office, 1970.
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(including mercury), which together constitute less than 0.1 percent of
+he total demand. There should be some relief in concludinq that 99.9
percent of the probable future demand for metals (by weight) is clearly
satisfiable at least for a world of 35 billion people and $300 trillion
t I ;WP--and that this conclusion does not depend upon using the consider-
able resources of outer space.
In examining data about "known reserves" or "ultimately recoverable
resources," we are dealing with the technology of the immediate or near
future. For our a fortiori argument, we only assume that the main changes
-hat will take place in mining will involve equipment and techniques
similar to those currently in use, exploiting lower grades of ore. In
the 19th century, for instance, only copper ores containing 4 to 6 per-
cent of copper were regarded as useful. At present, however, ores are
worked with an ore content of.as little as 0.4 percent. It is virtually
certain that in 20 to 30 years ores with as little as 0.25 percent will
be profitably exploited. Flotation methods of enriching polymetallic
ores have been developed, and hydrometallurgical and other processing
techniques make it possible to extract zinc, lead, silver, copper, ri*ckel,
cobalt and many other metals from low-grade ores. Until recently, for
example, the mineral nepheline (about 20 percent aluminum) was considered
to be of little or no value. Now a technique has been developed for ex-
tracting its aluminum content, and it has been reclassified as a valuable
raw material. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. Geological Survey
now lists 10 major sources of aluminum other than bauxite. Technological
advances of this type are certainly not uncommon and will clearly continue.
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Certain other corridors of technical development seem to be opening.
The first involves the possibility of extracting minerals at deeper levels
of the earth than are worked today. At depths of more than 5 kilometers,
some of the rock formations are thought to contain extremely large de-
posits of iron, manganese, chromium, cobalt, nickel, uranium, copper and
gold. In order to get at these resources, very sophisticated scientific
research and engineering design are necessary to develop instruments and
equipment that can be used under extreme heat and pressure. Although in-
tense research and development efforts are under way, it may not be until
sometime after the year 2000 that this equipment has been evolved. That
it will evolve seems almost certain. Whether or not it will be economical
is less clear. But if other methods grow very costly, then this, one
would become more competitive.
A really big difference in both the near- and long-term futures
seems likely to be caused by the mining of the ocean floor, which is al-
ready developing rapidly. Interest has been shown in this concept since
the beginning of the 1960's, and the basic technology for mining at depths
from 10,000 to 15,000 feet now appears to be available. The manganese,
nickel, cobalt, copper and other minerals that are found on the floor of
the Pacific Ocean in iron-manganese nodules would, if brought to the
surface, increase the supply of some items enormously. It is still too
early to give accurate estimates of the amount of the nodules, but some
experts have claimed that the Central Pacific alone could contain
1,600 billion tons. Table 13 shows estimates of the potential of these
nodules (based on a 1,000-billion-ton total) and compares them with
other resources. The lessons that will almost certainly be learned in
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SEA
WATER(c)
EARTH(cl)
CRUST
COBALT
COPPER
GOLD
IRON
LEA[)
MANGANESE
MERCURY
URANIUM
Table 13
SOME COMPARATIVE LAND AND SEA RESOURCES
tonsT
3.6 BILLION
8.9 BILLION
11 MILLION
1.06 BILLION
50,000
710 BILLION
1.8 BILLION
24 BILLION
920,000
29 MILLION(`)
6 BILLION
(a) Dennis Meadows, D~rnamics of Growth in a Finite World.
180 BILLION
(b)Assumes 1 trillion tons recoverable ore. Uncertainties are large. But
J. Mero estimates 1.6 trillion tons in the Pacific Ocean alone. (John L.
Mero, "Potential Economic Value of Ocean-Floor Manganese Nodule Deposits,"
in David R. Horn (ed.), A Conference on Ferromanganese Deposits on the
Ocean Floor (Washington, D.C.: The Office for the International Decade
of Ocean Exploration, National Science Foundation, January 1972), p. 191.]
National Research Council, Resources and Man (San Francisco: W. H. Free-
man, 1969).
(d) Upper layer only: 1 million trillion tons--about 4 percent of total.
From U.S. Mineral Resources, 1973.
e) High estimate of U.S. resources at costs up to.$100/lb..
-
18 BILLION
8
0,000 TRILLION
-
80 MILLION 1
110 TRILLION
3
BILLION
800 MILLION ]
25 TRILLION
1 3
BILLION
6 BILLION
63 TRILLION
8 MILLION
3.5 BILLION
130
BILLION
18 BILLION
5
8,000 TRILLION
4 BILLION
60 MILLION
160
BILLION
4 BILLION
60 MILLION
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this field in the next 5 or 10 years should result in substantial produc-
tion from the seabed well before the end of this century; and this kind of
mining will perhaps be especially attractive for nations such as Germany
and Japan, which are currently have-nots from the point of view of natural
resources, but are highly developed and organized in industrial research
and production techniques.
Other long-term possibilities include extracting ores from seawater
or processing higher-grade rocks. Calculations indicate that every cubic
kilometer of seawater contains approximately 37.5 million tons of solids
in solution or suspension. The major portion of this consists of sodium
and chlorine, but there is also an enormous amount of magnesium and vary-
ing and relatively huge quantities of gold, cobalt, lead, mercury and
many other minerals. A cubic kilometer of the earth's crust on average
contains about 210 million tons of aluminum, 150 million tons of iron,
150,000 tons of chromium, 7,000 tons of uranium, 80,000 tons of copper,
and so on. Table 13 compares the crustal and sea resources with Meadows'
estimates for land resources.
Current techniques already make it possible to obtain some materials
from the sea and from the ocean floor. Others will follow as incentives
develop. For example both the Japanese and the Germans have launched
projects to extract uranium directly from seawater. In time the rocks
and the ocean will constitute an essentially infinite resource base,
although it is unlikely In view of the alternatives that average crustal
rocks will ever be mined for mineral content.
The above would seem to most to be an optimistic scenario. We would
characterize it as realistic, but because of the many potential advances
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it. has leftout, it may be a little pessimistic. After all, why is it
optimistic to postulate: a growing rate of resource exploitation via
conventional methods for the next few decades or so, accompanied toward
the end of this century by a commercial mining of the ocean nodules; in
the next century and after, deeper drilling into the earth for important
concentrates; and ultimately, technologies for extraction of minerals
from seawater and from ordinary but higher-grade rock, where needed?
Such a flow of events is, of course, by no means certain. Nonetheless,
all of it is more or less in the cards and only waiting to be revealed.
The long-term outlook for minerals cannot be the limbo of resource
exhaustion to which mankind has been condemned by neo-Malthusian groups.
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Chapter 5
Because large sections of the world, especially in the developing
areas, appear crowded and on the verge of famine, most observers seem to
feel that the gap between food demand and food supply must inevitably
grow. But we argue that, as a direct consequence of available resources
and improving technology, a more reasonable projection would be in the
direction of an eventual abundance of food. Although this conclusion
can be strongly supported by the evolving potential for food production,
it rests in part on the expectation that relatively sensible policies
and priorities will characterize future food production in many of the
most seriously affected nations--and even more important that there will
be enough economic growth so that even poorer groups can afford an ade-
quate diet. We believe the potential is so great that even with moder-
ate levels of bad luck and poor management, the new conditions should
be achieved in the not too distant future.
During 1974, the year of the World Food Conference, prospects for
sufficient nutritional food for the world's people were viewed most
pessimistically. Factors that had contributed to this grim view were
the two years of extensive droughts (1972 and 1974) in many countries,
including the United States, and published statistics revealing the
lowest world grain reserves in decades, coupled with the highest prices
ever. The worst forebodings of the neo-Malthusians seemed to be con-.
firmed.
Note: Most of the material in this chapter is based on the research
and analysis of David P. Harmon, Jr., and Marylin Chou.
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Our assessment of this experience. however, is that from a historical
perspective two years of bad weather should not be perceived as anything
more than temporary bad luck. There is no reason why weather fluctuations
._4nd other agricultural hazards, which generally are unpredictable, should
Ise interpreted as heralding a trend toward permanent scarcity. Indeed,
inq the sprina of lg7c, as a bumper world harvest appeared in the
fieg, the attention of most food-exporting countries shifted rapidly
io problems associated with oversupply and falling prices. On the other
nano, at the time of writing, it seems likely that the Soviet Union will
Save one of the worst shortfalls in history, which may put some pressure
ill food prices. It should be noted, though, that the Soviet shortfall
=goes not imply any shortage of grain for human consumption, but mainly
s)r- reed grain for its farm animals and cattle.
position we argue is that, except for the occasional regional
ucruations caused by natural disaster, inappropriate policies or the
misapplication of resources, the long-term prospect is for adequate food
Lipp ies. By "adequate" we mean both an increasing amount of food per
:ipita and an improving nutritional balance in the countries of the
world currently deficient in either of these respects. Indeed, wihin
GO years we anticipate that--if desired--it will be possible to increase
weria food consumption to the level of the United States today (approxi-
mately 2,000 pounds per capita of grain equivalents annually). Our
,argument will be based upon what can be accomplished with conservative
cxpectations for technological advance, coupled with reasonable manage-
rent. but with no requirements for unusually good luck or especially
a.rtunate technological breakthroughs, even though some such breakthroughs
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now seem inevitable. However, we will also assume sufficient economic
development (as discussed in Chapter 2) so that either the poor can
pay for the food they need or it can be financed.
The organization of food production in more advanced societies is
currently based upon exceedingly complicated systems that are not easily
achieved by poorer countries. These systems include: highly educated
and trained farmers, land that has been developed over decades and main-
tained for high productivity, the availability of large amounts of capital
for farm machinery and equipment, sophisticated transportation and storage
facilities, marketing organization, manufacturers, processors, agricul-
tural schools, research and extension services, numerous and far-reaching
communication networks, an adequate market to buy the food produced
and a complex system for delivering and selling the food. The rate at
which a similarly complex system can evolve in developing countries depends
a good deal on the social, political and economic milieu. In some cultures
we find the system has evolved fairly quickly, and in others its progress
has been slow and difficult, rarely maintaining the population above
the subsistence level and often letting it slide into shortages and
famine. It is these anomalies in agricultural development that account
to a considerable degree for the great disparities in food production
and distribution.
Additional confusion has been created by estimates made, with the
best of intentions, by prestigious organizations anxious to dramatize
the plight of the few by making it appear to be the curse of many. The
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has been a prime example. In
1950 its director, Lord Boyd-Orr, claimed that two-thirds of the world's
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oeopie went to bed hungry. The noted economist Colin Clark later shcmied
hat Boyd-Orr's successors knew this statement was untrue. It had been
'lased on a simple confusion compounded by inaccurate FAO statistics;
ionetheiess they were loath to lose the impact its pronouncement had made.
(11 was this tendency to exaggerate the international food problem that
,evoked The Economist in 1952 to describe the FAO as "a permanent inssti-
"ation devoted to provinq that there is not enough food to go around.'")
Hie FAO later changed its point of view, in its 1969 publication The State
Food and Agriculture, and stated that the food problems of the future
night well be ones of surplus rather than shortage, the new optimism
a,vidently spurred by the initial results of the Green Revolution. But in
1'310, in its Third World Food Survey, the FAO again sounded the alarm,
l3iminq that 60 percent of the population of the developing areas (about
40 percent of the global population) suffered from undernutrition, mal-
iurrition or both. More recently, however, it has softened this state-
,lent by estimating that only 10 percent of the world population has an
insufficient protein-energy supply. Yet all of these shifts have occur-
red during a lengthy period in which the per capita food production of
yhe poorer countries nas remained approximately constant? perhaps increas-
inq siightiiy (that is, food production has at least maintained pace with
the growing population).
the food production system in the United States today is somewhat
:Analogous to a highly automated manufacturing firm. It its huge but
i-egcires relatively few people for its operation and maintenance.
In his book Starvation or Plenty/ (New York: Taplinger Publishing
Co., 1970).
Introduction and rapid spread of high-yielding varieties of wheal: and
r`'sce which took place in the non-communist developing countries in the mid-
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(Between 1790 and 1971, farm employment declined from 90 to 4.6 percent
of the total labor force.)" Although in principle the American system can
be emulated by poorer countries, in practice we expect that, for several
decades to come, food for most of the people in the world will come from
relatively small farms operated by farmers and their families, comprising
from perhaps 20 to 70 percent of regional populations. The task of organ-
izing and training large masses of small landholders to become efficient
producers undoubtedly is much more difficult than a similar task for small
numbers of large landholders. This argument has little relation to
whether a nation is socialistic, capitalistic or communal. It is, instead,
a matter of the sheer numbers involved, their traditions, their education
and the availability of capital and management resources. Moreover, it
is obvious that a successful organization for efficient food production
implies the need to transfer most of the population from small farming
communities to industrial areas, a shift that will have profound social
and economic implications.
We can easily understand that the transition from an agricultural
to an industrial society will require decades for the more adaptable
developing countries, and possibly generations for the others. But sur-
prisingly, perhaps, a strong urge to accomplish this transition is mani-
fested today by most of the developing nations. They appear to have a
sound instinct for the path to relative wealth, a willingness to struggle
for it, and, in our view, an excellent chance to achieve it.
* U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, A
Chronology of American Agriculture, 1970, revised 1971 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
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In makinq the case for the future of food production, we will discuss
1.hree distinct approaches. First, we will consider conventional food
produced conventionally. Clearly, this may not be the major method of
production in 2176, and most likely whatever replaces it will be more
!tficient. Therefore, if we can make a reasonable case that. after 200
years the world can produce an adequate amount of food for 15 billion
people by using today's conventional methods, then clearly an actual
-;elution can be expected to be much better in terms of costs, quantity
and quality. This is the sense of the a fortiori arguments that we have
relied on so much in this book, seeking one conceptual solution to a
?ajor issue through a simple, if suboptimal, approach. If this approach
can at least be made plausible, then the more likely, actual solution
nouid obviously bring better results.
In the second approach, producing conventional food unconventionally,
number oi= processes are now in existence, new ones are under develop-
rent, and undoubtedly others are still to appear. In addition, improve-
ments in productivity can be expected to come from the constant techno-
logical efforts that attend such processes. We will stress, as an illus-
s.rative and hopeful example, the potential of a recent development known
as the "nutrient film technique" (NFT), for growing plants without soil
under either partially or fully controlled conditions.
The third approach we will discuss is that of unconventional foods
produced unconventionally, a very promising avenue through which it
appears likely that palatable nutritious foods can be mass-produced in
more or less automated factories. With advanced technology, food wou'!d
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be extracted from almost any organic matter, including wood, leaves,
cellulose, petroleum and even urban and agricultural wastes. In retro-
spect, from the vantage point of the American Quadricentennial, this
approach may well appear to have been the easiest way to provide basic
food requirements. Even today the required technologies appear to be
well within our grasp. The cost of the food, produced this way is expected
to be substantially less than from conventional agriculture, and the pro-
duction potential appears essentially unlimited by anything except demand.
Finally, one of the major themes of this chapter is that although
instances of famine and malnutrition may continue for the same reasons
as in the past--poor weather, societal traditions that are difficult to
change, or political choices which are counterproductive--the prospect
for an abundant supply of food for future generations is not in any rea-
sonable sense limited by existing physical resources. The world is
likely to be much better fed a hundred years from now than it is today;
after 200 years current American standards, or even better, could very
well be the norm. Furthermore, it will become increasingly difficult
for bad luck and/or poor management to hold back progress.
The.task ahead looks difficult, but it may seem less so looking
back from the year 2176. From that vantage point, 20th-century concerns
about food may appear merely as a temporary detour of imagined and real
troubles on the road to success--troubles that were largely self-imposed.
The motivation now exists for increasing per capita food production and
providing security against severe annual fluctuations in output. The
resources, the technology and the capital all appear to be adequate now
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1 32
and improving steadily. The outcome will be a reflection of mankind's
wisdom in choosing sound policies in various sociopolitical arenas; but it
going to be increasingly difficult to choose disastrous ones.
Nutritional Requirements
Nutritional requirements are known to vary according to climate,
age, sex, body weight and physical activity. But even when these factors
are taken into account, there are still significant differences in the
various estimates of minimum calorie and protein needs. For example, the
FAO has estimated 1.900 calories per day for a South Asian engaged in
minimal activity. Colin Clark, on the other hand, estimates 1,625
calories per day for similar circumstances--that is, for small-bodied
persons worrying four hours per day in a hot climate. For a larger-bodied
person in a cooler climate (for example, North China) working throughout
the agricultural year, Clark's minimum requirement is slightly greater
than 2,000 calories per day.
Minimum protein requirements are known to be affected by caloric
intake as well as the quality (fractions of various amino acids) of the
protein. When the caloric intake is insufficient, the human body evi-
dently diverts some of the protein to meet the energy deficit. Conse-
quently, the protein deficiencies of the poorest regions of the world
have been _judged to occur largely as a result of insufficient calories.l'
United Nations World Food Conference, Assessment of the World Food
'situation Present and Future, Rome, 5-16 November 1971+, p.
,it:arvation or Plenty's, p. 17.
Michael Latham, "Nut'ition and Infection in National Development,"
,cience, May 9, 1975.
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This in turn causes various deficiency diseases and creates a greater
susceptibility to infection.
To obtain sufficient protein from nonmeat sources it is necessary to
consume from at least two different vegetable sources (for example, rice and
beans) at each meal in amounts that will supply at least the minimum required
caloric intake. Since not all the components of proteins satisfy nutri-
tional requirements equally, the FAO suggests that protein adequacy in
a vegetable diet requires an intake of between 52 and 68 grams daily to
obtain from 29 to 37 grams of usable protein. The most balanced proteins
for human consumption are available from meat, fish and dairy products;
the range of usable protein from a vegetable diet varies from 54 to 75
percent, compared to 69 to 95 percent for protein from animal products.
Clark's figure for protein is 0.5 gram per kilogram of body weight, or
about 25 grams per day for the average adult African or South Asian.
Thus his estimate suggests that between one-half and two-thirds kilogram
per day per person of grain containing 8 to 13 percent protein is required
in Africa and South Asia to meet the minimum needs for both calories
and proteins. Using an average of 2,200 calories per day per person, we
calculate that 15 billion people would require 4.8 billion metric tons
per year **to obtain all of their calories and proteins directly from
grains. This would be about three and a half times the current world
grain production.
No single vegetable provides protein with all the amino acids in
the proper proportions for human needs. Two (or more) vegetables can,
if selected properly.
*'Unmilled weight; normal loss in milling is 10 percent for wheat, 28
percent for rice; we have assumed 20 percent average milling loss.
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Increasing Food Production: Myths and Realities
Can all of the world's growing population be fed at least at a sub-
sistence level? Can it be fed better? Various answers have. been given
Lo these frequently asked questions. The simple argument: often presented
that hunger grows exponentially while agricultural resources are
finite and possibly at or near their ultimate limit now, We assert that
his argument overlooks or ignores the startling (and exponential) pro-
haress in agriculture in the last 100 years that has made agriculture such
i dynamic and impressive system in the developed world. The principal
,engines of this progress have been increasing affluence and advancing
technology., In conventional agriculture, these engines can be used to:
(a) increase and improve acreage under cultivation, (b) increase yields
by better inputs and multiple cropping, (c) increase efficiency of dis-
tribution systems and (d) decrease pollution by improved processes and
better management.
Will they be sufficient? Let us now examine some of the opposing
neo-Malthusian arguments to see whether reasonable rebuttals may be found.
1. Pi pulation Growth and Risin9Affluence
The neo-Malthusian position usually begins with the argument that
the primary sources of increasing demand for food are population growth
and rising affluence, and that therefore food scarcity will be a recur-
ring problem in the future. However, as we have already pointed out,
rising affluence appears ';_oday to be a causal factor in slowing popula-
tion growth and hence is ?iow an ally with, not an enemy to, the cause
of such restraint. Second, rising affluence appears to be precisely
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what is needed to help the world's population avoid malnutrition and
famine, for It can provide the education, research, markets and capital
for the production of more food of better quality. Thus, as the popula-
tion growth rate slows down in the developing nations, as even now it
appears to be doing, we might expect a gradual increase in food produc-
tion per capita, an important component of any reasonable definition of
the road away from poverty.
It has been argued that Americans should eat less meat and. stop
fertilizing their lawns and golf courses to make more food and fertilizers
available to the poorer countries of the world; but, however noble the
intentions, these policies are unlikely to have any measurable impact,
much less any long-run significance. Except for short-term fluctuations
caused by weather and other temporary economic factors, there is no short-
age of food or fertilizers; either can be bought if the funds are avail-
able. Furthermore, resorting to such sacrifices in the U.S. does not put
food into the mouths of the hungry. Supply and demand still seems to
be the basic economic determinant for the flow of agricultural commodi-
ties in the world market system. Indeed, it can be argued that the huge
grain surpluses that helped tide the world over the 1972-74 shortages
were made possible only because the United States and other exporting
nations, as meat-eating countries, had acquired large food stocks and had
developed a huge grain-producing system (including reserves of cropland)
to satisfy the associated demand for grains and to cushion against any
lean years. Without that development, the period from 1955 to 1975 might
have had some quite different characteristics-=namely, much less grain
production, much smaller inventories from which to meet international
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=emergency needs, smaller investments in agricultural research, and delayed
development of cheaper fertilizers because of lower demands. (Technical
.dvances reduced the cost of nitrogen fertilizer by 50 percent during the
i960's)
although prices fluctuated between 1929 and 1972, overall a downward
":rend occurred in real prices for grain, undoubtedly as a result of the
=greater production and productivity. The technology that had to be devel-
oped at great expense to make this productivity possible is now available,
essentially free, to all of the less-developed countries; thus the path
,it least to developing their own inputs adapted to local conditions is
learly marked. About the only thing that self-restraint in the consump'-
Ion of meat and fertilizer would do is to add to the propaganda that the
rich are takinq away from the poor--a position which we argue is in almost
eery way except, perhaps, in certain crisis situations contrary to the
facts and counterproductive.
2. Cropland and Water
Pessimists also argue that additional fertile cropland and water
sources are increasinqly cifficult to come by, that the "best land" is
already under cultivation--ignoring the fact that most land had to be
developed For it to be considered "best land." As Theodore Schultz has
observed:
...only about one-tenth of the land area of the earth is croDiand.
li it were still in raw land sn its natural state, it would be
vastly less productive than it is today. With incentives to
improve this land, the capacity of the land would be increased
it most parts of the world much more than it has beery to date.
Ir this important sense cropland is not the critical limiting
factor in expanding food production....
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Harsh, raw land is what farmers since time immemorial have started
with; what matters most over time, however, are the investments that
are made to enhance the productivity of cropland.*
The claims of water scarcity ignore the many ways of obtaining agri-
cultural-quality water such as digging new wells, "harvesting" rainfall,
utilizing rivers better, recycling waste water and desalinating seawater.
The Ganges River basin, covering parts of four countries--India, Nepal,
China and Bangladesh--offers a striking example of an abundant and largely
untapped water source. Within India it ranges over 800,000 square kilo-
meters containing a population of about 225 million. Some of the current
problems of effective land use and water development in the Ganges Plain
arise from the highly seasonal flow of the river and its tributaries.
The key to a successful water development project in this region is
the storage and beneficial use of a major part of the monsoon flows which
now run to the sea. It has been estimated if this potential were developed
and some modern agricultural technology utilized, the irrigated areas of
the Ganges Plain could produce more than 150 million metric tons of grain,
enough to provide a minimum satisfactory diet for 600 million people, the
entire population of India. According to this calculation, the value of
the potential cereal crops would be about $500 per hectare, 10 times the
annual costs of the irrigation.tt Finally, as discussed later, there
Quoted in D. Gale Johnson, World Food Problems and Prospects,
Foreign Affairs Study 20, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 46
tOne hectare equals 2.471 acres.
ttRoger Revelle and V. Lakshminarayana, "The Ganges Water Machine,"
Science, May 9,'1975.
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,Are many techniques in development for utilizinq water more efficiently.
Increased Costs of Agricultural Inputs and Increased Yields
1:_ is frequently said that the intensification of agricultural pro-
duction will lead to higher costs of food production because of rising
r.osts of agricultural inputs. It will be increasinqly difficult. accord-
inq to this view, to obtain higher crop yields--especially in developed
ountries where the land is already heavily fertilized. One response is
to emphasize the fact that production of agriculturilinputs is also a
dynamic process. Fertilizer, perhaps the most essential input for increas-
ir)g yields, is an excellent example.
f=irst, although the Drice of energy strongly affects the cost of
utilizer, there are other important components such as technological
idvances over time, economies of scale and utilization factors. Some of
r.>>ese are displayed in Table 16, which shows that with 1974 technology
PRICES FOR UREA
(Expressed in 1974 U.S. Dollars; MCF = Thousand Cubic
PRICE OF:
NATURAL GAS
1960 1974
313 IONS/)AY 1667 TONS/DAY
FREE $1/MCF
Feet)
UTILIZATION
(DESIGN CAPACITY OF '1667 TONS/DAY)
$164/TON $116/TON I $155/TON
iource: D. Gale Johnson, Works Food Problems and Prospects
p. 47, Notes 12 and 14.
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and economies of scale, and even with the price of natural gas at,$1 per
thousand cubic feet, the gate price of urea (a principal nitrogenous
fertilizer) is considerably cheaper than from older, smaller plants even
if the gas was free. In addition, in some developing countries where
fertilizer plants often operate at 60 percent or less of design capacity,
an increase to nearly 90 percent, which is regularly achieved in developed
countries, could lower their costs considerably.
Second, with increased fertilizer, the productivity of the other
inputs (water, insecticides, etc.) can also be increased, contributing
Further to lower unit costs.
Third, productivity can also improve over time as farmers learn to
use fertilizers more effectively. In addition, the use of seeds better
adapted to fertilized land and the determination of optimum plant density
also serve to improve yields.f
Fourth, the neo-Malthusian argument glosses over the important matter
of unequal responses of soils to specific measures. For example, the
estimated incremental yield from the addition of one ton of nitrogen to
India's depleted soil would be about 10 to 12 tons of wheat or rice, much
greater than that of soils already improved.
Finally, it wouldn't matter if the argument were correct in the
long run if the per capita income increased faster than the cost of food.
Price of fertilizer as it leaves the factory.
tAdapted from D. Gale Johnson, World Food Problems and Prospects
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1975) pp. 46-47.
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In that case people could afford to pay more for their food l,whiich they
wrwi i 1 do anyway to improve its taste and social desi rabi 1 ity") .
Climate and Ecological Stress
[ears are often expressed about potential climatic changes because the
world currently lacks the buffer of large international grain reserves. It
;s true that the results of speculation about long-term changes in the
weather are complex and uncertain, involving cyclical versus random theories
Of weather patterns. If weather is randomly variable, then in any given
year some areas wild naturally have more favorable weather than others.
If weather also follows a cyclical pattern, and in particular if it is
row in a cooling trend, as some observers believe, it appears that the
impact on crops will be mixed. For example, corn and soybeans at lower
latitudes would be hurt by a shorter growing season; in Asian rice-
(it-owing areas, a major disaster would be caused if the monsoon failed.
IIut if it turns out that the world is entering a long-term cooling
period, but only very gradually, agricultural technology offers many
.11ternatives that could be phased in, such as controlled-environment
regriculture, more widely adaptive varieties and synthetic foods. But
z_his, of course, adds to our argument that the sooner LDC's achieve a high
evel of affluence and technological sophistication the better, since it is
oxactiy these resources and capabilities which would enable them to deal
"Just as what is considered "proper clothes" has little to do with
the minimum required for modesty and to protect one from weather condii-
tions, so what is considered a "proper diet"--that is, socially accept-
able and desirable--has little to do with nutrition and much more to do
4ith social standards, style, and personal taste.
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with such negative developments. Poor and technologically unsophisticated
people have no such capability.
The claim that severe ecological stress is caused by intensive agri-
cultural activity is associated with much confusion that needs research
and clarification. The main questions apparently are related to whether
the runoff after application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides
causes significant water contamination, what the short- and long-term.
effects of this might be, and what countermeasures are available. A
study of the water quality in Midwest streams suggests that fertilizers
have not been shown to be the cause of eutrophication of bodies of water
and finds no evidence that the heavy application of fertilizers endangers
human health.* The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, which
has kept an annual census of fish kills since June 1960, has reported
that of the number of fish reported killed, only 2.5 percent were attrib-
uted to the use of pesticides.
Criticisms of past abuses in the application of chemicals to control pests
have already shifted research and development programs toward more environment-
ally acceptable insecticides, herbicides, fungicides and rodenticides.t The
best strategy claimed for controlling most pests is "integrated pest control,"
which has as its goal the maintenance of potential pest populations below
the level at which they cause serious health hazards or economic damage.
* George H. Enfield, "Water Quality in Midwest Streams," paper presented
at the Midwest Fertilizer Conference, Chicago, February 17, 1970.
t Committee on Agricultural Production Efficiency, National Research
Council, Agricultural Production Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1975), p. 168.
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this strategy involves the coordinated use and management of many tech-
ioiogies, including preventive measures, resistant varieties, pesticides,
3iological agents, proper cultural practices, crop rotation, sanitation
.end specialized chemicals such as attractants and growth regulators.
It has been estimated that annual losses caused by pests could be reduced--
)erhaps by 30 to 50 percent--by making better use of technologies now
-available. Eventually, this could mean an increase of 10 to 15 percent
in the world food supply without bringing any new land into production.
'sill, integrated control is a complex high-technology approach which will
'equire much time and effort to achieve large-scale worldwide use. During
Lhe period of transition to better controls, it does not appear likely
;what the world faces an extreme threat from the use of current pesticides.
i, Government Priorities
It is often argued that misplaced government priorities in the less-
1eveloped countries have emphasized industrialization rather than focus-
ing on the agricultural sector as the initial engine of growth. This
argument, especially as to misplaced priorities, seems to us to have a
Fair degree of validity for some of the developing nations. For example,
the Indian government, after initial success with the Green Revolution,
switched its emphasis from agriculture to industry and became excessively
,iulnerable to the 1972-74 food crisis. In this connection, we should
,rote that with few exceptions the developed countries industrialized only
after a secure agricultural base had been established.
Agricultural self-sufficiency is obviously important to economic
health and growth. It reduces the danger of malnutrition and averts
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143
severe strains on foreign exchange. A nation with stockpiled reserves
or excess food production capacity is less vulnerable to natural disasters
and their economic consequences. Still, most developed countries have
for some years been net importers of food and have managed quite well.
It is the less-developed countries which need to assure their food pro-
duction. The recent food crisis might have helped in reorienting govern-
ment programs in these countries to more appropriate policies. Although
the World Food Conference did not result in any spectacular new institu-
tional arrangements or intergovernmental programs, it did serve to publi-
cize two important issues related to food production: reserves and self-
sufficiency.
6. Long-Run Scarcity and Triage
The final and most frightening claim of some neo-Malthusians is that
the world is entering so severe a period of international scarcity of
major agricultural goods that mankind may have to come to grips with the
decision of who shall eat and who shall not (the "triage"* decision), a
decision presumably to be made by the major grain-exporting nations.
This view assumes that world food production soon will reach an inadequate
Triage refers to a World War I system for sorting the wounded into
three survival categories:
(1) Those who would survive without help;
(2) those who would probably die anyway; and
(3) those to whom medical help would make the difference
between survival and death.
The limited medical resources were then concentrated on the third category.
A triage concept in food aid evidently visualizes writing off the "hopelessly"
needy nations. While we agree that the emphasis has to be on self-help, and
that therefore only occasionally does need exist for "hard decisions," we deny
any necessity to make decisions that are really comparable to the triage system.
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limiting level which cannot be overcome. Even though food aid has decreased
-aver the past ten years, the available evidence clearly suggests that it
hiahly unlikely that the United States or any of the other grain-
xporting countries would consciously accept mass starvation in any
cation without givinq some assistance--almost certainly when ''food
,urpiuses" are available--probably at the cost of some belt-tightening
if necessary. The question then is: will serious belt-tightening ever
-ae necessary?
The major counterarqument to the triage concept is that even in the
,hart run, but especially in the long run, agriculture's inherent flexi-
I,ility and dynamism, together with the expected gradual approach toward
Iiopulation stability, will effectively defuse the threat of an inevitable
long-term global food scarcity. This is not to say that nations or govern-
ments cannot contribute to calamities through mismanagement, callousness
or lack of foresight, or that there cannot be bad luck, but it is to
deny, emphatically, that the problems are beyond solution. Indeed, it
the major purpose of tFis chapter to make the opposite case: that,
;liven reasonable attention, food problems should ease rather than grow
with time.
Scenarios for the Next 200 Years
In ascending order of sophistication, the following are several tech-
nological avenues to a future of abundant food production:
1. The increased use of relatively conventional techniques employing
current technology with modest future improvement.
2. The application to conventional agriculture of newer technologies
that are now under development but may require a decade or two
to be phased into mass production.
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3. The use of successful unconventional technologies which are
promising today but require further development and testing.
4. The widespread adaptation of dietary tastes and habits to
inexpensive food produced by high-technology factories in
the long term.
A practical fifth approach would combine the above four by using
relatively conventional techniques in the near term and high technology
or "exotic" methods over the longer term, with some changing of tastes
being phased in gradually as they are required or desired. This fifth
case provides a broad basis for a reasonably optimistic scenario in which
the long-term increases in food production and/or adaptations of tastes
are more likely to be evolutionary than revolutionary.
In attempting to estimate the production increases that the world
might expect from relatively conventional agriculture as well as from
more "exotic" technologies, our major purpose is to provide a perspective
for the future in which food demand can be effectively--perhaps even
abundantly--met.
1. Conventional Agriculture
a. Expanding Tillable Acreage
Of the world's 1.1 to 1.4 billion hectares of arable land, farmers today
harvest over 700 million hectares of grain. The balance is in pasturage
and other uses. Excluding Greenland and Antarctica, the world has 13.15
billion hectares of land, of which the FAO estimates 3.19 billion to be
potentially arable. Thus the potential farm acreage is over four
times that now being harvested. Table 17 depicts a few of the principal
sources of additional land and the major requirements to make them
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SOME SOURCES OF NEW AGRICULTURAL LAND
~i1OUNT
REGION (HECTARES)
3tin America--
Principally Brazil 450 million Advances in tropical soil research-
-e-,specially the alleviation of the
leaching of nutrients by heavy tropi-
cal rains--in order to improve the
existing low soil fertility.
Principally the
Peruvian and
Chilean seacoasts
50 million
lnited States
100 million
;ub-Saharan Africa
5001-
Low-cost water--probably from de-
salination of seawater. This arid
area has the advantage of constant,
ideal growing temperatures (68?-75?F.),
day and night, year round.
Anticipation of sufficiently high
prices to justify the investment
required.
200 million hectares: eradication
0 million of the tsetse fly; estimated to
ccst a total of $20 billion over
20 years.
300 million hectares: irrigation.
An additional 200 million hectares
now exist in sparsely populated
regions.
)roductive. The average cost of opening new land in previously unsettled)
areas has been variously estimated from $218 per hectare to $1,150 per
hectare.t Whatever figure is chosen, it seems clear that such costs should
Paul Ehrlich, et, al., Human Ecolo9, Problems and Solutions, (Sari
Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973 p. 90.
Donella H. Meadows. et al., The Limits to Growth: A Report tor the
Club of Rome's Project: on theVredicament of Mankind (New York: Universe
books, 1972) , p. W.'
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147
be no great deterrent in a world of growing affluence, even if they should
run as high as $2,000 per hectare within some of the regions listed in Table 17.
b. Multiple Cropping
The equivalent of additional land area can be gained wherever there
are opportunities to grow more than one crop per year. The developing
countries generally have better opportunities for "multicropping" since
most are located in tropical and semitropical areas with longer growing
seasons. With multicropping the total 3.19 billion hectares of potentially
arable land could be made equivalent to approximately 6.6 billion hectares,
almost 10 times that harvested today, though approximately three-quarters
of this additional potential would require some irrigation for multi-
cropping to be feasible.
Increased yields per unit of land farmed probably offer the quickest
opportunity for increased food production via conventional agriculture,
and a major key is the adoption of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of grain.
The potential of HYVs has many facets:
An improved response to fertilizer.
Additional possibilities for multicropping
Opportunities to increase the protein quantity and quality
per pound of grain.
Alleviation of the threat of disease generally attendant in
wide-scale monoculture by crossing many varieties of the same
grain to build in a broad spectrum of genetic resistance.
*The World Food Problem: A Report of the President's Science Committee,
Vol. II, Report of the Panel on the World Food Supply (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p? 3".
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More productive varieties over the full range of growing
conditions, varying from no fertilizer and very limited
crater to ideal conditions.
Innovations such as triticale, a cross between wheat and
rye combining the hiqh-yield potential of wheat with the
inherent disease resistance and hardiness of rye.
The longer-term outlook for HYVs is very favorable for the developing
world; but for near-term benefits, government assistance is needed to
,iarshal the resources and carry out the policies to enable farmers to
.xploit the HYV potential effectively. The great range of wheat and corn
yields among various nations indicates the real possibilities for near-term
improvement.
the potential for expanding the use of HYVs is made clearer when it
s understood that:
The use of HYVs has been heavily concentrated in relatively few
countries and even there in many cases only on the better-irrigated
land in selected regions.
Most farmers using HYVs have failed to adopt the entire recommended
package of inputs, such as adequate fertilizers, water, insect and
and disease controls. For example, at the end of the period of
initial widespread introduction of HYVs (1966-70), only 12 percent
Of the Indian HYV farmers were fully following recommendations;
yet the use of HYVs was responsible for approximately 60
percent of the overall increase in wheat production and 75 percent
of the increase in rice production in the decade between 1960-63
and 1970-73.`
The vigorous response of HYVs to fertilizers determined in test
plots, when compared to the relatively low use of fertilizers
on HYVs by farmers, suggests that the potential yield is much
higher than has been achieved (especially in the depleted soils
of many less-developed countries).
Joseph W. Willett of the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, The Ability of the Developing Countries to Meet Their
Own Agricultural Needs in the 1980s," a speech given at the Canadian
Agricultural Economic Society, Quebec, August 6, 1974.
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149
4. With the projected increase in fertilizer production capacity
over the next five years, adequate supplies should be available
by 1980 to meet most of the world demand.
How much do all these potential conventional changes portend for food
production over the long term? The following are some rough estimates:
Increased agricultural
land harvested factor of 2.5 4
Multicropping factor of 1.5 2
Average yield per crop:
Improved use of
fertilizer factor of 1.5 2
irrigation factor of 1.5 2
HYVs factor of 2 2.5
Other inputs factor of 1.2 1.4
Multiplicative Totals factor of 20 110
These potential increases in production include the possibility
of opening new tropical lands which lend themselves to both multicropping
and the entire input package of high-yielding varieties. (Our later
estimate that grain requirements will increase by a factor of 11 over
200 years should be well within our conservative estimate of an increase
in production by a factor of 20 from purely conventional means.)
2. Unconventional or Currently "Exotic" Agriculture
In following the second and third technological avenues, progress
in some unconventional techniques continues and is assumed to be reason-
ably--but not outstandingly--successful. It is clear that a technological
advance does not necessarily have to be exotic to be dramatic. For example,
the nutrient film technique (see Figure 8), a rather novel and simple
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fj1ITP1ENT FILM TECHNIQUE
t'iani5 Iii 4;rsntaii` e s
Pump
Nutrient solution
tank lined with
polythene film
Polythene film galleys
FEED FROM
FLOW PIPE
Source: A. J. Cooper, "Soil? Who Needs It?," American Vegetable Grower, August 1974, p. 18.
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.4
variation of hydroponics, is rapidly coming into use today." This tech-
nique of growing crops was conceived in the 1960's at the Glasshouse Crops
Research Institute in England and is in practice in some 20 countries today,
primarily for high cash-value vegetables and flowers. The NFT method
has the following characteristics:
a. Capital and operating costs are low; only a waterproof material,
such as polyethylene, is required for gulleys. The system does
not require extensive, rigid, water-tight tanks or expensive root-
support media, as do other kinds of hydroponics.
b. Water:
Recirculation and the configuration of the gulleys eliminates
loss from drainage and evaporation.
Storage requirements are minimal since plants thrive in a thin
film of nutrient solution (a one-millimeter film has been found
to be sufficient).
c. Fertilizer:
- No nutrients are lost through runoff.
A low concentration of fertilizer may be used in the solution;
yet a wider range of nutrient concentration is tolerable than
when a solid rooting medium is used.
- Mistakes made in composition of the nutrient solution can be
rapidly rectified via quick adjustment (or replacement) of
the solution.
d. Soil-borne diseases:
Continuous sterilization of the liquid in its flow pipe can
be used to overcome root disease problems.
- Systemic fungicides and insecticides at nonphytotoxich concen-
trations can be used.
Increased resistance to virus diseases has been experienced,
possibly because the root system is not subject to the abrasions
encountered with soil culture.
e. The use of triangular gulleys, acting as a watershed, avoids the
leaching effect from rainfall and permits outdoor farming. Rocky
or saline soils pose no special problems.
We place a strong emphasis on NFT here not because we believe it will
provide the solution we are seeking, but because it is one of the newer
variations of hydroponics that might be developed into part of a solution.
Also, we believe the use of a specific illustration, for the a fortiori
argument will make the point more vividly.
tNonphytotoxic means non-poisonous to plants.
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Elimination of drvina-out cycles increases average growth
rates .
+1. temperature control of the nutrient solution enables "onger
=growth periods in both colder and warmer climates.
h. The shallow stream of nutrient solution in the plastic gulley
Illows a sinale thick, continuous root mat to form? providing
i very stable support for plants.
As with most new techniques, there are still some uncertainties:
in some instances, root death has occurred, lowering yields; however,
precautions taken in early 1975 to prevent root death are claimed to have
been successful so far. Little is known about the need for sterilizing
the nutrient film, althouqh if necessary this can be done easily at small
ast. There is only limited experience with its use, and most of this
has been for certain high-cash crops. Its applicability to the principal
grains appears feasible but has yet to be demonstrated. Still, if one
looks at NFT from the standpoint of a developing country's small farmer,
the potential benefits (as seen in the listing of its characteristics)
,ire dramatic, particularly in view of greater availability of credit clue
t:o shorter time between crops.
NFT is far from its full development, but the process is spreading
rapidly. Its successful application to the cultivation of outdoor grass
for grazing or turf lends hope to the possibility of its use for growing
ice and wheat at competitive costs. Capital requirements may be lowered
if a cheaper alternative to polyethylene, such as a cellulose or a
"ilicone-based material, is developed for the gulleys. Experiments are
4iow being Manned to grow cereal grains in shallow, wide, rigid gulleys
on a layer of absorbent material saturated with nutrient solution anc
able to hold seeds in place.
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153
We suggest, but only as an a fortiori argument, that the world could
produce all of its cereal grain needs by some form of hydroponics or other
soilless controlled growth.` by the year 2176, We chose this alternative
for a variety of reasons:
a. Agricultural technology to date shows that nature's way of growing
has tended to be increasingly modified: the use of special seeds,
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and irrigation; the
alteration of food genetically to suit needs; and a whole host of
methods and techniques for planting, cultivating and harvesting
which deviate from nature's pattern. It is to be expected that
this modification can be continued much further.
b. The input and loss factors can be much lower in hydroponics than
in conventional agriculture. Potentially, it is a nonpolluting,
high-productivity, controlled-environment agricultural system.
c. Hydroponics can use relatively inexpensive arid land or desert
areas where the large amount of sunshine is beneficial for
plant growth and makes possible several crops per year.
d. Although the standard hydroponics approach to date has been high
in capital costs--anywhere from $20,000 to $80,000 per acre,
depending on the complexity of the installation'--we expect that
technological advances, economies of scale, conservation of water
and nutrients, the sheer size of world income, and alternate uses
for land can make wide-scale hydroponics feasible and competitive
during the next century, especially because of its potential for
obtaining four or more crops per year.
Since the world, with an average GNP per capita of $1,300, currently
produces grain at a normal price of about $100 per ton, a world 200 years
from now with a projected GNP per capita of $20,000 could. undoubtedly
* Conventional hydroponics requires the use of a solid rooting medium
which introduces high capital-cost components. True hydroponics entails
the growing of food without any solid rooting medium. The NFT development
greatly enhances the possibility of relatively low capital-cost, soilless
food production.
These estimates are based upon recent Israeli experiences. It is
possible, of course, to make much greater investments.
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As
afford grain at even $500 a ton, five times the normal price and our
loighest estimate for the cost of producing grain by large-scale hydroponic
x_~chniques after 100 years or more of research and development. We expect,
c,f course, that actual production costs would be much less--probably even
ess than today's $100 per ton. Assuming present U.S. consumption rates,
grid with three grain crops annually, each yielding 12 metric tons per
hectare, 15 billion people in 2176 would require crops covering about 2
riillion square miles. Actually, we would expect a hydroponics-type opera-
,_ion by then to better current field records (wheat approximately 13 metric
q:ons per hectare; corn about 19 metric tons per hectare for a single Crop).
`;ix relatively unused areas--the Sahara Desert, the Amazon basin, the
+iobi Desert, Saudi Arabia, Australia and the seacoasts of Chile: and Peru--
i)ffer some 7.5 million square miles of excellent opportunities for lairge--
.scale controlled-growth operations where maximum sunshine is available.
These lands alone,althouqh not suitable today for conventional agricul-
ure, potentially could produce more than three times the food requirements
~st:imated above for the world in 2176. There remain, of course, problems
>f political feasibility and reliability.
To sum up, hydroponic techniques have been shown capable of growing
rops with less water, fertilizer and other inputs than needed in conven-
r.ional agriculture, and of growing them unblemished and free of disease
;7r insect attacks. We believe it is plausible to assert that after 200 years
of experience improving these techniques, it will be possible to grow grains
.it today's yields per acre at costs not more than five times today's (in
constant 1975 dollars). To buttress this cost argument: still further., we
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155
note that in 1967 a prestigious summer study team at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratories concluded that wheat could be grown by conventional methods in
an optimally designed nuclear-powered industrial complex for somewhere between
$40 and $100 per ton. None of this required any new breakthroughs in tech-
nology, and 100 percent of the water was to be furnished by a nuclear-powered
desalting process. Even if these estimates were optimistic by a factor of
two or three, they still would provide another .a fortiori argument for
the feasibility of feeding very large world populations.
Clearly, with the economic growth projected in Chapter 2, almost every-
body in 2176 would be able to afford to pay five times the current grain prices.
In this example affluence alone creates a context in which really new solu-
tions are made available. Actually, we expect the price of food in real
terms to go down, not up. But we hedge this expectation by emphasizing
that affluent people can afford expensive solutions, and that expensive
solutions will be available if for some reason our optimism turns out not
to have been justified.
Thus it is possible to argue that the world's principal food require-
ments can be produced by unconventional means at tolerable costs on land
nearly worthless now. Even more importantly, we can assert that in reality
the world is likely to find a much better solution, one that we cannot com-
prehend in the present context. However, because it is relevant to our
topic, we will speculate on a few of the exotic future possibilities cur-
rently being discussed.
3. High-Technology Possibilities for the Future
A new approach that might be technologically feasible for supplying
food within a decade or two is the production of single-cell protein
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j`1 F'). This hiqh-protein food can be grown in a petroleum-based medium
by the conversion of cellulose from trash, paper, wood or agricul-
iorai wastes to glucose. which in turn can be transformed by
crohial action to SCP. It appears to be commercially possible to
roduce SCP suitable for animal feed on a large scale by this process by
file mid-1980's. Shortly thereafter, an improved product, suitable for
?ejmarr consumption. is expected to be practical.
'lithir a decade there are likely to be 10 to 15 SCP plants throuqhout
rep world, half in Europe and each with a capacity of about 100,000 tons
-,>ear. it has been estimated that the cost of production of SCP from
Jurnicipai waste would be less than half: the cost of the soybean meal now
ileiv used; thus an early potential of SCP is its use as a low-cost
.implement to eradicate protein deficiencies from human diets. It
;rouid be noted that the above techniques eliminate almost all problems
=i Lind use, climate, pollution and farm runoff.
fioetic innovations also hold promise. For the medium term, the produc-
.con of grains with a better balance of amino acids appears nearly certain
cause of. a) the breeding of new varieties, (b) the fortification of grain
Crown from traditional varieties, and (c) the potential for new plants from
"aide crossing" (for example, triticale). For the long term, it appears
_;CP is "complete," containing all eight essential amino acids. Its
:rude protein content is hiqh--44 to 51 percent, compared to 32 to 42
ercent for soybeans. Some current production of SCP is now used as a
livestock feed supplement.
`:;ingle-Cell Protein Comes of Age," New Scientist, November 28, 1974,
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that the opportunities offered by current research on cell and tissue
culture are more than merely interesting speculation. Tissue culture offers
the possibility of transferring desirable genetic potential among widely
divergent species as well as among similar plant species. Cell culture
(protoplast hybridization) offers the possibility of creating new plants
via the fusing of different nuclei of two species within the same cell
membrane. To date cells with unfused nuclei of two species within the
cell membrane have been formed in the laboratory for soybeans with corn,
barley, peas or rapeseed, as well as numerous other vegetables. Once the
problem of growing fused nuclei is solved, if it is, then this technique
could permit a wide range of new plants incorporating many desired charac-
teristics, such as increased protein, disease resistance, higher yield
and nitrogen fixation.'
4. Grain for the Next Two Centuries
As indicated earlier, our reasonably optimistic scenario is based on
conventional agriculture gradually and partially giving way to unconven-
tional and finally exotic methods, as well as upon a gradual change in
dietary habits if this becomes desirable. Figure 9 depicts this scenario
for grain production (or its equivalent) over the next 200 years. The
lower boundary of the figure represents minimum nutritional requirements
while the upper represents our view of a more realistic supply of grain
equivalents, depending on both nutritive and "aesthetic" factors. The
early part of the 21st century is marked by the advent of controlled-
* August E. Kehr of the Agriculture Research Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, "New Developments in Plant Cell and Tissue Culture," a
talk to the Third International Congress of Plant Tissue and Cell Culture,
the University of Leicester, England, July 21-26, 1974.
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5+I i L h 2I ` fR. E Je i..Ei';~i GRAi 'r :~WLJO't~i
3200 cal./day/person
200 lbs./year dressed Teat
7000 lbs.lyed' (,fain
200 lbs. consumed directl
Nt'J'RIENT FILM TECHNIQUE, HYDROPONICS &
CONTROLLED-ENVIRONMENT AGRICULTURE; FOOD
FACTORIES, INCREASED USE OF LOW-POLLU-
TION CONVENTIONAL AGRICULTURE,
SOME GENETIC INNOVATIONS
12200 CAL./DAY/PERSONI
(All calories & '~
protein obtained
L directly from grain
ijnmi7i~ri ford nrainc
~r 1 1 1 I I I 1
1976
2076
2l7...
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environment agriculture, while the 22nd century may see increasingly wide-
spread use of exotic and/or high-technology means of producing food.
By the year 2176 man's daily diet may include nutrients from foods
such as single-cell protein, "super cereal," and synthetic foods which
would be considered exotic if available today, but which might be common
by then. The factors that determine long-term changes in man's diet are
economy, health, taste and convenience. Although food habits are usually
difficult to change quickly, they do change and people do gravitate toward
palatable foods that are cheaper or more nutritious. And if they don't,
it will most likely be because they are so rich and food is so abundant
that there is no economic need to worry about nutritional values (as is
often the case today).
The potential for use of synthetic foods in 2176 appears greater in
light of such developments as the recent rapid increase in meat analogues
made from soybeans. This "meatless meat" lends itself to large-scale food
preparation; it is cheaper, and it provides more usable protein than
animal meat. (But it is far from the cheapest protein available.) Sales
of this synthetic reached $10 million in 1973, and are expected to exceed
$1 billion by 1980, replacing 20 percent of the natural meats in processed
foods.
For nutritive fortification of food, single-cell protein offers
great promise, especially in those areas of the world where there is a
severe protein deficiency. Even today fortified foods are taken for
granted (for example, iodized salt, enriched breakfast cereals). Thus
* E. B. Weiss, Marketing to the New Society (Chicago.: Grain Communi-
cations, Inc., 1973), p. 32.
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it should not be difficult to expect changes in diets if the economic con-
=iderations are desirable and the cultural or social mores are not too
rigid--not in a year, or in five years, but with economic or nutritional
)enefits it should be quite possible in two to five decades. Within the
.pan of our scenario, we consider changes in diet a virtual certainty.
The Special Problem of India
When one examines the world food situation and potential severe
shortages, attention is immediately turned to the South Asian subcontinent
mnd especially to India. v1ith a population approaching 600 million, '
.projected to reach 1 billion by the year 2000, India has lived with the
threat of famine for centuries. Currently, the Indian population repre-
>ents roughly half of the world's food problem.
To a large extent the government of India seems to have exacerbated
the problem with misplaced priorities. Since its independence India has
Umphasized industrializatian (with capital-intensive industries such as
steel yet to become profitable) and more recently national defense and
development of nuclear energy, all of which have diverted resources that
.ould have been applied to the agricultural sector. India's defense
:!xpenditure is the largest item in its budget, taking one-third of the
,4overnment budget in 197.2-73. Agriculture, on the other hand, decliined
over the period 1971-74 from $1.1 billion to $850 million. Desperately
seeded irrigation facilities and fertilizer production have not been
encouraged; the problem has been compounded by a failure to operate
'xistinq fertilizer plants at more than 60 percent of design capacity.
?erhaps equally important have been the unfavorable terms of trade to
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which farmers have been subjected, demonstrated especially in the rela-
tively high fertilizer prices set by the government. In addition,
India's food procurement and distribution system is buffeted by rapidly
shifting governmental policies attended by administrative incompetence
and corruption. Attempts to obtain grain from the private sector at
prices well below those of the open market, and a ban on the movement of
commercial quantities of wheat to neighboring states, have induced wide-
spread hoarding and smuggling of grain.
To summarize, the lack of priority given the agricultural sector,
an absence of a strong agricultural infrastructure, national policies that
discourage foreign investment, unrealistic planning, a bureaucracy often
bordering on paralysis, lack of competence in the international market,
and the tolerance of corruption at all political levels appear to be
the principal factors which have hamstrung India's agricultural develop-
ment.
Does the foregoing imply that India is destined for mass starvation
or is perpetually tied to intolerable levels of food imports? Examination
of India's agricultural sector shows a considerable potential for greater
food output. When compared today with China, Japan or Taiwan, Indian
agriculture has a rather low degree of fertilizer use, a rather high ratio
of arable land to population, and relatively low yields.t Moreover. India
For example, it has been calculated that in 1968-69 the Indian farmer
required 5.2 kilograms of rice to purchase 1 kilogram of fertilizer, com-
pared to only 1.35 kilograms for the Japanese farmer and only 1.15 kilo-
grams for the Pakistani farmer (James D. Gavan and John A. Dixon, "India:
A Perspective on the Food Situation," Science, May 9, 1975, p. 546).
t Ibid.
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is blessed with extensive and fertile river basins. The need for irriaa'-
a ion and development of water resources is one key to greater production
since monsoon rainfall occurs only over a four-month period., leavinq a
large part of the country semi-arid for the remainder of the year. As
btated earlier, the development of the Ganges basin could increase grain
)roduction by 150 million metric tons or more, a development that alo+ie
lould meet the increases in minimum nutritional requirements during tie
Text quarter-century.
India's immediate potential for expansion is not a matter of technical
reisibility, but depends rather on whether it can undertake the policies
end orograms needed to use its resources effectively. It appears that
,3niy in the Punjab region has much organization for effective production
Already taken place. An improved approach would appear to require both
c decentralization of planning and a change in national emphasis from
~-equlatory to facilitative procedures. In the short run, an increased
use of fertilizer is the principal means of raising agricultural output
or India, as it is for most nations. For the lonqer run, increased
agricultural output will depend mainly on institutional changes which
will encourage such actions as better use of water resources and multi-
1:ropoing, and will create an environment conducive to the efficient use
cYF new technologies.
in response to the urgent need to increase India's food production,
is government announced in March 1975 that developmental priorities had
for a more complete discussion of this recommendation, see John W.
Mellor, The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Develop-
_i_ncJWorld, A Twentieth Century Fund Study Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, Forthcoming April 1976), Chapter 3.
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163
shifted to food and energy. When she proclaimed a state of emergency at
the time of the Indian political crisis in June 1975, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi introduced a number of measures ostensibly aimed at improv-
ing the lot of the peasant. The promised measures included steps to
bring down prices, reduce peasant debts and achieve a fairer distribution
of land. In addition, the government promised to increase the amount of
irrigated land by 19,000 square miles and electric power by 20 percent.
The new policies could greatly help to develop India's agricultural poten-
tial, but only if the government makes a serious long-term commitment.
It is clear that there are many means for providing ample food for
the world during the next 200 years. The availability of resources and
a powerful expanding technology leave no doubt as to the potential of
both conventional and nonconventional agriculture. In addition, flexi-
bility in dietary habits enhances the prospects for exotic factory foods
in the decades ahead. These potentials, however, should not be taken
as an invitation to complacency. A tremendous effort will be required to
realize them over the long term. More crucial in the short run will be
enlightened and intelligent attention to the institutional factors that,
can enable available resources and technological skills to be utilized
fully.
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Chapter 6
THE NEAR-TERM ENVIRONMENT:
CLEAN AIR, CLEAR WATER, AND AESTHETIC LANDSCAPES
Until recently, people treated their environment as a free commodity,
accepting as natural the gifts it provided of air, heat, water, and
the disposal of wastes. Now, however, the environment can no longer ful-
fill these needs for civilization without economic cost and/or environ-
mental degradation. Demand, having increased dramatically during the
last 200 years, has exceeded the free supply. As a result, although the
environment still provides these resources, they are now limited, no
longer free (but not necessarily costly) and/or tainted. Advanced indus-
trialized societies are learning that they have only two options: to
restrict their demands or to pay for the environment by keeping it rela-
tively clean and protected.
It is our main thesis that while it will be expensive to develop and
maintain a satisfactory environment over the next quarter-century, it will
continue to be both economically and technically feasible during the next
200 years, even if the world population and economy grow, as we project, to
15 billion people and a $300 trillion GWP. Our secondary thesis is that
with improvement in technology and practice, eventually the costs will go
down.
A Perspective on the Current Issues
The environmental issues are politically "up front" these days, in
part because they are relatively new but also because some very expensive
changes must be made in the way things are done as a result of some very
expensive recent legislation. Moreover, it is never easy to give up old
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66
customs and habits. Not only must the cost of meeting reasonable
environmental standards on new projects now be internalized, but, in
principle, it has also been decided to accept the costs necessary to
,etrofit factories, buildings, transportation systems and farms to meet
new standards. Furthermore, these changes are to be accomplished within
.i 1`ew short years. This is a painful commitment. The Council on Environ-
rental Quality estimated that by 1982 the pollution control expenditures
.or the previous decade would total $325 billion (in 1973 dollars), with
.rn annual expense for operating and maintaining the systems of about
billion.` Although these sums seem huge, they constitute only a
?;rnall fraction of our GNP, which presumably can and will be paid.
How well will such expenditures meet the desired standards'? There is
i vague impression in some circles that the pollution problem simply cannot
e overcome in a growing economy. Indeed, the public sometimes seems aston-
ishingly unaware that even the relatively small efforts made to date have
resulted in some progress. For example, one of the authors recently found
that a group of high school students he met in Pittsburgh were aware that
,.environmental pollution is a major current issue, but none realized that
;iis own city had already cleaned up its air pollution to a remarkable
degree. We have been told by some British colleagues that a similar
?5ituation exists among students in London. In both cases the young had
been taught--and believed--that the situation was deteriorating
steadily. During the 1950's Los Angeles eliminated backyard incinerators
end controlled industrial emissions to reduce the air pollution problem.
Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report (Washington,
D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974) p. 221. Note that the
actual dollar costs--which are increased by delays, litigation, closures,
abandonments, inflation and oversights--may be greatly underestimated.
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The Council on Environmental Quality has described the 30-year process
involved in the cleaning up of the Willamette River basin;" a similar
but even more complex effort took place in Germany's Ruhr Valley.
Japan today is spending about 2 percent of its GNP on antipollution
devices, perhaps a greater proportion than any other developed nation.
That nation is also in the forefront of creating technology that will
keep the environment clean, a technology which could easily become a
major Japanese export. The Japanese have experienced especially severe
pollution problems because of their high population density and their
spectacular economic development during the past 30 years. Rapid devel-
opment without encumbering environmental controls enabled them to become
a wealthy nation in a short time. They were not necessarily mistaken in
this policy. They must now pay the cost of neglected environmental adjust-
ments, but they have the money and technology needed. Also one learns
through hindsight how things might have been done. So Japan may become a
model for many of the less-developed nations: its past successes and
errors should help guide would-be followers toward a more optimal path.
For example, one serious error the Japanese made was to overlook the
poisonous potential of wastes from heavy metals; mercury poisoning caused
a major tragedy in the Minamata and Nigata bays, resulting in more than a
hundred human deaths in addition to disasters among birds, fish and cats.""
;ti
Council on Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual Report (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 44-70. The sharp con-
trast between the relatively clean environment of modern times and the
putrefaction and hazardous conditions during the last century is carefully
documented in a fascinating book, The Good Old Days--They Were Terrible by
Otto L. Bettman (New York: Random House, 1974), which we strongly recom-
mend to those who desire a 100-year perspective on U.S. environmental issues.
J Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report, p. 27.
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The debate about prooar test procedures for avoiding such hazards
associated with advancing technology is a complex one. Although everyone
who wants to achieve a reasonable balance between potential risks and
benefits has access to the appropriate forums, mistakes have been and
.rievitably will be made--in exercising too much caution as well as in
,raking too many risks. The evidence suggests that most developing countries
understand their option of accepting some pollution in the short or medium
term in order to attain more rapid economic growth--and that they will
probably have to oay a higher cost eventually for retrofitting with
an tipollution equipment, presumably after poverty has been much reduced
or eliminated. However, since current technology can often substantially
reduce pollution from new installations at tolerable costs, the future
problems of countries now developing may prove less severe than those
presently facing more advanced nations.
Nevertheless, the developing nations will have to make many difficult
e visions in complex situations. For example, Rio de Janeiro has one of
the finest harbors and beaches in the world. The famous Copacabana is
enjoyed mostly by tourists, well-to-do Brazilians and visiting businessmen.
Therefore, one might quest7on whether the Brazilian government should
?xpend the large sums needed to maintain this beach and harbor rather
than use the money to develop the poverty-stricken northeast region. In
4 similar vein, one might also ask whether the Taj Mahall or Chartres
Cathedral should have been built at the expense of the peasants of those
times. How is the general long-term benefit to society traded off against
the short-term costs to the local poor?
The environmentalist movement deserves credit for helping to create
:he great interest in this issue, and the accompanying tensions, which have
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led to major actions by governments--even though these organizations have
sometimes allowed their dedication to the cause to overrule their good
judgment. Some of the credit also belongs to their predecessors--hunters,
outdoor sportsmen and nature lovers--who led a strong movement for
environmental preservation and in fact formed the major public constituency
of the Sierra Club prior to the mid-1960's.
Entrenched lobbies require strong new counterlobbies to bring about
change through legislative action. Thus, without the dedicated efforts
of the current environmentalist movement, it is unlikely that Congress
would have authorized strong controls over automobile emissions. We
believe that some important arbitrary decisions were needed and were made.
For example, when Congress in 1970 set the deadline for the automotive industry
to produce vehicles with effective emission controls, it would have chosen
1980 if it had relied upon the i.ndustry's advice, and in due course that
deadline might well have been pushed back to somewhere between 1985 and
1990. In fact, when Congress chose 1975, it chose an arbitrary five-year
period, apparently for no compelling reason. (Efforts to track down a
more precise reason for this figure have yielded only the observation
that it was an obvious number--the fingers of one hand!) In retrospect,
however, this action appears to have been both appropriate and wise, since
it served as the spur that caused the industry to move--if not very rapidly.
If Congress generally set arbitrary standards and stuck to them it
could prove to be very costly. But the setting of high standards to
be met in a short time, which later can be allowed to slip by a year
or two, can prove an effective approach without resulting in terribly
high costs. Actually, it turned out that Japanese companies were able to
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design automobiles to meet the U.S. standards before American companies.
3ut the fact that the U.S. manufacturers did not meet the original dead-
lines hardly makes a strong case for special punishment. Their struggles
to comply with this unexpected change in the rules and the losses they
have already suffered may be punishment enough. The lack of sympathy
by some of the more militant environmentalists, to the point of "total
unforgiveness" over the industry's agony, might almost be labeled
"bigoted" and probably is counterproductive, as such a stance costs them
some support and makes them appear vindictive.
hhe environmental movement probably also lost supporters because of
its relentless attempt to delay the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAP), even
after the energy crisis had become critical. Environmentalists were
successful--and probably justified--in bringing about the review of the
original pipeline: plans; indeed, substantial and useful modifications
resulted. But subsequent delays seemed to reflect little more than ex-
cessive zeal and ideological intensity. If during the next several years
the Alaskan North Slope and adjoining offshore areas are found to have,
say, a 50-billion-barrel oil reserve instead of the 10 billion now
conservatively estimated, lengthy delay in the completion of the pipeline,
caused in large measure by court proceedings brought by those in extreme
opposition, may turn out to have produced a blunder in U.S. policy of
historic dimensions. Such a delay could become a classic example of an
indulgence of the kind that even a wealthy advanced country cannot afford.
And even at 10 bullion barrels, the lost years have probably caused a
balance-of-payments loss of about $25 billion or more.
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In critical times a country needs understanding from its citizenry
and flexibility in behavior. This is not to imply that the mere existence
of an emergency is sufficient cause for riding roughshod over environ-
mental considerations or legal restraints. But some bending, some
temporary compromises, may be necessary. A major weakness of the
environmental movement is its apparent need to oppose every major project,
often, it would appear, simply as a matter of "principle." Undoubtedly
there are some specific reasons for opposition in each case, but to oppose
all projects, the good and the bad, is to delay without sufficient cause
and at great expense government approval of those programs that are vitally
needed. Few of the good things in life come free. Hard choices must be
made, and concerned environmentalists must share in the responsibility.
In effect, we should have a "cost impact" statement filed by environmental
groups of the cost of their intervention; in some instances it might be real-
ized that, in the long run, the real costs of intervening may exceed those of
not intervening at all. Otherwise, excesses of the environmentalists--especially
in the midst of a recessionary economy--could well create an unfortunate
backlash and result in a general public distrust and subsequent rejection
of many of the positive contributions the environmental movement has to offer.
Some Consequences of Environmental Regulation
Because legislation of the last decade has perhaps made it too easy
for anyone to interfere with almost any proposed change, the result has
been an enormous amount of lobbying, harassment, political initiatives,
litigation, abandoned projects and bitterness. It seems obvious that new
procedures are needed in order to settle environmental disputes with
greater dispatch. The huge costs associated with protracted delays
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r:vidently were not contemplated by Congress when it passed the National
environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969. Besides the postponement;
in building the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, there are many other examples of
costly delays caused by objections made by environmentalists. Indeed.
it is difficult to find any proposed project related to the important
area of new enerqy supplies that has not been so affected. This applies
to coal mining or conversion plants, ocean drillinq for oil and qas, oil-
shale projects. ruclear power, thermal electric power, transmission lines,
iipelines, refineries, petroleum or natural gas storage, and even geothermal
:)owe r.
Another consequence of the environmental movement, resulting from
its hasty rise to prominence and the attendant political power, is that
it has been responsible for some disastrous decisions. In retrospect,
5orne of these mistaken judgments may even seem humorous, but it is no
laughing matter when they add unnecessary costs to be borne by the already
overburdened taxpayers. And there are even tragic examplles when riillions
Of people have suffered from ill health or in some instances died because
',f such a mistake, as exemplified by the DDT case:
Ceylon was one of the first Asiatic countries to ban DDT,
with startling results. More than 2 mil l ion Ceylonese had
malaria in the early 1950's when DDT was first introduced
to control malarial mosquitoes. After 10 years of control,
malaria had all but been eliminated in Ceylon. The country
banned the aesticide in 1964. By 1968 over a million new
cases of malaria had appeared. Ceylon rescinded its ban on
PDT in 196c)."
Of course every new movement attracts dedicated workers who are
relentless in pursuit of their goals and unable to make rational modifica-
--ions of their positions--perhaps a definition of extremists. Unfortunately,
Cy A. Adler, Ecological Fantasies (New York: Green Eagle Press,
1973), p. 194; The New York Times, March 16, 1969.
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our political process is vulnerable to such extremism and serious
consequences can result. Perhaps the greatest blooper is that nobly
worded section of NEPA which allows any "interested" citizen (often
translated as "fanatic") to "intervene" (translate: "harass as much
as possible") in "any" environmental impact hearing (and they have, it
seems, in every one).
The 1970 amendments to the Air Quality Act of 1967 reflect a compre-
hensive revision of previous pollution control statutes in the United
States and are generally considered to constitute the most advanced
approach to air quality management in the world today. The latest figures
from the Environmental Protection Agency's monitoring programs indicate
that these standards are beginning to be met quite generally throughout
the United States. A large number of the reporting stations show that
particulate and sulfur dioxide standards are being met on the average
throughout the year. Automotive-related pollutants such as carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbons have been reduced substantially, although these
chemicals and the nitrogen oxides are still a problem for many communities.
The new auto pollution control devices for the 1975 models and those of
later years should help to decrease these pollutants steadily in the near
future. It is doubtful whether all air quality standards can be met
throughout the country for the indefinite future as the population and
industrial and transportation activities change. If they could be, the
standards should and probably would be made more stringent. On the other
hand, the public is aware -of the laws, regional plans have been approved,
and action has been taken to limit the emission of pollutants. It is
clear that the air is getting cleaner and that this trend will continue.
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The frequent emotional cha.-ges to the contrary as a general proposition are
e, mpiy unfounded (see Figure 11). The coming decade will demonstrate the
degree to which strong public involvement and major expenditures can
F ucceed in meeting the recent standards for clean air.
1-he Federal Water Quality Act of 1972 is clearly one of the most far-
reaching pieces of environmental legislation. By 1977 all nonpublic
f,tationary sources of water pollutants must employ the best practicable
control technology currently available, and public sources must have at
,east the equivalent of secondary treatment of sewage. By 1983 the best
available technology economically achievable must be installed. By 1985
.g national goal of zero pollutant discharge into navigable waters is to
be attained, an impossible goal and thus one clearly destined for modific:a-
-`on (or reinterpretation) to more realistic standards. One result will
probably be a lot of abuse hurled at the government for "'selling out."
he Environmental Protection Agency has accelerated its efforts to
obligate funds appropriated by Congress for municipal waste treatment
t:onstruction. A total of 318 billion has been authorized by Congress, and
grants reached nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 1975. It is likely that
,he 1977 requirements will be widely achieved, but the 1983 and 1985 goal''
mply major process changes in industry, as well as in municipal pollution
+:ontrol, some of which are not yet designed. Probably because of ;-ec,
increases in cost estimates. there appears to be movement tewar.. revi for
or these goals; in fact, no one has yet defined what "zero pollutant dis--
charge" would mean in practice.
-tainly progress has been made in limiting additional water poll---
on, and a beginning has 3een made toward cleaning up the rive-s, st rear's
'Ind lakes of this nation. On the other hand, even if the 1985 goals were
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achieved, most waters of the United States would still be receiving
both urban and rural runoff, which injects various quantities of sediment,
chemicals, bacteria and even viruses. The degree to which this area-wide
pollution (as contrasted to point-source pollution) will be controlled
and over what period of time are still among the issues that must be
resolved through legislative action and technological progress.
Environmental Economics
Every student of elementary economics has learned that, in theory
at least, pollution controls should cease when the next dollar spent
yields less than a dollar's worth of benefits. In other words, we know
conceptually the exact optimal point to which our control activities
should be carried. Unfortunately, in practice a serious problem impedes
the use of the optimal solution: while we can often reasonably approxi-
mate the expenditures required for pollution abatement, there is no clear
or accurate way to measure the economic value of most of the benefits
(cleaner air, a cleaner lake or a quieter street) or most of the social
costs (health hazards, ecological stresses, unsightly landscapes) even
in gross terms, let alone to determine marginal changes. This difficulty
is so great, in fact, that the concept of an optimal point has little
value outside the economics classroom, for in practice the optimal point
is usually determined in Congress as well as in the numerous political
arenas at other levels.
Somehow out of this maelstrom of environmental struggle, solutions
emerge and standards are set which of course are constantly subject to
change as the endless search for the optimum goes on. Consequently, the
current standards for air and water quality, radioactivity, noise levels
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;= i gu re 10
POLLUTION CONTROL COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 20~,.?
;ounce: Adapted from S. Fred Singer, "Future Environmental Nees
and Costs Econ., : t i c s of a Clean Env i t onncn t, a e,
of the Proceedings of a Symposium cosponsored by The
Mitre Corporation and the American Geophysical Un on 'n
McLean, Virginia. published by The Mitre :orporatior,
McLean, Virginia, July 1974, p. 21.
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and other elements must be considered temporary. Today's rules and
regulations, together with voluntary local customs, define the current
optimum point; tomorrow's will almost certainly be different. This
situation appears chaotic and inefficient to some who are deeply involved
and can see many of the blunders along the way. However, a rich country
has the advantage of being able to afford temporary mistakes and inef-
ficiencies--to a substantial degree. If, as we expect, after another
decade or two the battle will have subsided to a less controversial level
of administration of rules and regulations, history may eventually deter-
mine that for a democratic society the United States followed a practical
and satisfactory route.
An important problem to be resolved in the years to come can be seen
in Figure 10, which projects increasing costs for pollution control over
time as a proportion of GNP--from about 1.5 percent currently to between
5 and 6 percent in 50 years. In other words, if the model is correct,
the environmental maintenance costs will be a steadily increasing portion
of U.S.GNP and a substantial growing burden on the economy, exceeding the
projected defense budget in 2020. However, like all mathematical models,
this model is vulnerable to the claim that it provides an oversimplified
view of the real world; still we expect that it will prove reasonably
accurate for the next few years. One of its potential weaknesses is that
it assumes that the reduction of wastes per unit of output as a result of
technological improvements is limited to a factor of two; another is that
the reduction in abatement costs per unit of pollutant is limited to a
factor of two, and that even these results are only gradually attained
over several decades. (The usefulness of these limits is questioned in
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3_he next section..) On the other hand, we believe that a wealthy country
Iike the United States is Doing to want very high standards--indeed that
it will want to keep imoroving them until the costs become orohibitive.
Substantial funds are likely to be allocated to imoroving the land anc
the landscape. The costs for clean air and water appear likely to peak
during this century and subsequently diminish--at least as a percentage
if the GNP.
++echnoloyy: Force for Good or Evil?
A currently popular attitude is to blame technoloqy or technologists
or navinq brought on the environmental problems we face today, and thus
Lo try to slow technological advance by halting economic growth, We
,)elieve this view to be thoroughly misguided. If technology brought us
.uutomob i l es that pollute the air, it is because pollution was not recoq-
siized as a probleii which engineers had to consider in their designs.
Obviously, technology that produces pollution is generally chewer, but
now that it has been decided that cleaner cars are wanted, '.ess poll,itinc
cars will be produced; cars which scarcely pollute at all could even
be made. This last option, however, would require several years and
,wch investment. Althouch technology is responsive to the ..il of the
eople, it can seldom resoond instanteously and is never free. If sor
s_hanges its requirements tr-ere will, of course, be added costs to pay,
:t least during the transition. Technology cannot end all problems--
perhaps not the most important ones--but technology can solve or allev'ate
almost all pollution problems and it can also create a chysiccal cont.xt
that makes possible the creation of a better society and cu",tura.
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We take the position that nearly every measurable environmental
blight or hazard can be corrected by a combination of technology, a
reasonable amount of money, sufficient time to make the required changes,
and (occasionally or temporarily) some (otherwise undesirable) self-
restraint. Many environmentalists tend to rely almost completely on the
self-restraint approach, which, we believe, is disturbing to the nation
and probably counterproductive to the cause of a cleaner environment.
Normally, one cannot change automobile pollution by more than a factor
of two or three by self-restraint, while technological improvement seems
likely to yield a factor of 5 to 50. In a few cases it may be reasonable
to require the phasing out of an activity or a moratorium on an industry
or potential industry, at least until the major objections can be handled.
This course of action was followed, for example, for some smelting opera-
tions, and it may be deemed advisable for the proposed breeder reactor,
perhaps even other nuclear power reactors. In other cases, an appropriate
decision requires striking a cost-benefit balance between aesthetics and
health or other needs (for example, standards for engine exhausts or the
use of pesticides). This involves a political process which during the
short run produces aggravation on both sides. However, the aggravation
usually subsides as the problems are solved and people's interests shift,
as in the case of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
The limits-to-growth model--with its conclusion that continued
economic growth causes pollution that will inevitably overwhelm us--is
undoubtedly incorrect. Our principal argument is that although the fraction
of our GNP needed to control pollution may increase over the near term, it
is likely to remain a very small part of the whole GNP. Secondly, we
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80
b _onciude that from now on, if the choice is made, the air, water and land-
scapes can become cleaner over time--along with continued) economic arowth.
Whenever more stringent standards are adopted or it is decided that envi--
ronmental improvements are to be achieved more rapidly, or both, averaqe
income will, for a tine, be reduced accordingly. But these are political
Mf FAILURES OF SUCCESS
WE HAVE ,RIOT WE ALSO HAVE
1. NO NEED TO WAIT FOR POSSESSIONS OR MOST OF WFAT WE DESIRE.
HENCE RELATIVELY LITTLE NEED FOR SELF-DISCIPLINE. AS A
RESULT PEOPLE ARE AT THE SAME TIME OVERLY CONCERNED WITH
SATISFYING THEIR MATERIAL. WANTS AND SATIATED. BORED AND
PETULANT WHEN THEY DO AND FURIOUS IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE
WHAT THEY WANT IMMEDIATELY.
:ONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GROWTH. TECHNOLOGICAL Z. IMPOSSIBLE DEMANDS MADE ON THE GOVERNMENT: STEADY
IMPROVEMENTS GROWTH UNINTERRUPTED BY BUSINESS CYCLES IS REQUIRED
AS A MATTER OF COURSE; UNREALISTICALLY HIGH GROWTH
RATES ARE DEMANDED:. All GROUPS IN SOCIFTY MUST GROW
LLONUMILALLY Al IHE SAME RAIL SO IHAI NO ONL IS LEFT
BEHIND. IMPROVEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY ENCOURAGE UNREAL-
ISTIC EXPECTATIONS ELSEWHERE.
LASS CONSUMPTION 3. AESTHETIC AND COMMERCIAL STANDARDS ARE DETERMINED BY
THE TASTES OF THE MASSES.
cC:ONOMIC SECURITY, LITTLE REAL POVERTY 4. EMPHASIS ON RELATIVE POVERTY, HENCE A DESIRE FOR
RADICAL EGALITARIANISM.
o-"HYSICAL SAFETY, GOOD HEALTH, LONGEVITY 5. A NEUROTIC CONCERN WITH AVOIDING PAIN AND DEATH.
ALTERNATIVELY, THE LACK OF GENUINE DANGER ANC RISKS
LEADS TO THE CREATION OF ARTIFICIAL AND OFTEN MEANING-
LESS RISKS FOR THE SAKE CF THRILLS.
,;OVERNMENT "FOR THE PEOPLE " 6. NO REALIZATION THAT THERE ARE GOALS HIGHER THAN THE
WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE'-E.G.,,THE GLORY OF GOD, NATIONAL
HONOR, GREAT PROJECTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS.
THE BELIEF THAT HUMAN BEINGS AND HUMAN LIFE
ARE SACRED AND THE ONLY ABSOLUTE.
7. THE BELIEF THAT NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN HUMAN
LIFE, HENCE THAT NOTHING IS WORTH DYING (OR KILLING)
FOR. LOSS OF ARISTOCRATIC AND UPLIFTING IDEALS AND OF
VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR
PERFORMANCE AND INDIVIDUALS.
RATIONALISM AND THE ELIMINATION OF SUPERSTITION 8. THE LOSS OF TRADITION, PATRIOTISM, .FAITH: EVERYTHING
WHICH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY REASON CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED.
9. NO SUDDEN RISES TO POWER. EVERYONE MUST SHOW HIS WORTH
RY WORKING HIS WAY UP THE BUREAUCRACY--AND BY BUREAU-
CRATIC AND MERITOCRATIC TECHNIQUES. EXPLANATION AND
RATIONALIZATON BECOME MORE IMPORTANT THAN ACHIEVEMENT
AND SUCCESS. FURTHER BY THE TIME THEY GET TO THE TOP,
PEOPLE HAVE LOST MUCH SPIRIT. HENCE FEWER YOUNG,
IDIOSYNCRATIC HOTHEADS AT THE TOP TO SHAKE THINGS UP.
ALSO, NO RESPECT FOR EXPERIENCE WHICH DOES NOT CONSTANTLY
PROVE ITS WORTH BY MERITOCRATIC AND BUREAUCRATIC CRITERIA.
10. NO SENSE OF ONE'S PROPER PLACE IN SOCIETY. IN TRADI-
TIONAL SOCIETIES, IF YOU ARE BORN AN ARISTOCRAT, YOU
DIE AN ARISTOCRAT. NOW. WHEN YOU RISE UPWARD. YOU
DON'T KNOW WHEN TO STOP STRIVING. THUS, YOU HAVE
CEASELESS STRUGGLES FOR MORE MONEY AND POWER--OR CEASE-
LESS STRUGGLES AGAINST ANY DISTINCTIONS OF CLASS OR
PRIVILEGE--EARNED OR UNEARNED.
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we have strong fears concerning that near term and the emerging transition
to a postindustrial society.
Consider, for example, certain South Pacific islands which, to many
outsiders, seemed to be almost a Garden of Eden; in this idyllic economy,
many of the necessities of life--perhaps all--came virtually free. On such
islands anthropologists invariably found elaborate structures of taboos, totems
and rituals. But what outwardly was an earthly paradise was, in some ways,
internally a psychological hell, at least by current standards. One is
tempted to argue, perhaps too quickly, that there is something in the human
psyche which requires that the absence of objective external pressures be
balanced by internal psychological structures and goals. Whether we accept
this simple formulation or not, it may be a clue to one major set of issues.
Actually, we argue that some cultures adapt more easily to affluence and
safety than others. Indeed, we would hazard a guess that the Atlantic-Prot-
estant culture is one that has relative difficulty in adapting to wealth
and safety, while the French and Chinese cultures do so more easily.
John Maynard Keynes, in his famous essay "Economic Possibilities For
Our Grandchildren," provides us with some interesting insights into this problem:
I draw the conclusion that, assuming no important wars
and no important increase in population, the economic problem
may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within
a hundred years. This means that the economic problem is not--
if we look into the future--the permanent problem of the human
race.... .
I see us free, therefore, to return to some of the most
sure and certain principles of religion and traditional virtue--
that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of usury is a mis-
demeanour, and the love of money is detestable, that those walk
most truly in the paths of virtue and sane wisdom who take
least thought for the morrow. We shall once more value ends
above means and prefer the good to the useful. We shall honour
those who can teach us how to pluck the hour and the day vir-
tuously and well. The delightful people who are capable of
taking direct enjoyment in ppthings, the lilies of the field who
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But. beware! The time for all this is not yet, For at
ast. another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and
,) every one that fair is foul and foul is fair: for foul is
seful and fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must
our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead
ais out of the tunnel of economic necessity into dayliaht.*
Ceynes's perceptions may to somewhat romantic--we do not feel that the
future belongs to the kind of "flower children" he describes, who in
y fect (in our terms;) "drop out" of contact with most external realil-y--?
`.jrut we do believe that there will be strong trends in the direction he
indicates. And we would like to endorse--in fact., emphasize strongly--
the thought of his last paragraph.
We would argue that many of the problems one found in Sweden, Holland,
the United States, and to a lesser degree in Canada and Australia in the
late 1960's and early 1970's were products of the premature introduction
c= upper-middle-class elites of some of the characteristics of post-
industrial culture. It should be noted that in many ways the country most
severely affected was Holland--an interesting phenomenon because Holland
had no Vietnam, no race problem, no problem of poverty. Indeed, ever its
pollution is mostly imported.
We can clarify one kind of transitional problem by considering an image
)f the United States in the year 2000. At that point it should have about
~50 million citizens, of which 50 percent will probably be in the labor
force--perhaps 100 to 125 million workers. If we assume the lesser figure
1)F 100 million jobs, it is likely that only about 25 million people will
.John Maynard Keynes, "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren"
(1930), in Essys in Persuasion (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
i973), pp. 5-66, 371-72. Italics added.
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be needed in the so-called primary and secondary industries--that is,
only a fourth of the labor force will man the production-oriented part
of the economy. The other three-fourths will be in service industries,
some in tertiary services (that is, helping goods-oriented industries)
and the rest in quaternary services (doing things judged worth doing for
their own sake). It is difficult to estimate productivity in the quaternary
activities, particularly in the government sector, and if current trends
continue, it could be said that a considerable number of these service
workers will simply be receiving disguised subsidies or welfare. That is,
the jobs they will be doing will be meaningless in terms of product to
society, though they may enjoy doing them; the jobs will merely be an
accepted way of transferring income to such people. The salaries they
receive will be counted as part of the GNP, but it will be increasingly
difficult, in many cases, to associate this portion of the GNP with any
kind of increase in benefit to others.
How Likely are Democracy and World Government?
Considering the difficulty of discussing changing values and life-styles,
what can be predicted about the political systems that will govern in the
next 200 years? This is as difficult to project confidently as is the issue
of life-styles and values. Moreover, politics will both influence and be
influenced by life-styles. We offer some conjectures for whatever they
may be worth.
Many countries will be relatively or at least nominally democratic,
though some democracies will probably be more authoritarian than truly
parliamentary. The reason is not the universal superiority of either the
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democratic or authoritarian types of government; rather, it is that an
affluent, technological world almost has to be--at least initially--some-
ghat cosmopolitan, secular, pacifistic, relativistic and perhaps hedonistic.
in deeply religious communities there is a strong tendency for the
tovernment to be conducted by a theocracy which in effect speaks to God
r mediates His wishes. heroic cultures are often governed by a great
leader, an aristocracy or an oligarchy of talent, wealth or military skill.
But secular-humanist cultures are not willing to legitimize any of these
types of government. Their method of making a government legitimate is by
social contract and the manifest consent of the governed., or by a mandate
of history which clearly yields acceptable results to the governed (bv
their criteria).
This need for legitimization by explicit real, or pro forma, elections
pplies to both real and pseudo-democracies (such as many of today's
'people's republics"), to relatively paternalistic, authoritarian govern?-
naents (as in southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia), or to a
dictatorship more or less maintained by naked force (as frequently found
n Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin America). In this respect
authoritarian should not be confused with totalitarian or dictatorial
Governments. In authoritarian states, there is a relatively high level
=rf legality and usually some lip service to parliamentary representation,
including a need for relatively genuine elections--if only in a validating
end public relations role. Particularly if the world is to experience a
:enitury of relative peace, and no great inflations or depressions, we can
;}lausibly, but not certainly, assume that even more governments will be
democratic than at present.
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243
It should be noted that in the last 200-300 years stable democratic
government developed primarily in what we describe as the Atlantic
Protestant cultural area and Switzerland. In all other parts of the world,
democracy still seems to be relatively fragile. Clearly, though, it has
also attained strength in Israel, France, West Germany and Japan; and to
a lesser degree in Italy, Colombia, Venezuela, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Costa Rica, Malaysia and perhaps Mexico and the Philippines. But it
should be noted that there are almost no other authentic democracies in
the other approximately 125 nations of the world. Thus one cannot think of
democracy as a movement that clearly dominates other forms of government,
particularly if democracy is put under serious strain or if the people
and leaders cannot participate with a modicum of democratic self-restraint
and a firm and informed sense of political and financial responsibility.
It is also likely that there will be many functional organizations
which will deal with the various international issues that will arise in
the 21st century. Many of the most effective organizations will probably
be of an ad hoc nature, but some of them will be part of larger inter-
national organizations such as the United Nations.
Many people believe that as more functions are undertaken by inter-
national organizations, there will be an almost inevitable growth toward
world federal government. But unless the functions are performed with
superb efficiency and effectiveness, this kind of evolution by peaceful
development rarely proceeds very far without involving considerable
violence. It is clear that the requirements of preserving peace and the
problems of arms control, the environment and economic relations, as
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well as many law and order issues, all create great pressures toward
peaceful evolution to world federal government. Yet we remain skeptical.
One reason for skepticism arises from thinking about the likely answer of
the Japanese, Soviets, Europeans and North Americans to the following
kI Lies t ions:
i. Are you willing to turn your lives and interests, and
those of your families and communities, over to a govern-
znent based upon the principle of one man, one vote--that
is, to a government dominated by the Chinese and the
I ridians?
Would you be willing to turn your lives and interests
over to a government based upon the principle of one
state, one vote--that is, to a government largely con-
t-oiled by the small Latin American, Asian and African
nation-states?
t;learly, the answer to these two questions will be a very strong
saegative, as would also be the reply to a suggestion for a bicameral legis-
9ature with two branches organized according to the above two principles.
We can imagine a world lecislature based upon one dollar, one vote
(dominated by the United States and Japan)--or on other realistic, if
inadequate, measures of actual power and influence. But it is more diffi-
cult to imagine such a government emerging peacefully, or being very strong
if it did evolve peacefully. There are many ways to create a political
consensus; but none of these methods makes it easy to imagine a real world
government evolving by purely peaceful means.
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Chapter 9
We would like to have been able in this book to be completely optim-
istic, to present a view of the future which argues that while struggle,
dedication and intelligence may be required, mankind will resolve all of
its problems if only a reasonable effort is made--and also that man's
dream of an egalitarian utopia on earth may soon come close to realiza-
tion. Unfortunately, no such assurances have ever been possible; nor
are they now. In particular, we believe that large income gaps between
nations could persist for centuries, even though there will be some tendency
for them to narrow. Moreover, our discussion of the long-term environment
(in Chapter 7) had to be so uncertain and inconclusive that it may have
left many readers with considerably lowered morale after our predominantly
optimistic presentation of such issues as growth, energy, food and resources
in the previous chapters. Our own attitude is certainly basically positive--
and we do not believe that the persistence of income gaps is necessarily
either tragic or immoral--but our picture of one aspect of current reality,
as set forth in Chapter 7, does make us apprehensive, perhaps excessively
so. We are not among those who are pleased or take any satisfaction in
finding out that great tragedy, even doomsday, is indeed possible--or at
least not to be ruled out--and that various degrees of catastrophe are
still possible even if man puts forth his best efforts. Such possibilities
have always been present, but now they seem to arise as much from man's
activities--that is, from what we call the Faustian bargain--as from
nature. On the other hand, it is clear that our basic image of the future
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emerges as bright, and since this image is based on careful analysis and
projection--and takes as full account of negative possibilities as we
can--it should go far to reassure those who are excessively apprehensive.
It is also equally c 'ear that an enormous disservice can be rendered
:o all, including the poor, by raising excessive expectations or by defin-
ing a relatively normal, healthy and near-permanent condition as a serious
moral problem which has to be solved. What most people everywhere want is
visible, even rapid, improvement in their economic status and living stan-
(lards, and not a closing of the gap. They would love to double their
income in 15-20 years, (,i.e., move up from poor to middle class) and
they are generally shocked to hear that this is indeed a possible and
practical goal (which it is in most poor countries--or would be with
reasonable government policies). Of course, much less can be accomplished
in live or ten years,
The First Task: A Realistic Image of the Future
Projecting a persuasive image of a desirable and practical future
is extremely important to high morale, to dynamism, to consensus, and in
general to help the wheels of society turn smoothly. But we also wart to
-emphasize that we at Hudson are interested only in improving morale after
we are ourselves convinced of the truth of our message. For us, the
virtue of the image of the future presented here is not that it may prove
useful (though we are highly pleased that this may be so), but rather
that our forecast of the future may prove accurate, or at least about: the
most plausible image one can develop now. If we could not realistically
justify an optimistic image, we would be quite willing to portray a
negative one, arguing that it is our business to call the shots as we
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see them. Furthermore, such a negative image, if persuasive and realistic,
might help elites to mobilize to face real problems (as opposed to un-
realistic negative images, which tend to raise false issues, create un-
necessary controversy and divert resources and attention from practical
solutions). Actually, we believe that it Is almost always easier, except
in the direst emergencies, to mobilize society around a positive rather
than a negative image. It is also our view that if the negative image is
largely inaccurate and morale-eroding as well, it could be destructive if
widely disseminated. This might be especially true if it dominates the
educational curriculum--as indeed the limits-to-growth view has in a
surprisingly large portion of the Atlantic Protestant culture and in
Japan.
It is also worth noting that it. is not true, as many people contend,
that what might be called the "max-min strategy" would require taking a
limits-to-growth perspective. In such a strategy one examines the worst
that can reasonably be expected to happen with each policy and then picks
the policy that limits one's risks--that is, of all the policies available,
the one with the least worst of the possible outcomes. We would argue
that, in fact, almost the opposite may be true. It is not the post-
industrial perspective which would force enormous repression on individual
countries and which would consciously continue,-i.n-a dangerous way, absolute
world poverty. Indeed, it is the limits-to-growth position which creates
low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments
everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities
and encourages sabotage and obstructiveness to reasonable policies and
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(lopes. `hus the effects of this position increase enormously the costs
of creating the resources needed for expansion, make more likely mislead-
ing debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely construc-
Live and creative lives. Ultimately the position even increases the
potential for the kinds of disasters which most of its advocates are
trying to avoid.
Clearly, the first task is to gain acceptance of a more reasonable
ew of the future, one that opens possibilities rather than forecloses
them. We believe that current prophets of peril are makinc forecasts that
could indeed be self-fulfilling, if only in the short run. For if enough
people were really convinced that growth should be halted, and if they acted
on that conviction, then billions of others might be deprived of any
reatistic hope of gaining the opportunities now enjoyed by the more
fortunate. Indeed, lacking the incentives that have guided them and their
forebears, they too might soon despair, bereft of both ambition and coals,
and irresponsible activist leaders might take over. We believe that
eventually--when the postindustrial economy has arrived--much of the
industrial imperative and its appurtenances will erode or expire; but to
weaken it prematurely, before it has run its natural course, would be to
impose unnecessary trauma and suffering and make even more difficult the
full exploitation of the many opportunities now available.
Overcoming the Known Problems of the Near Term
Next among the tasks ahead is to find the appropriate means for
dealing with the problems of the present and the immediate future. While
cur scenario for America and the world is generally optimistic for the
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long term, we do recognize the real possibilities of serious anomalies,
dislocations and crises in the short term, any one of which could greatly
complicate the process of getting from here to there. Among these potential
difficulties are regional overpopulation, retarded economic growth, energy
shortfalls, raw material shortages, local famines, short-run but intense
pollution, environmental surprises and (most terrifying of all) large-
scale thermonuclear war. While we offer no solutions that will guarantee
the avoidance of these problems, we do believe our proposals will both
reduce the possibility of their occurrence and mitigate the consequences
if any do occur.
1. Population
Recent data show that the rate of population growth is declining in
almost all the developed countries, and that birth rates are also declin-
ing in many less-developed countries. These trends have led us (and U.N.
population experts) to plausible projections that a maximum will very soon
be reached in the rate of growth of world population and that in less than
200 years the number of people on earth will become more or less stable.
Nevertheless, there are now--and may continue to be--areas where popula-
tion increase is about as rapid as economic growth, and this does cause
a severe drain on resources needed for development.
However, increased population is not necessarily a cause of slower
growth, even though correlations can often be found between high popula-
tion growth rate and low development. The stronger case is that, under
current conditions, with economic development there is almost always an
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,)ssociated decline in birth rate. As two Stanford researchers have stated:
From a broad look at the whole world, we conclude that mortality is a
Function of modernization and development, that truly low levels of
mortality are rarely found in the least-developed countries, and that
declining natality is found in precisely those LDCs which have made the
social and economic progress apparently required for a significant mor-
tality decline."
' -hus the primary response to rapid population growth is not neces-
:arily an antinatal1st program, even though such programs can be useful
;and sometimes have a significant impact, as was the case in post-World
War II Japan. A cont:rarv example is just as impressive: in the United
":Mates the total fertility rate declined from seven children per woman
in 1800 to fewer than two per woman in 1970, without benefit of an anti-
natalitt program. (Ironically, it is just at the end of this strong
trend that movements for such programs have begun to attract attention.)
t. seems clear that what is needed for the most part--to truly affect
population growth--is economic development in those areas where birth
rates are still very high.
2. Economic Growth
When we come to the question of economic development we find some-
thing quite strange indeed: a surprising lack of awareness of the progress
Frank Wm. Oechsli and Dudley Kirk, "Modernization and Demographic
Transition in Latin America and the Caribbean," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, April 1975, p. 395.
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that has been made. For example, in 1960 the United Nations set a goal
for the Decade of Development of 5 percent growth for the less-developed
countries. It was not expected that the goal would be met; it was one
of those unrealistic rhetorical goals that one strives for but does not
actually expect to attain. Yet the goal was actually exceeded by 10 per-
cent--the less-developed countries achieved an average of 5.5 percent
growth--and this impressive feat was not celebrated anywhere. Instead,
people began explaining with great ingenuity and desperate eagerness why
the Decade of Development had almost totally failed. One issue involved
the fact that the poorer two-thirds of the LDCs had achieved only 3.9
percent growth, but the critics failed to realize that even 3.9 percent
was actually closer to the goal than most had anticipated the noncoping
nations would achieve; indeed, most had expected that the poor would get
poorer, not richer (which they did at rates that would have been judged
to be quite high by pre-World War II standards).
We believe that the prospects are good and getting better for the
coping nations, and that these are the developing countries that will
help drive the world's economic growth in the 21st century. For the non-
coping nations, the immediate prospects are not so good, but our projection
is that over the long term they, too, will gradually join the ranks of
the coping nations. We further believe that the key to accelerating this
process is not primarily exploitable natural resources or economic aid
or population-control assistance, but instead training, education, innova-
tion, savings and investment, institutional change and what Joseph
Schumpeter called "creative destruction." We agree with Simon Kuznets
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:hat: "purely technoloqical and economic factors allow sufficient margins,
in most underdeveloped countries, to permit substantial and sustained
,!conomic growth, even with a significant rise in population growth--at
least for the proximate future of two or three decades. The difficulties
and the problems lie in the limited capacity of the institutions of
-iitle underdeveloped countries--political, legal, cultural and economic--to
channel activity so as to exploit the advantages of economic backward-
ness." It does not help these countries to erect artificial problems
and blocks--or to discourage their commitment and morale. It is precisely
i_he advantages associated with the income gap, as we emphasized in
Chapter 2, that constitute the great opportunity for the world's poor
nations. Thus the task ahead, for America and the developed world, is
to help raise the capacity of these nations' institutions to exploit
the gap whose very existence can accelerate their growth. Closing that
clap will not occur soon--n fact, for a time it may even widen--but mean-
while the doubling or tripling of the income of the poorest that does take
place will be a substantial and welcome development for peasants and
workers and most businessmen, even if Western intellectual and governmental
establishments downplay or ignore this achievement in favor or rhetorical
remarks about the inequities of the gap.
3. Energy,
Long-term energy prospects--resting on sources that are inexhaustible--
E:re very good; but the oil embargo of 1973-74 showed how vulnerable the
Simon Kuznets. "Population and Economic Growth," Proceedings o
American Philosophical Society, June 22, 1967, p. 190.
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developed world may be in the short term. In these circumstances the
task ahead in energy is twofold: the development of alternate energy
sources and the achievement of a degree of energy independence.
We have spoken of energy sources as "current," "transitional," and
"eternal." Much is still available in the current inventory, especially
in coal, but well-intentioned yet wrong-headed policies may keep this
energy source from being developed. Price ceilings on hydrocarbons may
for a time help restrain inflation--at least as measured by government
indices; but they will also encourage the misuse of these fuels, increase
dependence on imports and remove incentives to develop alternative sources.
Some may temporarily benefit from lower prices, but the eventual cost
could be embargo vulnerability, crippling energy shortages and skyrocketing
prices. Price floors on hydrocarbons, on the other hand--if set suffi-
ciently high--could slow their use and provide the needed incentive to
realize the potential of other energy sources. Encouragement is also needed
for transitional sources, particularly synthetic fuels and fission power.
In this case, though, high risks and many problems may make government
assistance necessary. This can occur in many forms, including grants
of government land, tax benefits and accelerated depreciation. Federal
assistance will also be necessary for the early exploitation of eternal
sources. Here the important task will be to support multiple paths of
research and development and to avoid prematurely allocating excessive
resources to initially attractive--but far from proven--technologies.
(Many argue that this applies in the U.S. to the current liquid
metal fast breeder (LMFBR) type of nuclear power reactor.) We realize
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that all this represents a considerable intervention by the'governmerr_
into the free market system; but we believe that such intervention is
justified--in large part to enable the free market system to better
allocate society's resources and to prevent excessive dependence on
external sources.
A reasonable corollary to the above is the achievement of a degree
of energy autarky--or at least short-term independence. It is fashionable
today--as it has been for much of this century, especially since World
War 11--to preach the valje and necessity of global interdependence.
But in many matters interdependence increases both the likelihood of
sharing bad fortune and the opportunity of being held hostage. Nations
cannot "stop the world and get off," but they can seek to follow a f=orm
of interdependence that emphasizes constructive cooperation and "system
toughness" rather than potentially destructive dependence and "system.
weaKness." In terms of energy sources, this is not an argument for
total independence, which is normally too expensive an alternative in the
calculation of opportunity costs; but it is a plea for a degree of autarky
sufficient to protect against the threat of energy blackmail or'accidental
or deliberate slowda+in in delivery.
This arqument runs counter to the major conclusions of the Club of
Rome's second report--(Mihajlo Mesaroyic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the
Turning Point (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 9974)--which emphasizes
the importance of global interdependence and stresses the necessity of
solving problems in a "global context" by "global concerted action."
We believe this goes in exactly the wrong direction, and that the organic
interdependence it suggests would insure that a dislocation anywhere would
be a dislocation everywhere. We prefer redundancy, flexibility and a
decree of "disconnectedness." If India, for example, goes under, we
want to be able to help save her, not go down with her.
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4. Raw Materials
Here the alarm seems genuinely misplaced. Sources of most raw
materials are great and, with new discoveries, are growing. (Mining
of ocean nodules will vastly increase the supply of several metals con-
sidered vital to industry today.) Before these sources are exhausted--
if this ever occurs--we anticipate that extraction from high-grade rock
and from the ocean itself will be economically feasible; and it is also
possible that extraterrestrial mining will provide new, and practically
inexhaustible, sources in the distant future. We also anticipate that with
the passage from super- to postindustrial economies, the trend to reduced
per capita use of raw materials, already visible today in several metals,
will continue and accelerate, thus further reducing pressures on supplies.
For those materials which are vital and in short supply in the near
term, initial efforts will focus on recycling, conservation and substi-
tution. Most metals that have been mined still exist today, but in some
manufactured form. Recycling--which for the most part has only barely
begun--can make them usable again. Where supplies are short and recycling
is too difficult or too expensive, increased prices will spur efforts
toward conservation and the search for synthetics and substitutes.
Finally, for those few cases where all the above approaches prove inade-
quate, research and development will have to find ways of replacing the
processes and devices using the scarce materials, and the old tools and
methods will then be relegated to the museums of the future as the relics
of a bygone age.
The near-term tasks ahead are: to accelerate the exploration for
and exploitation of raw materials and to restore confidence (hopefully
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justified) in the safety of investment and contracts in the developing
nations, whose economies need the stimulus this exploitation will pro-
vide; to reach agreements (de facto or dedure) on the exploration and
development of the resources of the world's oceans (it is hoped these
agreements will promote constructive cooperation, but at the least they
should allow development to proceed at a reasonable pace); and to
accumulate stockpiles of vital materials, for that will protect against
many eventualities that could otherwise prove destructive.
Our discussion has emphasized that it is not the production of
food that is critical--the world has adequate land, water and fertilizer
now available to feed its present numbers; rather, it is the inadequate
distribution of food that accounts for malnutrition, hunger and famine
in parts of the world. Regional famine is therefore primarily a prob-
lem of public policy and resource allocation. In practice, this can
ire reduced to the simple proposition that adequate food is available
to those who can produce it, who can pay for it, or who can get somebody
else to pay for or finance it.
There are thus two urgent tasks which must be undertaken to reduce
the likelihood of severe regional or nationwide famines. The first is
to create a margin of safety by building stockpiles that can be drawn
upon in periods of emergency created by poor harvests and natural
catastrophes, as well as by gross errors in national policy. However,
i,r is important to recognize the it is the surplus-food-producing
nations of the world (the United States, Canada, Australia and to a
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lesser extent Argentina) that will have to build these stockpiles, not
some international consortium created.by the good will of nations whose
hearts are full but whose contributions are small. Advocating such
international cooperation is often merely a "cop-out," useful more to
soothe consciences than to fill stomachs.
Second urgent task is that of achieving vital institutional reforms
that will enable food-hungry nations to improve their own agricultural
sectors. This should be done as much to increase their GNPs as to
provide more food for home consumption. Too often developing nations--
in their haste to industrialize--have emphasized manufacturing at the
expense of agriculture in their plans. Yet history shows that, with a
few exceptions, the path to economic growth has been across fields of
wheat, not tracks of steel. What is required in the chronically food-
short countries are policies that allocate resources to the development
of agricultural technology, provide inputs and incentives to farmers to
increase production, and create an agricultural infrastructure (includ-
ing transportation, irrigation, education, storage facilities and sources
of credit). These tasks require the assistance and cooperation of the
developed nations, but in the final analysis it is each developing nation,
which must recognize that its first priority is to find ways of producing
food and income for its people.
6. Pollution
Much has been done and much still needs to be done to clean both
our air and water. The accomplishment grew out of the fact that enough
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people in enough places discovered that the air and water were deterio-
rr:atina and that they could afford to do something about it. Thus indus-
pries and other groups who had never paid much attention to their impact
upon the air and water suddenly found they had to, and could, do so.
(here has been a growing recognition that air and water are scarce, and
belong to the public, and that one must pay to use them, just as one
pays for raw materials or labor or building space. Moreover, one must
operate in ways to protect them. The task ahead is simply to persuade
those who use the air and water that they must pay the costs to clean what
they have fouled. While it is normally economically efficient to make
such payments equal to the costs, it might be better, in principle, to
make penalties higher, perhaps twice as high as the actual cost of clean-
up, thus not only encouraging steps to prevent fouling in the first place
but eliminating any suggestion that the government is going easy on the
polluters. (If those who pollute pay enough to have two pounds of pol-
lutant removed for every one they add, then the government might be able
to claim, "the more they pollute the cleaner the medium!")
The problem of pollution in the less-developed countries is more
difficult. Many in these countries prefer pollution to poverty, and
there is some justification to their claim that they should not have
to bear a burden not borne by the developed nations when they industrial-
i:ed. Even if they can afford it, it may be hard to convince nations who
are struggling to use their limited resources on expensive or sophisticated
antipollution programs. Several points should be made. First the
sacrifice the less-developed countries would make to control pollution
is less in many cases than the developed world has had to make in undoing
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years of lack of attention to the environment. Second, new technologies
are regularly being designed which will either make pollution control
unnecessary or create situations where the gains in permitting pollution
will be small but the losses large. Finally it is often possible to design
plants or programs to permit pollution controls to be added at reasonable
costs at a later time, when resources are more abundant. These are
choices which each developing nation must make for itself.
7. Thermonuclear War
It is true--though not often acknowledged--that even two enormously
destructive wars did not appreciably slow the accelerating pace of industrial
growth in this century. Nevertheless, one can hardly be so confident that
the world could similarly overcome the effects of a war involving the wide-
spread use of nuclear weapons, particularly if they were employed in their
most destructive modes (that is, more against civilian than military tar-
gets). As we contemplate the tasks ahead, this is probably the single
biggest danger.
It is ironic that today--in the atmosphere of Soviet-American detente--
there is less concern about thermonuclear war than there was just five
years ago, while at the same time, in nations on every continent develop-
ments are taking place that could, conceivably within two decades, quad-
ruple the current number of nuclear powers and make atomic weapons almost
as common in the world's arsenals as battlefield tanks were in World
War II. The greatest concern is, of course, a war which would see the
massive and almost uncontrolled unleashing of the nuclear arsenals of the
great powers; fortunately the present leadership of each superpower
realizes the enormous destruction such an exchange would cause, and this
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awareness in itself exercises a very strong restraint. iHowever, even a
very small nuclear war could do an extraordinary amount of damage.
The task ahead in dealing with this problem is difficult and complex.
Clearly part of it is to try to prevent further nuclear proliferation, but
just: as clearly such an effort is not alone sufficient, for if this policy
F=ails--as we must realistically consider it might--then to what policy do
we fall back? The answer is that while making every effort to slow and
halt the pace of nuclear proliferation, we must also begin preparations
now to make as certain as possible that a world of more nuclear powers
will be even less likely to witness their use, and that: if such use
occurs, it will not only be an extremely costly failure to the user but
will provide a very strong cautionary example to other potential users.
We can only outline the beginning of a program here. One might start
by decreasing rather than increasing the potential utility of nuclear
weapons. Gradually--allowing time for necessary adjustments to be made--
could decouple themselves from arrangements under which a nuclear
''first use" response might. be expected in a wide range of contingencies,
until finally most or all of the nuclear nations agree that the only
valid purpose of nuclear weapons is to negate the use of nuclear weapons.
Equally, the U.S. must insure--in arrangement with other nuclear nations--
that: any other use of such weapons will be met with instant and propor-
tionate retaliation. In effect, this would be a resort: to the Biblical
injunction of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth--the lex talionis
of primitive tribal law, where the measure of retaliation implies not
only "at least," but also "at most." In addition, nations should threaten
first to "excommunicate" and then bring to justice any nuclear offender
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where it is practical to so do. In a sense, they would be adopting the
same peacekeeping attitude as the U.N., which rarely asks who was right
but only tries to stop the violence. The primitive tribe has learned
that this cannot usually be done unless the damage has been evened out.
By clearly enunciating and living up to these rules, the principle
would be established that there is no provocation, no matter how terrible--
short only of a nuclear provocation--that justifies the use of nuclear
weapons and that any nation initiating such use would not only be cut
off from all communication and intercourse with other nations but would
immediately be the recipient of at least an equal attack. Achievement
of such an agreed disutility for nuclear weapons would admittedly be
very difficult, but we believe it is a much more practical approach
than would appear at first sight. If made credible, such a policy
would eliminate the principal reason for nations to possess nuclear
weapons and thus remove or reduce the incentive to acquire them. No
other alternative seems likely to slow the pace of proliferation or
reduce the danger of living in a nuclear-armed world as much.
,It should be noted that the basis for the view of a world without
thermonuclear war is the concept that for most countries the best path
to wealth, safety and power is through internal development and not
through war. It is a great virtue of the postinudstrial economy that
there are very few conditions under which war pays--or even seems to
pay--as opposed to the situation that has applied during much of the pre-
industrial and industrial eras. It is true that in a very wealthy
society the motive for serious conflict is likely to be other than an
economic one, but it is also possible that economic satisfaction might
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result in much diminished conflict or even less occasions for conflict.
It is therefore conceivabie, though not inevitable, that a postindustrial
ociety may be relatively free from violence and war.
lopinq_with the Unknown Problems of the Long Term
Mankind's intellectual and physical resources must also The devoted
to the task of monitoring and overcoming potentially catastrophic lonq-
term environmental problems. The first focus should be here on earth,
?.-here the full terrain of possibilities should be mapped, extrapolating
from the known to the unknown--and still leavinq room for possibilities
beyond these extrapolations. To help in this effort, we would recommend
the worldwide creation of a number of public and private institutions with
various specific purposes, but all with an overall mission of the system-
atic and intense study of far-fetched and improbable phenomena, but phenom-
ena which would be extremely important were they to occur. In effect, these
institutions would together constitute an articulate lobby and an "early
warning system'' for long-term environmental problems. It is only fair to
warn the public that anyone who studies such phenomena full time is almost
certain to exaggerate their likelihood, impact and dangers. To do so is
simply human nature. We do want the people making these studies to qo
about them with an almost fanatic intensity, since such fanaticism can
be very useful in sustaining interest, drive and even creativity. But
we do not want this Fanaticism to be carried over into iudaaments on
11 These can be adjuncts to--and participants in--GEMS (the Global
Environmental Monitorinq System), created as part of Project Earthwatch by
UNEP (United Nations Environment Program). See Clayton E. Jensen, Dail
W. Brown and John A. Mirabito, "Earthwatch," Science, October 31, 1975,
pp. 432-38.
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public policy. The "fanatics" can alert the world to the problems and
perhaps eventually to their solutions, and they can put enormous effort
into the study of both, but we also recognize that this kind of fanati-
cism, while useful in research and study, can be a disservice if it
dominates public discourse.
The first purpose of this early warning system should be to alert the
technological and scientific community, governments and other relevant
elites. We are not suggesting, of course, that these scientists be re-
stricted from public communication, but we do believe that the general
public is usually not in a good position to make early judgments on
technical matters. If the experts do not soon reach a consensus, then
the public must make its own judgment; and sometimes even if the experts
and elites do reach a near-consensus, the public may choose to differ
from them.
Our view is that such a system could evolve into a quite satisfactory
one. People are now beginning to understand these issues better, includ-
ing the need for both "whistle-blowing" and concerned but responsible
opposition. For these purposes, the free market of ideas among profes-
sionals is probably still an essential concept. Often the problem is
that there are well-developed biases which can lead to an almost auto-
matic "cover up" and a protection of vested interests and the status quo.
But just as frequently--and this seems to be especially the case today--
there is a kind of mindless "opposition for the sake of opposition,"
nurtured by institutions whose prestige often gives them an aura of
authority in the public mind. Yet even this latter is not intolerable
and probably is worth the insurance it gives us--at a minimum when its
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r 64
spokesmen are right at least as often as they are wrong.. (Because these
institutions are prestigious, people will listen longer and give more
credence co their periodic cries of "wolf," but still be attentive when
the wolf really is there.) Thus the U.S. can afford to have cyclamates
needlessly banned, without great tragedy to society, even though such
an action should be avoided if the evidence does not justi'Fy it. Yet
it is also important to understand that overreacting can eventually cause
a serious loss of credibility.
On balance, we are confident that the task of monitoring and early
warning--if sufficienty supported--could give us the very high probability
Or acouiring an assessment of long-term environmental problems that is
credible and timely enough to permit effective remedial action. But we
allso believe that it is important to look beyond the earth, to outer
space. The imperatives of our current earthbound problems and the c.~n-
straints of worldwide stagflation have lowered the Priority given to
activity outside our atmospheric envelope. We point out that the eco-
nomic growth we project will make available enormous resources for such
activity (1 percent of our projected GWP in 2176 will be a staggering
$3 trillion--60 percent of today's GWP and about 1,000 times 'larger than
the current U.S. space program). It could even turn out. that a capa-
bility for self-supportinq existence in space would make possible the
continuation of earth's civilization and the resuscitation of human
life on the planet following an irreversible tragedy of the kind sketched
in Chapter' 7. We estimate the probability of such a calamity as too
smail, by itself, to justify such an effort. Nonetheless, its potential
disutility is so enormous that a concerted international effort to create
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extraterrestrial self-sustaining communities, in concert with other
space objectives, would probably be well warranted. In short, we are
advising a dual-purpose lifeboat for spaceship earth.
Thinking About the Postindustrial Era
We, of course, cannot decide here what the nature, development and
organization of life and society in the postindustrial era will be, even
though we do believe that these are the real- issues of the future, far
surpassing in their significance--and in their difficulty--the more trac-
table issues we have dealt with earlier in this volume. People often talk
about consciously choosing their future, but historically it is clear that
only rarely has such a choice actually been available--and then usually
under an authoritarian political leader such as Augustus, Tokugawa, Napoleon
or Lenin. All of these did make deliberate choices which set the courses of
nations for a century or more. But the main concern of the future is
negotiating the trip from here to there, and for this reason it is the
short- and medium-term issues which tend to attract the most attention.
One might like to be able to choose the future, but probably the best
that can be done is to affect the path to it.
Yet it is interesting--and in some ways useful--to set down the
likely changes that our descendants will both create and confront. They
do give us an outline of the possible shape of things to come, and in
this way prepare rind forewarn us as we contemplate the journey.
It seems very likely that many subtle and sophisticated questions
will arise as mankind--increasingly relieved of the burdens of simple
sustenance and richer in technological capabilities and economic
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some such questions are already arising.
The fundamental physiological and psychological aspects of human
life are being altered today, and will be changed further tomorrow. Most
Of the great diseases of the past have been all but eliminated (smallpox,
for example, will soon be a memory almost as distant as 'those of scurvy
and beriberi), and death increasingly will be mainly the result of either
accident or the simple wearing out of vital organs (here, too, new oppor-
tunities for life extension are arising through the rapidly growing science
of organ replacement and soon of organ regeneration). As man progresses
further in genetic research, he will move closer to the time when it will
he possible to influence the design of his offspring, perhaps even pro-
duce them ectogenetically. People can now alter their mental state with
drugs, and over time even influence their personalities. Will man, with-
in 200 years, be able to condition his mind to increase his ability to
learn, to communicate, to create, and will he have the power to affect
others similarly, perhaps without their knowing it?
llow will all of these potential changes, many quite likely, affect
human beings for whom work--in the postindustrial era---will be an activity
of relatively short duration, and of a primarily self-serving nature? It
is almost impossible to imagine such an existence. But already there are
available electromechanical devices that effect enormous savings of
'labor, and the next generation of such devices--spurred by the computer
revolution--will probably free man from the necessity of manacling them,
except for the preselection of appropriate computer programs. What kind
of a life will a genetically engineered, vital-organ-replaceable,
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mental-state-adjustable, computer-robot-assisted human being want to live?
Will he find satisfaction in the postindustrial era? Will he seek even
more to test himself in the combat of sport, the risk of adventure or the
challenge of exploration? Or will he be able and prefer to experience
all of this--and more--through artificial stimulation?
And what of social organization in this postindustrial era? Will
people group as child-rearing families, in service-providing communities,
under national banners? Or will these human beings of dramatically
different makeup seek greatly altered institutions? It seems clear that
there will be many more people and that most will have the means to
obtain more in terms of goods and possessions than they can today. But
will these goods be distributed as they are now, acquired with finite
resources through billions of interacting calculations of marginal
utility? Politics, Harold Lasswell once wrote in a famous definition,
is "competition for scarce values." In a world of great abundance for
almost all, but greater abundance for some than others, will the same
competition still obtain? And in that world of greatly advanced communi-
cation and transportation, will we still see each other as being so
different?
The postindustrial world we foresee will be one of increased abun-
dance, and thus hopefully of reduced competition; it will be one of
greater travel and contact, and thus possibly one of diminished differ-
ences among its peoples. But it will also be one of enormous power to
direct and manipulate both man and nature; and thus its great issues will
still be the very questions that confront us now, though enlarged in range
and magnitude: Who will direct and manipulate, and to what ends?
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Forrester, Jay W. World Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen, 1971.
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273
LIST OF MEMBERS OF
HUDSON INSTITUTE'S PROSPECTS FOR MANKIND ADVISORY BOARD
Harry B. Adams
Associate Dean
The Divinity School
Yale University
George Farenthold
Managing Partner
Total Oil and Gas Ltd.
John Adams
National Resources Defense Council
Walter Annenberg
President
The Annenberg School of
Communications
Robert Berks
Sculptor
Environmental Planner
Lewis M. Branscomb
Vice President and Chief Scientist
International Business Machines Corporation
Diane J. Brokaw
The President Ford Committee
Douglass Cater
Director
Aspen Institute
Richard M. Clurman
Time Magazine
William Drayton, Jr.
Associate
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
Rene Dubos
Professor Emeritus
The Rockefeller University
Freeman J. Dyson
Professor
The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton
Frances Farenthold
President
Wells College
James Finn
Editor
Worldview
Herbert I. Fusfeld
Director of Research
Kennecott Copper Corporation
MacRoy Gasque
Vice President and Director, Health Affairs
Olin Corporation
Neal Gilliatt
Vice Chairman
The Interpublic Group
Robert W. Gilmore
President
Center for War/Peace
William T. Golden
Treasurer & Director
American Association
of Science
for the Advancement
R. E. Gomory
Vice President and Director of Research
International Business Machines Corporation
James P. Grant
President
Overseas Development Council
Arthur Gray, Jr.
Chairman
Tallasi Management Company
Eric Hoffer
Author
Ernest F. Hollings
United States Senator
South Carolina
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