STATUS REPORT ON HISTORY OF THE USIB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000100060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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b" t.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Staff
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
Status Report on History of the USIB
Memo, same subject, 23 June 1971
1. Since the reference report on my work in June, I continued
working on the history of USIB beginning again in September under a
contract initially terminating at the end of December 1971. In
accordance with the original understanding I have also been serving
as a consultant with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board when and as needed. It was initially contemplated that I would
devote about three-fourths of my time to the USIB history. As a
result of the planning for the President's reorganization of the foreign
intelligence effort, however, I have spent a much larger part of my
time than expected d-assisting in the staff work for the PFIAB in advising
on this reorganization. My contract therefore has been extended
through the end of April 1972.
2. During the period since _ I September 1971, I have completed
the remaining sections of Volume II covering USIB activities from its
creation in September 1958 through the end of the Eisenhower
Administration in January 1961. In addition to the seven sections in
60 pages giving an overall description of the Board and types of agenda
items which I finished in June, ten more sections of about 150 pages are
now in first draft. Seven of these latter sections cover the reporting to
the USIB by 14 of its more active committees, while the other three
sections summarize the Procedures and Secretariat of the Board, the
USIB Annual Status Reports to the NSC, and the Joint Study Group
Report.
3. I am now doing research and preparing to draft the subsequent
Volumes III and IV covering respectively (a) the growth and crises
faced by the USIB under President Kennedy from 21 Jan 61 - 22 Nov 63,
and (b) the increased and varied intelligence needs in support of
President Johnson from 23 Nov 63 through the and of Mr. McCone's
tenure as DCI on 28 Apr 65. Plans for these volumes as described
in my June report are still being followed as of this time.
;Signed
SECRET.
6iiUUr' f.~._
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Volume I
1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created by
National Security Council Directive in 1958 to advise and assist the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in coordinating the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States 1 The Director of Central
Intelligence was designated as Chairman of the Board based on his
statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act as head of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as in his NSC-directed
role of coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities. In addition,
the membership of the :Board included the chiefs of the intelligence
components of the Departments of State and Defense, and representatives
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the Atomic Energy
Commission. The establishment of the USIB in effect constituted a
merger of two previous intelligence coordinating committees - the
Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the United States
Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).
2. The stated purposes of the United States Intelligence Board were
"to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully coordinated
intelligence community, and to provide for a more effective integration
of and guidance to the national intelligence effort". This stress on
GROUP I
Excluded iron automatic
dorrn4rading and
L dccEa~ei lontlan
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more effective integration and guidance made clear that the USIB was
to be a single forum in which the DCI could obtain the advice and
assistance of all the intelligence chiefs in connection with all forms of
intelligence activities. Previously coordination of the important field of
communications intelligence or COMINT had been dealt with solely by
the USCIB while the I.A.C was concerned with the coordination of all
other intelligence activities. This pattern of compartmented coordination
of COMINT separate from the mechanism for coordination of other
intelligence activities had been in existence since World War II.
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A. The Joint Intelligence Committee in World War II
1. The concept of a coordinating committee composed of the
intelligence chiefs from the various departments and agencies originated
with the creation early in World War II of the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 2/
The JIG
membership at its first meeting in March 1942 consisted of the
intelligence chiefs of the Army and Navy, and one representative each
from the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later the
Foreign Economic Administration) and the Coordinator of Information
(subsequently the Office of Strategic Services). The intelligence chief of the
Army Air Corps was added in 1943. By agreement at its first meeting,
the senior military service member of the Committee acted as Chairman.
The JIC was supported by a Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) consisting of
representatives designated by the committee members. The military
service representatives on the JIS were detailed to full-time duty in the
offices of the JCS. The civilian agency representatives were part-time
until the JCS issued a charter for the JIS in 1944 which required that all
JIS representatives be detailed to full-time duty. In addition, there was
a secretariat of the JIG as a component of the secretariat of the JCS.
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Z. The principal function of the Joint Intelligence Committee was to
provide estimates of enemy capabilities and probable reactions for use
in developing strategic war plans for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
military service members of the Joint Intelligence Staff also contributed
intelligence estimative support directly to the war planning committees of
the JCS. In addition the JIC furnished advice and assistance to the JCS
organization on other intelligence matters, as well as taking agreed actions
to achieve more effective and coordinated intelligence operations by the
member agencies. Toward this end a number of JIC subcommittees or
groups were established in various fields such as preparation of a weekly
current intelligence report, publication of basic intelligence studies on
foreign areas, continuing study of the enemy oil position, and planning for
members
intelligence exploitation of liberated areas. The JIC/also functioned as the
U. S. representatives on the Combined Intelligence Committee of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff in coordinating intelligence estimates with the
British. Thus the Joint Intelligence Committee made a notable contribution
to the over-all war effort and to the development of an intelligence capability
which could be the basis for a post-war national intelligence effort. There
were also many lessons learned from the JIG experience that could and
would be applied in the past-war era. In fact, as early as 1944 the
military and civilian members of the JIS had already been discussing amongst
themselves the concept of a post-war intelligence organization.
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3. When General Donovan as head of the Office of Strategic Services
made his first proposal for a post-war central intelligence service late in
1944, it was referred to the JCS. Through the work of the Joint Intelligence
Staff and then the prolonged and sometime heated deliberations of the Joint
Intelligence Committee, a single plan for a post-war National Intelligence
Authority and a Central Intelligence Agency was developed and ultimately
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under this plan the National Intelligence
Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a
representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was to be responsible for all federal
intelligence activities related to the national security. Under this Authority,
a Central Intelligence Agency was to be headed by a Director appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the National Intelligence Authority . The
JCS plan also contemplated as advisors to the Director a Board consisting of
the heads of the intelligence services of the Army, Navy, State and other
agencies concerned with the national security. The JCS plan contained many of
the basic concepts and proposals in the Donovan plan with the important
exception that the JCS provided that the Central Intelligence Agency would be under
the Cabinet-level National Intelligence Authority instead of reporting directly
to the President as General Donovan contemplated. In fact, the Secretaries of
State, War and the Navy would have been members of a board to advise and
assist the director of the central intelligence service under the Donovan plan,
as compared with the advisory board composed of the departmental intelligence
chiefs in the JCS plan.
**A full description of the various plans for a post-World War II intelli-
gunce organiz.tion is given in Chapter II of the history of CIA by
Dr. Arthur B. Darling which also covers the period. down to 1950. 3/
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4. Thus, the Joint Intelligence Staff had contemplated a Board which
would be advisory to and chaired by a Presidentially-appointed Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency rather than the system of the Joint
Intelligence Committee in which the Chairman was the senior military
officer representing his own service on an equal basis with all the other
members. The Staff was thoroughly familiar with the difficulty of
achieving a coordinated viewpoint amongst such a committee none of whom
had any superiority or leadership authority over any of the other members.
In the case of substantive estimates this lack of an authoritative chairman
had frequently resulted either in a mass of widely divergent views very
confusing to the reader or in a watering down of the estimates and their
conclusions in order to achieve what many considered the lowest common
denominator. In the case of efforts to achieve coordination of intelligence
activities the same difficulty applied to reaching agreement when there
was no one who could determine when a reasonable consensus had been
reached and a decision should be recorded, subject if necessary to appeal
to higher authority. The Presidentially-appointed Director who would chair
the proposed advisory Board would certainly be in a position to exercise a
leadership role in determining when there should be no further compromise
of judgment or principle in the deliberations of the Board, even though he
did ncthave directive authority over the members.
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5. This concept in its basic essentials was ultimately incorporated
in the directive by President Truman on 22 January 1946 creating a
National Intelligence Authority, a Central Intelligence Group, a Director
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of Central Intelligence and an Intelligence Advisory Board. The
Authority was composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and
a personal representative of the President. The Central Intelligence
Group, headed by the Director, was to be provided with persons and
facilities assigned from the respective departments. Under the direction
and control of the Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence was to
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and to
disseminate the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence, to
plan for the coordination of intelligence activities and recommend over-
all policies and objectives to the Authority, to perform for the benefit
of all agencies services of common concern as determined by the Authority,
and to perform such other intelligence-related functions and duties as
the President or the Authority might direct. In performing these functions
the Director of Central Intelligence was to be advised by an Intelligence
Advisory Board consisting of the heads or their representatives of the
principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government as
determined by the National Intelligence Authority.
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6. This 1946 Presidential directive therefore created the first
post-war intelligence advisory committee to assist and advise the
Director of Central Intelligence in the performance of his functions.
Moreover, it established three major areas of intelligence activities
in which the DCI was to have varying and generally increasing degrees
of responsibility and authority over the subsequent years:
a. Producing and disseminating strategic and national
policy intelligence (later called national intelligence).
b. Planning and recommending policies and objectives
for the coordination of :intelligence activities related to the national
security.
c. Performing for the benefit of all intelligence agencies
such services of common concern as can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally.
7. The fundamental issue which continued to be debated for many years however
was whether the committee of intelligence chiefs chaired by the Director of
Central Intelligence was to advise and assist him in his individual responsibility
for coordination as authorized by higher authority, or whether the committee
itself had collective responsibility to higher authority for achieving such
coordination. There have been many views and varying interpretations on this
question of the principle of individual versus collective responsibility.
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B. The Evolution of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
1. The composition and procedures of the Intelligence Advisory Board
were further defined in brief terms in National Intelligence Authority
Directive No. I, 8 February 1946, which primarily established basic policies
and procedures for the Central Intelligence Groun/The intelligence chiefs
of State, Army, Navy and the Army Air Forces were designated permanent LAB
members, with the heads of other intelligence agencies to be invited for
matters within their province.
2. The GIG was to furnish national intelligence to the President and the
State, War and Navy Departments and, as appropriate, other departments
and agencies having national security functions. In preparing its intelligence
reports, however, GIG was to uftlize all available intelligence, and note
any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency. Note that
this provision did not mention the IAB and consequently the extent to which
that Board was used, if at all, to coordinate estimates was left up to each
DCI and the IAB members. The manner in which this provision was applied
during the existence of the IAB is described in the IAC history by Dr. Montague.
A history of the Intelligence Advisory Committee up to 1954 prepared by
Mr. L. L. Montague (HS/HC 195, Item 8) provides more detailed treatment
of the evolution of the IAC and its role in the coordination of national
intelligence estimates and of intelligence activities.
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3. With respect to coordination of intelligence activities, NJA Directive
No. 1 specified that all recommendations by the DCI were to be referred to
the lAB for concurrence or comment before submission to the NIA. The
DCI was also to submit any non-concurrence by a Board member. If
however the DCI and IAB agreed unanimously on a recommendation and had
the existing authority to execute it, it could be put into effect without action
by NIA. NIA-approved recommendations would govern the intelligence
activities of the departments represented, and each IAB member was
responsible for ensuring execution within his department.
4. Therefore, any DCI recommendation on which he could obtain NIA
approval, whether the IA.B members concurred or dissented, was
binding on all the intelligence agencies as well as CIG. Admiral Souers as
the first DCI sought full consultation and concurrence with the IAB, and
initiated the CIG as a ''cooperative interdepartmental activity" which
supplemented but did not attempt to duplicate or compete with departmental
activities. General Vandenberg who was Admiral Souers' successor obtained
NIA authorization, despite differing views of IAB members, to expand and
strengthen the CIG with its own research and analysis , coordination and
operational capabilities. Specifically, NIA Directive No. 5 as approved on
recommendation of General Vandenberg permitted him to determine what research an<
analysis activities should be accomplished centrally, act for the NIA in coordinating
all Federal foreign intelligence activities, and conduct all organized Federal espionag
.and counterespionage operations outside the US and all Federal monitoring
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foreign press and propaganda broadcasts6/General Vandenberg then concentrated on
the build-up of CIG, consulting or meeting with the IAB only infrequently when necessary.
In February 1947 General Vandenberg was authorized by the NIA to be executive agent
for the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.7/When he became DCI on 1 May 1947
Admiral Hillenkoetter, in the few months before the National Security Act became
effective, attempted by requesting NIA to revoke its recent designation of the DCI as
8/
executive agent and by other means to regain the cooperation and collaboration of the IAB:
5. The National Security Act of 1947 provided a statutory base for the Central
Intelligence Agency, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence, as an independent
agency under the National Security Council9/It specified that"for the purpose of
coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security ... " the CIA under NSC direction would
(1) advise the Council on intelligence matters, (2) make recommendations to the NSC for
coordination of intelligence activities, (3) correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence
relating to the national security, (4) perform services of common concern as determined
by the Council, and (5) perform. other functions and duties related to intelligence as
directed by the NSC. In producing national intelligence under (3) above, CIA should use
where appropriate existing agencies and facilities, while the departments and other
agencies continue to collect,, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental
intelligence. The DCI was also made responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosures.
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6. This Act, which continues to be the statutory foundation for
coordination of the intelligence community under the direction of the
National Security Council, defined the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency and of the Director of Central Intelligence as its responsible head
in differing ways with respect to the major areas of intelligence activity.
In the first instance it clearly identified the DCI as the principal advisor to the
President and the NSC on all intelligence matters. As to coordination of
intelligence activities the DCI is the primary source of recommendations
which, subject to the approval of the NS,C , establish the policies and
procedures to guide the foreign intelligence effort. Production of national
intelligence is the direct responsibility of the DCI using all available
agencies and facilities. The NSC, normally based on recommendations of the
DCI, determinesthose services of common concern which the CIA performs
centrally for the benefit of all intelligence agencies.
7. The National Security Council subject to the final approval of the
President issues the basic policies and procedures under which all intelligence
activities are to be conducted in the form of National Security Council
Intelligence Directives, (NSCIDs). NSCID No. 1, the first version of which was
effective 12 December 1947 (three months after the Council was established)10/
specifies the basic duties and responsibilities of the intelligence
community. Other NSCIDs deal with particular areas of intelligence
activity such as the various fields of collection, production and processing.
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8. The National Security Act does not contain any mention of or provision for
a committee of the intelligence chiefs such as the previous Intelligence Advisory
Board, thereby deliberately leaving it up to the National Security Council to decide
the form of any such coordinating machinery. One of the first actions of the NSC
therefore, based on a recommendation by Admiral Hillenkoetter, was to continue
in effect all NIA Directives while directing the DCI to submit to the Council within
sixty days proposed authorizations supplanting these former directives and
specifying his functions and those of CIA in accordance with the provisions of the
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National Security Act- The NSC also decided that the DCI should attend all of its
meetings as observer and advise~2 in dealing with such intelligence matters under
its new authority, the NSC as well as the DCI and the intelligence community
benefited greatly from the appointment by President Truman of Sidney W. Souers
as the first Executive Secretary of the Council.
9. A few days before the first NSC meeting on 26 September 1947, Admiral
Hillenkoetter had also recommended to the Council that, while not so obligated
under the National Security Act, he be authorized to continue to have available to
him an advisory body similar to the former IAB. The Acting Secretary of State,
Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force, and the Chairman of the new National
Security Resources Board approved this recommendation during October of 1947.
The Secretary of the Army however late in November opposed the DCI' s plan,
insisting as had the Army and Navy intelligence chiefs that the new Intelligence
Advisory Committee not only advise the DCI but also have the duty of insuring full
departmental coordination of all matters before submittal to the NSC. This effort to
establish collective responsibility of the new IAC rather than the individual
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responsibility of the DCI to the NSC was thwarted by direct and forceful
intervention by Secretary of Defense Forrestal in favor of Admiral Hillenkoetter' s
position. Consequently the DCI, after further coordination with the former LAB
members, submitted to the Council his first recommendations for National
Security Council Intelligence Directives to guide the conduct and coordination of
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foreign intelligence activities.-
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, as approved by the
Council on 12 December 1947-4a/long with three other NSCIDs, stated that "to
maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the Central Intelligence
Agency and the intelligence organizations, " an Intelligence Advisory Committee
consisting of the intelligence chiefs from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the
Joint Staff (JCS)* and AEC would be established "to advise the Director of
Central Intelligence". The DCI was to invite the chief of any other intelligence
agency to sit with the LAC for matters within that agency' s purview. This latter
instruction included provision for FBI attendance whenever required on a case-by-
case basis.
* This addition of the Joint Staff member to the IAC coincided with a reorganization
of the Joint Intelligence Committee under which the State Department membership
in JIC was withdrawn, leaving only military members on that Committee.
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As a general guideline NSCID No. 1 stressed that coordination of
intelligence activities was to be designed primarily to strengthen the overall
governmental structure, and that primary departmental requirements were
to be recognized and receive cooperation and support of CIA. It also
retained the proviso in the previous NIA directives that the DCI in
recommendations or advice to the NSC pertaining to intelligence activities
would include a statement indicating concurrence or non-concurrence of
IAC members. If however unanimity was not obtained among the Military
Department heads, the problem would be referred to the Secretary of
Defense before presentation to the NSC.
While the DCI. therefore was to determine the substance of any
recommendations and advice he chose to submit to the Council, he was to
seek to strengthen the overall structure, recognizing and supporting
primary departmental needs, and reporting any lack of agreement in the
IAC. This guidance put a premium on gaining as near unanimity as possible
in the Committee' s deliberations. Admiral Hillenkoetter arranged for a
Standing Committee of the IAC in an attempt to achieve an increased measure
of agreement between the various agencies on coordination matters.
Divergent agency positions stemming from NIA/IAB experience were not
appreciably resolved through this mechanism.
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NSCID No. 1 made clear that the DCI would "produce intelligence
relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national
intelligence , " thereby reinforcing his individual responsibility for such
substantive estimates and reports as provided in the National Security
Act. The Council did however specify that the DCI should not duplicate
departmental activities and research, but should make use of existing
facilities and departmental intelligence for such production purposes. The
DCI was also to disseminate national intelligence to the President, NSC,
IAC agencies, and other departments and agencies as designated by the NSC.
Intelligence so disseminated was to be "officially concurred in by the Intelligence
Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent." Estimates
prepared by CIA following issuance of this directive were somewhat better
coordinated with the working level representatives of the IAC agencies before
circulation to the IAC itself. The final drafts however were invariably sub-
mitted to the IAC members for written concurrence or dissent without the
benefit of discussion or deliberation at a committee meeting.
The continued unsatisfactory relationships of the DCI and CIA
with the other intelligence chiefs and agencies, as reflected in the IAC and
elsewhere, resulted in the creation by the NSC in 1948 of the Dulles-Correa-
Jackson Intelligence Survey Group to make an overall review of the
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functioning of the intelligence community under the National Security Act.--
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The Group' s report was critical of CIA and the DCI for failing to gain
cooperation and participation of the IAC in coordination. The report
however stressed the leadership role of the DCI in coordinating activities
with the IAC in an advisory capacity, but supported the concept of
collective responsibility of the DCI and IA.C in producing national estimates.
Comments by the DCI and IAC members on the Group' s report were
so diverse that the NSC referred it for study to the Secretaries of State
and Defense who with the help of General Mc Narney recommended the
actions subsequently approved by the Council on 7 July 194916/The NSC
rejected the Survey Group concept of collective responsibility, endorsing
instead the view that the IAC should participate as an advisory body under
more forthright leadership of the DCI in coordinating intelligence activities
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and national estimates. A revision of NSCID No. I was also issuediwhich
made clear that the DCI was Chairman of the IAC and returned the Director
of the FBI to full membership to assist coordination of foreign intelligence
and internal security activities. In addition confusion as to whether "an
agreed statement of substantial dissent" to a national intelligence estimate
or report meant that there could be only one agreed dissent was overcome
by substituting the wording "a statement of substantially differing opinions".
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The National Security Council actions on 7 July 1949 also referred
a number of "particular intelligence questions" raised in the State/Defense
report prepared under General McNarney, to the Director of Central
Intelligence for further study and report back to the Council. One of these
questions related to the handling of intelligence regarding crisis situations
and the procedure for producing estimates thereon g/Following a report by
the DCI on this question, the NSC on 19 January 1950 added a paragraph to
NSCID No. I calling for any IAC member obtaining information indicating
an impending crisis situation seriously affecting U. S. security to furnish
the information immediately to other IAC members and other appropriate
officials. The DCI was immediately to convene the IAC and, after receiving
the Committee' s views, to prepare and disseminate promptly a national
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intelligence estimate on the situation-
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S E C R E T
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General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence
from October 1950 to February 1953 set the stage in the Intelligence
Advisory Committee (LAC) for many of the basic concepts and methods
which are still applied in the United States Intelligence Board.
General Smith, with his personal prestige based on a distinguished background
and knowledge in military and diplomatic affairs, exercised "forthright
leadership" as DCI beginning with his first meeting with the LAC on
20 October 1950. He stressed to the members the need for "rapid
cooperative work" and "collective judgment" while making clear his
individual authority as DCI. In effect, he was adopting the concept of
Admiral Souers that the DCI should have individual responsibility based on
~
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coordinated effort. - General Smith established the organization and
procedures for preparing and coordinating national intelligence estimates
essentially as they continue in the USIB. He also established an office
responsible to him to develop plans for coordinating intelligence activities
in close collaboration with rep3asentatives of the IAC. The head of this office
served as LAC Secretary as well as chairman of various IAC subcommittees..-.'
*Dr. L. L. Montague has written an historical account elaborating more
fully on the relationship General Smith established with the IAC.-
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This transformation by General Smith of the IAC into an active and
,ping concern under DCI leadership was accomplished without change in the
basic charter of NSCID No. 1 except for one addition approved by the Council
as of 28 March 1952. In order to clarify the authority for dissemination of
national intelligence to foreign governments, the DCI recommended with the
concurrence of IAC a new sub-paragraph in NSCID No. 1 authorizing such
dissemination upon determination by the DCI with IAC concurrence
that such action would substantially promote
the security of the United States. 2L/
The only issue in this case involved insertion of a proviso that any disclosure of
classified military information in such national intelligence be in accordance
with U. S. National Disclosure Policy as determined by the military members.
This general issue of the relationship between these two authorities to disclose
information to foreign governments has been raised many times since then in
he IAC and USIB.
Following his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence on
~o February 1953, Mr. Allen W. Dulles continued to make full use of the
:Intelligence Advisory Committee as a forum for considering community
problems. In producing national intelligence estimates, Mr. Dulles permitted
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full and frequently lengthy discussion but never hesitated to exercise his right
to determine the final text and invite dissents on unagreed matters of importance.
With regard to coordination of intelligence activities, however, he sought to
resolve issues by achieving full agreement amongst all LAC members. Without
derogating from his own authority, Mr. Dulles preferred to obtain cooperation and
collaboration of all elements of the intelligence community by thorough discussion
and negotiation rather than by appeal to higher authority.
The final version of the IAC charter was issued as NSCID No. 1 effective
21 April 1958. This directive was prepared in response to a report to
President Eisenhower by the President' s Board of Consultants on Foreign
intelligence Activities dated 20 December 1956. 24/ This report contained among
others three recommendations directly concerned with the role of the DCI and
his relations with the LAC.
Recommendation No. 1 of the report contained the following general
We do not believe that drastic changes in the structure
of our national intelligence organization are required to
make progress' toward some of the objectives we outline below.
We do suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence
be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and
positive, coordinating responsibility and we feel that
he can do this within the intent of existing laws. If
directed and supported by you in discharging this
responsibility, the Director of Central Intelligence can
accomplish much in the direction of integration, reduction
of duplication, and coordination within the national intelligence
effort without change in present statute or organization.
as provided a further analysis of the approach adopted
" by Mr. Dulles in his relations with the IAC.??/
S E C R E T
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.;.econ-imendation No. 4 noted that:
With regard to the integration of the Intelligence
Community, we are convinced that a strong centralized
direction, under which the resources of the various
elements would be brought closer together, would do
much to strengthen our national intelligence effort and
to contain its cost. We therefore recommend that action
be taken toward this end, both through the National
Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence.
13oth of these recommendations were approved by the President, after consideration
of agency comments, and referred to the DCI for action.
Recommendation No. 9 of that report specifically recommended that:
the National Security Council review their Intelligence
Directives and substitute a more coherent, consolidated
Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our
intelligence activities under today' s conditions.
President Eisenhower, after considering agency comments, approved this
in January of 1957
recommendationt and referred it to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for
review of all NSCID' s and for early submission to the National Security Council
(through the NSC Planning Board) of recommended revisions 25/
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These three recommendations taken together implied that, if the
DCI did not "exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating
responsibility" with "a strong centralized direction," it probably would
mean that "drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence
organization" would be required.
At the IAC meeting on 30 April 1957 Mr. Dulles presented a
proposed revision of NSCID No. I and drafts of his interim responses to
Recommendations No. 4 and 9. His approach to these and other re-
commendations by the President' s Board of Consultants was expressed
in his remarks emphasizing his feeling that, over the past few years, the
members "had been achieving by agreement and mutual understanding a
very great improvement in the intelligence effort". He expressed
confidence that the members would cooperate in further developing and
improving coordination, and generally carrying out the President' s mandates. 26/
The IAC tentatively approved a revised NSCID No. 1 in June of
1957. Mr. Dulles informed the LAC at its 2 July meeting that he had designated
General L. K. Truscott, USA (Retired) as Deputy Director (Coordination)
of CIA, after consulting the President and to implement President' s Board
recommendations. 27/ General Truscott had primary responsibility for
drafting and coordinating the subsequent revisions of the NSCIDs.
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In response to Presidential request, the DCI submitted a report
on the progress of the NSCID revisions in September of 1957. The first
set of proposed revisions were completed by the LAC in January of 1958 and
considered by the National Security Council in March.
While the IAAC was engaged in preparing these revised NSCIDs and
following the September progress report by the DCI, however, the
President' s Board of Consultants submitted a semi-annual report to the
2 8
President on 24 October 1957-/This report contained a Recommendation No. 2
that the responsibilities of the United States Communications Intelligence
Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee be vested in a single Board
to be known as the United States Intelligence Board. The President before
taking action requested that the DCI consult with the USCIB and IAC
agencies and furnish to the NSC his views and comments on this
recommendation. It was suggested that Mr. Dulles take into account the
then current review of the NSCIDs in providing his report on this new
recommendation for NSC consideration by 15 January 1958.
The sequence of events on this latter recommendation and on the
NSC actions regarding the revised NSCIDs will be resumed in a subsequent
section following the next section on the USCIB.
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C. Compartmented Coordination in the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board*
1. The establishment of an entirely separate mechanism to coordinate
communications intelligence (COMINT) after World War II followed the wartime
concept and practice that this extremely sensitive source must be handled in a
compartmented system with severely restricted access. Accordingly, the number
of people specially cleared for the conduct of COMINT activities or the resulting
product was held to an absolute minimum. Consequently, the officials permitted
to have knowledge of this field during the war, other than those actually engaged in
COMINT operations, were almost exclusively confined to key military officers and
a few top civilian officials of the armed services.
2. The first meeting of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board
(ANCIB) was held on 14 March 1945 based on a formal directive signed by
General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral King, Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. 29/ Previous to that meeting there had
been regular monthly meetings of an Army-Navy coordinating committee which
continued as a sub-unit of the ANCIB. The members of ANCIB were the Army
and Navy intelligence chiefs and the heads of the COMINT organizations in those
two services.
3. The reasons for the creation of this Board quickly became apparent in the
subjects discussed at its third meeting on 21 August 1945. The first item was
a recent memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral King _
proposing that ANCIB be asked "to examine and make
more comprehensive history of the background and development of the USCIB
is contained in the history of the CIA SIGINT effort prepared by
on which many sections of this Chapter are based.
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"recommendations as to the advisability of combined Army and Navy
intercept, cryptographic and cryptanalytical activities under appropriate
joint direction, and if this should be impossible for any reason to
recommend procedure to ensure complete integration. " The next item
concerned he
necessity for a governmental decision "by the highest authorities of
the Nation". The Board also discussed the "cryptanalytical activities
of the F. B.I. ", and "participation by the State Department". 30 /
4. Discussion of the memorandum from General Marshall during
the fourth ANCIB meeting on 4 October 1945 forecast the great concern
of the military services that "a centralized national intelligence agency"
might take over the COMINT functions of the Army and Navy unless
unnecessary duplication was eliminated. The Army stressed the
advantages of merging the two service cryptanalytic units. The Navy,
favoring continued collaboration and coordination between these two
"operational intelligence" units which must remain under Military
Command, proposed establishment of a joint intelligence center for
strategic evaluation. 31/
5. Based on an ANCIB recommendation at its 13 December 1945
meeting approved by General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, and
Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, the Department of State
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became a member of the Board early in 1946 and its name was
changed to State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board
(STANCIB). The first State member was the Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. 32/
6. Meanwhile General Eisenhower in a 2 January 1946 memorandum
to Admiral Nimitz had suggested "a fresh start" on the entire subject
of Army and Navy signal intelligence activities. Specifically,
General Eisenhower proposed that the question of integration of these
activities again be referred to ANCIB which should approach the
problem without limitation and present detailed approaches for its
solution, including alternatives if agreement could not be reached. 33 /
General Eisenhower agreed with Admiral Nimitz that this step need
not await the final result of the study being made by a State-War-
Navy Committee on the formation of a Central Intelligence Agency.
Admiral Nimitz indicated his agreement with these proposals.
7. Subsequently, at a meeting on 15 February 1946, the Board
(then STANCIB) approved in principle that the responsibility for
technical operations be divided into three categories: (a) Navy work
on purely naval communications, (b) Army work on purely military
communications, and (c) work on diplomatic and other communications
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be considered a joint project under the direction of a Coordinator
of Joint Operations responsible to the Board. The Board also agreed
that a report on these plans to the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval
Operations should indicate that further coordination of intelligence
34/
functions is planned. /On 22 April 1946 STANCIB approved a memorandum
outlining the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Joint
Operations, and appointed the Chief of the Army Security Agency
as the first CJO. 35/
8. On- 14 February 1946 the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in a letter to the Senior Member of STANCIB had outlined
the Bureau's interest in communications intelligence and in
membership on the Board. 36' With the approval of the Army Chief
of Staff,the Chief of Naval Operations and the State member of STANCIB,
the FBI was invited to appoint a permanent representative on the
Board. On acceptance of this invitation, the Board's name was
changed to United States Communications Intelligence Board as of
13 June 1946. The FBI Member, an Assistant to the Director,
attended his first meeting on 31 July 1946. 37 /
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9. Prior to this first USCIB meeting, the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group had
not participated in any of the activities of the communications
intelligence boards and committees. Admiral Souers shortly
after his appointment as the first DCI attended a STANCIB
meeting on 11 February 1946 to discuss National Intelligence
Authority requirements for the use and handling of COMINT.
He said that the NIA. was not primarily concerned with arrange-
ments and procedures for COMINT production which were the
responsibility of STANCIB as well as coordination with other
agencies in this field. Admiral Souers stated however that
NIA was particularly concerned with the availability and
selection of intelligence (including COMINT) required for use by
the Authority or by various government organizations. 38 /
During the remainder of Admiral Souers tenure, the NIA, DCI
and CIG concentrated on the development of general policies and
directives for the postwar intelligence effort, organization and
functioning of the CIG, and initial arrangements for coordination
among the intelligence agencies.
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10. General Vandenberg who succeeded Admiral Souers as
DCI on 10 June 1946 had been the Air Force representative on
the USCIB and therefore was thoroughly familiar with the
activities of that Board. With the approval of the Army Chief
of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State and FBI Director based on a USCIB recommen-
dation, General Vandenberg was invited to become a member by
3 July 1946 memorandum from the Senior Member of that Board,
and accordingly attended the first USCIB meeting on 31 July 1946. 39/
11. There was no designated chairman of this Board until
it became USCIB. Meetings of ANCIB during 1945 were held in
the Navy Department with the senior Naval member leading the
discussion. During the first half of 1946, meetings of STANCIB
were held under Array auspcies with the Army intelligence chief
presiding. At the first USCIB meeting an Organizational Bulletin
was approved including a rule requiring unanimous votes on Board
decisions. General Vandenberg was unanimously elected to be the
chairman. The Board also agreed at that meeting that a Diplomatic
Summary ("Black Book") be prepared by the State, War and Navy
Departments under the auspices of the USCIB as a means of briefing
selected senior officials on information obtained from cryptanalysis
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12. The activities of the USCIB during the period from mid-1946
to mid- 1947 were largely concerned with the coordination of U. S.
COMINT activities including the relationship of the Board and its sub-
ordinate bodies such as the "Coordinator of Joint Operations" to the
Army and Navy COMINT agencies. The Board also devoted considerable
attention to legislation affecting its responsibilities
13. Just prior to approval on 26 July 1947 of the National Security
Act of 1947, the USCIB on 10 July convened with an Army Air Force
member (in addition to two Army members). After discussion in
which Admiral Hillenkoetter who had become DCI on 1 May 1947
declined the State member's nomination to be the regular Chairman,
the Board elected General Chamberlain of the Army as Chairman for
one year. USCIB also agreed on an annual election with the provisos that
the same agency could not have the chair twice m succession, a new
chairman would be elected if an incumbent could not complete his
term, and the chairman would be elected by majority vote. During
discussion General Chamberlain said that the chairman was only a
parliamentary head with no influence to dominate the Board, 41/
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14. The USCIB began in November 1947 to consider the need
42/
for a new charter, and to hold regular monthly meetings. /Debate on
a proposed Executive Order and accompanying charter continued until
43/
drafts were accepted by the Board on 3 February 1948. /-The basic
issues were (1) the "parent body" of the USCIB, and (2) the extent of
the Board's authority to "control" or "coordinate" the national COMINT
, Navy
effort. As to the first issue, State/and the DCI preferred the NSC
or the Secretary of Defense, while Army and Air Force favored the
,originally suggested by Navy,
JCS. The State compromise adopted /was a "Committee of Four" as
an appolate body composed of the three Chiefs of Staff and the Under
the
Secretary of State. On the second issue, /DCI, State and Navy thought
the Board should be given "control" because the national effort was
broader than its military aspects and might become more so in the
future. The Army and Air Force favored "coordinating" authority with
control residing in the respective departments and agencies. In
fact the Army thought the Board should be confined to establishing
priorities and the Coordinator under the JCS handle allocation of
tasks. The Board finally agreed on "authoritative coordination"
but not "unified direction".
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15. When the proposed Executive Order and Charter were
accepted , the Board agreed each intelligence chief would submit
them for approval by the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy
and Air Force prior to transmittal by the DCI to Admiral Leahy for
consideration by the President. Secretary of Defense Forrestal reacted
to these proposed documents by writing a memorandum to the three
Service Secretaries stating that instead of an Executive Order the
objects desired can more appropriately be accomplished" by means
of a National Security Council directive in accordance with Section 102
of the National Security Act which deals with the Central Intelligence
Agency. 44 / He sent a copy to the Secretary of State and the DCI.
16. With this support CIA drafted an NSC Intelligence Directive
which established USCIB under the NSC to effect "authoritative
coordination and unified direction" of COMINT activities and to advise
the DCI in matters relating to protection of sources of COMINT and
"those matters in the field of communications intelligence for which
he is now or may hereafter be made responsible".45 / When the Navy
Member of USCIB objected, Admiral Hillenkoetter again compromised
and, after further consideration in both IAC and USCIB, a proposed
NSCID was forwarded by the DCI to the Executive Secretary of the
46/
NSC on 18 May 1948./ This proposed directive would establish the
USCIB under the NSC and authorize it to act for the NSC, under the
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principle of. unanimity (except in electing a chairman by,r ajority vote),
in carrying out its responsibility for "authoritative coordination" (but not
"unified direction")of COMINT activities. The Board was also to
advise the DCI (who was one of its members) in those COMINT matters
"for which he is responsible," which were not otherwise defined. When
the Board could not reach a unanimous decision, it was to refer the
matter to the NSC for resolution, except that lack of unanimity in the
military departments was to be presented to the Secretary of Defense be-
fore reference to the NSC. USCIB decisions and policies within its
jurisdiction were to be applicable to all executive departments and agencies.
Moreover, COMINT activities were to "be treated in all respects as being
outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities", and
any orders, directives, etc. relating to such other activities (including
other NSCIDs and DCIDs) were to be non-applicable to COMINT activities.
17. Admiral Souers as Executive Secretary of the NSC, in an effort to
clarify and strengthen the role of the DCI, referred this proposed NSCID
back to Admiral Hillenkoetter for reconsideration and discussion with the
IAC of two points. First, Admiral Souers noted that previous NSC policy
had been to look to the DCI as the channel for achieving intelligence
coordination, and that the proposed directive would make it necessary for
the NSC to coordinate USCIB activities with those of the DCI in all other
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intelligence fields. He believed that "this complication could be
obviated without changing the intent" by providing that USCIB advise
and assist the DCI in achieving coordination of COMINT, while retaining
the requirement for unanimous concurrence prior to taking coordinating
action. Second, Admiral Souers questioned whether the NSC directive could be
made applicable to all executive departments and agencies. 47/
18. Admiral Hillenkoetter immediately sent a new draft NSCID
revised in accordance with Admiral Souers' memorandum to the USCIB
48/
and then to the IAC./The State member of IAC having achieved State's
main objective of placing USCIB under the NSC, opposed the new DCI
draft and supported the previous USCIB version, and he was of course
joined by the Army, Navy and Air Force members. Admiral Hillenkoetter,
after having compromised so many times before, tried to maintain his
position this time by submittirg his redraft of 'the NSCID to the Council
despite the noncnncurrence of the other IAC members who recommended
49/
the previous USCIB version./The National Security Council on 1 July 1948
issued NSCID No. 9"Communications Intelligence" which adopted the
previous USCIB version practically unchanged except for amended
provisions stating that the President would designate those departments
and agencies authorized to engage in COMINT activities (rather than "only
those***represented on the Board"), and that USCIB decisions and policies
within its jurisdication would be applicable to departments and agencies
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represented on or subordinate to the NSC or others designated by the
50/
President (rather than "all" executive departments and agencies)./ This
NSCID No. 9 remained in effect until December 1952 except for a
revision approved on 10 March 1950 which reinstated FBI membership
on USCIB. 51 /
19. Following the issuance of NSCID No. 9 in July 1948
Secretary Forrestal sent terms of reference to the three Service
Secretaries for the creation of an Armed Forces Security Agency
52/
(AFSA). / A report prepared by representatives of the three services
and of Secretary Forrestal's staff
/which proposed an "Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board"
(AFCIB) as well as the AFSA was sent in January 1949 to the DCI and
State, both of whom objected that functions proposed for the AFCIB
53/
were in direct conflict with the USCIB functions in NSCID No. 9. /After
Secretary Forrestal resigned in March 1949, the new Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson two weeks after taking office advised
Admiral Hillenkoetter that on 20 May 1949 an Armed Forces Security
Agency and an Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory
Council (AFCIAC) had been established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with the approval of the President. Secretary Johnson stated however
that the new directive and its implementation would not interfere with
54/
the functions of USCIB under NSCID No. 9./ At a 17 June USCIB meeting
the DCI and the State Member enumerated specific points of conflict
55/
between the directive establishing AFSA and NSCID No. q./-The DCI
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subsequently informed Secretary Johnson of these issues and asked
that an effort be made to resolve them but no reply was ever
56/
received. / Admiral Hillenkoetter with the support of State however
had expressed during this exchange the basic concern that the
creation of the new committee with such broad power would give
hegemony to a major source of intelligence which, in the national
interest, should daily be operating increasingly to service those
departments and agencies charged with prosecuting the cold war".
20. Despite the confused relationships within the COMINT
structure, the USCIB dealt with a wide variety of subjects during
the period from 1949 until the major revision of the concept and
organization of COMINT activities occurred with the approval of the
29 December 1952 version of NSCID No. 9. The overall review and
strengthening of U. S. national security policies and programs after
the Soviet atomic bomb explosion of September 1949, based upon the
approval of NSC 68 and its implementation, were directly reflected
in a greatly increased COMINT effort. The requirements of the
Korean War beginning in June 1950 added to and speeded up the
mobilization and deployment of augmented COMINT capabilities.
The Korean War also prompted new consideration of the security of
U. S. communications for which an existing but inoperative Clypto-
graphic Security Board (CSB) had authority. USCIB therefore
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discussed whether it should take cognizance over such COMSEC
matters. At its 9 March 1951 meeting all USCIB members agreed
to recommend to the NSC that it be given authority over COMSEC,
except the State member who favored modernizing the CSB as a
separate body under the NSC. State postponed its submission of a
minority position until the USCIB in 1952 agreed to defer its report
to the NSC pending completion of the Brownell report (discussed in
the following paragraphs). Other items frequently considered by
USCIB during 1949-52 included numerous and serious security
problems,
21. The 1952 revision of NSCID No. 9 was based directly on
an overall survey of COMINT activities conducted by a committee
chaired by Mr. George A. Brownell with Ambassador Charles Bohlen,
General John Magruder and Mr. William H. Jackson as members.
This survey was recommended to the NSC in December 1951 by the
DCI based on a study by Mr. Kingman Douglass who was then the CIA
57/
COMINT Officer./ Following Presidential approval of this recommenda-
58/
tion on 13 December 1951,/the Brownell Committee was appointed and
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submitted its report in June 1952. /-The main recommendations in
this report for a new concept and general reorganization of the
COMINT effort were accepted by the Secretaries of State and Defense
and the DCI, the only significant exception being that the military
services were allowed to retain membership on the new USCIB.
22. On 24 October 1952, President Truman approved a
directive submitted by the Secretaries of State and Defense with the
concurrence of the DCI based on the Brownell Committee Report
which:
a. Established communications intelligence as a national
responsibility which must be organized and managed to exploit avail-
able resources and satisfy legitimate intelligence requirements of all
participating departments and agencies.
b. Designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a
Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT which, with DCI assistance,
would establish policies governing COMINT, keeping the President
appropriately advised. The Attorney General was to be a member
when matters of interest to the FBI were before the Committee.
c. Designated the Secretary of Defense as executive agent
of the government for the production of COMINT information.
d. Instructed the Special Committee to issue a new
NSCID No. 9 along the lines recommended by the Brownell Committee
as accepted by the Secretaries and the DCI.
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60/
23. This NSCID No. 9 issued 29 December 1952/reconstituted
the USCIB under the Special Committee with a membership consisting
of the DCI as the permanent non-voting Chairman; a representative
of
of the Secretaries of State and of Defense, /the Director of the FBI and
of CIA (each with two votes); the Director of the new National Security
Agency and a representative of the Army, Navy and Air Force (each
with one vote). This voting pattern thus gave equal representation
to Defense and the civilian agencies. The Board was to reach
decisions by majority vote subject to appeal to the Special Committee.
make
In accord with these procedures, the Board would advise and /r ecommeiiTations
to the Secretary of Defense on COMINT matters within the jurisdiction
of the Director of NSA, and recommendations of the Board would be
binding on the Secretary. On matters not in NSA's jurisdiction,
USCIB was to coordinate COMINT activities among departments and
agencies authorized by the President to participate therein, to initiate
and supervise COMINT arrangements with foreign governments except
for those of a clandestine nature covered by NSCID No. 5, and to
recommend COMINT policies of common interest including security
standards and practices for which purpose the Board could investigate
and study such standards and practices of departments and agencies in
utilizing and protecting COMINT information. Any unanimous recom-
mendation of USCIB on these matters would be binding on all departments
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and agencies, while those approved by a majority were to be sent
to the Special Committee for action.
24. The 1952 NSCID No. 9 also contained a directive to the
Secretary of Defense which stated that the COMINT mission of NSA
was to provide an effective, unified organization and control of such
activities, and for integrated operational policies and procedures
pertaining thereto. The Director of NSA was to be a career military
officer serving a minimum term of 4 years with at least 3-star rank,
with a civilian deputy primarily responsible for cryptologic research
and development. Under the Secretary of Defense and in accordance
with approved policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA was given
operational and technical control over all COMINT collection and
production resources, and could centralize or consolidate the perfor-
mance of COMINT functions for which he was responsible. In certain
circumstances where the Armed Forces and other agencies required
close support, however, direct operational control of specified
facilities and resources would be delegated by the Director,for periods
and tasks determined by him,to military commander and agency chiefs.
The Director of NSA was responsible for making plans and policies,
conducting and determining logistic requirements for COMINT
activities, as well as prescribing security regulations and conducting
foreign liaison except that covered by NSCID No. 5.
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25. Finally this NSCID stated that the special nature of
COMINT activities required that they be treated in all respects as
outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities.
Therefore all other orders, directives (including NSCIDs and DCIDs),
policies or recommendations relating to intelligence and/or classified
material were not applicable to COMINT activities unless specifically
so stated and issued by competent authority or NSC directive. This
provision with all of the compartmented structure specified in the
1952 NSCID No. 9 was to keep the COMINT field a special preserve
not subject to other controls or coordination governing foreign intelli-
gence activities until 15 September 1958 when an NSCID No. 1 was
approved which merged USCIB and the IAC _ into a United States
Intelligence Board.
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26. At the same time that President Truman issued his directive on
communications intelligence on 24 October 1952, he approved a separate
directive on communications security(COMSEC). This latter directive
stated that the security of Federal communications is a national responsibility
and that COMSEC policies and procedures must be integrated to achieve
effective cooperation and to satisfy legitimate requirements. The Secretaries
of State and Defense were designated as a Special Committee of the NSC for
COMSEC matters to establish policies related thereto. This Special
Committee was also directed to establish a United States Communications
Security Board (USCSB) for integrating policies and procedures, and to
assure establishment of appropriate responsibilities and authorities in
this field. An NSC directive on COMSEC, including a charter for USCSB, was
issued by the Special Committee as NSC 168 on 20 October 1953 for a trial
period of one year. After a number of extensions of this trial period, the
USCSB recommended and the Special Committee approved a permanent
61/
COMSEC directive as NSC 5711 dated 25 April 1957,/which continued in
Security
effect until a revised "NSC: Communications/Directive" was issued by the
Special Committee on 4 June 1968.
27. Hence the fields of communications intelligence (COMINT) and
communications security (COMSEC) have been coordinated by separate
boards from 1952 to the present. The question of combining these
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coordinating functions under one board has been raised a number of times -
by the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission in 1955, by the
Chairman of USCSB in connection with release of cryptographic equipment
to NATO nations in 1960, and by the Executive Office of the President in
1961 - with a negative answer in each case. In addition to the differing
types of functions and responsibilities in these two fields, one of the prime
considerations favoring separate boards has been the need to distinguish
between the possible desirability of U. S. assistance to friendly or allied
(USCSB)
nations in improving their communications security/as compared with the
possible adverse impact of such assistance on U. S. COMINT capabilities
(USCIB or USIB).
28. The last major change in the authority of the USCIB before it
was merged into USIB came in 1955 when it was made the national policy
body for'Electronics Intelligence'' (ELINT). Prior to that time ELINT
operations had been conducted by the military services (the most extensive
being those of the Air Force) and by CIA, with no national coordinating
body in this field. At the USCIB meeting on 9 April 1954, General G. B.
Erskine as the Defense Member had proposed that the Board's authority
be extended to cognizance of ELINT. Supported by Lt. General C. P. Cabell,
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as Acting Chairman despite some
temporizing by various service members, the USCIB agreed in principle
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to recommend to the NSC that its authority be extended to ELINT in
the same manner as COMINT except as it applied to the COMINT
operations of the Director of NSA. The Board also agreed to form an
ad hoc committee under a Defense Department chairman to recommend
specific proposals. 62/
29. On 16 May 1955 the National Security Council issued NSCID No. 17
establishing the following organization and procedures "in order that
Electronics Intelligence, :hereinafter called ELINT, may be made more
effective. " The USCIB in addition to its authority and responsibility in
NSCID No. 9 became the national policy body for ELINT, including policy
related to the new Technical Processing Center, arrangements with
foreign governments, and recommendations concerning research and
development requirements. In this field the USCIB was to operate under
the procedures in paragraph 1-(f) of NSCID No. 9; namely, its recommen-
dations were to be binding on all departments and agencies only if adopted by
unanimous vote. Subject to these provisions, Defense and CIA were
responsible for their respective ELINT collection activities. Technical
processing was to be accomplished in a center administered by Defense and
jointly staffed by individuals detailed from Defense and CIA. All data
collected was to be available to the center, subject only to minimum delay
in field exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes. The center
was to effect expeditious processing, furnishing the results to interested
agencies and if practicable in the form they desired. 63/
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30. Thus was the coordination of ELINT made subject to the
same body that coordinated COMINT, but under separate and distinct terms
of reference with operations conducted under differing organizational
structures. COMINT continued to be the major concern of the USCIB
until it was merged into USIB. In fact a separate subcommittee to
handle ELINT was not established by USCIB on the urging of General Cabell
until March 1958, the same month the NSC directed that IAC and USCIB
be combined into a single board.
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D. Forced Consolidation into the United States Intelligence Board
1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created in 1958
by merging the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the United
States Communications ]ntelligence Board (USCIB) pursuant to the
personal direction of President Eisenhower based on the advice of
his Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, despite a
recommendation by the Director of Central Intelligence that this action
be deferred primarily because of the "strong and sincerely motivated
opposition" of the military intelligence chiefs. 64/
2. During the Eisenhower Administration there was increasing
concern with the rising size and cost of national security programs
reflected in the deliberations of the National Security Council,
expressed particularly by the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget shared by some Secretaries of
Defense. As a result the foreign intelligence effort, as well as the
military and foreign aid programs, came under critical review as to
efficiency, effectiveness and cost from an organizational and manage-
ment viewpoint.
3. Consequently the first recommendation of the President's
Board of Consultants in its 20 December 1956 report stressed the
need for the DCI "to exercise a more comprehensive and positive
coordinating responsibility" in order to "accomplish much in the
direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination within
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the national intelligence effort without change in present ;statute or
organization. " Recommendation No. 4 called for "a strong
centralized direction, under which the resources of the various
elements would be brought closer together, *** to strengthen our
national intelligence effort and to contain its cost. " The Ninth
Recommendation was that the NSC "review their Intelligence Directives
and substitute a more coherent, consolidated Directive or set of
Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's
conditions. " Recommendations No. 1 and 4 were approved by the
President and referred to the DCI for action on 29 January 1957, while
Recommendation No. 9 was also approved and referred to the IAC for
review of all NSCIDs and early submission to the NSC of recommended
revisions. *
4. On 30 April 1957 after discussion in an IAC meeting,
Mr. Dulles sent a report on the status of the review of NSCIDs
indicating anticipation that the revisions would be presented to the NSC
by 1 August. "/ On 18 July 1957 Mr. Dulles addressed a letter to the
No. 1 and 4
President referring to the above-quoted Recommendations/ on coordina-
tion and centralized direction, expressing full agreement with them,
and advising that he had designated General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.
as his Deputy Director for Coordination. The DCI said that
General Truscott would. be charged with reviewing "all possibilites for
e -Section B, pages _ for the full text of these three recom-
mendations. 65 /
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"increasing integration, reducing duplication, and improving coordi-
nation in the national intelligence effort" in consultation with repre-
sentatives of the intelligence agencies concerned. 67/ Mr. Dulles also
submitted to the President for his approval a proposed memorandum
to the Statutory Members of the NSC and the DCI as a response to the
above letter. The JCS had commented on the DCI letter and proposed
Presidential memorandum by noting a strengthening of the intelligence
effort through the existing machinery for coordination, stressing that
mutual respect and community of effort by the various intelligence
activities while discharging their statutory responsibilities must be
preserved, and stating that they would render the DCI fullest possible
cooperation. 68/ President Eisenhower on 5 August signed the
proposed memorandum in which concurred in the need for centralized
direction and coordination, and in the appointment of a Deputy Director
for Coordination. He concluded by stating that all members of the
intelligence community will render the DCI the fullest possible coopera-
tion in accomplishing this objective. 69/ General Truscott concentrated
on completing the review of NSCIDs as chairman of an ad hoc IAC
group. Revisions of NSCID No. 1 along with four others were concurred
in by the IAC on 21 January 1958 and submitted to the NSC on
28 January. 70/
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5. While the above actions were being taken by the DCI and
the IAC, the President's Board of Consultants had submitted to the
President on 24 October 1957 a semi-annual report which contained
among others the following Recommendation No. 2:
"That, in order to achieve a better integration of
our national intelligence resources (1) the policy,
coordinating and supervisory responsibilities
presently being discharged separately by the USCIB
andlAC be vested in a single Board (to be known as
the United States Intelligence Board) established at
the present level of the USCIB, with appropriate
membership, under the chairmanship of the Director
of Central Intelligence and responsible directly to
the National Security Council, (2) the operation of
the National Indications Center be made the direct
responsibility of the new Board, and (3) the remain-
ing functions of the USCIB and IAC (and their sub-
committee) be redistributed on the advice of the
Special Comint Committee and the Director of Central
Intelligence respectively. "
Before taking action on this recommendation the President requested
that the DCI consult with the USCIB and IAC agencies and furnish to
the NSC his views and comments on this recommendation. The NSC
Executive Secretary in transmitting this request suggested that the
DCI take into account the then current review of NSCIDs and actions
under way regarding the recent report on COMINT and ELINT activi-
ties by the Baker Panel. of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Office
of Defense Mobilization.. 71/
6. The above recommendation obviously indicated that the
President's Board had changed its mind since its 20 December 1956
report in which it believed that the DCI could accomplish needed
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integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination "without
change in present statute or organization". In explaining its new
recommendation the Board saw no good reason why the IAC and
USCIB should continue as separate entities. On the other hand it
felt there were many reasons why they should be reconstituted into
a single body to provide appropriate advice and assistance to the
DCI in discharging his coordinating function. 72/
7. After brief discussions at the 8 November 1957 USCIB
meeting and the 12 November 1957 IAC meeting, it was agreed that
General Truscott would consult with each of the members individually
prior to developing a draft reply for consideration at a joint meeting
on 6 January 1958. General Truscott sent a memorandum to the
members of USCIB and IAC reporting the results of his discussions.
He indicated that the members would oppose any overall Board which
impaired the national intelligence production functions of the IAC. He
presented the concept of a single ten-man Board in which members
would participate actively to the extent of their agencies' responsibili-
ties and capabilities, and to profit from exposure to community
problems when their agencies were not directly involved. General
Truscott cited the advantages and disadvantages of the merger,
indicating that the merger should facilitate better coordination in
overall collection efforts, intelligence security, and intelligence
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communications. He concluded that there were two lines of action:
(1) nonconcurring in the President's Board recommendation and
recommending Presidential disapproval, or (2) concurring in the
merger and recommending Presidential approval in principle. 73/
8. At a joint USCIB - LAC meeting on 22 January 1958 the views
of the respective members were expressed, and it was recommended
that the DCI reply regarding the President's Board recommendation
reflecting these views and concluding that USCIB and IAC believed
that a merger was not desirable at that time. The opposition of the
three service chiefs was highlighted by a memorandum tabled at the
meeting by the Army :Intelligence Chief, General Robert A. Schow,
expressing the considered judgment that the merger would have an
adverse effect on national security, and would impede the effective
conduct of both US COMINT operations and the production of
national intelligence. 74/ Accordingly, Mr. Dulles on 29 January
1958 submitted to the NSC his response on the President's Board
recommendation. He summarized the positions of the IAC and
USCIB members as follows: (a) the Army, Navy and Air Force
believed the merger would entail grave disadvantages, (b) State and
the AEC were favorable, while the Joint Staff was unfavorable, (c)
the Defense Representative believed it inappropriate to make a
decision without more detail on implementation, (d) NSA felt that,
so long as he received adequate and authoritative policy guidance, he
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could operate under the merger or the present situation, but would
not wish to participate in considering national estimates or other
related IAC work, and (e) the FBI expressed a neutral view.
9. Mr. Dulles then summarized the disadvantages of the merger
advanced by opposing members to be: (a) violation of the ;principle
that COMINT must be compartmented and treated outside other
intelligence activities, with the DCVs role in this field insuring that
intelligence production and other "normal" operations are coordinated
with COMINT, (b) an increase in the number of individuals cleared for
COMINT, thus jeopardizing security, (c) involvement of agencies in
producing national intelligence that have no related concern or capa-
bility, (d) longer agendas, larger attendance and waste of time and
personnel at meetings, (e) impairment of the favorable USCIB status
in international COMINT relationships and (f) combining essentially
dissimilar functions of policy and procedures governing the COMINT
effort in contrast with the production and dissemination of finished
intelligence.
10. Mr. Dulles then explained that members favoring the merger
also favored further study of responsibilities, procedures and safe-
guards prior to final decision. They pointed out that a merger would
be in harmony with the general trend toward better integration and
more central direction of national security activities, and would
promote closer understanding and better knitting-together of the
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intelligence community. They cited the advantages to be: (a)
improved stature of the community in the government and improved
attention paid to the intelligence product, (b) expedited consideration
of overall intelligence policies, coordination and supervision; and
more effective community support for requirements, budgetary and
otherwise, (c) improvement in the production process by reduction of
barriers caused by greater compartmentation than required for security
and (d) improved relationships and product resulting from "cross-
fertilization" of ideas and more intimate associations and appreciations
of problems.
11. The DCI then concluded that, while there was much to
recommend a merger and it might eventually be desirable, it should
not be directed at that time because: (a) there was strong and sincerely
motivated opposition by many of the most important USCIB members,
(b) the two Boards were functioning smoothly in close coordination,
(c) a consolidation would not in his opinion result in any early saving of
time or effort, possibly it would lead to a waste of time since the supporting
staffs and subcommittees were wholly distinct and joint meetings would
require both staffs and (d) the merger would call for a prior major
decision in principle regarding the position of the DCI which should be
reached independently prior to a merger. Mr. Dulles therefore recom-
mended that action on the President's Board recommendation be deferred,
and that he be directed to make further recommendations after an
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opportunity to test the revised NSCIDs, and after the extent and
scope of the reorganization steps being contemplated within the
Department of Defense had been clearly defined. 75/
12. The President's Board of Consultants commented on
4 March 1958 that the DCI appeared to misunderstand the purpose
and intent of the Board's recommendation which was to establish
a single group to advise and assist him in coordinating all opera-
tions, both special and other forms of intelligence, such a group to
be concerned with policy and guidance matters. The Board
explained that operational and non-policy functions performed by
the IAC and USCIB separately should be dealt with by committees
at the departmental level, with continued compartmented handling to
the extent desirable for security. 76/
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13. With all interested parties having had their say, the
time of decision arrived with a National Security Council
meeting on 13 March 1.958 with the Chairman of the President's
and USIB
Board of Consultants and the members of the IAC/in attendance.
The meeting began with a discussion of the draft NSCIDs and the
views regarding them of the JCS and of the President's Board.
With respect to the comments of the JCS relative to "joint intelli-
gence" as a part of military intelligence with which the IAC was
not concerned, President Eisenhower responded by stating that:
"Nearly every department and agency of Government
(not only the military departments) would have responsi-
bilities under the conditions of a modern war; that each
significant intelligence appraisal would have implications
for the national security, useful in the preparation of
' national intelligence' ; and that appraisals which were
in effect 'national. intelligence' would be prepared under
the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.
The NSC then approved the draft NSCIDs Nos. 1 through 5 subject
to modifications to be submitted later in No. 1 and No. Z. Action
on the draft NSCID No. 6 dealing with ELINT was deferred pending
later consideration of a new NSCID dealing with COMINT. Further
studies and reports were directed regarding the draft NSCID No. 7
on Critical Intelligence Communications. The NSC then was informed
of a decision made by President Eisenhower prior to the meeting
which was recorded as follows:
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"Noted that the President had approved a recommen-
dation of the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities that there be established
a single group to assist and advise the Director of
Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility
for the coordination of all operations concerned with
both special and other forms of intelligence; which,
together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of
the United States; such single group to be assigned the
policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities
presently assigned to the U. S. Communications
Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee (the remaining functions of USCIB and IAC to be
redistributed to appropriate subcommittees). "
The NSC also noted that the President had directed the DCI to prepare,
in consultation with the IAC and USCIB, and to submit within six
months for Council consideration, a draft NSCID to carry out the
approved recommendation; with the necessary modifications of
other draft NSCIDs to follow. 77/
14. Aside from the directive to establish the USIB, the action at
this meeting represented a major mire stone in the concept of the
role and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
The new NSCID No. 1, as subsequently approved
to be effective 21 April 1958, gave the DCI for the first
time the clear nz"an_ate "coordinate the foreign intelligence effort
of the United States, in accordance with the principles established
by statute and pertinent National Security Council Directives". The
DCI was to be advised by the IAC, andi.n providing advice and recom-
mendations to the NSC the DCI was to transmit a statement indicating
concurrence or nonconcurrence of the IAC members. This NSCID
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also defined "national intelligence" as that intelligence required for
formulation of national security policy, concerning more than one
department or agency, and transcending the exclusive competence
of a single department or agency. The DCI was made responsible
for producing national intelligence, which was to have the concurrence
of the members of the JAC or carry a statement of substantially
differing opinion. Departmental intelligence was defined as that
which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.
The modification of NSCID No. 1 discussed at the NSC meeting
and subsequently incorporated in the approved version was designed
to strengthen the role of the DCI, in consultation with the IAC, in the
protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. 78/
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15. Mr. Dulles arranged a meeting on 22 April 1958 at
which General Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, and General Hull,
Chairman of the President's Board of Consultants, accompanied
by the Executive Secretary, NSC, discussed with the members of
the IAC and USCIB the Presidential Directive to establish a single
USIB. General Hull explained that the aims. of the President's
Board in making the recommendation were "to improve organization,
increase coordination and enhance the prestige of the intelligence
community within the government". General Cutler noted the
President's personal interest in a further integration and coordina-
tion of the activities of the intelligence community and the importance
he attached to the ready availability of an integrated end-product in
a time of crisis. Both Generals Hull and Cutler expressed the
opinion that the new Board should review national intelligence
estimates and General Cutler emphasized the importance of pre-
serving the integrity, worth and utility of these estimates. In
summary this discussion made clear that the two basic missions of
the new Board were (1) to achieve better organization and coordination
of all intelligence activities, and (2) to improve the timeliness and
quality of the substantive "national intelligence" required by the
President and the NSC members, departments, and agencies. 79 /
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16. Pursuant to agreement at that 22 April meeting,
General Truscott circulated proposed changes in NSCID No. 1
for accomplishing the merger of the IAC and USCIB into a single
USIB, based on the decisions at the NSC meeting of 13 March. 80 /
Following preliminary discussion at a 10 June IAC-USCIB meeting
81/ and further discussiorsby General Truscott with IAC and USCIB
members, draft NSCII)s No. 1 and No. 6 were approved for forwarding
to the NSC at a joint IAC-USCIB meeting on 15 July 1958. 82 / The
on 29 July
DCI sent to the Executive Secretary, NSC/the draft NSCID No. 1,
the draft NSCID No. 6 to replace the previous Nos. 9 and 17 dealing
with COMINT and ELINT respectively,- and minor changes necessary
in NSCID Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as a proposed new NSCID No. 7
on "Critical Intelligence Communications." 83/
17. The National Security Council approved, to be effective
15 September 1958, NSCIDs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The
approved NSCID No. 1 contained only three non-substantive changes
from the draft submitted by the IAC and USCIB; 841, The only change
affecting the United States Intelligence Board provided, based on the
discussions with the Bureau of the Budget, authority for the Board
to establish subordinate and working groups as appropriate. 85/_ The
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only change made by the NSC in the IAC/USCIB draft of NSCID No. 6
was to specify that the Secretary of Defense would determine those
ELINT collection and processing activities which are essential to
provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military
operations, the responsibility for which would be delegated by him to
those commanders or the cryptologic agencies supporting them. 86 /
18. The primary modifications in NSCID No. 1 as approved
by the NSC on 15 September 1958 compared with the 21 April version
were in the strengthening of the concepts that the U. S. intelligence
effort is a national responsibility, to be coordinated by the Director of
Central Intelligence (including "both special and other forms of
intelligence") with the advice and the assistance of a United States
Intelligence Board under his Chairmanship. It was stressed that the
for
purpose of the Board was "to provide/a more effective integration of
and guidance to the national intelligence effort". The USIB was given
specific functions including: (1) establishing policies and developing
programs for guidance, (2) establishing intelligence objectives,
requirements and priorities, (3) reviewing and reporting to the NSC
on the national effort as a whole, (4) making recommendations on
intelligence matters to appropriate U. S. officials, including the
Secretary of Defense on matters within the jurisdiction of NSA, (5)
develop ng and reviewing seciity
standards and practices to protect
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intelligence and intelligence sources and methods and (6) formulating
appropriate policies regarding intelligence arrangements with
foreign governments. It was stated that the Board would reach its
decisions (other than on substantive "national intelligence") by
agreement, but the decision-making authority of the DCI was
strengthened by providing that when the Chairman determines a
given position represents a consensus it is to be considered as
agreed unless a dissenting member requests referral to the NSC.
The new NSCID defined "interdepartmental intelligence" as integrated
departmental intelligence which transcends the exclusive competence
of a single department: or agency to produce, for which the sub-
committee structure of USIB may be utilized for production and
dissemination. 87 /
19. NSCID No. 6 as approved by the National Security Council
covered both communications intelligence and electronics intelligence
supers.pdixig the 1952 NSCID No. 9_ _.. aA_d .. the 1955 NSCID No. I7.
The basic change was contained in the statement that " COMINT and
ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being
within the framework of general intelligence activities except as
otherwise established under this directive". Consequently the
Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT was eliminated, and
the types of functions performed by the USCIB were
generally assigned to the USIB.
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was given the mission of providing " an effective unified organization
and control" of ELINT as well as COMINT intercept and processing
activities, integrated operation policies and procedures pertaining
of
thereto, and/producing "COMINT information and ELINT information
in accordance with objiectives, requirements and priorities
established by the United States Intelligence Board". Thus the
function of the DCI as overall coordinator of foreign intelligence,
with the advice and assistance of the USIB, was extended to include
separate reserve
the previously / of COMINT and ELINT. The functions of the
Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the conduct of COMINT
activities were also extended to include ELINT. The roles of the
Director of NSA and of the military departments in the COMINT
and ELINT fields were specified. COMINT and ELINT arrangements
with foreign governments were to be conducted in accordance with
policies established by USIB. The DCI, with technical advice and
assistance of the Director of NSA, was made the Executive Agent
responsibility of the Director of NSA in general consultation with
the DCI. 90/
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20. Thus the United States Intelligence Board was created
to replace the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the U. S.
Communications Intelligence Board, with the membership com-
bining the representation on both of those Boards. President
in
Eisenhower and the National Security Council / NSCID No. 1
had stated that "The intelligence effort of the United States is a
national responsibility, and must be so organized and managed as to
exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government
and to satisy the intelligence requirements of the National Security
Council and of the departments and agencies of the Government".
Now it was up to the USIB to provide the best possible advice
and assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence in coordina-
ting all foreign intelligence activities in an effort to achieve the
above goals in the interest of our national security. 91 /
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