DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD UNDER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, 15 SEPTEMBER 1958 - 20 JANUARY 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000100070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1999
• Content Type: MIN

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Development of the United States Intelligence Board
Under President Eisenhower, 15 September 1958 - 20 January 1961
1. The first meeting; of the United States Intelligence Board was
held in the "USIB Conference Room", of the CIA Administration
Building at 1045 on 16 September 1958. General Charles P. Cabell
chaired this initial meeting as Acting Director of Central Intelligence in
the absence of Mr. Allen W. Dulles. The members present at this first
meeting are listed as follows:
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
General Graves B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations
Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance, Acting for Rear Admiral
Lawrence H. Frost, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
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Major General James H. Walsh, Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force
Lieutenant General John A. Samford, Director,
National Security Agency
Brigadier General Robert A. Breitweiser, Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission
representative to the USIB
Mr. Ralph R. Roach, Acting for Mr. Alan H. Belmont,
Federal Bureau of Investigation representative
to the USIB
2. General Cabell began the meeting with the following statement
which implied that the functioning of the new Board was to be based upon
and follow along the general lines of the previous progress which had
been made in developing the intelligence community concept:
The Chairman noted that he had been advised
on 15 September that NSC action necessary for
the creation of the new United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) had been completed. He stated
that the members therefore were meeting for the
first time as USIB. The Chairman and each of
the members then expressed his views on the
significance of this event, particularly with
respect to matters such as the progress that had
been made in recent years in developing the
intelligence community concept and the potentiali-
ties of the new Board for increasing the coordina-
tion and integration of community activities. I/
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3. The Board then gave its formal approval to recommended actions
providing for continuity in the normal functioning of intelligence community
activities. These proposals as submitted by Mr. Dulles had been approved
in principle with amendments at an earlier IAG meeting. The approved
recommendations stated that the previous USCIB Executive Committee
(less the executive secretary) would be redesignated as the USIB
Committee on Communications Intelligence with expanded membership for
all USIB agencies and a Chairman to be designated from its members by
the DCI with the concurrence of the Board. It was further agreed that this
Committee would not be charged with responsibilities for ELINT matters
which were to continue to be handled by the ELINT Committee recently
established by the USCIB. Each of these committees would report directly
to the USIB but coordinate fully on matters cutting across their respective
fields, and their Terms of Reference were to include this provision to
assist and ensure close coordination. The Director of the National
Security Agency was to chair a USIB Coordinating Committee for Signals
Intelligence consisting also of the Chairmen of the COMINT and ELINT
committees. The Executive Secretary of USIB was to work out arrange-
ments for providing secretariat support for those two committees.
Finally the COMINT Committee [and by subsequent action the ELINT
Committee] were to recommend to the Board draft DCIDs stating their
missions and Terms of Reference. Z/
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4. The third item on. the USIB agenda was noting the change
in NSCID No. 1 authorizing USIB to establish subordinate and working
groups, as submitted to the NSC by General Cabell following discussion
with the Bureau of the Budget. 3/ Having completed these formalities
of establishing itself and providing for continuity, the USIB then pro-
ceeded with the regular order of business which was reasonably
representative of the Board's agenda for the remaining years of
President Eisenhower's Administration.
A. Types of USIB Agenda Items
5. Following the first three items on the a genda of the first
USIB meeting, the remaining eleven items listed below ,4% contain examples
of most of the types of subjects, reports or discussions considered by
the USIB from 15 September 1958 through 20 January 1961:
(a) Approval of minutes of the previous meeting
of the IAC on 9 September 1958.
(b) A Situation Review in two parts consisting of:
(1) Consideration and approval of the Watch
Committee Report giving any indications of
hostilities by the USSR or its allies which could
endanger the security of the U. S.
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(2) A Review of Sensitive Situations in which
the Board exchanged views on developments in
actual or potential crisis situations short of
hostilities anywhere in the world.
(c) A report by the Critical Collection Priorities Committee
on "Exploitation of Soviet, Long -Range Missile Test Activities",
which was referred back to the committee for further review and
report to the Board.
(e) A memorandum on "Analysis of Bloc Radio and Press
Propaganda" prepared by Mr. Abbot Smith of the Board of
National Estimates (:BNE), which was noted by the USIB.
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(g) Two estimates were approved with amendments
as follows: a SNIE on "Chinese Communist and Soviet
Intentions in the Taiwan Straits" and a NIE on "The
Outlook in Poland". In addition the Board agreed to
release each of these estimates to the United States
Information Agency (USIA), which was a decision
required by the :Board in the case of each approved
estimate.
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(h) An Executive Session requested by the Chairman
during which the members agreed that Mr. T. Achilles
Polyzoides of the Department of State should be the initial Chairman
of the new COMINT Committee of USIB.
6. These last eleven, agenda items came very close to, setting a precedent
for the types of actions taken\in US1-kymeetings for each of the fiscal year periods
from 16 September 1958 through 20 January 1961 as indicated by the percentage of
total actions for each type of item in the following table: 5
Minutes
9-10%
Situation Reviews
9-10%
Estimates and
Related Items
30%
USIB Committee
Reports
26-29%
Ad Hoc Studies
and Reports
7- 9%
Ora]. Reports
and Briefings
4- 5%
Miscellaneous
Discussions
5- 6%
Announcements
and Presentations
5- 7%
During those years the Board was convened in Executive Session during
one-third to one-half of the meetings. In addition to actions in U.SIB meetings ,
the USIB has also taken actions by the circulation of memoranda for approval,
concurrence or noting for information. In such cases the members might
transmit their votes b,r vote sheet or by telephone, while on items for
information only it might be recorded that they had been noted in the absence
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of any comment or objection by a member as of a certain date. During
this particular period however there were very few Board actions taken
by memoranda. The total actions by the USIB taken in meetings or by
memoranda during this period are shown in the following table:
Meeting
Items
Memo
Actions
Total
Actions
16 Sept. 58 - 30 June 59
517
8
525
1 July 59 - 30 June 60
575
12
587
1 July 60 - 20 Jan. 61
279
31
310
Total '
1,371
51
1,422
B. USIB Minutes
7. Normally the first item on a USIB agenda would be approval of
the minutes of the preceding meeting, subject to any corrections that may
be agreed upon. A draft of these minutes was prepared and circulated
after each Board meeting by the Executive Secretary with the assistance
of his staff which is called the USIB Secretariat, abbreviated to USIB/S.
The minutes first recorded the time and place of the meeting and the
names of the presiding officers and members present. They presented a
relatively brief summary of the pertinent discussion and actions taken by
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the Board on each agenda item considered. They were not a verbatim
transcript but were essentially a carefully stated record of the decisions
or other forms of action taken by the Board together with a resume of
the discussion sufficient to provide useful guidance to those who would
need to implement the actions, whether they attended the meeting or not.
The great majority of agenda items involved consideration of written
documents circulated as far as possible in advance of each Board meeting.
The minutes therefore tended to consist of an identification of each subject,
a reference to the pertinent documentation, a summary of the comments
and views, and an indication of the actions taken on the documents,
whether approval or concurrence, noting for information, referring to
the originator for reconsideration or other action. Actions taken by the
Board by memorandum or other means between USIB meetings were
usually recorded by "Secretary's Notes" at the end of the minutes of the
following meeting. Approval by the Board at its next meeting gave official
sanction to the minutes.
C. Watch Committee Reports
8. During the period under review, the next agenda item would
normally be a "Situation Review" consisting first of a Watch Committee
Report and then a "Review of Sensitive Situations." The preparation of a
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weekly report for Board consideration was one of the major functions
of the USIB Watch Committee. Its mission stemming from NSCID No. 1
and as stated in DCID No. 1/5 was 6/
To provide earliest possible warning to the
United States Government of hostile action by
the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the
security of the United States.
The committee was composed of a senior officer representing each USIB
member organization, one of whom was designatedas Chairman by the DCI
after consulting the Board.
` The committee was supported by a
National Indications Center headed by a Director provided by CIA and an
inter-agency staff. This Center conducted on a continuing basis analyses
and evaluation of all-source information and intelligence relating to the
imminence of hostilities, and developed conclusions as to indications of
(a) Soviet/ Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against the
United States, its possessions or forces abroad; U. S. allies or their
forces; or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit; or (b) any other develop-
ment susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/ Communist hostile action
which would jeopardize U. S. security. These conclusions were normally
presented by the Center in the form of a weekly report for approval by
the Watch Committee, consideration and noting by the USIB with any agreed
amendments, and subsequent dissemination to the Principals of the USIB
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(including the President, the NSC and the JCS) and other appropriate
recipients. In the event of an impending critical situation however USIB
Principals were to be immediately advised after which the DCI in consul-
tation with the USIB were to prepare and disseminate immediately as
appropriate a national intelligence estimate of the situation pursuant to
NSCID No. 1. In practice, reports on such critical situations were
prepared during an urgently-assembled special Watch Committee meeting, if
necessary cleared by each committee member with his USIB Principal and
disseminated by the quickest possible means. In this connection however the
Terms of Reference of the Watch Committee stress that the proper discharge
of the mission of providing warning of hostile action depended upon the carrying
out of the complementary watch and estimating functions, and that the Watch
Committee should avoid duplicating USIB estimative functions.
9. Watch Committee reports during the September 1958 - January 1961
period normally consisted of one or two page Conclusions on indications of
hostilities, with an Attachment providing a background information summary of
the pertinent developments on which the committee based its findings. 7/ The
Conclusions were generally divided into three or four sections. Section A
would normally state that
No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate
hostilities against the continental US or its
possessions in the immediate future.
Section B began
No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately
to initiate direct military action against US forces
abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit
in the immediate future,
with the addition of "except as noted below" when needed. Section C
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generally dealt with "situations susceptible of direct exploitation by
Sino-Soviet hostile action which would jeopardize U. S. interests", and
these words were used as a leading statement to that section beginning in
January 1959. Under Sections B, C and if needed D there would be a
brief statement or "Note" identifying the nature and locale of the
indications of hostile action threatening U. S. security. For example the
Watch Report considered at the first USIB meeting had a "Note" under
Section B which began by stating that the Chinese Communists would
continue with the artillery barrages, interdict supply lines to the Offshore
Islands in the Taiwan Straits by using artillery and military elements as
necessary, and maintain a high state of readiness for air operations. It
then went on to assess the Chinese Communists capability to launch major
that
attacks against certain of the Offshore Islands and/their seizure of one
or more was possible. It concluded that the Chinese Communists
to take
probably would not intend/:major military action against Taiwan and the
Pescadores but possessed a capability for air attacks against them. The
report further concluded that the Chinese Nationalists fearing U. S.
concessions in talks with the Chinese Communists, might undertake
independent provocative action calculated to embroil the U. S. in hostilities.
latter
This /statement however was subject to a footnote indicating that the
Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff, agreed that this is possible, but
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considered it unlikely in the immediate future. If of a substantial nature,
such a dissenting or differing viewpoint could be expressed by any
USIB member as a footnote to the final Watch Report. The final statement
under Section B of this initial USIB report dealt with the possibility of
Chinese Communist military action against U. S. Naval or Air Units
operating in the area and the likelihood of Soviet involvement in support
of the Chinese Communists. Section C of this report pointed out that
although deliberate hostilities in the Middle East were unlikely in the
immediate future the situation there remained unstable, particularly where
U. S. and U. K. commitments were involved and incidents or coups
could occur at any time. A following "Note" cited a threat to the
survival of the Jordanian regime, warning that if it collapsed action by
Israel and other neighboring countries to take control of Jordanian
territory was likely.
10. The examples in that first USIB Watch Report cited above are
typical illustrations of the format and character used throughout the period
under consideration. Subsequent reports during the first nine months of
of the USIB's existence dealt with such diverse situations such as
internal' developments in Iraq and Lebanon, fighting between the French and
Algerians, Soviet and East German threats to. the four power status of
Berlin and Western access thereto, Israeli-Syrian border clashes,
Communist plotting in Cambodia, and instability in Sudan. There were
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two Special Watch Reports, one in February 1959 regarding a Soviet
trawler cutting North Atlantic cables and another in April involving
reserve mobilization in Israel and Syria.
11. During FY-1960 critical situations continued regarding Berlin,
the Middle East including' :[ran and
increased instability in Iraq, the
Communist guerrilla warfare and unstable political situation in Laos
beginning in' July 1959, the continued threat in the Taiwan Straits, and
military tension between Israel and the 'UAR. Special reports in, that fiscal
year appraised unusual military developmenisin Communist China relating
to the Taiwan Straits, and a Chinese Nationalist report of Chinese
Communist fighters moving forward to coastal airfields opposite Taiwan.
12. In the period July 1960 - January 1961 an;early report had
negative conclusions on indications of hostilities in Sections A, B and C
follo wed by a "Note warn ng ithat the current militancy of Soviet
give
foreign policy tactics could/rise to a situation in which the danger of
hostilities would be increased. Beginning with the 9 August - 1960 coup
in Laos the Watch Report concluded that internal developments there
were favoring Communist exploitation. It added however that there were
no indications of Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese intent to
intervene overtly but that this danger would be greater if Thailand or
South Vietnam intervened militarily, prompting an Army and Navy footnote
saying that the situation was best described as presenting an opportunity
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for Communist exploitation without regard to the many possibilities
for which there were as yet no indicators. The critical situation in
Laos continued to be a major concern but beginning in September 1960
the deteriorating situation in the Congo was frequently reported. Soviet
and East German moves regarding Berlin and access thereto were
appraised as well as evidence of stepped-up guerrilla warfare in
South Vietnam, and the threat posed by Soviet military aid to Cuba.
Possible Soviet military aid to Algeria and Morocco were also assessed.
Special reports were prepared on East German threats to Berlin,
unusual developments in Soviet communications security, and major
Communist attacks in Laos. Reporting on the military situation in Laos
dominated the Watch Report at the end of 1960, including Army and Joint
Staff footnotes differing with "estimative statements" regarding possible
increased Communist military pressure and commitments. The Watch
inauguration. The report was evaluated as probably false with no infor-
mation to corroborate it, but added that the possibility could not be completely
discounted. The final 18 January 1961`Watch Report to President Eisenhower
dealt With the -situation in Laos, and the threat of radical nationalist
Communist Bloc
African and/ diplomatic support for the Lumumba regime in the Congo.
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13. In summary the Watch Reports during this 1958 - 1961
period performed the warning function primarily by citing indications
of hostile actions in the areas of the Taiwan Straits (especially the
Offshore Islands), Berlin, the Middle East (particularly Jordan, Iraq, Iran
and Israeli tensions with Syria and the UAR), Indochina (mainly
Cambodia and Laos) and the Congo. It is interesting to note that
South Vietnam and Cuba were first mentioned in October of 1960. There
were ten special reports during this period, many of them dealing with
possible indications of hostile action which were correctly assessed as
false or exaggerated. In general, the Watch Reports appraised military
for
capabilities and states of readiness J ihostilities without giving a
definite forecast of their occurrence. There appeared to be a tendency
to mention possililities which, while considered unlikely, could not be
discounted. In a number of these cases, dissenting footnotes expressed
alternative conclusions. Some of these cases highlighted the continuing
problem of trying to draw a line between the warning and estimative
functions.
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D. Review of Sensitive Situations
14. As compared with the Watch Report which was primarily
concerned with the imminence of hostilities, this agenda item which was
initiated by a January 1957 proposal by Mr. Dulles 8 / to the IAC provided
the USIB with an opportunity to review developments in actual or potential
crisis situations (short of hostilities) anywhere in the world. Such a
review was regularly placed on the agenda of meetings with each of the
Board members free to propose matters for discussion. Most of the
"Sensitive Situations" were presented orally by one or more of the members,
although in some cases a short paper was handed out at the meeting.
Generally the discussions consisted of a brief identification and analysis of
the situation by a Board member, followed by any additional information
or comments by other Board members and when warranted by members of
their staff having pertinent knowledge of the situation. These discussions
usually involved a short exchange of views by the Board, primarily designed
to keep the members current on actual or potential crisis situations which
deserved attention or scrutiny by the USIB members and perhaps by their
respective Principals. Frequently the Chairman might indicate that he
considered a particular subject being discussed of sufficient importance or
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interest to merit including it as an item in his regular briefings at
National Security Council. meetings. On other occasions the discussion
would lead to agreement by the Board that a particular situation had such
critical aspects or potentialities that an estimate should be initiated or a
committee should be assigned to report on it. 9/
15. While the Watch Reports cited some 20 situations where there
were indications of possible hostile action endangering U. S. security during
the September 1958 - January 1961 period, the "Reviews of Sensitive
Situations" during this period included discussions of actual or potential
crises (shortof hostilities) in over 70 countries or areas of the world. This
difference in the areas covered is readily explained by the concept that the
"Sensitive Situations" were concerned not only with new developments
relating to existing crises but also an effort to anticipate any potential
for in the near future.
trouble spots which migh.t;be prevented or prepared/ Understandably
the USSR was the country most frequently discussed during this entire
period in an overall average of one-third of the meetings. These discussions
covered a wide spectrum of subjects including threatening developments in
especially related
Soviet foreign and military policies, military capabilities/to new weapons
systems, or efforts at penetration or subversion of other nations particularly
through military and economic aid. The Board gave second attention to
the increasingly serious situation in Cuba at about one-third of its meetings,
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although it was only in the latter part of this period that indications of
by Cuba
hostile actions /against the U. S. were mentioned in the Watch Report.
Frequent concern was also evidenced, in order of frequency,by
discussions of developments in Laos, Iraq, the Congo, Indonesia, the
Taiwan Straits and Berlin. The situations in Panama, Communist China
(other than the Taiwan Straits), I Algeria, Sudan, Iran,
Venezuela and the Caribbean area especially the Dominican Republic were
reviewed on a number of occasions. 10/
E. USIB Committee Reports
16. Following the Review of Sensitive Situations at the first USIB
meeting, the next agenda item was a report by the Critical Collection
Problems Committee on "Exploitation of Soviet Long-Range Missile Test
Activities". This item was a good example of the types of reports prepared
by USIB committees or working groups, which appeared on the agenda of
Board meetings during the September 1958 to January 1961 period on an
average of three reports per meeting.
17. These USIB committees constituted the principal means of
assisting the Board in coordinating the intelligence activities in each of
their fields, aside from the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates which
was the responsibility of the Board of National Estimates meeting with the
"USIB Representatives"- particular, the committees supported the Board
in carrying out the responsibilities stated in Paragraph 2 a. of NSCID No. 1
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of (1) establishing policies and developing programs for guidance of the
intelligence community,(2) establishing intelligence objectives, require-
ments and priorities, (3) reviewing and reporting to the NSC, (4) making
recommendations on intelligence matters to appropriate U. S. officials,
(5) developing and reviewing security standards and practices relating to
protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosures and (6) formulating appropriate policies regarding
intelligence arrangements with foreign governments. These were matters
on which the Board was to reach decisions by agreement, with the under -
standing that when the Chairman determined that a given position represented
a consensus of the Board it should be considered as agreed unless a
dissenting member requested a reference of the issue to the NSC. 11/
18. The USIB was authorized by NSCID No. 1 to establish
subordinate committees and working groups as appropriate. The Terms
of Reference of these committees varied as to their missions, organization
and procedures depending upon the field of intelligence assigned to them.
Some were standing committees while others were ad hoc committees or
working groups. Most of the standing committees were established by the
issuances of DCIDs. In general all members of the Board could designate
representatives on the committees if they desired or had an interest in
the particular field. In many cases the committees were authorized not
only to advise and assist the Board by submitting reports but also to act
for the Board in their respective fields within the limitations of
established Board policies and guidance. Consequently, once the Board had
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provided sufficient guidance, most of the committees acted on their own
by agreement in achieving coordination in their respective fields, reporting
to the Board only when the actions they proposed to take were beyond
established policy or their Terms of Reference, were specifically requested
by the Board, or were of such significant importance or urgency as to
require USIB endorsement. This historytherefore will be primarily
concerned with the reports prepared by the committees for the consideration
of the USIB.
19. Following the first USIB meeting the Board agreed that all IAC
and USCIB committees and working groups should continue to function
under existing Terms of Reference until changed by USIB action. It also
agreed that these committees and working groups should consider
whether changes in their organization or functions were appropriate, and
that the Chairman of each group should report thereon to the Board. By
memorandum dated 19 September 1958 the Executive Secretary of USIB
requested that each group initiate such action including recommendations
regarding revision of Charters or other basic documents covering
their activities. 12/
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at that time
20. The 17 standing committees/covered the following fields:
COMINT
ELINT
Critical Collection Problems
Interagency Defector
Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities
Procurement of Foreign Publications
Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Economic Intelligence
Economic Defense Intelligence
Guided Missile Intelligence
Scientific Estimates
National Intelligence Survey
International Communism
Critical Communications
Documentation
Watch
21. In addition responses were requested from the following 5
ad hoc subcommittees and working groups:
Domestic Exploitation Committee
Committee on Exchanges
Resistance Intelligence Committee
Warning Systems Survey Committee
Working Group on Arab-Israeli Situation
22. During the spring and summer of 1958 the Charters or Terms of
Reference of many of these committees had been reviewed in light of the
revised NSCIDs approved in March and April and the impending merger
of the IAC and USCIB into USIB. Among the significant changes made during
that time was the separation of a single Advisory Committee on Foreign
Language Publications into two committees on Exploitation and Procurement
respectively, the establishment of a standing Committee on Critical
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Communications replacing an ad hoc committee, establishment of a
Committee on Documentation replacing an ad hoc committee, and the
creation of a Critical Collection Problems Committee under IAC-USCIB
auspices in February 1958. Consequently most of the committees
respondedby reaffirming their Charters subject to identifying them as
USIB committees and to the additional membership of representatives of
the Assistant to the Secretary for Defense for Special Operations and the
Director of the National Security Agency who were members of the
USCIB but not of the IAC. The principal change in the committee
structure was the establishment of the COMINT and ELINT committees
(in place of the USCIB) by the issuance of DCID Nos. 6/1 and 6/2
respectively, effective 21 October 1958. 13/ At the 14 October 1958
USIB meeting the Economic Defense Intelligence Committee was
dis sowed ariU established as a subcommittee of the Economic Intelligence
Committee, while the Co:mmitteeon International Communism was kept
in existence until the remaining Collection Requirements Lists were
completed, and renamed the Committee on Intelligence Priorities and
Requirements relating to International Communism. 14/ As of 14 November 1958
a new Charter for the Watch Committee was approved. 15/
23. During the first half of 1959 a number of committee Charters
were revised and some new committees were established in support of the
USIB. Revised CIR rters were issued for the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
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Committee 16/, the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
Committee (replacing the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee) 17/,
the Scientific Intelligence Committee (replacing the Scientific Estimates
Committee) 18/, and the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities
Committee. 19/ On the recommendation of Mr. Dulles based on the
increased responsibility for protection of intelligence and of sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosures which NSCID No. 1 placed upon
the DCI with the assistance and support of USIB, the Board approved
establishment of a standing Security Committee in March 1959. 20/
That same month the USIB approved a recommendation by the CIA
Deputy Director for Coordination for the establishment of a Space
Intelligence
Surveillance /Support Committee to facilitate development and utilization
of a national space surveillance system against foreign space vehicles
for the benefit of the intelligence community. The Board also approved
General Truscott's recommendation to establish a regular Satellite Intelligence
Requirements Committee (replacing an existing ad hoc committee) to
provide intelligence guidance and support to U. S. reconnaissance
satellite programs. 21/ In April a revised Charter for the Committee
on Exchanges was approved, establishing it as a permanent rather than
an ad hoc committee. 22/ In June 1959 an; Ad Hoc Working Group on
Intelligence Costs which had been formed in the fall of 1958 reported on
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its efforts to provide a medium by which the DCI and USIB could develop
cost data broadly applicable to the intelligence community as a whole.
The working group stressed the need to prevent misinterpretations which
might damage the intelligence effort because of the differences in cost
estimating practices involved in unilateral agency reports to the Bureau of
the Budget. The working group therefore recommended and the Board
approved the establishment of a standing Cost Estimates Committee
responsible for compiling an estimated foreign intelligence cost report
for FY-1959 and each year thereafter' after the close of the fiscal year,
as well as any cost data reports required by the Board. 23/ Then
effective as of 26 June 1959 the Board acted on a memorandum by the
Executive Secretary on necessary changes, largely of a routine nature,
in the Charters or Terms of Reference of USIB committees or working
groups which had not been brought up-to-date since the USIB was created.
As recommended in this memorandum, in the case of the ad hoc Soviet
Weapons Requirements Committee and the ad hoc Resistance Intelligence
Committee, the Board instructed them to submit recommendations
regarding their future activities and organization. 24/ With these actions
cornpTeting the reorganization of the committee structure under the USIB,
the
General Truscott who had shepherded revisions of NSCIDs and DCIDs
throughoutthe process of merging the IAC and USCIB into USIB was
commended for his outstanding contribution to intelligence at the
30 June 1959 Board meeting prior to his retirement from CIA.
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24. From mid-1959 through 20 January 1961 there were a number
of revisions, additions, or deletions in the USIB committee structure.
The , Ad Hoc Weapons Requirements Committee was disbanded on its own
recommendation in August 1959. 25/ In September 1959 an Emergency Planning
Steering Committee was established to coordinate emergency planning
activities by the intelligence community for ensuring continued intelligence
support to the Government under conditions of nuclear attack. 26/ The
Resistance Intelligence Committee recommended and the USIB approved
that it be dissolved as a formal standing committee of the Board in
September 1959. 27/ In January 1960 ,an Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign
Intelligence Publications was formed to draft a reply to a request by the
President's Board of Consultants on' Foreign Intelligence Activities for
a review of such issuances. 28/ In March 1960 the USIB approved
recommendations by the Committee on Intelligence Requirements
relating to International Communism, including changing its title back
to Committee on International Communism and broadening the scope
of its activities. 29/ Based on an earlier suggestion by General Cabell
for the possible consolidation of the Satellite Intelligence Requirements
Committee and the \Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, the USIB in August 1960
approved
/ the creation of a Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to replace those
two committees. 30/
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25. In addition to the committees and working groups described
above, the USIB during the period September 1958 - January 1961 also
established a number of temporary committees to handle specific
problems which arose. In March 1959 the Board established a Special
Committee on the Berlin Situation to monitor significant developments
bearing on that situation, including preparing special indicators, keeping
reporting,
abreast of current suggesting allocation of collection resources
and making other appropriate reports to the Board. 31 / Beginning in
mid-March 1959 this Berlin committee reported at almost every USIB
meeting until mid August when it was recessed until further notice. 32/
In mid-October 1960 the USIB concurred in General Cabell's suggestion
that the Berlin committee be reconstituted and function generally as
before, submitting a report in two weeks and thereafter on a monthly
basis. 33/ In March of 1959 the USIB approved as a descriptive Board
document a proposed paper on Procedures and Secretariat for the USIB. 34/
In September 1960, based upon a study by the Security Committee of
personnel security procedures related to classified foreign intelligence, the
Board constituted an ad hoc committee of legal and security personnel to
consider certain legislative proposals recommended by that Committee which
would help to
effect overall improvement of the standards of personnel
security within USIB departments and agencies. 35/ On 22 November 1960
the USIB noted a report by an ad hoc committee on the Cuban Situation and
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agreed that future reports need not be produced at precise intervals
but that the committee should watch the situation closely and produce
future reports on its own initiative or as requested by a Board member. 36/
26. The frequency with which the work of each of these committees
appeared upon the USIB agenda varied widely depending upon the particular
from
types of functions. During the 28 months / September 1958 to January 1961
only five of the 23 standing committees at the end of that period were the
subject of Board actions on an average of more than once per month. As
might have been expected based on the USCIB experience, actions related
to the work of the COMINT Committee were recorded in the USIB minutes
once
on an average of / per week, far more than any other committee. The
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee was the subject of
(on matters other than its regular weekly reports)
Board concern about twice per month. The Watch Committee/ Critical
Collection Priorities Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee each appeared, in order of frequency, on an average of more
than once per month. Other committees appearing in descending frequency
on the Board's agenda were those dealing with Security, Defectors,
Critical Communications,
Scientific Intelligence, ELINT, Overnead R.econn i.ssance --Excriariges,-/`
Documentation, Economic'Tntelligence, National Intelligence Surveys and
Cost Estimates. Action relating to all the remaining standing committees
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(Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, Procurement of Foreign
Publications, International Communism, pace 25X1
Surveillance Intelligence Support and Emergency Planning Steering
Committees) were recorded in USIB minutes three or less times during this
period, with the exception of the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities
Committee which did not report to the Board except for approval of its
Charter. The six ad hoc committees or working groups all reported to the
Board except the one dealing with Legislative Proposals Regarding Personnel
Security which had just been formed in September 1960. The most active in
reporting to the Board were the Special Committee on the Berlin Situation
and the Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation. The Ad Hoc Committee
on Foreign Intelligence Publications submitted three reports to USIB, the
Working Group on the Cuban Situation reported once and the Warning Systems
Survey Committee made a preliminary report in January 1961.
An analysis of significant actions taken by USIB related to the work of the
more active committees will be the subject of later sections of this Volume.
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F. National Intelligence Estimates and Related Agenda Items
27. The last five items on the agenda of the first USIB meeting before
the Board went into Executive Session were concerned with various aspects
of the functions of the Board of National Estimates. BNE as it was called
was primarily responsible for assisting the Director of Central. Intelligence
with the support of the USIB in producing National Intelligence Estimates
pursuant to Paragraph 4 a. of NSCID No. 1. 37/ These estimates, along
therein
with the Watch Reports, constituted "the national intelligence" defined/as
"that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security
policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the
exclusive competence of a single department or agency. '' In effect it is
the principal end product of the intelligence community prepared for the
President and the National Security Council, as well as the USIB member
departments and agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The term
"produce" as related to this national intelligence is also defined in
NSCID No. 1 as meaning ''to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security" which is one of the duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency specified in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
Section 102 (d) (3). 38/ Consequently the production of national intelligence
personally
was assigned/to the DCI with the support of the USIB,with the proviso that
intelligence so produced shall have the concurrence, as appropriate of the
USIB members or shall carry a statement of any substantially differing
opinion of such a member.
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28. This assignment to the DCI of individual responsibility
for the substantive content of national intelligence meant that, after
considering all of the facts, views and opinions of the USIB, the final
version of an NIE, SNIE or Watch Report was to be determined solely
by the DCI. The other Board members however had the right to
have any substantially differing opinion recorded in the document as
disseminated to the President and other national security officials.
In practice Mr. Dulles and most DCIs have sought to achieve a meaningful
consensus on these estimates or Watch Reports, short of compromising
essential judgments or watering them down to the least common
denominator. This line is difficult to draw in terms of value and service
to the policy makers since neither a weak and ambiguous agreed
estimate or a widely split and contentious version carries much weight
in official circles. On the other hand differences of view are quite
sincere and understandable considering that all the essential facts can
never be available and these estimates are inevitably projections into
an uncertain future. Under these circumstances expressions of rational
divergencies can be useful to policy makers in judging various options.
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The operating procedures for producing National Intelligence
Estimates were specified in a DCID No. 1/1 effective 5 August 1959,
which superseded a similar Directive issued on 21 April 1958. 39/
This Directive charged the Board of National Estimates periodically,
but not less than quarterly, with presenting to ? UUSIB for approval a
Program of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National
during
Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) for production' I; the following six months.
In preparing this Program BNE was to consult with the NSC Planning Board
and appropriate committees of the USIB and to coordinate with USIB
agencies. In developing this Program BNE and its Staff in the Office
of National Estimates took into account its knowledge of the world
situation in terms of subjects or areas in which actual or potential
updated
developments merited a new`r/ analysis and appraisal through
the estimative process. The proposed Program was also based upon
any specific request from senior policy making or operating bodies or
officials. In particular during President Eisenhower's Administration,
the Board was guided by the policy making requirements or plans of the
NSC and its Planning Board which drafted most of its policy papers under
the Chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, with the assistance of the career NSC Staff. The CIA
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Deputy Director for Intelligence as the representative of the DCI and the
intelligence community on the NSC Planning Board was able to provide
continuing guidance to BNE in programming estimates to meet the needs
of the NSC for intelligence support in developing national security
policies. By DCID No. 1/1 requests for estimates not programmed
were to be transmitted to USIB via BNE which was to take appropriate
action such as preparingc:Ornments, initiating immediate action subject
to USIB ratification, or attaching draft-' Terms of Reference to its recom-
mendation that the estimate be approved for production.
The normal preparation of estimates as provided in DCID No. 1/1
consisted of four stages:
a. BNE after consulting USIB agencies would
circulate Terms of Reference indicating the scope and
the intelligence material needed. The agencies or a
USIB committee or other appropriate group would then
prepare contributions for submission to BNE.
b. After considering the contributions and
appropriate consultation with the contributor BNE
would prepare a draft.
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c. Representatives of the USIB agencies,
referred to as the "USIB-Re sr-esentatives'r, would
meet with BNE to review, comment on and revis e
the draft as necessary.
d. The final draft was then submitted to the
U5IB for approval.
Under exceptional or unusual circumstances, which have occurred. .-a number of
times, any of these above steps could be omitted. Any USIB agency could
dissent to any feature of an estimate, in which case the dissenter would be
identified and his position stated. The finished estimates were disseminated
by the DCI under established procedures, and carried a note joC the extent
of coordination within the intelligence community. Specifically this note
would show the USIB members who participated in the coordination of a
particular estimate, as well as those members such as the Atomic
Energy Commission and federal Bureau of Investigation Representatives
who wished on occasion to be recorded as abstaining because the subject
matter was not within their jurisdiction.
31. Estimates identified as NIEs were generally those scheduled
in the regular six-month programs submitted by BNE for USIB approval
at quarterly intervals. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)
were usually unprogrammed estimates prepared on a relatively urgent
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basis in response to actual or potential developments of an unanticipated
or crisis nature or at the specific request of policy making or operating
they
bodies or officials. In many cases /were requested in terms of probable
foreign reaction to particular or alternative U. S. policies or courses of
action under consideration.. During the September 1958 to January 1960
period, estimates specifically scheduled each quarter on the Program
for the next six-months averaged between three or four estimates per
month. 40/, while the estimates actually produced during the six-month
periods averaged between five or six per month. In part this difference
between scheduled and produced estimates was deliberate to provide some
leeway for preparing unanticipated SNIEs. Of the 144 estimates published
during the period under review, 64 or about 44 percent were SNIEs. 41/
32. From 15 September 1958 through 20 January 1961, NIEs
covering
or SNIEs were produced / developments in every major area of the world.
The wide diversity of coverage was illustrated by the two estimates on the
first USIB agenda, one a SNIE on "Chinese Communist and Soviet
Intentions in the Taiwan Straits" and the other a NIE on "The Outlook in
Poland". Of the 144 estimates published during this period" nearly
*This figure includes a few multiple copies of certain sensitive estimates which
were issued in two (or once each in 3 or 4) versions, including the full
text for special limited dissemination and sanitized versions for wider
U. S. distribution or release to selected foreign governments.
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one-quarter (32) of them concerned the Communist Bloc, in which the
USSR was naturally the preToxn~riant interest. About one-fifth (29) of
the estimates were on the Middle East, with the situation in Iraq being
the country receiving most attention. Southeast Asia was the area third
on the list (13) followed in order by the Caribbean (12), Africa (10), the
Far East (8), Western Europe (7), South Asia (6) and South America (4).
There were 23 miscellaneous estimates, most of them resulting from
requests for SNIEs. The total number of estimates during the period
averaged about five per month, although their actual production varied
considerably from month to month. 42/
In producing the 144 published estimates referred to above,
the USIB had them under consideration as an item at Board meetings a
total of 177 times, indicating that about one-fifth of the estimates required
consideration at more than one meeting. 43/ The estimates normally
requiring the greatest effort were the important estimates regarding
Soviet military capabilities which were regularly produced each year as
one of the main bases for the development of U. S. military programs.
During the 1958 - 1960 period these estimates covered the following
subjects (with the calendar years shown in parentheses):
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34 Estimates on the other areas of the world depended upon
actual or anticipated developments. In many cases the subject covered
by the estimates paralleled those dealt with the Watch Reports although
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the estimates covered a much wider variety of subjects and dealt
primarily with estimates of future developments rather than indications
of imminent hostilities. In the September - December 1958 period
the situations in the Middle East and the Taiwan Straits were dealt with
a number of times. During calender year 1959 the USSR, the Middle East
(especially Iraq), Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia and Laos), Berlin,
the Taiwan Straits and South America were of major concern. In calendar
year 1960: interest continued'-,in the USSR, the Middle East, Indonesia and
Laos as well as the addition of Cuba, Korea and Sino-Indian relations.
The last estimates published during 1-20 January 1961 were "The Estimate
of the World Situation", "Probable Short-Term Reaction to U. S. Resumption
of Nuclear Tests'and "Main Elements in the Congo Situation". 45/
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37. In addition to considering, - and.approving National
Intelligence Estimates and approving international estimates, the
USIB considered variety of other matters related to the estimative
process which are generally functions of the Board of National
Estimates. For example at the first USIB meeting, the USIB not only
approved two estimates and concurred in the procedures for producing
but also noted a memorandum by Mr. Abbot Smith
of BNE on "Anlaysis of Bloc Radio and Press Propaganda IT
During the September 1958 - January 1961 period, while the Board was
considering and acting on the estimates themselves a total of 177 times,
the Board also acted on 255 agenda items related in one way or another
to the estimative process. 48/ Most of these related actions were
of a routine or nonsubstantive nature but each required consideration by
the Board. One of the most unusual in fact was the Analysis of Bloc
Radio and Press Propaganda prepared by Mr. Abbot Smith for the
information of the Board based upon an interest in this subject expressed
by the IAC members in connection with the Reviewof Sensitive Situations
at the 12 August 1958 meeting. 49/
38. By far the geatest number of USIB actions related to
estimates involved decisions on
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Such releases were governed by the provisions of
Paragraph- 4 d. of NSCID No. 1 which authorized the DCI,in addition
to disseminating national intelligence as appropriate within the U. S.
government, also authorized him to disseminate national intelligence
and interdepartmental intelligence produced within the USIB structure
on a strictly controlled basis
/with the concurrence of USIB, that such action would
substantially promote the security of the U. S.
_Such di s s e nination
had to be consistent with existing statutes and Presidential policy,
intelligence
and disclosure of FBI information had to receive prior clearance with
that agency. 50/ Dissemination of NIEs and SNIEs therefore had
to be determined on a case by case basis. as substantially promoting
U. S. security. By Board direction BNE was instructed to submit
its recommendations on such releases for consideration normally at
the USIB meeting following approval of the estimate.
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41. The USIB also had a standing procedure for determining
which National Intelligence Estimates were authorized for release to
the United States Information Agency (USIA). Except in the case of estimates
of a sensitive nature or based on sensitive sources, the Executive
Secretary of USIB would normally record in the Minutes, immediately
that
after indicating approval of an estimate, `] '.'there was no objection to
the release of this estimate to USIA". Accordingly if and when the
Board approved the Minutes of the next meeting, it would signify that
the Board had authorized release to the USIA. In addition the Board; some-
times authorized release of an estimate to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration if they were related to that agency's responsibility.
42. In presenting each NIE or SNIE, the Board of National
Estimates normally submitted two other documents related thereto
a
for Board approval or noting. One of these was designated/"Post-Mortem"
on the particular estimate, in which deficiencies were noted that
identified areas in which intelligence information was inadequate due
either to gaps in collection or in research or analysis. No attempts were
to deal
made in the Post-Morie-rn/with the validity of the substantive judgments.
mss. ---
The nature and purpose of these Post-MMortems- - can be illustrated by
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G. Other USIB Agenda Items
44. In addition to the types of agenda items described in Sections
B - F above, the USIB also considered a wide variety of other subjects
and reports which constituted nearly one-quarter of all USIB actions
during the September 1958 - January 1961 period. These miscellaneous
agenda items could be generally dividided into the following categories
(with an indication of the frequency of Board action on each category):
Priority National Intelligence Objectives,
(normally reviewed annually).
b. Ad hoc studies and reports, (averaging about
four times per month).
c. Oral reports and briefings,(approximately
twice per month).
d. Miscellaneous discussions, (about three times
per month).
e. .nnouncements and presentations, (on an average
of more than three times per month).
Although these items were not regular types of Board actions, they
constituted a very important part of the Board's activities both in
terms of facilitating the Board'sfunctlons.and in dealing with some
of the more unusual6ut frequently.very important problems.
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45. The requirement for Priority National Intelligence
Objectives (PNIO s) was specified in Paragraph 3 b. (1) of
NSCID No. 1 which stated that DCIDs to be issued should include
"general guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for
other
the production of raa,ti`-oal -naf'and / intelligence and for collection
and other activities in support thereof;' This was to be carried out,
by the establishment of comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives
generally applicable to foreign countries and areas, and by the
identification on a current basis of Priority National Intelligence
Objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects. These
comprehensive and priority objectives were to be issued for
general intelligence guidance and formal transmission to the NSC,
which took the forms of DCID Nos. 1/2 and 1/3 respectively. 57/
At the third USIB meeting on 30 September 1958, the Board approved
recommendations by the Board of National Estimates that the
DCID No. 1/3 containing the PNIOs as approved by the IAC on
18 March 1958 not be amended but that two topics should be added
specialized
to one of the I Annexes to that DCID. The Board also agreed
that the PNIO q together with the subsidiary objectives contained in
its Annexes which had been temporarily approved at the 1 July 1958
IAC meeting, should be considered as finally approved by USIB and
published in one volume. 58/ The next revision of the PNIOs
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was approved by the USIB at its 15 December 1959 meeting to
supersede the 30 September 1958 version. At that meeting the Board
also agreed that appropriate committees or other staffs should proceed
at once to develop revisions of the specialized annexes to the
30 September 1958 version. 59/ On 24 May 1960 however the
USIB after further consideration decided that the December 1959
revision of DCID No. 1/3 and succeeding revisions should be published
without the annexes other than Annex A which stated the criteria for
determining PNIOs. At the same time the Board instructed the
Economic Intelligence Committee, Scientific Irtelligence Committee,
Joint Atomic Energy Committee, Guided Missile Intelligence Committee
and the Committee of International Communism to take cognizance of
the implementation of the PNIOs in their respective fields, and report
in six months on the effectiveness of their implementation. i60// The
last version of PNIOs to be issued under President Eisenhower was
approved by the USIB at its meeting on 4 January 1961. The Board
also noted the committee reports submitted in response to the
May 1960 instructions, and then agreed that the committees were
authorized, but not required, to issue on their own authority more
in
detailed statements of priorities in their respective fields;/ implementation
of the overall PNIOs, and that they could use the phrase "published by
the authority of USIB" if these statements were submitted for Board
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approval. 61/ The trend indicated in this series of Board actions
constituted an effort to refine the PNIOs and to make them more
meaningful in providing guidance to the intelligence community as to
those factors requiring priority attention and treatment, leaving the
application of that guidance to the committees and agencies in their
respective fields.
46. During this period Annex A to DCID No. 1/3 stated the
criteria for determining the PNIOs that were to be directly related
to the intelligence required in the formulation and e :cution of
national security policy, flowing directly from the intelligence mission
were
set forth by the NSC and /therefore more detailed specifications of that
tf~at -
intelligence. The criteria stressed that most of /intelligence would
be the product of normal collection and research, and that the PNIOs
should be limited to the critical factors requiring special attention
and effort. They should afford a stable basis for intelligence planning
and therefore be designed to remain valid over an extended period,
excluding topics of urgent or transitory interest,, Since broad
generalities were of little practical use, the PNIOs should be specific
enough to provide for planning the allocation of collection and
research resources but not so specific as to constitute in themselves
research and collection requirements. This last statement sums up
the dilemma which the Board has always faced in determining the scope
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of the PNIOs. Where to draw the line between general guidance
which can be interpreted in many ways and specific statements
which are toodetailed has been the subject of debate throughout USIB
history. Finally the criteria noted that some PNIOs would be. of
greater urgency or importance than others, and therefore the
objectives must be based on an analysis of the world situation and
U. S. security interests and should be reviewed annually. 62/
47. The PNIOs themselves were divided into three categories
in general order of priority, with no significance to the order of
listing items within each group. It was emphasized that not every
bit of information related to a given priority subject would be required
may be
with equal urgency and that some/procured by routine means. This
made it incumbent upon research personnel to exercise discrimination
in allocating analytical resources and in formulating requirements so as
to accord priority only to those aspects requiring priority effort.
collection
Similarly if specific/and analytic facilities were inadequate to
satisfy all requirements levied upon them, then priority in their use
would have to be determined under general P NIO guidance Tout in
terms of specific operational capabilities.
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51. Of the miscellaneous agenda items, one-third of them
dealt with.ad hoc studies and reports which were considered by the
Board on 120 occasions during the September 1958 through
January 1961 period. Reference has been made in connection with
the USIB committee reports to a number of ad hoc committees
to
or working groups which-were established /study and report on the
Arab-Israeli situation, the Berlin situation, foreign intelligence
publications and ithe Weapons Systems Survey Group, all of whose reports
are included in the above total. Another important group which
reported to the Board in 1958 and in 1959 ( and was subsequently
used in the following Administrations) was the DCI's Ad Hoc Panel
on the Status of the Soviet ICBM Program. This group, also
referred to as the Hyland Panel for its Chairman, consisted of
distinguished scientists and military operational officers especially
qualified in the balli stic missiles field. Each of these years they
auspices
were, assemb-led under the of and briefings by the Guided
Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, submitting their
views on the subject orally and subsequently in writing. They made
a very important contribution in the ICBM field. Temporary ad hoc
groups were formed from time to time to report on such problems
as a study of the Soviet cable cutting incident in the North Atlantic,
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56. Oral reports and briefings solely for the information of the
Board were given a total of 66 times during the period under review.
Mr. Dulles as Chairman frequently reported orally to the Board on
information or developments relating to NSC activities, his briefings
to. the President's Board, Congressional testimony, incidents of
unauthorized disclosures of sources and methods, special :intelligence
coordination arrangements and the scope of intelligence briefings
provided the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the 1960
election. The Chairman as well as other members, committee
chairmen or their staffs gave oral reports on many of their foreign
trips or attendance at international conferences. The Board also
received briefings by various Cabinet Members who travelled
abroad, U. S. Ambassadors to selected countries, committee chairmen
and representatives of the military services, especially on technical
matters relating to intelligence. The USIB members also reported
on significant developments regarding intelligence projects or
organization as well as breaches of_security.
57. Under the heading of miscellaneous discussions which totaled
74 during this period, there were 52 Executive Sessions attended only
by the Chairman, the Board members and the Executive Secretary and
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his Deputy, and as required one or two senior intelligence officials
cognizant of the problem under discussion. These Executive Sessions
were a very useful and vital part of the Board's activity in permitting
the USIB Principals to engage in afree and largely unrecorded
exchange of views or information of a particularly sensitive, or critical
nature or concerning appointments of committee chairmen. On
number of occasions- the Chairman or a Board member would ask
for an Executive Session to present a very difficult or serious problem
on which he sought the Board's wisdom or help. In regular sessions
of the Board there were useful miscellaneous discussions of such
matters as various intelligence programs and projects (particularly
relating to technical collection or information processing), the
dissemination and control of intelligence information, and serious
intelligence problems involving international negotiations ( the
Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, Berlin and Cyprus). Critical
situations were discussed such as the Soviet shoot-down in 1960 of
and an RB -47.
58. Finally various announcements and presentations were
made to the Board involving changes in USIB membership and in staffs
and committee chairmen, scheduling of USIB meetings and of agenda
items, tributes to deceased or retiring officials, and the appropriate
distribution of USIB documents.
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59. All of these miscellaneous agenda items were a very
valuable and in many cases equally important supplement to the
regular order of business relating to; inutes;_ Watch Reports,
estimates and committee reports. Some of the more serious
problems, critical situations, controversial subjects and sensitive
matters were handled by special means particularly appropriate
to their character or urgency. These miscellaneous reports
and discussions also provided a forum through which the Board
members could keep better informed regarding the community as a
whole and hence develop a better coodinated and more coherent
approach to intelligence problems.
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