RESPONSE TO PRM-11, TASK 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000200020019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 6, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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15 April 1977
NOTE FOR: C/PAID
C/HRD
C/SD
C/ID
AC/IS
SUBJECT : Response to PRM-ll, Task 2
The package at Tab A contains the
response drafted by to the
DCI's own outline for Task 2 of PRM-11.
This package was passed to Defense
informally during a recent meeting by
At Tab B is a rewrite of the
0
response, which was done by the DCI.
At Tab C is
DCI's rewrite.
A draft paper on the response to
Part 3 of PRM-11 is at Tab D for your
review.
STAT
STAT
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DCI/IC-77-0774
6 April 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
r r nt e l igence Community
SUBJECT : Response to Part 2 of PRM-11
1. Attached at Tab A is a paper prepared as the Part 2 response to
PRM-11 which is specifically based on the outline that you provided on
4 April.
2. At Tab B is an alternative paper generally based on the approach
used in the outline you provided, but which takes a somewhat different
approach and illustrates the complexity of the present situation and the
action options in tabular format.
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Attachments:
as stated
Distribution:
Orig. - Adsee., w/atts
1 - ER, Watts
1 -- D/DCI/IC, Watts
1 - AD/DCI/IC, Watts
I- D/OPEI/ICS, w/atts
1 - ES/ICS Subject, w/atts
1 - ES/ICS Chrono, Watts
1 -- IC Registry, w/atts
SA-D/DCI/IC
(6 April 1977)
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INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE AND MISSION
Res onse to Part 2 of PRM-11
A. INTRODUCTION
1. The basic purpose of intelligence activities is to provide each
echelon of command and control from the President to the military field
commander with judgments and information relating to all aspects of the
foreign situation needed as basis for his decisions and actions in execu-
tion of his responsibilities. Responding to the national, departmental
and tactical needs of the users of intelligence requires the existence
of assets and arrangements for the collection, processing, analysis,
production and dissemination of intelligence that is timely, accurate
and responsive to user needs.
2. It is the role of intelligence to support the formulation and
execution of policy decisions and strategy in diplomatic, military,
economic and other arenas, to provide strategic and tactical warning, to
support crisis responses, to provide guidance for weapons system acquisition,
to prevent technological surprise, to provide a basis for force structure
planning and to support preparation for and the conduct of military
operations.
3. In execution of this role, the Intelligence Community must have
goals and objectives which will enhance its support for national policy and
strategy, for national tactics in crisis management and for military strategy
and tactics.
B. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO ITS GOALS
4. As reqards national policy and strategy:
-- Inputs are long-term political, military and economic
indicators.
-- The primary techniques used are technical collection systems;
covert and overt human collection assets; good analysis,
synthesis and interpretation, and prompt dissemination.
-- Principal consumers are the President, the NSC, Cabinet
members and the Congress.
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5. As regards nitiona1 tactics in crisis mana ement:
-- Inputs are immediate military and other warning indicators.
-- The primary techniques used are technical collection systems,
covert human collection assets, good correlation and display,
and rapid interpretation.
-- Principal consumers are the President, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense.
6. As regards military strategy:
-- Inputs are primarily military order of battle, characteristics
of present weapons, and anticipated weapons and force developments.
-- Primary techniques used are technical collection systems, covert
and overt human collection assets, and net assessments.
-- Principal consumers are the President, Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
7. As regards military tactics:
-- Inputs are time-urgent data on military force movements and
actions.
-- Primary techniques used are technical collection systems and
tactical intelligence assets under theater or local military
control.
-- Principal consumers are the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operational
field commanders.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES IN COORDINATING TECHNIQUES AND SUPPORTING CONSUMERS
8. Basic problems of organization, of command and control and of
coordination arise from the fact that:
-- Individual collection systems and techniques are capable of
simultaneously serving the needs of consumers at different
echelons of the Government;
-- Tasking control of collection assets capable of serving
consumers with widely differing needs are not always clearcut;
-- There is some overlap in the capabilities of various collection
techniques to acquire needed information.
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9. On matters of both national and departmental intelligence, there
is overlap for program and budget development and for operational tasking
between the assigned responsibilities of the DCI and the departmental
secretaries, primarily the Secretary of Defense.
10. The key point for consideration is the desired degree of centralized
control.
a. As regards management, including program and budget development,
budget approval and fiscal control, the alternatives are:
-- A collegial system, in which the DCI is Chairman;
-- Assignment of authority to the DCI to serve as arbiter;
-- Assignment of authority to the Secretary of Defense, with
the DCI reporting to the Secretary.
b. As regards operational tasking going beyond the authority to
establish requirements and priorities, the alternatives are:
-- A collegial system in which the DCI is Chairman and
arbiter;
-- A collegial system in which the Secretary of Defense is
arbiter;
A collegial system in which the President designates those
matters on which the DCI shall be arbiter and those on which
the Secretary of Defense shall be arbiter, depending on the
relative importance assigned to national and/or military
requirements;
-- Assignment of control of operational tasking responsibility
to the DCI;
Assignment of operational tasking responsibility to the
Secretary of Defense, with the DCI reporting to the Secretary.
c. Whatever the degree and focus of centralized control in peacetime,
provision will have to be included for transfer of operating tasking
authority to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in wartime, as determined by the
President.
11. The foregoing alternatives can. be depicted in the following
alternatives:
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MANAGEMENT UNCERTAIN PRESIDENTIAL
TASKING COLLEGIAL DESIGNEE
TASKING TASKING
Collegial
Option A--what Option B--Resource manage-
exists today. ment as today, more specific
operational tasking pro-
cedures.
DCI in charge Option C--Stronger Option D--Stronger DCI role
DCI role in resource in resource management; more
management; opera- specific operational tasking
tional tasking as procedures.
today.
Secretary of Option E--SECDEF is Option F--SECDEF is head of
Defense in charge head of the entire the entire Intelligence
Intelligence Community as well as
Community as well as military forces.
military forces.
D. CHANGES IN DIRECTIVES NEEDED TO MATCH MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
12. Changes in statutes or Executive Orders needed to put into effect
each of the six options outlined above are as follows:
Option A: None
Option B: Modify E.O. 11905 to provide specific guidelines for
tasking each generic national, departmental and tactical
intelligence collection and production asset.
-- Such guidelines should designate the normal arbiter
for each category of intelligence, provide for
modification as circumstances warrant, and designate
those systems which will normally be subtasked to
military field commanders for-some portion of their
operations.
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Option C: Modify E.O. 11905 to give DCI final authority for budget
development and approval for submissions of CIA NSA
F_ I
VIA, the military service intelligence organizations,
and INR/State, with coordinating authority on budgets
for the intelligence/counterintelligence functions of
the intelligence elements of the FBI, Treasury Department
and ERDA.
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Option D: Will require a combination of B and.C above.
Options Will require amendment of the National Security Act
E & F of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949 and E.O. 11905 to give
the Secretary of Defense full authority over the
Intelligence Community, including the CIA.
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES REQUIRED TO MATCH THE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
13. The organizational changes required to bring the Intelligence
Community structure into consonance with the options outlined in
Paragraph 11 and the changes in directives described in Paragraph 12
are as follows:
Option A: None.
Option B: None.
Options Two key questions are involved:
C & D :
a. First, should the DCI, as resource manager for
the entire Intelligence Community, also be the operating
head of the CIA?
(1) If the answer is "Yes," no organizational
changes are required.
(2) If the answer is "No," a new issue arises
as to whether the DCI can perform his role as intelli-
gence advisor to the President without control of some
intelligence analysis and estimating resources.
(a) If it is considered that such resources
are needed, decision will be required as to
whether the DCI staff must. include:
-- Only the present, or an expanded,
NIO organization;
-- The NIO Staff and part of the CIA
Directorate of Intelligence;
-- The NIO Staff and all of the CIA/DDI.
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(3) The DCI already has responsibility for
production of national intelligence, and there is
no statutory provision for the internal organiza-
tion of CIA, so the only requirement would be
indication by Executive Order that the DCI, separated
from CIA, was charged to produce national intelligence
and authorized to establish such a staff as his duties
and authorities required.
b. The second key question is whether resource
many ement and operational tasking by the DCI of NSA
is compatible with-their having a dual response i i
the Secretary of Defense? If the DCI is separated from
the CIA, a related question is whether he should have the
same direct control of national intelligence collection
assets within the Department of Defense as he will have
over CIA operations?
(1) If the answer to the above questions is
"Yes," an Executive Order will be required trans-
ferring management and operational control of NSA
rom
the Secretary of Defense to the DCI. Careful study
would be needed as to whether it might be preferat-e
to transfer these organizations out of the Department
of Defense.
Options. Since the National Security Act of 1947 provides that the
E & F : CIA is under the direction of the National Security
Council, making the Agency directly responsible to the
Secretary of Defense would require legislation. Careful
study would be required as to whether the degree of
control to be exercised by the Secretary of Defense
actually would require that the CIA become an element of
the Department of Defense.
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INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE AND MISSION
Response to Part 2 of PRIM-11
A. INTRODUCTION
1. The basic purpose of intelligence activities is to provide each
echelon of command and control from the President to the military field
commander with judgments and information relating to all aspects of the
foreign situation needed as basis for his decisions and actions in
execution of his responsibilities. Responding to the national, depart-
mental and tactical' needs of the users of intelligence requires the
existence of assets and arrangements for the collection, processing,
analysis, production and dissemination of intelligence that is timely,
accurate, and responsive to user needs.
2. Complexity of the interrelationships among U.S. intelligence
activities is illustrated in Table 1 by listing the five basic activities
for which continuing inputs of intelligence are needed, and showing the
overlaps that exist among categories of intelligence, primary customers,
the essential products and the collection assets needed.
3. The pr blem to be assessed in Part 2 of PRM-11.1s how these
interrelationships can best be recognized in mechanisms for direction and
coordination of intelligence activities which will promote effectiveness
of the overall effort.
*National intelligence means that intelligence required by the President,
the National Security Council and other officials of the United States
Government involved in formulating and directing the implementation of
national policy, particularly foreign policy and national security policy.
Departmental intelligence is that intelligence that any department or
other independent organization of the Government requires to execute
its assigned mission.
Tactical intelligence is that intelligence required by the operating
forces of the military services to maintain their readiness for combat
operations and to support the planning and conduct of such operations
under combat conditions.
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TABLE 1
INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
BI 1C ACTIVITIES
SERVED BY INT
ELLIGENCE
:
Formulation of
Warning and
Weapon
Military Readiness for
National Policy
Crisis
Systems
Force Conduct of
and Strategy
Management
Acqui-
Structure Military
sition
Planninj_ Operations
CATEGORY OF
INTELLIGENCE
National
x
X
X
X
Departmental
x
x X
Tactical
X
X
PRIMARY CUSTOMERS
President
x
X
-----
X
X
NSC
X
X
X
X
Sec. Defense
x
X
X
X X
Sec. State
x
X
JCS
X
x
x X
ti i l i tar Depts.
X
Operational
Commanders
{ X
X
Congress
X
ESSENTIAL INTEL. ;
PRODUCTS
Mid/Long-Term
Indicators
X
X
X
Multi-discipline
Estimates
x
X'
X
Net Assessments
x
X
X
Near-term Estimates
i x
i X
X
Technical Analyses
X
Current Reporting
X
X
Situation Reports
X
Alert Memoranda
COLLECTION ASSETS
X
X
NEEDED
-
SIGINT Sensors
x
x X
x x
Ima ery Sensors
x
x { x
x x
Human (covert} x
Human (over
X
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B. CURRENT ORGANIZATTON AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES
4. Over a period of more than 30 years the U.S. foreign intelligence
effort has evolved into a diverse and rather complex network of intelli-
gence organizations, operating under numerous directives and coordination
mechanisms intended to foster the effectiveness of the effort. In recent
years the trend has been to invoke limited centralization mechanisms, and
recent Presidents have indicated an interest in strengthening the role of
the Director of Central Intelligence. The current situation, in terms of
allocation of responsibilities, is presented in Table 2. There are problems
in looking at intelligence as national, departmental or tactical (as Table
2 does) because some information, by its use, falls in more than one
category, but it is generally accepted that most intelligence organizations
have a primary mission which comes within one of the three categories, e.g.,
CIA is a "national" organization, DIA is "departmental" and an armored re-
connaissance unit is "tactical."
5. As Table 2 indicates:
a. The only collegial responsibility is the NSC Policy Review
Committee review and approval of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget that includes both national and departmental intelli-
gence elements. Even here, a potential conflict exists because of
responsibility of each departmental secretary for the budget of his
department.
b. The DCI (under Executive Order 11905) and the departmental
secretaries each have responsibilities to develop budgets for
national and departmental intelligence activities.
c. By his establishment of requirements and priorities for
national intelligence the DCI can exert an influence tantamount to
tasking of organizations within the DoD with the primary mi
of collection of national
dr-e d150 u sec to departmental tasking but~these organizations
C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES
6. The basic organizational and management problem for consideration
is the relative responsibilities of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense
for national intelligence activities. The Secretary of State and other
organization heads are involved, but emphasis is put on the Secretary of
Defense because four-fifths of the resources for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget are appropriated for intelligence
elements in the Department of Defense. The problem stems from the fact
that departmental prerogatives can run counter to DCI responsibilities as
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TABLE 2
CURRENT ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
National
Department
Tactical
Responsibility
Intelligence
Intelligence
Intelligence
Issue policy guidance
NSC
NSC
Departmental Secy.
NSC/PRC
NSC/PRC
Develop plans
DCI
Dept. Secy.
Dept. Secy.
Program
JCS
JCS
Mana ers
Develop programs
Program
Program
JCS
Managers
Managers
Military Services
Develop budget
DCI
DCI
}}
Dept. Secy.
Dept. Sec y.
Dept. Secy.
Approve budget
NSC/PRC
NSC/PRC Dept. Secy.
Establish requirements,
Dept. Secy.
Dept. Secy.
priorities, collection
tasking
DCI
Dept. Secy. Operational Cmdrs.
}
Exercise programatic
DCI (CIA only)
'i Dept. Secy. Operational Cmdrs.
tasking
Dept. Secy.
Manage by line control
DCI (CIA only)' Dept. Secy. Operational Cmdrs.
Dept. Secy-._i
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set forth by the President in E.O. 11905 to "ensure the development and
submission" of the NF.tP budget, to develop national intelligence require-
ments and priorities, and to supervise the production of national
intelligence. Two basic questions are involved:
a. Who should have budget development and approval authority
for national intelligence?
b. Who should have operational control and tasking authority
over organizations with the primary mission of acquiring and
producing national intelligence?
7. Responsibilities for the.actual collection, processing, analysis
and production of national intelligence are quite clearly delineated,
coordination mechanisms exist, and the system, while far from perfect,
is working quite satisfactorily.
8. Presidential options for decisions and actions affecting the
questions listed in Paragraph 6 above are depicted in Table 3. They
range from retaining the present situation through putting either the
DCI or the Secretary of Defense in a somewhat stronger position to making
the position of either of these officials much stronger.
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TABLE 3
DECISION OPTIONS AND ACTIONS FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
PRESIDENTIA1
OPTIONS II
DCI position
H much stronger
DCI position
somewhat
stronger
Sole authority to develop/approve
program and budget for all
national intelligence activities
Sole authority for operational
tasking of all national irtel-
licence activities
Program/budget controls
LRetain present situation No change
perational tasking
SECDEF position
somewhat
stronger
i~ SECDEF position
much stronger
H Program/budget controls
u Operational tasking
Sole authority to develop/approve
program and budget for all
national intelligence activities
Sole authority for operational
tasking of all national intel-
ligence activities
DCI not operating head of CIA;
remove NSA and National Recon-
naissance from DoD; CIA, NSA
and National Reconnaissance under
direct DCI operating control
E.O. 11905 amended to clarify DCI
authority to deal directly with program
managers and heads of intelligence
offices
E.O. 11905 amended to strengthen DCI
authority to task NSA and National Recon-
naissance elements directly
DCI and NSC/PRC position on NFIP budget
to be a recommendation to SECDEF in
development of his Department budget
No DCI tasking of DoD intelligence
elements except through, and with
approval of, SECDEF
DCI heads CIA but reports to SECDEF.
CIA may be integrated into DoD
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DCI RESPONSE TO PART 2 OF PRM-11
When one addresses the question of the most effective
organizational arrangements for meeting. the nation's intelli-
gence needs, it is important to underscore that good intelli-
gence is a prime requirement at every level of Government
concerned with national security from the President and
members of the National Security Council to the military
field commanders.
At the national level, the purpose of the U.S. Intelligence
Community is to produce high quality, relevant, and objective
intelligence for the President, the NSC, and, increasingly, for
the Congress. These national needs range from information and
analysis supporting the formulation of major policy decisions
to providing strategic and tactical warning. Such intelligence
is derived from the most technologically advanced technical
collection systems as well as from the most traditional forms
of espionage.
Intelligence must also serve the particular needs of the
Department of Defense and the military services. At one level
intelligence is used in making decisions as to what weapons
S E C IJ
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system to develop as well as in force structure planning. At
another level, intelligence provides essential information for
crisis response and support for the conduct of military operations
including the time-urgent data on military force movement and
activity. The means and manner of collecting, processing, and
producing such intelligence are as diverse as are the needs.
At issue is what organizational arrangements will most
effectively serve the wide variety of intelligence needs of
national, departmental, and tactical users.
The National Security Act of 1947 and the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives of the late 1940s and 1950s
established the basic division of responsibilities with respect
to intelligence activities among ageTcies and departments.
These divisions had their origins in the traditional distinction
between military and non-military intelligence. The CIA was
directed to produce "national" intelligence while the military
services were asked to continue to collect and produce "military"
intelligence for use both in war and peacetime.
In-charging the Director of Central Intelligence, as head
of CIA, with "coordinating" the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments, the National Security Act of
1947 sought to prevent a repeat of the intelligence confusion
and delays that occurred prior to Pearl Harbor. The problem
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addressed under the act was how to collect, collate, and
process intelligence reports and estimates that would best
serve the national leadership--the President and the NSC.
It is clear that the national security "language" of
the 1940s and 1950.s does not serve the needs of a modern and
technologically complex Intelligence Community. The old
distinctions between "military" and'hon-military," and
"tactical" and "national" have blurred.
Two separate aspects of the problems have markedly risen
in importance since 1947: the efficient management of the
resources allocated for intelligence collection and analysis;
and the optimal targeting of intelligence collection assets.
The resource allocation role of the DCI is complicated by
the fact that the resources applied to signals intelligence
and to satellite reconnaissance systems within the Department
of Defense represent more than half of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program budget. In contrast, the portion of the
NFIP budget that is appropriated to the Director of Central
Intelligence (in his capacity as Director of the CIA) is only
about percent. This has created problems for the DCI in
his exercise of leadership of the Intelligence Community, and
puts the Directors of NSA and the national reconnaissance
effort in the position of serving two masters--the Secretary
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of Defense and the DCI. At the same time, the existence of
intelligence collectors with potentially overlapping capa-
bilities, and the high costs of technical collection systems,
makes it increasingly important that there exist arrangements
to consider tradeoffs between the different systems.
The management of intelligence activities throughout the
Intelligence Community actually involves three types of
tasking.
First, is "mission" tasking, which is the "what to do"
tasking of collection and production organizations. This type
tasking is now done for the DCI in the collection field through
his development of requirements and priorities, and his levying
them on collectors, primarily through the mechanisms of the
DCI COMIREX and SIGINT Committees. In the production of
national intelligence, mission tasking is controlled by the
DCI through his NIOs and his operational management of the
CIA.
Second, there is "operational" tasking, which is the "how
to do it" response to mission tasking. Operational tasking
is the responsibility of the operating head of each organization
of the Intelligence Community. The DCI operationally tasks
only the CIA. Operational tasking of Defense elements of
the Intelligence Community is handled within the Defense
Department.
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The third type is "program and budget tasking" which
is tasking directly related. to "what should we do in the
future?" It is in this area of tasking that current DCI
responsibilities and authorities do not match, and in which
there is the potential for differences with departmental
secretaries who look upon program and budget tasking for
intelligence activities as a part of their overall respon-
sibilities to task elements of the department to do whatever
is needed to develop programs and budgets. Executive Order
11905 charges the DCI to "ensure the development and submission
of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program,"
but his authority for program and budget tasking is subject
to departmental challenge.
The tasking of collector organizations is complicated
because increasingly, intelligence data-collection systems
have grown capable of serving both the broad interests of
the policymakers and defense planners and the more specific
technical interests of weapons developers and field commanders.
Signals intelligence provides both economic and military
communications intelligence. Spies are asked to collect
information on Soviet weapon technology, political intentions,
grain harvests, etc. Satellites produce pictures which are
critical both to the SALT pol.icymaker and the Army Commander
on the East German border.
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There are issues of how to provide the tactical commander
in the field not only the appropriate product of "national"
intelligence collection assets, but how to permit that
commander to task those assets directly to his needs; and.
there are issues in the opposite direction, mainly involving
ensuring that the appropriate product of "tactical" intelli-
gence collection is made available to national policymakers.
One key question, then, is what degree of centralization
of control in the Intelligence Community will best provide
resource rationalization and insurance against duplication
and waste. Another question is how to task the multiplicity
of collection systems in ways that will be fully responsive
to the needs of all consumers. For example, any gains in
efficiency of tasking at the national level cannot be at the
expense of the Secretary of Defense's requirements for
immediately responsive intelligence assets in crisis and in
wartime.
Alternative forms of resource management and operational
tasking control deserve to be considered.
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Resource Managemerit Techni ues
Resource decisions?on collection and analysis systems
and organizations could be made on a collegial basis in a
negotiating forum which deals with resource management matters.
The Director of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of
Defense could be the Chairman, but neither would have final
decision authority. Differences would be referred to the
National Security Council or the President for decision.
The same negotiating forum, could be used with the DCI
having decision authority, subject only to appeal by other
members to the NSC or the President.
The Secretary of Defense could have the decision
authority.
Day-to-Day Operational Control and Mission Tasking Techniques
The direct mission tasking of intelligence collection
systems could be left to committee decision with actual command
authority left uncertain, and subject to negotiation.
The President could designate the DCI or the Secretary
of Defense as the tasking authority for a particular type of
system under specific circumstances, depending primarily on
the balance of importance between national and military
requirements.
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These variations in authority over resource allocation
and operational tasking can be combined into the following
basic management techniques:
Tasking
Collegial
Presidential Designee
Management
Tasking
Tasking
Collegial Management
A
B
DCI Control
C
D
Sec. Defense Control
E
F
Option A is about today's arrangements. No changes
would be necessary to E.O. 11905.
Option B is today's resource management procedures
with more specific mission and operational tasking
procedures. E.O. 11905 would have to be modified to-
provide specific guidelines for tasking each generic
category of "national" and "tactical" intelligence
collection.
Option C is a strengthened DCI role in resource
management with today's mission and operational tasking.
E.O. 11905 would have to be modified to provide DCI
full resource control over present DDO assets.
Option D is a strengthened DCI role in resource
management with more specific mission and operational
tasking procedures. Changes in E.O. 11905 as in B and
C above.
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Option E is Secretary of Defense in control of
resource mana.gement.and today's mission and operational
tasking. Changes would be necessary in E.O.-11905 to
reduce DCI responsibility for resource management.
Option F is Secretary of Defense resource control
and more specific mission and operational tasking.
Changes in E.O. 11905 as in E and B above.
Possible Organizational Changes to Match the Above Management
Techniques
There would seem to be no organizational changes required
under A and B.
With C and D, where the DCI would have responsibility
for allocating national intelligence resources, the question
arises whether a DCI with final authority for all resources
should also remain as head of one of the agencies (CIA)
competing for these resources.
If the answer is "no," then the question must be addressed
as to whether the DCI as principal intelligence advisor to the
President can perform that function effectively without direct
control of some intelligence analysis and estimating resources.
And if he must have such resources, what are the alternatives:
The NIO organization only, the NIO and all of the DDI, the NIO
and part of the DDT?-
9
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With C and D, there is also the issue of whether resource
rationalization and efficient management would be possible if
the DCI had responsibility for resource allocation while the
Secretary of Defense continued to manage intelligence activities?
25X1
This would require considering transfer of the principal DoD
collection assets (
to the DCI. Finally under C and D,
there is also the question as to whether procedures could be
devised to provide continuing availability of intelligence
resources of the right type to meet the needs of military
commanders during a time of crisis or war? This would require
some explicit provisions for collegial control of major
resource decisions on procurement or discontinuance.
In E and F the question would arise as to possible
conflicts between the DCI's role and that of the Secretary of
Defense in resource management. Could the DCI be subordinated
to the Secretary of Defense for resource management purposes,
but left with a direct access to the President for purposes of
advising on matters of intelligence substance?
There are, of course, variations on these techniques,
especially as to degree of control. That is, a move to give
either the DCI or the Secretary of Defense stronger control
of resource management need not be total, but only more
definitive than at present. The attached chart summarizes
these various techniques with gradations in between.
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TECHNIOIIES FOR MANAGING AND TASKING. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
A & B-
DCI position
much stronger
DCI position
somewhat
stronqer
Sole authority to develop/approve
program and budget for all
national intelligence activities
Sole authority for mission an
operational tasking of all na-
intelligence activities
tional
Program/budget controls/tasking
'Mission tasking
0O0erational tasking
Retain present situation
SECDEF position!
somewhat ''
stronger I
Program/budget controls /tasking
IMission tasking Pdo chan e
Operational tasking
Sole authority to develop/approve
program and budget for all
SECDEF position national intelligence activities
much stranger
Sole authority for mission a u
operational tasking of all na-
tional intelligence activities
F
DCI not operating head of CIA;
remove NSA and National Recon-
naissance from DoD; CIA, NSA
and National Reconnaissance under
direct DCI operating control
E.O. 11905 amended to clarify DCI
authority to deal directly with program
managers and heads of intelligence
offices, and task them directly
E.O. 11905 amended to strengthen i
authority to task NSA and National
Reconnaissance elements directly .
No change
DCI and NSC/PRC position on NFIP budget
to be a recommendation to SECDEF in
development of his Department budget
No DCI tasking of DoD intelligence
elements except through, and with
approval of, SECDEF
DCI heads CIA but reports to SECDEF.
CIA may be integrated into DoD
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RESPONSE TO PART 3, PRM-11
1. Need for changes in present directives governing the
Intelligence Community should focus on four'areas, the controls
over which are key to the effectiveness of the U.S. foreign
intelligence effort. These four are the controls over:
a. Legality/propriety of intelligence activities;
b. Production and evaluation of national intelligence
products;
~
c. Establishment of requirements and- r
4e and
tasking of current collection assets;
d. Planning, programming and budgeting of future
assets.
2. Since the role of the senior U.S. intelligence officer
(the DCI) is key to consideration of the organization and
functioning of the Intelligence Community, the following dis-
cussion of these four areas of control focuses largely on the
responsibilities and authorities of the DCI.
B. CONTROLS OVER LEGALITY/PROPRIETY OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
3. Effective controls in this area call for clear directives
or laws, professional ethics and an effective oversight mechanism.
a. The Attorney General's Part 1 response to PRM-11
should indicate whether there is any need to expand on
provisions of E.O. 11905.
b. A high standard of professional ethics depends more
on leadership and morale than on directives.
c. The Intelligence Oversight Board system established
by E.O. 11905 has worked reasonably well.
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4. It would i:ot be appropriate to charge the DCI to
oversee the legality and propriety of intelligence activities
conducted by any organization for which he*does not have
operating management responsibility. No change should be
made in this area other than to provide that the Intelligence
Oversight Board (or whatever other mechanism the President
may elect to. establish for this oversight function) shall
furnish to the DCI all reports relating to the possible
illegality or impropriety of activities for which he is the
operating manager.
5. The DCI responsibility and authority for the production
of national intelligence is quite clearcut, and his role in the
production of intelligence has carried with it recognition that
he also is responsible for evaluating the timeliness, quality
and responsiveness of the products.
a. Improvement in the intelligence product relates
more to management attention, the development of analysts,
the adequacy of personnel and automatic data support than
to changes in directives or restructuring of offices.
b. Likewise, improvement in the interface among
national and departmental products to assure a maximum
of mutual support is .a matter of leadership and effective
staff-level actions rather than of directives.
6. Overall, the DCI has adequate responsibility and
authorities to direct national intelligence production, and
to evaluate the effectiveness and utility both of the products
and of the collection, processing and analysis efforts that
support intelligence production. No change in existing
directives or in existing organizational arrangements is
needed for the production of national intelligence.
D. CONTROL OVER REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT, PRIORITY SETTING,
AND MISSION TASKING OF CURRENT COLLECTION ASSETS
7. The DCI currently is charged to develop national intelli-
gence and priorities and he has developed mechanisms for levying
these on collectors as mission tasking.
a. This process is highly developed-in the imagery and
SIGINT fields, and requirements, and their.tasking, are handled
in a systematic way by the DCI's Committee on Imagery Require
ments and Exploitation (COMIREX) and SIGINT Committee.
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b. As regards collection by human resources, DCI
authority extends only to the CIA. Delineation. of DCI
authority to task both overt and covert human resources
would improve the situation.
c. Defense Department concerns over transfer of
control over national intelligence assets to the Secretary
of Defense in wartime call for a careful study of arrange-
ments by which this can best be accgmplished. Presidential
action should be limited to directing that this be done.
Update of the existing Memorandum of Understanding between
the Secretary of Defense and the DCI could be the vehicle.
8. Overall, the DCI has adequate responsibilities and
authorities to develop national intelligence requirements and
their priorities. He has an effective system for levying mission
tasking on collectors of imagery and signals intelligence.,
Attention should be given to granting the DCI directive authority
to levy national intelligence requirements on human resource
collectors other than those in CIA.
E. CONTROL OVER PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING FOR
FUTURE ASSETS
9. Interest in furthering the effectiveness and efficiency
of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort under tight fiscal con-
straints has turned Presidential interest toward greater cen-
tralization of the planning, programming, budget process. The
DCI has been the focal point of those interested in centraliza-
tion. To date this has resulted in assigning the DCI respon-
sibilities which are not matched by authorities. A primary
result of the PRM-11 exercise should be rectification of this
imbalance.
a. The DCI is now charged to "ensure the development
and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program," but lack of specific authority for the DCI
to deal directly on these matters with intelligence program
managers and the operating heads of intelligence organiza-
tions makes DCI actions in this field subject to departmental
challenge.
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b. The NFIP budget assembled by the DCI is submitted
to the NSC Policy Review Committee for review and approval,
but it is unclear whether the PRC decision as to the NFIP
budget is directive on the departmental secretaries or is
merely a recommendation to he considered in development of
the departmental budget.
10. The first decision to be made is whether there should
be a return to the pre-1971 situation in which there was no
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. The CIA prepared
its own budget and the budgets of intelligence components within
the departments and other agencies were handled strictly within
departmental channels. The balance of this paper is premised
on the expectation there will be no decision to return to the
pre-1971 situation.
11. Assuming there will continue to be a consolidated
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, there is need
to assure that whoever is responsible for preparing that budget
also has responsibilities and commensurate authorities for the
planning and programming which provide underpinning for the
budget and assure the development of adequate future capabilities.
12. Whatever mechanisms are provided for the planning,
programming, hudgeting of future assets, the system must be
such that it:
a. Permits thorough study of pertinent issues;
b. Allows an airing of all claims;
c. Is flexible enough to encourage new approaches;
d. Provides for appropriate resource tradeoffs within
and among programs;
e. Works smoothly and resolves disputes quickly and
decisively.
13. Options for a Community arrangement which would support
the functioning of such a system are outlined in the next It
section.
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14. The approach to the problem of organizational options
for the Intelligence Community initially involves three
questions:
a. Should the person who is primary intelligence
adviser to the President also be responsible for planning,
programming and budgeting needed to assure adequate future
national intelligence capabilities?'
(1) Yes. The President's adviser will inevitably
need to advise on both substantive information resource
needs, including the basis on which such needs are
determined.
b. Should the primary intelligence adviser to the
President also be responsible for the production of
national intelligence?
(1) Yes. Whoever is responsible for substantive
information, particularly in crisis or time-urgent
situations, will be, in fact if not in title, the
actual primary intelligence adviser to the President.
Denial to the senior intelligence officer of his
analytical and production base would virtually destroy
his capability to serve effectively as the President's
primary intelligence adviser.
c. Would it be appropriate to designate as primary
intelligence adviser to the President a person who is
assigned to a department and is directly subordinate to a
departmental secretary?
(1) No. The independence of the primary intelli-
gence adviser to the President from departmental con-
cerns and loyalties will be a continuing hallmark of
his value to the President.
15. The problem of options, therefore, essentially boils
down to the role and authorities of the DCI: Should they be
roughly as at present, should they be expanded moderately, or
should they be expanded in a truly major way?
a. Leaving matters as. they are probably is unacceptable
to the President, whose issuance of PRM-11 suggests an inten-
tion to put his mark on the Intelligence Community and the
manner in which it functions.
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b. A moderate expansion of the DCI role could be
accomplished by leaving him as the Director of the CIA
as well as of the Community, and making the following
changes by Executive Order.
(1) Make the DCI responsible for preparing the
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and
submitting it to the NSC Policy Review Committee.
Grant the DCI clear authority for direct contact
with program managers and the operating heads of
intelligence organizations and to obtain from them
the information and data required for preparation
of the budget and associated studies on issues
identified during budget development.
(2) Provide, through the role of the NSC Policy
Review Committee, for interdepartmental review and
consideration of the NFIP budget. As now, where
there are disagreements between the DCI and the
secretary of a department, the appeal channel to the
President should be retained.
(3) Specifically provide the DCI with authority
to oversee the development of intelligence plans and
programs and to task elements of the Community for
preparation of planning and programming inputs as
required for planning and programming activities of
his Intelligence Community Staff.
(4) Direct the DCI to develop arrangements and
mechanisms by which overt and covert collection
capabilities of human resources in organizations
other than CIA can be tasked to work against national
intelligence information requirements.
(5) Direct the DCI to initiate efforts to provide
for a working interface among national, departmental
and tactical intelligence assets in wartime which will
assure direct responsiveness to requirements of the
Department of Defense and the operational commands,ILLEGIB
and still retain essential support for national
intelligence needs.
6
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16. A major expansion of the DCI role could be accomplished
by drastic surgery on the national foreign intelligence community
resulting in:
a. Creation of a National Intelligence Agency (by
whatever name) with three subordinate elements: The
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency
the Department
ot De tense which are now included in the NFIP. Because
of its size, it probably would not -be feasible to include
the NIA in the Executive Office of the President.
b. Establishment of a Director of National Intelligence
as the senior intelligence officer, primary adviser to the
President and operating head of the National Intelligence
Agency.
25X1
d. Establishment of a Director of the CIA as operating
manager of the Agency and reporting in the chain of command
to the Director of National Intelligence.
17. On balance, it is recommended that the program outlined
above for a moderate expansion of the role and authorities of
the DCI be approved.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
12 April 1977
25X1
The attached draft paper responds to
your request this morning for a position
paper responding to Part 3 of PRM-11.
and I prepared 25X1
separate approaches to an outline, and
the attached paper reflects ideas from
both. I think the draft responds to
expressed concerns, and have ~W1
passed a copy to him for review.
SA-D/DCI/IC
Attachment:
as stated
ACTION
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