REPORTS TO USIB BY THE SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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M. Reports to USIB by the Satellite Intelligence Requirements
Committee and the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
111. In March 1959 the USIB established tanew committees,
the Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee (SSISC)
and the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC). These
two committees took over functions previously performed by inter-
departmental ad hoc groups organized under Defense Department
auspices chaired respectively by the Advance Research Projects
Agency and by the Air Force. In response to a January 1959 letter
from the DCI requesting views on the desirability of USIB assuming
such responsibilities, Acting Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles
had expressed agreement in a March 1959 letter to Mr. Dulles
that the work of these two ad hoc groups should now be formalized
within the USIB structure. 202 / Consequently the two USIB
committees were established based on recommendations by the
Office of the CIA Deputy Director for Coordination. The SSIRC was
to facilitate development and utilization of a national space surveillance
system against foreign space vehicles for the maximum benefit of
the intelligence community, particularly in connection with substantive
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intelligence requirements and the utilization of data. The SIRC
was to provide intelligence guidance and support to U. S.
reconnaissance satellite programs, particularly in connection
with substantive intelligence requirements and the utilization of data.
The Board agreed that the two committees should after an
appropriate interval make recommendations with respect to the
Board's future approach to problems in their respective fields. 203/
112. Accordingly the first reportsto USIB by these two
submitted in November 1959
committees were seven month progress reports/on the actions
accomplished by each of them to date and those currently pending.
The (SSISC) indicated it had provided guidance to the Advance
Research Projects Agency and to the National Aeronautics and
Space Agency and had maintained cognizance of three Air Force
surveillance operations nd
their availability to meet community requirements. The SIRC
reported on their comprehensive discussions with the Air Force
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of the SAMOS satellite reconnaissance system. Both committees
expressed their intention to continue their efforts to e sure that
all intelligence requirements of the participating USIB members
were given the consideration in the space surveillance and satellite
reconnaissance programs. The USIB in November 1959 noted these
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committees should continue as separate committees, working
toward their current objectives. 204/
113. The SSISC did not normally report to USIB during the
remainder of its existence until it was abolished in February of
1962. At the meeting prior to the establishment of the SSISC, USIB
had approved a statement of space vehicle surveillance requirements
developed by the predecessor ad hoc group under Defense auspices.
This statement indicated the data required regarding the nature
and purpose of the space vehicle, in order of priority (a) immediately
available prior to and a few hours after launch, (b) results of interim
analysis for a continuing period after launch, and (c) data and
analysis on all aspects including scientific findings over an
extended period. This statement was considered as preliminary
national intelligence objectives, and GMAIC was to study and
recommend the relative priorities for the various requirements. 205 /
Based on these stated requirements, SSISC subsequently monitored
for the intelligence community the space surveillance system, and
provided intelligence guidance and advice for its development.
In January of 1962, the Chairman of the SSISC recommended that the
committee be abolished since its main purpose had been fulfilled
with the assignment by the Secretary of Defense of operational
control and command of the space surveillance system to NORAD and
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SSISC into the NORAD operational requirement for the system.
The USIB approved that recommendation with the understanding
that GMAIC would assume responsibility for developing and
coordinating future space surveillance intelligence requirements. 2061
114. The SIRC, in addition to its November 1959 progress
report to USIB, submitted two reports to the Board on intelligence
requirements for satellite reconnaissance systems. The first in
March 1960 recommended a proposed letter from the Chairman of
USIB to the Secretary of Defense revalidating statements of intelli-
gence requirements for the SAMOS system (then known as Project
SENTRY) which had been previously developed in November and
the
December of 1958 by the interagency ad hoc group under/Air Force
which was the predecessor to SIRC. The draft letter also requested
vigorous action to expedite completion of the development of the
SAMOS system. This committee report was based on a re-
examination of the 1958 requirements in view of the estimated date
for an initial operational. capability of a Soviet ICBM/IRBM force
which made it highly desirable to achieve a collection capability
with SAMOS at the earliest possible date. This SIRC report
appended copies of the 1958 requirements statements which contained
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operational and technical characteristics for ELINT and COMINT
subsystems, as well as for a photographic intelligence capability
which contemplated obtaining raw information by electronic
transmission, although recoverable satellites were also being
considered. National objectives reconnaissance requirements for
these subsystems were also stated in priority order particularly
in terms of offensive and defensive weapons systems. The
photographic requirements specified the use and frequency of
coverage desired with ground resolution of objects approximately
In the December 1958
statement, the highest priority need was said to be intelligence
related to warning of the Soviet air offensive threat, but the
relative priority of the various collection capabilities was provided
for the 1959 - 1960 and 1961 - 1962 time periods. 207/
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115. The second SIRC report to USIB stemmed from a statement
at the 1 June 1960 USI]3 meeting by Robert Amory, CIA/DDI who
was presiding, noting that the President's Scientific Advisory
Board was undertaking an overall review of DOD's space-
satellite programs and. that this matter would be considered at the
NSC level at an early date. After the Board members discussed
the desirability that any briefing at the highest level include a
presentation of relevant intelligence requirements, the Board
agreed that the Chairman, SIRC should convene his committee to
develop urgently an up-to-date statement of satellite intelligence
requirements, bearing in mind the feasibility and practicability
of these requirements? 208/ Although the reason for this high
level review is not recorded, the termination of U-2 reconnaissance
over the USSR after the 1 May 1960 shoot down of Gary Power's U-2
aircraft heightened '. the urgent need for a satellite reconnaissance
capability. Difficulties with the SAMOS system by that time also
made a re-examination of intelligence requirements a necessity.
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116. After preliminary discussions at its 28 June 1960 meeting, the
USIB approved with amendments on 5 July the SIRC report on
"Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance Systems of
which SAMOS is an Example", together with a letter of transmittal
from the Chairman of USIB to the Secretary of Defense which
stressed that the fulfillment of these requirements was considered
critical to U. S. security. 209/
noting that while not yet operatiomllydemonstrated such a
system should produce useful information on the great majority
of intelligence questions against which reconnaissance systems
might be employed as well as being less affected by political
considerations. A photographic system was called for capable
of obtaining coverage of denied areas of object, resolutions of
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An annex gave examples of objectives that could be identified at
these resolutions. The system should provide for repeat coverage
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missions. COMOR was also directly and frequently concerned
with specific problems regarding the security, handling,
dissemination and release of TKH material.
120. Reports prepared for the USIB during this period
included a special report on the handling of TALENT photography
of Cuba which was concurred in by USIB in November 1960. 212/
At the same meeting, USIB concurred in a proposal by the
Acting DCI that each agency should decide the applicability of
TALENT material which had been downgraded in any presentations
to Congressional Committees at the SECRET ' NOFORN level,
bring such questions to USIB if desired. 213/ COMOR also
assisted the USIB by issuing a revision clarifying a USIB decision in
provided
August 1960 which / r that release of materials, reports and
information obtainable through overflights . of the USSR prior to
1 May 1960 (the U-2 shoot down) in the TALENT security control
system was authorized after such material had been downgraded
to SECRET and bore the dissemination limitation of NOFORN
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214 / Another COMOR
report was approved by USIB in December 1960 authorizing the
downgrading and release of TALENT material on the Eastern
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European Satellites, Communist China
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Indochina obtained prior to December 1959. The procedure was
.to be the same as for the USSR material, namely downgrading
material on Communist China and Indonesia might also be
This COMOR report was only approved after
resolution of objections by the State USIB member. 215/ In
contrast to this early period, COMOR during many subsequent
years made more reports to the USIB than any other committee
as the overhead reconnaissance program was developed and
became operational in providing critically important intelligence.
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