GUIDELINES FOR ADP DISASTER PREVENTION AND CONTINGENCY BACK-UP PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00096A000100060007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 11, 1972
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 200 FID1 - 79M0009 6A0001 QQ@6-%WAnt 1 to
IHC-MM-296
17 February 1972
IBSEC-CSS-R-9
I1FEB1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Information
Handling Committee, United States
Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Guidelines for ADP Disaster Prevention
and Contingency Back-up Planning
1. The attached "Guidelines for ADP Disaster Prevention
and Contingency Back-up Planning[ were developed by the Computer
Security Subcommittee in coordination with the Support Staff of
the Intelligence Information Handling Committee. The Security
Committee approved these Guidelines at its 25 January 1972
meeting.
2. The Guidelines are intended for the use of USIB member
agencies in ensuring against disruption of the computer processing
and exchange of vital information. Throughout their development
no consideration has been given to making them directive in nature.
3. Subsequent to IHC review and approval, I would propose
their issuance and dissemination as a joint product of the SECOM
and IHC.
25X1
Chairman, Securi ommittee
USIB
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ANP Cni! T I iiGEiICY BACK-UP PL/,?l?~ I MC IBSEC-CSS-R-9
25 Jan 72
provide basic guidance for the development of a
disaster prevention and contingency back--u1} proram for
insuring, the continuous compute-.r processing and exchange of
vital information. To outline the major areas of concern and
1 i st conditions and procedures necessary to insure the
protection of APP assets. To 11st actions and procedures for
consideration in the formulation of a contingency plan.
Guidance set forth herein is based on the premise that
organizations relying heavily on computer system operations
should develop an into rated APP Disaster Prevention and
Contingency Back-Up Program to minimize the severity and
effects of unforeseen computer system disasters. Such
pl a n n ing should be a specific design factor integrated into
total system. planning for each individual W yster:a and its
unique environnent.
I I I . GEi1EPAL C011S I DEPAT I GP;
Potential causes of disaster vary considerably in their
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prohah i l ity of occurrence, degree of criticality and
feas i b i l i ty of preventive and/or hack-up measures. Fires,
explosions, toxic fumes, nuclear weapon detonation and the
effects of natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes
and floods can be immediately disastrous resulting in the
death or serious injury to personnel. The damage caused by
such events to computer equipment, the physical structure
housing the system, and the storage media may be disastrous
for an extended period of t 1r?e depending upon resource
recovery capabilities. Other disruptive events such as
outages of electric power or- air conditioning, the loss of
telecommunications facilities or the erasure of vital
information from r.lagnetic storage media are not 1 ikely to be
as serious because back-up measures can be provided.
Al though positive security actions and procedures can reduce
the effects of riots, theft, sabotage and vandal i srn, these
events can Occur and result in disastrous operating
consequences.
IV. DISASTEP ANALYSIS
A disaster includes any incident or event which results
in a critical disruption of the computer operations.
Peschedul inL of work loads according; to user priority nay be
requi red depending upon the al lowable delay of the most
critical user processing r(?quirements. Processing, priorities
1,my also 1) n r- ~c~rI'ed ee
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ope rab 11 1 ty of the system. The disruption can reach major
proportions rendering the system inoperable for a prolonged
period of time and requiring movement of highest priority
processing to an alternate Computer site.
The emergency or back-up act ions needed to restore the
capabilities of a computer system after a disaster has
occurred should be proportionate to the critical effects of
that disaster. These actions may be identified through
consideration of at least the follm,;ing:
1. The event, cause or condition creating the disruption;
The capab i l ity to restore the system;
3. The total period of time the system is expected to be
nonoperational;
The tolerable t i ne-l i ni is of system inactivity based
on user requirements;
5. The feasibility of a degraded mode of system, operation
whereby critical processing could continue; and
G. The ava i 1 ab 11 i ty of an alternate system capable of
assuming the critical processing requirements for a
specified period of tire.
V . MAJOR ARE;"-,S OF COFICER?i AMC; PREVENT I VE 1417- A"') U ['\I ES
The major areas of concern involve the protection of
assets required for computer operation. The protection of
APP assets requires the implementation of various measures
as part of a disaster prevention pro ram. Security and
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computer personnel should he alert to the passibility that a
disruption in computer activity may be del ibe rate rather
than accidental and Should invest i cate any situation ti-:here
such evidence exists. Although the configuration of computer
systems and the physical environment of computer centers
vary, the following areas are applicable to all systems:
1. System Ilardware: The mechanical, electromechanical,
electronic, magnetic and electrical components of a computer
system.
a. taintenance: Effective. maintenance planning;
represents the initial preventive measure against a
potentially serious disruption of operations.
b. Engineering Support: Technical support should be
available on a 24 hour on-site basis if the computer center
rewires such support. Rack-up of critical hardware parts
should be maintained on-site or in a readily accessible
location.
c. Hardware Secrrrity: The implementation of measures
such as memory protection and user/executive modes of
operation is recommended to insure protection of user data
sets.
2. System Software: Computer prograr.~s and procedures
including system and user programs.
a. Testing; a flew Installation: Duplicate programs
shoul d be run on both the current and proposed system so
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that the data can be compared. If duplicate testing is not
feasible, a test deck should be used to check the system's
logic.
b. Program Changes and
Testing: Extensive prog ram
debugging is recommended to reduce the number of disruptions
caused by software errors. Any request for a program change
should he submitted in writing and the action authorized
only by a responsible manager. The number of persons
authorized to make changes in operating programs should be
limited. Program testing should be subject to review by
authorized personnel and not conducted solely by the person
who wrote the program.
c. Software Security: Software security measures such
as user identification and authorization should be used to
reduce the poss i b i l i ty of unauthorized personnel accessing
the system.
3. System Operational Personnel: The individuals whose
primary duties are concerned with the operation of the
computer system. .
a. Selection of Key Personnel: Key personnel
designated to continue the operation of a computer system
should be briefed and provided written guidance as to their
responsibilities and duties in the event of a disaster.
5. Training of Key Personnel: Training programs
should be developed Mich stress the proper handling and
Haintenance of computer system components. Key personnel
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should be broadly cross-trained in the event that certain
key personnel should be unable to respond to an emergency
situaatiOn c. Personnel Security: Computer personnel, visitors
and users constitute a theft and/or sabotage threat to the
computer center. Restrict ions on the nur,mber of people
al 1 owed unescorted access and on the areas to which they
have access are recommended.
It. System Env i ronrment: The computer facility,
supporting utilities and operational posture.
a. Facility (General): The facility housing a
col-iputer system should be constructed of fire resistant
building r:mater1als and equipped uith appropriate smoke
detection, heat sensing and fire fighting devices. Periodic
safety checks of such devices for their operational
capability is encouraged. The use of the FPMR anti the
flat i onal Fire Code volume 5, section 75 is recommended in
the construction of computer facilities. Consideration
should be given to maximum physical protection against the
potentially catastrophic effects of natural disasters
(hurricanes, earthquakes and 171 oods) as wel l as c iv i l
disorder and conventional and nuclear warfare.
l7. Auxi11ary Power and Air- Conditioning:
Malfunctions and failrre s of electric power and/or air
conditioning are two of the major causes of disaster
affecting a computer- system. Provisions Should he i-.)ade for
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the use of an independent back-ups power source as wel 1 as
providing for immediate repair or replacement of air
conditioning equipment. Consideration of line monitors
and/or- overvoltage protectors to prevent damage from power
failure and powder surges is recommended. Security control s
should he applied to reduce the possibility of willful or
inadvertent damage to the electrical and air conditioning
equipments.
c. Physical Security and Control: Access to the
facility housing the system by other than author i zeal
personnel should be prohibited. The mechanisms installed to
enhance the security of the computer system area Should be
controlled by personnel designated as responsible for their
maintenance and integrity. All procedures relating' to
facility control should be 1n w,!riting and made available to
ass i;g;ned personnel.
5. Data F i les: Storage areas for magnetic s t o r a storage media
should be located outs i('10 the main computer area, preferably
in a vault or secure area depending upon security
considerations. Proper temperature and humidity should be
maintained and cleanliness restrictions should be observed.
All appra)ri atCe eXeCuIt!V0 programs, system docur;ientation,
operation manuals, etc., r0CjL!i red for the computerize d
Processing of informm tion should ho identified, duel icated,
a nsafely stored. se`c!.jri tV prCocedures should be installed
to prevent unauthorized personnel from reriov i ng f i 1 es Such
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tas !`:lial;net IC tapos f k"C7ia the CC,f;1puter center.
G. Coi.imunicat 1on Lines: Recquirements for protecting
coraar:iun i cation 1 ines tiai 1 l vary depend in? upon the existence
and location of remote to rr:i i nal s . The cor;-inun, i cat i on 1 1 nks
froi.a the central processor to the remote consoles are
vul ne ratl e to crosstalk, el e c t ror,iagnet i c rad i at i on and
w-wiretaps. U nprotected data transmission should he
el irninated by use of cryptographic techniques or by physical
security measures. Back-up coraniun i cat i on facilities should
be available to reduce the effect of failures in the
corrriun i cation area.
7. supplies: Supplies that are essential to computer
operations should he identified and accessibility to
baclkk-up suppl ies should be provided.
VI . CO"iT I MGPIOY PLANN I NO
A manual or handbook data I 1 i n? the computer cc rite r
methods of operation in the event of a disaster should be
prepared. I t shoul d specify the contingency or back-up
actions to be taken, individual responsibilities for these
actions and the fol1o%-on investigative anc:i reporting
ree;uIrer,aents. The degree of impier.ientat1on of the
contingency plan t-i11 depend upon the criticality of the
disaster.
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Planning for possible emergencies should consider the
recommendations 1 i sted bel ow for disaster prevention and/or
copping with disasters which have occurred.
. Prior Planning
1. Duplication and storage of vital programs,
documentation and data f i les i n a read i 1 y accessible
location, preferably off-site.
2. A determination that the fire safety equipment and
emergency plans are adequate to minimize damage from sr,moke,
chemicals, water or fire.
3. A determination that adequate electrical power, air
conditioning equ i pment, and heat in- systems are available
for back-up use.
It. Training of computer personnel to insure that they
are aware of proper procedures for operating and protecting
equipment and are aware of their responsibilities in the
event of a disaster.
5. Up-to-date 1 i sts of eme r gency and support
organizations and personnel with whom contact ray be
required. This may include medical centers, fire stations,
security services and equipment maintenance services.
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6. JAI data being processed should bear a priority of
processing order. Users should be alert to the need for
manual information processing, in the event computer
processing Is not available for low priority processing.
7. Copies of all disaster planning documentation ShOUld
be provided to each major funct1onal area supporting the
organization. Specific roles and responsibilities of each
supporting, function should he closely coordinated.
8. The contingency plan sihoul d be updated pe r i od i cal 1 y
to reflect changes in equipment, user requirements,
personnel , and back-up computer comp)at 1 11 1 ty and
availal it ity.
B. Major Disaster Planning- Contingency planning for a
r,maj or cl1 saste r trh i ch requ i res movement of compute r
processing activities to an alternate site should also
consider the following recommendations:
1. Prior identification of an alternate cog ;,pu.uter system
compatible with in-house systems that can be available if
needed. Physical surrondings of the alternate system should
conform to requ i red seCi.lri ty and safety standards.
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2. Identification and designation of personnel to
manage and operate the alternate system should be documented
and updated as the need arises.
3. The computer operations at the alternate site should
be careful 1 y documented. Among other issues, this document
should address Such items as the transportation of alternate
site computer personnel, their responsibilities during
alternate site operations, the necessary security
considerations for the computer environment and the transfer
of classified data to the alternate site, and the priority
processing order of data.
4. Periodic operation of the alternate cormpute r system,
using the duplicate docurmentat i on, software and data files
by the designated alternate system-,a personnel should be made.
results should be compared with normal operations in order
for changes to be effected if required.
5. Instructions for the destruction of classified data
and/or ecruipmnent under combat-emergency conditions whore
such classified materials may be reasonably expected to fall
into the possession of unauthorized persons.
C. Post Disaster Planning
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1. A determination of the criticality of the disaster
considering anticipated time of system inoperability and
user processing requirements.
2 . Immediate notification to management and system
users of the estimated length of delay in operations to
allow the users to consider alternate operational methods.
3. Notification of the appropriate higher levels of
management if the time delay exceeds initial estimates.
4. Contact with the appropriate emergency and support
organizations depending upon the cause and extent of the
disaster.
5. A determination of the feasibility of continued
computer operation in a degraded mode.
. Initiation of actions to move computer operations to
an alternate site if conditions warrant the move.
7. A determination that the disaster has not degraded
the essential system hardware, software or physical security
features and that procedural security controls remain in
effect.
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