DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 15, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Top Secret `( r
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
Developments in Indochina
USAF review completed.
State Dept. review completed
15 November 1971
Top Secret
160
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(Information as of 1500)
CAMBODIA
Lon Nol appears to have decided to break up
the Chenla.task force and abandon the effort
to reopen Route 6.
NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi reaction to President Nixon's troop with-
drawal announcement suggests the North Vietnamese
may have expected some policy changes. New
flooding reported in the rice-growing delta area.
Hanoi's top educator calls for educational reform.
SOUTH VIETNAM
The new economic reforms may contribute to price
rises in the near term but are expected to pave
the way for more rapid economic development in
the long run.
LAOS
h
The North Vietnamese are also
making
eavy use of the supply trails leading to-
ward the Plaine.
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CAMBODIA
The government appears to be abandoning its
efforts to reopen Route 6, but it will try to main-
tain its position along the road.
The Chenla task force will now be iviae
into two separate operational commands--Chenla-north
which will hold and defend the towns` of Baray and
Kompong Thmar, and Chenla-south, which will be re-
sponsible for the security of Tang Kouk and Skoun.
There are approximately 10,000 troops under each
command. The primary mission of the commands is
defensive, but the units have been authorized to
take the action to the Communists if feasible.
In opting for this course, Lon Nol is trying
to salvage as much as possible from the Chenla
operation, which had more than achieved its initial
objectives until the Communists launched a counter-
offensive in late October. Government losses since
the offensive began stand at about 120 killed and
another 700 wounded. Lon Nol evidently rejected
proposals that the entire operation be abandoned
or that South Vietnamese troops be requested to
open Route 6.
The division of the Chenla forces will in-
crease their vulnerability, particularly the troops
in the northern command that will be dependent on
a7 resupply. It is not clear, however, whether
ri
e
a
the Communists, who probably have taken heavy losses,
are in a position to take early advantage of the
more favorable tactical situation.
In the Phnom Penh area,
maintain pressure agains
of Pochentong Airfield.
the Communists still
rnment positions west
15 November 1971
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Hanoi propaganda is interpreting the announce-
ment of further US troop withdrawals as indicative
of a continuing tough US stand on the war.
Initial reaction from the North Vietnamese
suggested that they may have expected the Presi-
dent's statement would contain some changes in US
policy. Instead, according to Hanoi's official
commentary, the President failed to offer any "de-
cisive change...at all." The Communists charged
that the US plans to continue its Vietnamization
program, its support of the Thieu government, and
the use of US air power in Indochina "indefinitely."
The commentary picked up the factors which the
President said would enter into US decisions in the
coming months on additional troop withdrawals and a
reduction in US air operations. It implied that
the US could not expect the Communists to agree to
any restraint on the level of their military oper-
ations in South Vietnam in exchange for a further
reduction of the US military effort. As usual,
the propaganda pledged the Communists to a continued
war effort in South Vietnam but did not suggest
that Hanoi planned any particular step-up in mili-
tary action in response to the President's announce-
ment.
Hanoi emphasized that the seven-point peace
proposal remains the cornerstone of its demands
for a negotiated settlement. The commentary called
on the US to respond to the seven points and, in
an apparent reference to the President's plans to
visit Peking and Moscow, charged that the US planned
to carry out the "dirty trick" of conducting "dip-
lomatic activities" through channels other than
Paris.
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The propaganda reiterated the Communist con-
tention that the US must agree to points one and
two before a negotiated settlement is possible.
Point one calls for the withdrawal of all free
world military personnel and materiel from Vietnam
and the cessation of free world military action
within Vietnam. Point two demands an end to US
military support and political "backing" for Thieu
so that a coalition regime can be established.
There was no hint in the Communists' reaction
that they plan to make any concession on the matter
of US prisoners. In fact the propaganda left the
impression that they believe US prisoners may be-
come even more important as a negotiating card in
any future arrangement on ending the US role in
Vietnam. The commentary noted that the number of
US prisoners is growing because of the continued
fighting by US forces.
Typhoons Add to Hanoi's Flooding Problems
New flooding portends substantially greater
losses of the important November rice crop. Photog-
raphy shows that large-
scale oo ing occurre again in the central delta
provinces, generally the same areas inundated last
August. Water levels appeared higher behind the
dikes than in the rivers, suggesting that the latest
floods were caused by three to six inches of pre-
cipitation recorded from the deteriorating tropical
storm Hester. Primary transportation arteries were
intact but flooded secondary roads have isolated
many villages.
The new flooding will further reduce yields or
cause total crop failure in fields that had survived
the August floods. Shortfalls in-the November rice
crop will require greater imports bf foodstuffs be-
fore the spring crops are harvested. A substantial
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increase in food imports apparently took place in
October when total seaborne aid deliveries from
China and the USSR reached the highest monthly
level since the war began.
To Huu on Education
North Vietnam's top educator has rendered an
unusually harsh judgment on the level of talent
and ekpertise in the country and the educational
system responsible for it. Writing in a recent
issue of the party theoretical journal, To Huu,
the head of North Vietnam's National Commission
on Education and Science, attempts to demonstrate
the point that "the present educational level of
the people and especially the cadres is totally
inadequate to needs in many respects relative to
building large scale socialist production." Al-
though To is disposed to pessimistic views on a
variety of topics, his assessment in this case is
jarring since North Vietnam has traditionally
pointed with pride to the standards of literacy
in the country and to the quality of education.
To's article makes it quite clear that there
has been a significant reduction in Hanoi's edu-
cational effort since the war went into high gear.
By To's count, full-time school enrollment in. North
Vietnam now stands at one third the total popula-
tion. Since other North Vietnam statistics suggest
that one fourth of the people were in school in
1965, this most recent tally indicates that total
enrollment has increased by only eight percentage
points in the past six years. The pace may have
been even slower among North Vietnamese below 25
years of age. This group is estimated to make up
an increasingly large percentage of the population
and may well have to bear a disproportionate share
of its burdens. To Huu clearly makes the point that
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the number of older students in part-time classes
has declined in the past five years, from one mil-
lion to 400,000.
Although To deals only indirectly with the
impact of the war, this obviously has figured
heavily in North Vietnam's educational problems.
As in industry and agriculture, the US bombing
may have forced a dispersion and overextension of
the north's educational facilities that have not
been alleviated. In this connection, most avail-
able data point to a leveling off in the number of
the country's universities over the past five years,
although the government has been aiming at a major
expansion.
In addition, the north's accelerated mobili-
zation program has undoubtedly diverted away from
the educational system much of the talent needed
to support it. Most estimates agree that the num-
ber of students and teachers among North Vietnam's
draftees is steadily increasing. Although the
government continues to grant draft deferments to
graduate students it is known to have lowered the
upper age limit and to be giving clear preference
to students in science and technology. As a
corollary to the widespread mobilization effort,
Hanoi has saddled the civilian reserves with in-
creased responsibilities, thus leaving them less
time for educational pursuits. This may account
for the precipitous decline in the number of older
part-time students which To Huu reports. It almost
certainly represents a severe setback for the gov-
ernment's effort to hike the over-all rate and raise
the productivity of all segments of the population.
The pressures of the war, however, cannot fully
explain the shortages of skill and talent which To
Huu describes. Conceivably military service could
contribute to developing discipline and technical
15 November 1971
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expertise over the long term. Many inductees in
fact receive their initial training in areas where
they have continued access to educational facili-
ties. It is possible, moreover, that North Vietnam
until recently had a glut of students which the
government was unable to employ effectively. Cer-
tainly enough women are available in North Vietnam
to fill some of the gaps in school enrollment. To
Huu claims that the number of female students has
significantly increased in recent years.
In the last analysis, however, To Huu's problems
center not on the dislocations caused by the war,
but on something far more basic. In his estimation,
the largest single cause of the incompetence and in-
effi
i
c
ency he detects in the society is the focus
of education itself which he claims is unsuited to
practical economic and social requirements. Too
much emphasis, he says, is still being placed on
traditional academic training, and not enough on
science and technology. Presumably To would like
to see a major overhaul of the nation's educational
program, since already half of North Vietnam's
student population is enrolled in scientific or
technical institutions. To also emphasizes the
need for better political education, charging that
many young people have grown lax and acquired bad
habits under the influence of city life. Looking
toward the future, To Huu offers the gloomy prog-
nosis that Hanoi may face continuing inefficiency
and corruption on the home front unless there is
an immediate effort to correct the educational
deficiencies. "The hard truth is," he concludes,
"that if education continues to expand along cur-
rent lines it will have an immediate but only slight
of ford- ..,.. -
"
15 November 1971
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Saigon's announcement today of economic re-
forms will add to short-term price pressures but
will pave the way for more rapid economic develop-
ment. Although aware the reforms would be infla-
tionary in the short run, Saigon went ahead to
stave off further speculation and provide various
changes vital to economic growth. These include a
large devaluation of the piaster, simplification
and reduction of import taxes, and a wage increase
for the armed forces and the civil service. Pro-
posals for reform of domestic taxes--which will
probably be contentious--will be submitted to the
legislature. Through these measures the Vietnamese
hope to create a more favorable climate for invest-
ment, boost exports, and increase revenues. The
devaluation will bring the piaster more in line with
its black market value and provide a means for
flexible exchange adjustments in the future.
The reforms come at a time when events have
combined to create considerable upward pressure on
prices following more than a year of relative price
stability. After an increase of only eight percent.
since the start of the year, prices rose rapidly last
week as people began turning in piasters for some-
thing that would hold its value. Speculation was
spurred by rumors of the upcoming devaluation and
fears of reduced US economic assistance. The situa-
tion was further aggravated by the low level of gov-
ernment rice stocks, which are not sufficient to with-
stand a major wave of speculation and hoarding.
Embassy officials estimate that impact of the re-
forms on prices will be a boost in the cost of living
of an additional five to ten percent by the end of
the year. The unstable situation into which the re-
forms were injected, however, could produce much
greater price increases.
15 November 1971
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Other MiZitary,Actiyity
Military action remained light in north Laos
on 14 November. For the third consecutive night
the Communists fired rockets into irregular posi-
tions in the northern Plaine des Jarres, but
again inflicted little damage. The attacks did,
however, force a temporary halt to air operations
at one site.
Air observers continue to report that the North
Vietnamese are making heavy use of trails and roads
north and east of the Plaine in. moving supplies to
forward units. Aerial photography shows that Route
7 is open all the way from the border to the Plaine.
Some supplies--including ammunition--have been re-
ported to be moving toward the Plaine.
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