SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 2, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2004/DP79M 00095A0,400010011-8
4 EAR
03'8
2 February 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
25X1A
Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement
25X1A
SUBJECT:
Chief, Production Assessment and
Improvement Division
Systemic Problems in Soviet Intelligence
Production
1. Attached, for your comments, is the second draft of the
paper on systemic problems in the analytic base underlying NIEs
on the Soviet Union. I must invite a concluding section, but what
is said by way of conclusions depends on what use we want to make
of this paper.
2. If our perceptions of the problem are correct, a very
substantial Community effort will be needed to improve the basis
for intelligence production on the Soviet Union. These should be
a concerted Community program under NFIB to define improvement
goals and priorities, lay out a long-range "get-well" program, and
move out smartly with initiatives like an exercise analysis center
or the loose-leaf notebook approach to 11-3/8. There should also
be developed a set of detailed funding and manpower augmentation
proposals for PRC (CFI) action, because the improvements we have
in mind simply will not be adequate unless backed by more money
and people. The issue is how to use the paper to get these actions
moving.
3. I see three alternatives:
a. Alternative 1. Use the paper basically as it is to
provide background and an explanation of our goals. Add a brief
concluding section to bring the paper to a logical close, but avoid
listing specific next steps. Act through the various channels
available to us to set in motion a series of specific get-well
actions, returning to the IC Staff orchestration of those actions.
Approved For Release 2004/110/12: CIA-RDP79M000rc, 60fl40$O*O01+-8-- ---
"BERET 11 D Y /yQ)`I
0/
 Approved For Release 20(Sg A-RDP79M0009.000400010011-8
b. Alternative 2. Use the paper as an agenda for
Community action by NFIB and PRC. Add a substantive final
section with proposed next steps along the following lines:
- - Community working groups to develop detailed
implementation plans in four areas:
? Major upgrade of Community data bases
? Long-term Community program of basic research
studies on the Soviet Union
? Short- and long-term programs to upgrade the
body of Soviet specialists in the Community and
draw to a greater extent on outside help
? NSA/DIA/ CIA exercise analysis center
- - IC Staff and NIO consortium to research ways to make
NIEs more cost-effective. For example:
? Market research project
? Cost analysis of NIE efforts
? Loose-leaf notebook experiment with 11-3/8
? DCI policy guidelines on the treatment of evidence,
uncertainty, hypotheses, etc.
A user-Community consortium (broader than Andy
Marshall's contacts) to help guide a systematic Community
work program of interaction analyses and support to net
assessments.
c. Alternative 3. Structure the paper per Alternative 2,
but use it privately with an inner group of Community elite (managers
and analysts) to form an ad hoc steering group which quietly, but
effectively, orchestrates Community funding, manning, and planning
to move forward as fast as is bureaucratically possible on a get-well
program.
25X1A
Attachment a/s
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
cc: 1 1 w/attrn2
n[T
 Approved For Relsjse 2004/1 -IDP79M00095AQQQ400(XlGWI$a&ary 1977
Intelligence Community Posture
for Estimates on the Soviet Union
1. The Problem
In a period of rising concern and political controversy about the
Soviet threat and American policy toward. the Soviet Union, how well
is the Intelligence Community postured to assess this threat, in all
its dimensions ? How well can the Community lucidly analyze and
portray the strategic motives, intent, drives, constraints, and
probable future courses of action of the Soviet Union? How well
can it make a comprehensive assessment of Soviet political, economic
and military capabilities? Persistent criticism of Community perform-
ance by both insiders and outsiders indicates that the posture of
intelligence may not be adequate to meet the challenges posed by
the Soviet Union unless major improvements are made.
II. The Soviet-American Relationship and the Implications for
Intelligence
Since the 1960s, the Soviet-American relationship has increasingly
involved efforts by both sides to avoid military confrontation and
improve cooperation; at the same time, strong competition continues
in all areas of superpower interaction. These trends seem likely to
continue. US interests are likely to be increasingly challenged in the
traditional areas of foreign affairs and military capabilities, albeit
Approved For Release 2004/1 0/ 111 kL79M00095A0004000I 0011-8
 Approved For Rele a 2004/1. cIIDP79M00095AGQ400010011-8
in more subtle ways than during the two decades following World War
11. Moreover, new challenges have arisen and will continue in such
areas as international negotiations, relations with US allies and non-
aligned nations and international economics.
Determination of US policy in the face of these Soviet challenges
will be, if anything, more difficult than in the past, for several reasons:
-- The Soviet Union is becoming more subtle and sophisticated
in its dealings with the West.
-- The continued Soviet military improvement program makes the
East-West military balance more complex to assess and renders
less obvious the actions necessary for the United States and its
allies to maintain an acceptable balai_,:e.
American consciousness of the limits of military power,
sharpened by the final years of the Vietnam War, places
new constraints on the means by which the US may seek
to counter Soviet influence in third world areas.
Rising defense costs and the increasing need to deal with
America's pressing domestic and energy problems make
ever more necessary the requirement for fine judgment
in US military improvement programs, to define and maintain
an acceptable military balance with the Soviet Union at
minimum cost.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA- P79M00095AO00400010011-8
Er
 Approved For Relegse 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP79M00095AQQO400010011-8
While it is US policy-- and apparently that of the Soviet Union as
well--to avoid superpower confrontations, the consequences of US-Soviet
military clashes are potentially too devastating to neglect the possibility
of their occurrence. Moreover, third party actions--for example, in
the Middle East or Eastern Europe- -could lead to US-Soviet confronta-
tions. Thus, US policy cannot be based on the assumption that they
will never occur or that the Soviets will continue in the future to avoid
confrontation, as their military capabilities improve. Thus, remote
as the possibility may currently appear, the US and its allies must
continue to be prepared for military conflict with an increasingly
powerful Soviet Union.
The challenges posed to the Intelligence Community over the next
several years are equally as difficult--to understand Soviet purpose
and motivation; determine strengths and weaknesses in Soviet political,
economic and military challenges to US interests; make comprehensive
assessments of the import of these challenges; and analyze critical
areas of potential military interaction between the two sides.
A. Soviet Purpose and Motivation
What explains persistent Soviet challenges to US interests? Are
they really seeking dominance over the West? Do they want and expect
to achieve military superiority? Or are defense and insecurity the
motives? Or mindless momentum of the bureaucracy? These are
.intelligence issues, but are very political as well. They affect the
Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CAA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
 Approved For Releae 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP79M00095AQ9400010011.-8
"atmosphere" and rhetoric of US foreign policy and defense debates.
Most importantly, they illuminate the possible avenues of US-Soviet
relations and the limits of those relations. Very broadly--but only
very broadly--they indicate the likely direction of Soviet military
programs.
B. Soviet Strengths and Weaknesse.s
How do Soviet foreign policy, economic, and military efforts
relate to one another in fostering Soviet interests and objectives?
What are the strengths and weaknesses, the drives and constraints,
that shape these efforts and determine Soviet capabilities to challenge
US interests ? To provide US pol:i.cym.-nakers with the necessary insight
to deal with the Soviet Union, intelligence must analyze Soviet internal
affairs in far greater depth and from different perspectives than has
heretofore been the case. It isessential that there be better under-
standing of the factors that affect Soviet decisions on such matters as
military programs, arms control negotiating positions, foreign policy
initiatives, and actions in a crisis. For example, how will the Soviet
economy shape and constrain future military programs? What are the
effects of Soviet internal politics, dissident elements of society, or
bureaucratic interests? How do Soviet relations with allies or client
states enhance or limit their foreign policy? Their military capabilities?
4
Approved For Release 2004/10/1 479M00095A000400010011-8
 Approved For Relepse 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP79M00095AO00400010011-8
IWO
C. Comprehensive Assessrtients of Soviet Efforts
How effectively are Soviet challenges and competition likely to
be, now and in the future ? Whatever their intent, will the Soviets
have the ability to prevail over the West in any of the potential kinds
of theater, intercontinental or naval conflicts that might arise ? What
is the actual and perceived military balance likely to be over the next
decade? Can the Soviets really translate shifts in the military balance
into political or military advantage ? How will the Soviets seek to turn
arms control negotiations to their political and military advantage?
How effective are their efforts to influence non-aligned nations or US
allies likely to be ? Flow might the Soviet. exploit to their advantage
various international economic trends, the flow of Western teechnology,
or the energy problems facing. the world?
This is where the intelligence aspects of military net assess-
ments play a major role, as do correspondingly broad assessments
of Soviet foreign policy and economic efforts.
D. Critical Areas of Military Interaction
Partly as' an input to the foregoing comprehensive assess-
ments of Soviet efforts and partly to support US military force
posture and operational planning, there is need for basic intelligence
and net assessment in the fine. As the US-Soviet military balance
becomes less favorable to the US, the number of critical areas of
military interaction grows. Intelligence issues and analysis once
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 5CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
,
 Approved For Release 2004/19/12 Ci-RDP79M00095AD0400010011-8
thought to be "tactical" now become strategic in their importance.
For example, what are current and future Soviet capabilities for SLBM
attacks on US bomber bases ? How, in detail, does Warsaw Pact
artillery support a combined arms offensive ? How well trained are
Soviet tank crews? What are the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet
command and control in various theaters or at sea? How effectively
can Soviet naval forces locate and neutralize US attack carrier task
forces?
III. How Well is the Community Postured to Deal with These Issues?
To make judgments on such a complex matter as the Intelligence
Community's posture for dealing with future Soviet challenges to US
interests is difficult and perhaps foolhardy. Nevertheless, such
judgments are essential in view of the persistent criticisms of
Community performance and the evolving nature of the Soviet
challenges to US interests. Moreover, there is a growing set
of sources to assist in judgments about the Community posture,
including the IC Staff semiannual review of intelligence for the
National Security Council, the 1976 report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, reports by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, internal reviews of intelligence
performance by the CIA and by DOD intelligence organizations
and the various reports (some still in draft) associated with the
NIE 11-3/8-76 competitive analysis. While the recommendations
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIk-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
cri
 Approved For Relea a 2004/10/12: CIA-R~P79M00095A000400010011-8
of these sources are not in total agreement, there is general
consistency about the strengths and weaknesses of the Community.
The following findings are based upon:
-- A review of the foregoing sources.
- - An IC Staff survey of National Intelligence Estimates
on the Soviet Union produced since 1960.
-- A limited sampling of other interagency products,
Defense Intelligence Estimates, and CIA reports.
-- Discussions with experienced observers of intelligence,
from both inside and outside the Intelligence Community.
A. Community Strengths
The Community is strongest with respect to traditional
areas of intelligence on the Soviet Union, where the needs of users
are stable and well understood, funding has been consistently high,
and the analytic techniques have been proven by extensive use.
Community efforts on certain aspects of the Soviet economy (e. g. ,
agricultural output, energy issues,
monetary at fiscal :natters).
7
Approved For Release 2004/10/12: C
IA-RDP79.M009 , kOG 4ODD10911-8
25X1 B
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP79M00095A0400010011-8
B. Corni.-nunity Weaknesses and Systemic Problems
However, when viewed against the challenges posed
by the Soviet Union, now and in the future, the capabilities of
the Community must be substantially extended. To understand
Soviet behavior as regards military programs, foreign policy,
and crisis actions, the Community needs:
-- More sophisticated treatment of how the Soviets view
the world, using Soviet perspectives and terminology.
-- More insight into internal Soviet decision processes and
constraints.
-- A better view of coming Soviet leaders.
-- A sust.ned, detailed analysis of Soviet international
policy and goals, encompassing their military, economic,
and political efforts.
On an equal footing with the need to understand Soviet purpose
and behavior is the need to do better in assessing and projecting
Soviet military programs. To do this, the Intelligence Community
must:
Improve its ability to assess Soviet and Warsaw Fact war-
waging capabilities, up to some ill-defined line where
intelligence analysis begins to evaluate US capabilities.
Develop a wholistic view of Soviet military and military-
related R&D.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 00095AO00400010011-8
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12`: `CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
-- Vastly improve the predictive value of economic analysis,
in contrast to only documenting the cost of past military
programs.
-- Improve our grasp of Soviet operational concepts,
particularly for nuclear war, as an important set of
inputs to net assessments and Soviet force projections.
Most needed in this regard is more comprehensive and
systematic analysis of Soviet doctrinal literature and military
exercises.
Underlying these Community weaknesses are some systemic
problems of Comi-nunity-organizations, customs and resource
allocation which must be addressed if there is to be substantial
improvement in estimates on the Soviet Union.
1. Data Bases. Important sources of intelligence data
on the Soviet Union are under utilized, not because of collection
problems, but because the data is not systematically or compre-
hensively compiled into forms which are readily accessible to
intelligence analysts. Needed, for example, are the following:
-- A major increase in compilation of documents, bibliographies,
abstracts, and indices which more systematically and
comprehensively integrate various human sources on the
Soviet Union--unclassified literature, classified documents,
FBIS, clandestine'reporting, embassy reporting, defectors,
and emigrees, and information from CIA's
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : 00095A000400 10011 8_
25X1A as9 3
 Approved For Rele sse 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP79M00095AO00400010011-8
More comprehensive and timely reduction of all relevant
data on Soviet military exercises, with cross-references,
trend analyses, and other aids which will make this body
of information more readily available to production
components of the Community.
Accelerated efforts to compile basic economic data on the
Soviet Union.
More attention to the detailed data needed to support net
assessments, especially for Warsaw Pact general purpose
forces.
2. Basic Research. More emphasis is needed on basic
research studies to provide the detailed understanding of Soviet
internal affairs which is essential for production of higher order
analyses of Soviet military programs, economic programs, foreign
affairs, and crisis behavior. These basic research studies should,
for example, include the following:
;tx'- -- A broader range of basic economic, industrial and
technological studies than are now being conducted.
- - Studies of Soviet society and dissent.
-- Research on factors influencing Soviet decisionmaking
processes.
-- Studies of the Soviet R&D establishment.
Systematic series of basic military interaction studies.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 1 CIA-RDP79M00095AO00400010011-8
 Approved For Rel se 2004/10~12,;,? -F DP79M00095A0 400010011-8
3. Trained Specialists on Soviet Affairs. The Coiii.niunity
does not have enough trained specialists on Soviet affairs. Moreover,
the senior personnel who most influence the content of national estimates
do not have sufficient time to become or remarin familiar with the
extensive body of material that is currently available on the Soviet
Union. Measures such as the following can, over time, alleviate
these problems:
- A long-term program to build up and sustain a body of
intelligence production personnel within the Community
who are experts on the Soviet Union, both generalists and
specialists.
-- Programs to draw upon academic institutions, other govern-
ment agencies, and private research organizations to
complement Community efforts in various areas of Soviet
affairs.
-- Efforts to inform senior Community analysts, especially
those involved with national estimates, of the results of
ongoing research on. the Soviet Union. Senior analysts
must make time to spend with the relevant source material
and basic studies; data and research studies must be
organized to facilitate ready access and assimilation
by these personnel.
11
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP79KO0095A000400010011-8
RE' I
 Approved For Release 2004/10/1 CIA-RDP79M00095A0Qg400010011-8
4. Bureaucratic Barriers to Dissemination. Information
on the Soviet Union which can be important for national estimates
and other intelligence products is not always made available to the
responsible analysts. Examples of such restrictions on information
flow to intelligence analysts include:
-- CIA/DDO restrictions on dissemination of sensitive
clandestine reports.
Limited distribution (or virtually no distribution in
some cases) of State Department ca' les or information
gleaned during overseas travel by senior US foreign
policy officials.
25X1 D
25X1 C
Protection of sensitive sources and reduction of the likelihood
of leaks are the reasons usually given for limiting dissemination of
such data, and in many cases these are valid reasons. But there
appear to be few checks and balances to assure that sensitivity is
.properly weighed against the benefits of wider dissemination or that
dissemination restrictions are not inisused to serve bureaucratic
purposes.
12 .
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : ~~ 1 100095AO00400010011-8
 Approved For Release 2004/1- /1"2': CIA-RDP79M00095 00400010011-8
5. Relevance of NIEs to Users' Needs. NIEs on the
Soviet Union are costly, in terms of Community manpower, yet
there are persistent questions raised by some users about the
relevance and utility of NIEs. i'h.e DCI's National Intelligence
Officers are working to tinder sst:and and resolve concerns raised
by various users, but more can be done, such as:
Systematic research on the multiple markets for NIEs, to
assure that user needs for national intelligence are
fully comprehended.
-- Investigation of alternative formats, schedules, and
coordination procedures for NIEs to meet user needs
at minimum cost to the Community.
-- Development of clear and agreed guidelines for discussing
evidence and uncertainty in NIEs and providing hypotheses
and judgments about future Soviet behavior which go beyond
the sources and methods of intelligence. These guidelines
should be keyed to the needs of various users and developed
in consultation with them.
-- More extensive and systematic efforts to involve users in
the development of terms of reference and at other key
points in the production of NIEs, to assure relevance.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 b
T9 M 00095A000400010011-8
 Approved For Release 2004/10: QIA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8
Lo NO:
Destroy
CY TO:
SENT,
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010011-8