OVERHEAD RECONNAISANCE COMES OF AGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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C. Overhead Reconnaissance Comes of Age
59. The most significant and important changes in
the activities of USIB under Mr. McCone occurred as a
result of the successful development and operational use of
overhead reconnaissance by satellite as well as aircraft for
photographic and to a lesser extent SIGINT and other collec-
tion of highest priority intelligence. This combination of
TALENT/KEYHOLE resources was able to provide factual
information unavailable from any other sources on such vital
subjects as military capabilities, operations, weapons systems
and tests, particularly in the critical missile field. It also
enhanced the value and interpretation of intelligence from
other sources, and constituted a firmer base for appraising
or estimating military policies, intentions, programs,
resources and developments as well as those in related
political and economic matters. In other words, this
overhead reconnaissance program brought a whole new
dimension to the national intelligence effort and had a profound
effect on practically all of the work of USIB, Its impact was
reflected on the Board's agenda in the Watch Committee
reports, the National Intelligence Estimates, most of the
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reports and activities of USIB Committees, and miscellaneous
ad hoc studies, reports, briefings and discussions.
60. John McCone in effect used the USIB on essentially
a weekly basis-~~ as a f~umto provide continuing guidance on
intelligence requirements and priorities for this National
Reconnaissance Program. Under the agreement of 2 May 1962
between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI regarding this
program, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was to be
responsive solely to such USIB intelligence guidance. In
September 1963, Mr. McCone advised USIB that, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of NRO
would meet with the Board whenever matters of mutual concern
were on the agenda, normally as the first items. Similarly
NRO was to participate in appropriate COMDR deliberations.
The USIB concurred in these arrangements. 1~1J
61. In accordance with Board instructions 132/, the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance prepared for USIB
consideration most of the reports providing intelligence
guidance to the NRO, although the CCPC and GMAIC included
such guidance in many of their reports to the Board. In
=~~USIB actions related to COMDR reports during the two-year
period under review averaged more than one per week.
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addition to its reports which required USIB consideration,
however, COMDR was also authorized to provide directly to
NRO intelligence guidance for specific operational missions
in terms of targets, priorities, and frequency and types of
coverage required. NRO integrated this intelligence guidance
with its own operational and research and development needs in
the conduct of the missions.
62. During the period under review the guidance provided
to NRO by USIB with t:he assistance of COMDR consisted
largely of statements on intelligence requirements and priorities
by subject, area or type of coverage. Guidance on collection
operational factors such as frequency and priority of scheduling
various types of missions needed, and of developing new or
modified operational capabilities were also furnished to NRO
on a frequent basis. In addition the USIB considered and
acted upon many problems concerning the necessity for
protecting the highly compartmented security of this program,
and for downgrading and dissemination of the T/KH material
acquired, including dis sernination to selected foreign govern-
ment s .
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63. The greatest number of USIB actions providing
Y~equirements guidance to NRO during this period stemmed
from the Cuban crisis of October 1962 (discussed in the
following Section D). Overhead reconnaissance of Cuba,
primarily by U-2, had been conducted largely on a mission-by-
mission authorization for sometime prior to the Soviet arms
buildup in Cuba which lead to this crisis. On 6 October
however, at the request of the Director of NRO, COMDR
submitted to USIB a statement of "Intelligence Justification and
Requirements for Overflight of Cuba". This report stressed
the pressing and continuing need for up-to-date intelligence on
the Soviet arms buildup to assist the very highest level of
government in making policy decisions of immediate and vital
concern to the nation The items of most immediate concern
were the missile installations springing up all over the island.
In addition the confirmed presence of MIG-21 aircraft required
confirmation of the estimated numbers involved. Finally with
this buildup, the possibility of U. S. operations in the area
required intelligence to enable responsible commanders and
organizations to prepare for such events, although this was
preceding
secondary to the / requirements. COMDR therefore stated
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photographic requirements in four groups by type of coverage
and vehicle, frequency and objectives: Group I was a search
for new targets or to confirm/negat.e collateral reports by
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satellite U-2 and oblique photograph~on a one-time basis for
listed objectives; Group II covered operational targets, order
of battle and surveillance by U-2, FIRE FLY drones and oblique
of
with monthly coverage/listed objectives; Group III involved the
same type of coverage and vehicles as Group II but on a weekly
basis for other listed objectives; and Group IV gave technical
intelligence requirements by low-level tactical reconnaissance
for
aircraft on a one-time basis./ certain objectives. SIGINT
requirements by overhead reconnaissance were also stated
regarding the Soviet-furnished air defense buildup involving
radar missile systems, air order of battle and antiaircraft.
The USIB on 10 October agreed that the Chairman should
express to the Special Group that the targets in Groups II and III
should be surveyed as promptly as possible, and that COMDR
should submit for Board consideration.- a specific list of
priority targets in Group IV. 133/ The COMDR response
justifying the need for low-altitude reconnaissance and giving
ending
the target categories in priority order, / in a recommendation
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for low-altitude reconnaissance at the earliest possible
opportunity, was considered by USIB on 17 October, The
Board's action was to authorize and direct COMDR to keep
these requirements, targets and priorities up-to-date, and to
keep USIB members, NRO and appropriate operational authorities
currently informed. 134/ Following the 17 October meeting,
USIB met daily at 0830 for the next five days to provide
intelligence support to the NSC Executive Committee in
dealing with the Cuban crisis, as described in the following
Section D. After the dismantling of the MBRM/IRBM sites
in Cuba and the removal of most of the missile equipment
from Cuba, COMDR submitted a report reviewing the immediate
and continuing intelligence needs and recommended an
appropriate program far photographic reconnaissance of Cuba.
The requirements susceptible of satisfaction by reconnaissance
were identified as continuous knowledge of the deployment and
operational status of significant ~ weapons systems already known
to be in Cuba, and detection of any new weapons systems brought
into Cuban ports and deployed throughout the island. In -terms
of collection means, the requirement was divided into four
of
categories: (a) periodic surveillance /known-installations, largely
by U-2s supplemented at intervals by low level tactical coverage;
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(b) shipping reconnaissance with high-altitude surveillance
of ports and with both -high and low-altitude aircraft while
ships are in port; (c) special coverage of specific, selected
objectives such as military installations and weapons by both
High and low-level aircraft, and (d) search for new installations
and weapons and their location by periodic U-2 coverage. USIB
on 21 November approved this COMDR program with one
__
amendment. 135 / On 5 December L1'SIB, based on a
statement by the Chairman regarding the intelligence needs of
the NSC Executive Committee with respect to Cuba, approved a
response stating a reasonable program for photographic
for
reconnaissance of Cuba called / high-level coverage of
approximately 20 high-priority targets once a week and
surveillance of ail priority targets at least twice a month.
It also stated that low-level photography would be needed when
high-level or other intelligence sources revealed suspicious
activity, when weather precluded high-level coverage, or if
high-level photography could not be secured soon after
arrival of large hatch freighters in port. 136/ At its
12 December 1962 meeting USIB approved a statement of
collection requirements for reconnaissance of Cuba by the
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LIGHTNING BUG drone which had just been developed with an
interchangeable nose for SIGINT or photography. In this case
the effort was to obtain critical information oxthe operation
and capabilities of the Soviet SA-2 system deployed in Cuba
under conditions of an actual missile/target engagement. The
requirements were to be satisfied primarily by FLINT collected
by the drone providing answers to a list of questions, while
other questions were to be answered by SIGINT and other
collection facilities supporting the ZIGHTNJNGBUG operation. 137/
64. USIB actions regarding overhead reconnaissance of
Cuba during the remainder of this period from January to November
1963 were concerned primarily with the frequency and type of
coverage required to provide any information on the introduction
into Cuba of offensive weapons (MBRMS, IRBM and 'bombers) or
the release from concealment of such equipment and its
deployment, with a continuing requirement to investigate suspected
actual
and/military activities associated with such weapons and nuclear
energy activities. In February the USIB approved a COMDR
report prepared at the request of the Special Group for a
comprehensive study of low level reconnaissance of Cuba. This
report recommended that high-level photography be supplemented
by low-level and, where required night photography of Soviet
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personnel and equipment and certain unidentified installations. 138/
Again in March U5IB considered a COMDR review of that
previous report and noted a statement by the Chairman that,
while he had not pressed for authorization of low-level flights
because of certain negotiations, he was prepared to request
approval by the Special Group without much further delay.
Mr. McCone did not believe there was much difficulty as to the
relative priority for coverage of Soviet military camps (as
favored by CIA) and unidentified installations (as favored by
DIA and the Joint Staff). The Board concurred in the
Chairman's request for approval by the Special Group of
low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. -fie a~.so requested COMDR
to prepare a new paper on this subject, which USIB concurred
should be provided to the DCI for use at a Special- Group meeting. 139 /
Late in April Mr. McCone again stated his view that the intelligence
community could not meet its intelligence responsibility on Cuba
without low-level coverage, while noting that authorization for
such coverage had still been deferred pending completion of the
Donovan negotiations. The USIB then reaffirmed another state-
anent of priority intelligence requirements for low-level
reconnaissance and noted that the Chairman would resubmit them
to the Special Group 140 / In this case General Carter at the
"L May USIB meeting advised that higher authority had specified
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selection of three targets for low-level coverage. The three
targets selected were a large Soviet military camp, an
unidentified military installation, and a unidentified under -
ground installation, which would be submitted to the Special
Group.
141 / In mid-June USIB approved. a COMDR report
which recommended that, in view of the limited results of
high-level coverage of certain key targets during recent months
as compared with the results of the June low-level flights,
granted
approval be / for low-level coverage of four targets. 142/
In July USIB approved as amended an updated list by COMDR
of recorni-nended targets for low-level reconnaissance which was
circulated for information and ready reference. 143/
65. While these efforts were being made to obtain low-
level coverage, USIB also was taking actions to assure an
adequate level and type of high-level reconnaissance of Cuba. In
April COMDR proposed a revised statement of guidance for
high-level coverage. The committee expressed its concern
about the effects of the existing guidance for U-2 coverage
in that it was (a) imprecise in terms of current needs and its
effect on operations, (b) produced coverage with a frequency out
of proportion to actual changes and their significance and
amount of
(c) the/film collected had deleterious effects on-the management
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of photo interpreter resources1. While recognizing that political
considerations apart from intelligence requirements might
affect the frequency of missions, COMDR believed that they
should not be allowed to enter into its judgement to confuse
or obscure real intelligence requirements. After defining the
current requirements problems, COMDR recommended that
high-level reconnaisance be conducted under the following
formula:
entire coverage of Cuba every 14 days, insuring
coverage of the highest priority targets (about 30), (b) areas
and objectives mt adequately covered would take precedence
far the next time period, (c) specific coverage of critical targets
when warranted and (d) coverage of the whole territory accomplished
so as to maximize achievement with the fewest missions. After
considering this report however USIB 'agreed that its existing
x?equirernent for weekly coverage of Cuba (weather permitting)
remained valid, rather than coverage every 14 days as recommended
by COMDR. The Board also noted that the Chairman would consult
with the Secretary of Defense to determine i~` he still had a
requirement for daily high-level coverage of major military
encampments. 144/ In May DIA reported to the Board that,
after consulting with the Secretary of Defense concerning the
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requirement for daily coverage of major military encamp-
ments, he had agreed that weekly coverage as specified by
iJSIB would be acceptable. 145 / In July the Board again
considered a COMDR report on this subject in response to a
x?ecommendation by the Strategic Air Command that, in few of
the current bad weather over Cuba, total coverage each week
be changed to coverage of top priority targets weekly with
complete coverage scheduled when weather was favorable. USIB
approved the following revision of COMDR recommendations
that: (a) the requirement for complete high-level coverage weekly
be reeonfir;ned, (b) in view of the adverse weather conditions,
SAC be advised to make maximum utilization of favorable weather
with the objective of providing, as a minimum, coverage of highest
priority targets every 7 days, with complete coverage as
feasible, (c) COMDR be requested to report every two weeks on
the coverage obtained under this guidance. 146/ The Board,
after considering the first biweekly COMDR report, noted the
Chairman's statement that SAC had done a good job in taking
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advantage of favorable weather and he hoped, it would continue
to do so. In September 1963 USIB considered a COMDR report
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of the status of Soviet forces in Cuba, which concluded
that these forces were in a state of transition and
continuing reduction, that Soviet weapons were being transferred
no
to Cuban control and that there was/verifi-able evidence of the
retention or reintroduction of strategic missiles or IL-28
bombers since those weapons were withdrawn from Cuba in the
Fall of 1962. This time USIB, based on this study,appraved
COMDR recommendationsfor high-level coverage which were
identical with those submitted by the Committee the previous
April but rejected by the Board at that time. This action
therefore extended the requirement for high-level coverage of
the entire territory of Cuba (insuring coverage of the highest
priority targets) from the previous period of every 7 days to
every 14 days. This USIB action however was subject to the
DCI obtaining concurrence of higher authority prior to
putting it into effect. Mr. James Reber as Chairman of COMDR
assured the Board that the Committee would maintain a
close review of the effects of this change and report as required
to USIB. 147/ Subsequently the DCI advised USIB that the
President had approved this revised formula for high-level
coverage of Cuba every 14 days. 148/ The last USIB action
during the period under review concerning requirements for
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high-level coverage of Cuba involved a special request in
October for such coverage of the entire area as soon as
possible, for use in the preparation of a SNIE on the "Consequences
to Cuba of Hurricane Flora". 149 / This detailed account of the
necessity for USIB to obtain approval by higher authority for the
frequency of high-level coverage and of the reluctance of the Special
Group to authorize low-level coverage illustrates clearly the serious
concern of the President and the NSC to preclude the development of
another crisis situation with respect to Cuba.
66. Second to Cuba, the Far East was the area most
frequently the subject of USIB actions dealing with requirements for
overhead reconnaissance during the period under review. Communist
China was the principal target, although Southeast Asia and the
Sino-Indian border were also considered. In December 1961, a
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