STUDENTS AND WORKERS RIOT DURING MAY 1968 CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/21: CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150006-8
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:3. The student-worker coalition during the
crisis was somewhat paradoxical because French
workers have never regarded university students as
allies. Workers traditionally have viewed the stu-
dents as representatives of a bourgeois class with
vested interests in the governmental and social
establishment against which French labor strongly
rebelled. In 1968, however, militant student
leaders were fighting for objectives that appealed
to younger, leftist labor elements. The students
wanted not only a reform of educational institu-
tions---which among other things would have offered
greater opportunities to the children of workers--
but also, and more importantly, the students sought
a general reform of French society.
4. The workers rejected the government's
Grenelle Accords of 27 May, despite the urging of
their leaders, though the substance of these ac-
cords did eventually serve as the basis for the
settlement of the strikes in late June. In addi-
tion to wage increases ranging from 10 to 21 percent,
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the accords committed the government to introduce
legislation guaranteeing trade union rights and
increases in social security benefits.
Aftermath
5. The French economy started down the road
to recovery in the first months after the strikes.
The government helped to clear the atmosphere by
acting quickly to carry out its legislative promises.
Labor leaders, to protect their gains, pressed for
immediate implementation. But the regime was nervous
about several factors that still threatened the eco-
nomy. It was particularly concerned over labor's
intentions in the light of its new militancy and
over the stability of the franc in the face of the
new wage settlements. During the last two months
of 1968, the monetary crisis impelled the government
to launch an austerity program in preference to de-
valuing the franc. Currency controls were introduced,
credit and budget policies were tightened, a tax
policy to improve balance of payments was adopted,
and a new series of price controls imposed.
6. The workers feared the program would wipe
out their gains and place a disproportionate burden
on them, and the labor unions promoted some protests
against the program. No significant strikes re-
sulted, however, and labor demonstrations were mini-
mal. Most workers probably reasoned that prices
had not risen enough to justify serious protests.
Moreover, they were reassured by the government's
prompt moves to fulfill its promises on trade union
rights legislation, labor's most significant achieve-
ment in 1968. Nonetheless, as the year ended, most
of the basic problems that set off the May crisis re-
mained, despite the considerable effort to solve them.
7. No significant progress in labor-management
relations was made until President Georges Pompidou
came to power on 20 June 1969. In an effort to get
the unhealthy French economy moving, the Pompidou
government devalued the franc on 8 August 1969, at
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UuiN r 11J1iJN1 1 IAL
the expense of irritating labor, and instituted
an economic stabilization plan. These moves greatly
facilitated France's economic recovery and laid
the groundwork for reforms that served to ameliorate
labor-management relations.
8. In September 1969 Prime Minister Jacques
Chaban-Delmas announced his "new society" program,
describing it as the first step toward improving
the social climate. With the aid of two special
assistants, Jacques Delors and Simon Nora, he in-
itiated a pattern of government consultations with
the unions in a search for programs and policies
that benefit both. Although the consultation pro-
cedure varies with circumstances, the government
representative, Delors, bypasses the central labor
organization and talks directly with the local
leaders who are more aware of worker complaints.
Simultaneously, the other government representative
Nora, contacts management, stressing the importance
of resolving management differences with labor.
The system has worked well thus far, even in cases
involving civil servants and nationalized industries
where the government was one of the disputing parties.
The new technique contrasts with that of the De
Gaulle era. Then the government often intervened
directly in disputes and imposed solutions rather
than limiting its role to that of arbiter between
labor and management.
"Today governing a great state has become infinitely
complex, it requires the cooperation of all living
forces of the country. Becoming informed and in-
forming, listening and explaining have become im-
perious necessities. My government will therefore
heed the wishes expressed in the country, taking care
to act upon these wishes or to explain why it cannot
immediately satisfy them. The necessity of teamwork
therefore imposes itself-teamwork in which each
gives his ideas, his opinions, and in which the decision
is made by the man who holds this responsibility
after joint reflection.... "
National Assembly Address, 26 June 1969
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9. The Pompidou regime promptly enacted a
range of useful labor legislation that has brought
the country two years of general labor peace. The
first reforms were the upward revision of the legal
minimum wage with annual adjustments, and the es-
tablishment, in October 1969, of a shorter work
week (40 hours) without pay reductions. French
workers had been legally entitled to a 40-hour week
since the Matignon Agreements of 1936, but they
have rarely insisted upon implementation. The gov-
ernment has usually permitted management to extend
the work week to 43 or 45 hours, requiring only that
overtime rates be paid for the added hours. Because
many workers needed the overtime pay, they had for
many years few objections to the extra work hours.
10. Labor began to press for enforcement of
the 40-hour week., and this has resulted in signifi-
cant adjustments of work schedules since 1970. Many
industries in the public and private sector still
fall short of meeting official requirements. In
state-controlled enterprises,such as electricity
and gas, the work week was reduced by two hours to
42 hours; in the railroads by two,and a half hours
to 42 hours; and in the Paris transportation system
by 50 minutes to 41 1/2 hours. In private industry
and commerce, the average work week dropped less
than half an hour to 44 1/2 hours.
11. The Gaullist profit-sharing program of
1967 was strongly endorsed by the Pompidou adminis-
tration as an essential aspect of the "new society"
program, and legislation was introduced in December
1969 to facilitate its implementation. This measure
allows wage and salary earners to benefit from the
productivity gains of their company. When the profit-
sharing legislation was enacted, about 9,500 enter-
prises employing four million persons were expected
to negotiate with their employees on the adoption of
profit-sharing plans. According to the French Min-
istry of Labor, however, only 5,778 agreements had
been signed by the end of 1970. The, agreements,
covering 6,515 enterprises employing three million
workers, resulted in an average bonus of $64 per
worker in 1970, representing 2.7 percent of the
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MAJOR STEPS TAKEN TO IMPROVE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
April Extension of annual paid vacation to four weeks for all workers
who have completed one full year of work for the same em-
ployer (retroactive to May 1968)
August Devaluation of the franc to revive the flagging economy created
by the 1968 May crisis
September Creation of government's "New society" program to facilitate
- new labor legislation
September Initiation of government's policy of consultation with the trade
unions
October Establishment of a shorter work week (40-hours) without reduc-
tion in pay
October Revision of the legal hourly minimum wage in industry and
agriculture with annual adjustments
December Approval of compulsory legislation for implementation of
worker participation in profit shareholding programs (decree of
August 1967)
December Establishment of a social contract ("contrat de progres") as the
union's guarantee of wage adjustments linked to movements in
the GNP, worker productivity, and the general performance of
the employing company in return for a 90-day pledge from the
unions not to strike
March Enactment of Mensualisation agreement which transfers blue-
collar workers from hourly to monthly pay status and grants
them fringe benefits formerly enjoyed only by white-collar
workers
July Provision of vocational training with partial pay compensation
for young workers under 18 years of age and a one-year maxi-
mum training leave with full pay compensation for adult work-
ers with two years seniority.
1971
June Approval of legal hourly minimum wage increase
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