REPORT ON THE PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FIELD COMMANDERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00062A000200060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 12, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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'gy'p secret
actical - NationaU- Intelligence Interface Studies
I .-.port on the
PnOT STUDY ON 1 .1 `IUYVAIL
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT T.
O
FOLD COMMANDERS
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12.jonuary 197.6
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Tactical-National Intelligence Interface Studies
REPORT ON THE
PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT TO FIELD COMMANDERS
12 January 1976
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I )istribution:
1-Chairman, joint Chiefs of Staff
2-Deputy to the DCl for the Intelligence Community
3-12-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
13-16-Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army
17-21-Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
22-26-Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
27-Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps
28-33-Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (Attn: DIA DP)
34-36-Director, National Security Agency
37-38-Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Systems
39-Director, Intelligence Directorate, US European Command
40-Director, joint Staff, OJCS
41-Director for Plans and Policy (J-5), OJCS
42-Principal Deputy for Planning, Intelligence Community Staff
43-47-Joint Staff, OJCS (for further distribution)
48-75-IC Staff Registry
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Executive Summary ................................................. 1
Chapter I-Introduction ............................................. I-1
Purpose ........................................................ I-1
Study Organization ............................................. 1-1
Background .................................................... 1-2
Terms of Reference ............................................. 1-3
Criteria for Comparison .......................................... 1-4
Scope .......................................................... I-5
Chapter II-Scenario Development and Study Assumptions .............. 11-1
Contingency Plan ............................................... II-1
Assumptions for the Pilot Study .................................. 11-2
Pilot Study Scenario ............................................. 11-3
Chapter III-Theater Information Needs and Intelligence Capabilities ..... 111-1
Theater Information Needs ....................................... III-1
Theater Collection and Reporting Capabilities .. . ................... 111-3
Theater Tasking Against Theater EEI ............................. 111-5
Assessment of Theater Assets to Satisfy Theater EEI ................ 111-5
Theater Capability to Satisfy National EEI ......................... 111-7
Chapter IV-National Foreign Intelligence Capabilities .................. IV-1
National Foreign Intelligence Assets Availability .................... IV-1
National Strategic EEI ........................................... IV-2
National Assets ................................................. IV-2
Assessment of National Capability to Satisfy Theater EEI ............ IV-3
National Foreign Intelligence Assets in Total ....................... IV-8
Categories of EEI ............................................... IV-10
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Chapter V--Conclusions and Recommendations ......................... V-I
Mutual Intelligence Support ....................................... V-1
Future Actions .................................................. V-7
ANNEXES
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A. Pilot Study Guidance .............................................. A-i
Appendix I -Terms of Reference ................................... A-1
Appendix 2-Co-Chairmen's Memorandum of 20 February 1975 ........ A-
Appendix 3-Memorandum of Agreement of 2 November 1973 ......... A-9
B. Study Participants ................................................. B-i
Appendix I-Study Group Membership .............................. I3-1
Appendix 2-National Working Group Membership ................... B-3
Appendix 3-Theater Working Group Membership .................... B-5
C. Assessment of Confidence in Capability to Satisfy Theater EEI ......... C-i
Appendix I -Theater Working Group Methodology Instructions ........ C-1
Appendix 2-Theater Working Group Application of Methodology ...... C-3
Appendix 3-Theater Working Group Assumptions ................... C-7
Appendix 4-National Working Group Methodology Instructions ....... C-9
Appendix 5-National Working Group Application of Methodology ..... C- I 1
Appendix 6-National Working Group Assumptions ................... C-15
I). Theater Information Needs ......................................... I)-i
Appendix 1-USEL'COM Memorandum of 27 February 1975,
-Subject: Essential Elements of Information (L') ..................... 1)-I
Appendix 2-Criteria for Development of EEI Sample ................. [)-11
Appendix 3-Distribution of EEI Among Priorities .................... I)-13
Appendix 4-Distribution of EEl Among Timeliness Values ............ I)-15
Appendix 5-Distribution of Timeliness Values Among Priority I EEI ... D-17
Appendix 6-Distribution of Timeliness Values Among Priority 2 EEI ... D-19
Appendix 7-Distribution of Timeliness Values Among Priority 3 EEI ... 1)-21
Appendix 8-Distribution of Timeliness Values Among Priority 4 EEI ... D-23
Appendix 9-Distribution of Timeliness Values Among Priority 5 EEI ... 1)_25
:appendix 10-Subject Categories Encompassed by the EEI Sample ..... 1)-27
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Appendix 11-Map of Middle East Showing Countries and
Water Areas Included in the EEI Sample .......................... D-29
Appendix 12-Map of Eastern Europe Showing Countries and
Water Areas Included in the EEL Sample .......................... D-31
E. Theater Collection and Reporting Capabilities ........................ E-i
Appendix 1-Representative Collection and Reporting Assets by
Force Element .................................................. E-1
Appendix 2-Capabilities of Representative Theater Assets ............. E-5
F. National Strategic EEI ............................................. F-1
G. National Foreign Intelligence Collection and Reporting Capabilities ..... G-1
Appendix 1-Satellite Systems ...................................... G-7
Appendix 2-Airborne Systems ..................................... G-13
Appendix 3-Non-satellite SIGINT Systems .......................... G-17
Appendix 4-HUMINT Systems .................................... G-19
J. Assessment Matrices (under separate cover) ...........................
J-i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PURPOSE AND STUDY ORGANIZATION
1. (U) The Pilot Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders
responds to an agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence to conduct a pilot study to size problems in the tactical-national
intelligence interface, develop study procedures, and gain insight into possibilities for
mutual support between the national foreign intelligence community and the military
operating forces.
2. ^ The study provides a basis for recommendations by the joint Chiefs of
Staff regarding National Foreign Intelligence Program support that could be made
available to satisfy theater intelligence needs for a contingency operation in the
Mediterranean area, and follow-on studies of the tactical-national intelligence
interface. In addition, the study assesses theater capabilities to meet sample national
requirements for the contingency situation, and identifies and documents other
actions that relate to tactical-national intelligence relationships.
3. The study group was chaired jointly by representatives of the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, who also served as the
Joint Staff and IC Staff members of the study group. Other study group members
were appointed by each military Service, CIA, USEUCOM, DIA, NSA/CSS and
NRO. A Theater Working Group, chaired by DIA, developed and assessed theater
information needs and capabilities. A National Working Group chaired by the IC
Staff developed and assessed national foreign intelligence information needs and
capabilities.
B. ^ BAC,KGROUND, TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SCOPE
1. (U) The most critical aspect of the pilot study is the comparison of national-
level foreign intelligence needs and capabilities with those of the operating forces.
Competing priorities, relationships between operations and intelligence and between
resources and capabilities, and responsibilities for equipping, maintaining, and
commanding the military forces have caused the JCS and the Services to believe that
tactical commanders cannot count on the continuing availability of national
intelligence support in wartime. In their operational and force development planning,
therefore, they believe it essential that military departments and commands retain
and control their organic and direct support intelligence capabilities.
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2. Over the past several years. management interest in intelligence has
tended to focus on achieving savings by eliminating duplication and consolidating
intelligence activities across Services and agencies under executive agents. The
resource implications have tended to cause legitimate concern among the Services
that their resource management responsibilities for and command control over
organic and direct support intelligence assets could be adversely affected. degrading
the war-fighting capabilities of the forces.
3. EITertms of Reference for this pilot study are at Appendix 1. Annex A. The
study group found it necessary to permit some deviations from the Terms of
Reference. "These deviations, detailed in Chapter 1, affected procedures, but not the
purpose, direction or intent of the pilot study. The following are the most significant
deviations:
a =I'o consider only theater intelligence and related assets assigned to
the joint Task Force committed to the contingency operation in the study scenario.
h. QTo use sample essential elements of information (EEI) developed by
the working group chairmen and USEUCOII representatives.
c.0'I'o omit the explicit determination of the effect that additional tasking
for the contingency situation would have on the primary missions of national systems
and the quality of their responsiveness.
cl.='I'o omit determination of peacetime tasking of national systems that
could be reduced or terminated to accommodate tasking for the contingency
situation.
e Itho consider only national intelligence capabilities in or directly
related to the NFIP.
4.Q"I u create a manageable situation for a first, in-depth effort to understand
the complexities of tactical-national relationships, the scope of the pilot study was
limited:
a.=To it contingency situation in the Mid East and a continuing threat to
central Euro
I). b-I'o those theater intelligence forces available to USCINCEUR for the
specific contingency situation;
I'o intelligence capabilities operational by 31 December 1974; and
d.^l'o the political situation that obtained during the October 1973 Mid
East war.
C. (1'S) .S .'EI AR1O A.VL) STL`L)f' ASSN IVIPTIONS
1. 0 USCINCEUR proposed USEUCONI OPLAN
as the source for the pilot study scenario. Chapter II discusses USEUCOM
OPLANQand scenario development. This scenario permitted assessment of a
broad range of national intelligence assets against representative theater EEI, and
consideration of intelligence priorities between the national and theater levels.
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2. Chapter II lists a number of assumptions made by the study group that
affecteteoutcome of the study. The most significant among these were: that the
contingency situation posed threats of Soviet attacks against the U.S. and the
European central region; that EEI provided for the pilot study were a true
representative sample; that theater collection and reporting assets identified by
USCINCEUR would be available and would operate against theater EEI; that all
national and departmental level collection and reporting assets in the NFIP were
available for consideration for tasking against theater EEI; and that adequate
resources (funds and manpower) would be available for national and theater
collection and reporting assets.
D. AB THEATER INFORMATION NEEDS AND INTELLIGENCE
CAP ILITIES
1. ^ For this pilot study, a sample of 82 EEI represented theater information
needs for the conduct of conventional offensive operations in the Mid East under the
scenario. The sample has at least one entry for each type of EEI that would be
included in a comprehensive listing. Since the sample is not comprehensive, however,
it does not provide a basis for analysis of requirements in quantitative terms,
identification of recurrent requirements, volume assessments, or application of the
priorities established by USEUCOM and its component commands.
2. ^ The EEI sample does not include broader, and perhaps overriding, theater
requirements for concurrent operations outside the Mediterranean and Mid East.
3. ^ Most theater intelligence assets assessed in the study are organic to
combat units assigned to the Joint Task Force. Of the 40 units and activities included,
24 are HUMINT, six COMINT, two IMAGERY, three MASINT, and five multi-
sensor. Only six of these assets are in the NFIP.
E. (U) NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND
NATIONAL STRATEGIC EEI
10 National foreign intelligence assets available for collecting and reporting
against theater EEI were selected on the basis of their availability and apparent
capability to support a theater commander without a system or design change. The
deployment of national intelligence assets for the study was based on actual
experience in crises.
2. ^ In some cases, study assumptions for use of national assets permitted
assessments despite problem areas beyond the scope of the study. These assumptions
permitted a data base to be established under near-ideal conditions. Effects of
individual, real-world problems could then be applied to individual systems and
groupings of systems.
3. ^C'he study group found no officially approved national strategic EEI
applicable to a worldwide crisis, such as was postulated by USCINCEUR for the
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study.. sample set of assumed national strategic EEI was developed by the National
Working Group and agreed to by the National Intelligence Officers. They provided a
basis for judgments as to the extent to which national assets might be available to
work against theater EE;I. Of the 5' assumed national strategic EEI. 40 are identical
to theater EI'.I and were included in the evaluation.
F. (S) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEND.4TIONP
INlutual Intelligence Support
a. =Lbm(usion: A large number of studies and activities address various
aspects of tactical-national intelligence relationships. Each of these relates in some
ssay to improving intelligence support to field commanders. There has been, however.
only limited effort to pull together the results of these studies, collate and synthesize
the lessons learned from them. or develop a coordinated approach for further work.
t?teiwoniewlutton: Before undertaking new or follow-on efforts, a joint
J(a l(: 51.111 r ement should review all studies and activities relating to the tactical-
national intelligence interface, synthesize their results, identify and prioritize
specific problem areas, and develop a plan for further work.
I,=Cr,arlusron: Understanding interaction between intelligence and
operations in a combat environment is the key to the tactical-national intelligence
interface. To the combat commander. intelligence is an essential element of his force.
National intelligence assets that cannot meet his reporting timeliness and accuracy
requirements in combat are not adequate for tactical intelligence support in wartime.
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Rr-trm,mendatron: The JCS and the Intelligence Community should
continue jointly to make national and tactical intelligence assets mutually supportive
in conflict situations. Development of a conceptual framework to describe and
rationalize the division of labor should be pursued as a matter of priority.
omlusx n: There is no known documentation for national information
needs and priorities in wartime.
QRrtonmtendatton: The United States Intelligence Board should be
requested to address this problem.
d.0 C(Mehoton: The static matrix approach did not permit consideration
of the dynamics of the operational environment. In wartime, intelligence capabilities
would be subject to attrition. countermeasures and communications degradation that
can be assessed best in a gaming approach.
= Rerommrndatirn: The JCS and IC Staff should jointly assess
dynamic gamin methodologies for use in any follow-on studies.
e. .onrlusu,n: With adequate planning, each set of assets (theater and
national) can offset significant deficiencies in the other. The entire intelligence picture
could be improved. for example, by informing field commanders of the targets in their
areas of interest that will be tasked to national assets. National systems could cover
'In re%irwinq tIit, respreu,e rapahihtirs of natiorual and tactical assets to respond to established EEI. I)I:\
notes that less siongent t riteria were utitiird in measuring the abilities of national assets n, respond than was the
r. ,se her tau is it assets.
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some high-priority theater targets, permitting tactical commanders to employ their
organic and direct support intelligence assets on combat intelligence needs that they
otherwise would not be able to cover.
Recommendation: Develop procedures to coordinate national targets
with theater collection plans at appropriate levels, to include a mechanism for rapidly
notifying commanders of targets scheduled for national assets.
f.0 Conclusion: Theater assets supporting the joint Task Force have an
even or better than even chance of satisfying about 80 percent of the theater EEI
sample. The majority of theater EEI that could not be covered by theater assets with
any degree of certainty related to intentions, judgments and similar intangibles. Sixteen
theater EEI could not be satisfied by theater assets with high or moderate confidence
within the time constraints specified by USEUCOM. Of these, national assets could
contribute significantly to the satisfaction of nine. (Details regarding this conclusion
are in Chapter V.)
(1) ^ Four EEI that could not be satisfied by theater assets could be
satisfied by national assets with high or moderate confidence and within the
timeliness criteria. These four EEI focused on needs for information outside the area
of operations and on capabilities.
(2) D The remaining five of the nine EEI to which national systems
could contribute significantly, and theater systems could not, concerned primarily
weapons location and capabilities of enemy forces.
I1Recommendation: The capabilities of national intelligence assets
identified in paragraphs A.6.a and A.6.b, Chapter V, should be evaluated, updated
and tested in joint exercises to determine the extent to which they can support theater
intelligence plans. Following the evaluation, and in coordination with USCINCEUR
and the IC Staff, the JCS should recommend to the Secretary of Defense and Director
of Central Intelligence specific options for theater support by these national
intelligence systems.
g. Conclusion: Although the capabilities of theater intelligence assets
decrease with distance from the combat zone, theater assets can make a significant
contribution to national-level intelligence needs and can offset deficiencies in national
capabilities to collect and report on combat operations. Specifically:
(1) =Forty theater EEI were of interest to national authorities.
Theater assets had an even or better than even chance of satisfying 90 percent of
these, assuming that timeliness requirements at the national level are the same as
those of the combat forces.
(2)F]For the study scenario, theater assets appeared to be better able
than national assets to satisfy about one-third of the theater EEI considered to be of
equal national-level interest.
= Recommendation: Theater intelligence capabilities should be explicitly
considered. in national intelligence planning for crisis and contingency situations.
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2. ^ Future actions (Study Related)
:r.^ C:'onclus,nns: Computer programs and data base developed through
collaboration with I)la are responsive to paragraph 2.b. of the Study Terms of
Reference.
Recommendation. These programs should be further refined during
follow-on stu ies with a view toward making them available for planning and
allocating intelligence assets.
1,. ^ Conclusion: The confidence factor judgments of the degree to which
EF.I can be satisfied are composites of the several questions into which each EEI can
be factored. The judgments, while acceptable for the limited purpose of the pilot
study, lack the specificity for timeliness. accuracy and priority that would be needed
for intelligence planning analysis.
^ Rrconnnendation: EEl for future studies of this type should be
factored into specific questions. Capabilities judgments should be displayed for each
l,Ei and its component questions. In addition, to accommodate assessment of
scenario-constrained capabilities, each EEI should be clearly related to the specific
scenario times and events to which it applies.
( - ^ Cwnh sgn: Periodic theater readiness assessments include theater
intelligence assets. Theater staffs understand the capabilities and limitations of these
assets, can assess their mission impact, and have ready access to detailed data
concerning them. Initial assessments of theater capabilities for follow-on studies,
therefore. can be made best in-theater.
^) Reconnrndatwn: For Follow-on studies, Unified & Specified (U&S)
commanders should be requested to provide initial assessments of theater capabilities
and intelligence needs. The task of matching requirements to national assets would be
(lone best at the Washington level.
d. ^ Conclusion: There is little confidence in current capabilities to
differentiate tactical nuclear munitions from other types of munitions in the combat
zone.
^lnnn,nrndntmn: A follow-on study should specifically address
Capabilities to identify and characterize munition types in the combat zone.
r. omlu.uons: "There are three combat intelligence problem areas that
appear to have worldwide applicability:
I) ^ Intelligence relating to battlefield intentions, judgments, and
similar intangibles cannot be collected and reported with certainty.
(')^ Intelligence-capabilities of combat forces decrease with distance
from the combat zone.
(3)^l'imeliness under combat conditions is one of the most difficult
Criteria to meet. vet one of the most critical to the combat commander.
^Rrcnnunendation: Follow-on studies should address these problem
areas specifically, with a view toward generalized solutions that can be incorporated
in military doctrine and tactics.
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f. 0 Conclusion: Actual experience factors were not available for the
analysis of the capabilities of the entire range of collection, reporting and
communication systems.
Recommendation: Capabilities based on actual experience, where
they are not now available, should be identified in a future study.
g. Q Conclusion: The study organization--a study group of principals
supported by two working groups, one focusing on national and the other on theater
capabilities and needs-adequately represented the divergent and often conflicting
interests of the many organizations participating in the pilot study.
FIRecommendalion: The organization for any future studies should
ensure adequate representation for all divergent views.
h=Conclusion: The study was sponsored by the DCI and Secretary of
Defense, and co-chaired by their representatives. Study participants dealt with
matters of intelligence, operations and command and control. Honest differences
regarding interaction between intelligence and operations in combat and associated
resource allocations surfaced issues that could not be resolved at the level of the study
participants.
Recommendation: Insure future study participation at a level that can
address basic issues.
i._C'onclusion: Study and working group members participated in the
pilot study as an additional duty, severely limiting the time they could devote to data
collection and analysis for the study.
Recommendation: Depending upon the scope of any future study,
consideration should be given to assignment of a nucleus of full-time personnel.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
A.= PURPOSE
1. = This report responds to an agreement between the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct a pilot study to size problems in
the tactical-national intelligence interface, develop study procedures, and gain insight
into possibilities for mutual support between the national foreign intelligence
community and the military operating forces.
2. By its Terms of Reference (Annex A), this study:
a. =Provides a basis for recommendations by the joint Chiefs of Staff to
the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of Central Intelligence regarding:
(1) (S) The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) support
that could be made available to satisfy the essential intelligence needs of
USCINCEUR and his subordinate commanders for contingency operations in the
Mediterranean area.
(2) The conduct of follow-on studies of the tactical-national
intelligence interface.
bJ Develops and implements the computer programs and data base to
support the overall tactical-national intelligence interface study.
B. STUDY ORGANIZATION
1. Q The study group was chaired jointly by representatives of the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, who also served as the
Joint Staff and IC Staff members of the study group. Executive officers from the joint
Staff and Intelligence Community (IC) Staff supported the co-chairmen. Other study
group members were appointed by each military Service, USEUCOM, DIA,
NSA) and NRO.
2. Two working groups were established. * The Theater Working Group,
chaired by DIA, developed and assessed theater information needs and capabilities.
The National Working Group, chaired by the IC Staff, developed and assessed
national foreign intelligence information needs and capabilities. Working group
*To better reflect their actual functions, the study group changed the names given to the working
groups in the Terms of Reference.
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membership also included J-3. J-5 and J-6 directorates of the Joint Staff, each military
Service, USEUCOM, IC Staff, DIA, NSA/CSS, and NRO. DMA and DIS were
invited to appoint observers to the study group. CIA was offered and accepted full
membership on both study and working groups. Because of time and travel
limitations, the USEUCONI member participated with the study group only until
theater intelligence needs had been developed. USEUCOM study and working group
members supported the study in-theater.
3.0 This pilot study was an additional duty for both study and working group
members. The principal duties of the members, particularly in the working groups,
limited the time available to them for work on the study. This and the experimental
nature of the study contributed to its delayed completion.
C. D BACKGROUND
1. E3'1'he most critical aspect of this study is the comparison of national-level
foreign intelligence needs and capabilities with those of the operating forces.
Competing priorities, relationships between operations and intelligence and between
resources and capabilities, and responsibilities for equipping, maintaining, and
commanding the military forces have caused the JCS and military Services to believe
that tactical commanders cannot count on the continuing availability of national
intelligence support in wartime. In their operational and force development planning,
they ha%c to consider the possibility that national-level needs will take priority over
tactical needs: that many of our national systems are vulnerable to hostile action; that
national systems may not be able to report fast enough for combat support; and that
communications from the national level to the field are likely to be inadequate. For
these reasons, they believe it essential that military departments and commands
retain and control their organic and direct support intelligence capabilities. This pilot
study tends to support these views.
2. 0As intelligence buying power has decreased over the past several years,
management interest in intelligence has tended to focus on achieving savings by
eliminating duplication and consolidating intelligence activities, across Services and
agencies. under executive agents. The resource implications have tended to cause
legitimate concerns among the Services that their resource management
responsibilities for and command control over organic and direct support intelligence
assets could be adversely affected, degrading the war-fighting capabilities of the
forces.
3. =For this study, theater capabilities were aggregated at brigade, wing and
task group--organizational levels capable of independent, sustained combat. For this
reason, the description of some unit-level theater intelligence assets do not include
specific capabilities. In addition, other limitations in the pilot study precluded
conclusive judgments regarding the relative capabilities of assets. Judgments
regarding capabilities of national and theater intelligence assets to satisfy theater EEI
are detailed at Annex J.
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4. Study conclusions and recommendations for support to USCINCEUR
surfaces possibilities that warrant detailed examination. This pilot study provides a
methodology for comparing national intelligence needs and capabilities with those of
operating forces. It suggests specific national systems most likely to provide timely
and usable support to commanders in other theaters. It also recommends follow-on
actions that the study group believes most likely to result in improved overall
national-level support to the operating military forces.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
0
1. ^ The study group found it necessary to permit some deviations from the
Terms of Reference. These deviations affected the procedures followed by the working
groups, but not the purpose, direction or intent of the pilot study itself.
2. ^ The following Theater Working Group deviations from Terms of
Reference were approved by the study group:
a. To consider only theater intelligence and related assets assigned to
the joint Task Force UTF) committed to the contingency operation in the study
scenario (Chapter II).
b.[;:~ To use sample EEI. This sample was developed by the working group
chairmen and USEUCOM representatives, coordinated by J-2, USEUCOM with
component command intelligence staffs, and certified by the USEUCOM member of
the study group to be representative for the contingency situation.
c. Not to require USEUCOM to develop detailed theater intelligence
collection plans for the contingency situation. Theater Working Group analyses, in
effect, provide a basis for such collection planning.
d. Because theater intelligence collection plans were not needed, not
to attempt to coordinate statements of intelligence needs and tasking with responsible
commanders.
3. Q) The following National Working Group deviations from Terms of
Reference were approved by the study group:
a. To permit aggregations of national intelligence assets where
necessary to develop meaningful statements of capabilities. For example, Navy's
HFDF net could be considered as a totality because locating capabilities require data
from several stations in the net.
b. 1) To omit determination of the information or intelligence provided to
commanders in the contingency situation based on present targeting of national
systems, and to concentrate on intelligence needs stated in the sample theater EEI.
c. I'o omit the explicit determination of the effect that additional tasking
for the contingency situation would have on the primary missions of national systems
and the quality of their responsiveness. The effect of national priorities is reflected in
National Working Group assumptions for the availability of national assets.
d. I =] To omit determination of peacetime tasking of national systems that
could be reduced or terminated to accommodate tasking for the contingency
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situation. This. also, is reflected in National Working Group assumptions for the
availability of national assets.
it', To consider only national intelligence capabilities in or directly
related to the NFII'. Foreign Service collection and reporting were, therefore, not
considered.
4. (L The study group also approved some deviation from the Terms of
Reference to the tasks assigned Research and Analysis Branch. IC: Staff.
it. the
I)IA provided computer support to the Theater Working Group.
Research and Analysis Branch. therefore, provided-data support only to the National
Working Group.
h=reliminarv design was completed on a CIRIS-compatible program
to interface and correlate non-CI)IP and parallel CIRIS data. Because automated
correlation was not required for the pilot study, the program was not fully developed
and implenientcd. This program can be completed and implemented in six to eight
Weeks. Descriptive data for non-CI)IP units and activities can be formatted on the
(:IRfS 2812B input form and displayed in the same format as the First page of the
(:IRIS Yntity Status Report.
( .=)ata generated by both working groups, however, have been entered
in I)IA's computer program, and are now available for manipulation together.
~. = l'lw study group agreed to undertake three tasks in addition to those
specified in the Therms of Reference.
a.=hhe pilot study was expanded to include an assessment of theater
capabilities to meet national requirements for the contingency situation.
1, = Yo permit judgments on the availability of national intelligence assets
for theater support in the contingency situation, the National Working Group would
develop assumptions for national intelligence priorities.
r. _ To snake a survey to identify and document other studies that have
been completed or are in progress that relate to tactical-national intelligence
relationships.
I;. R CRI7Z'IU.4 1"01f (XL 1I'.AIRIS0.V
I. I o ensure that theater and national intelligence needs and capabilities
would ,e Stated in it Way that would permit cross-comparisons, the study group
adopted criteria for expressing their essential elements.
it t^t For intelligence needs, the criteria were:
1.1 ? ( t Geographic area or location of interest.
,21 () Subject of interest.
3 j ( ) Type of response desired (specific sensor output or material.
such as graphs, electronic signals, documents, hardware).
t-i; t0 Tolerances (accuracy needed for location, time of observation,
(Iuantity, mo%ement direction and speed).
(?t =Required timeliness (turnabout time from statement of
requirements to receipt of answer).
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Credibility of information needed for a commander to take
(7) Consumers.
b. For intelligence collection and reporting capabilities, the criteria
(1)
(2)
radar imagery, ELINT, IIUMINT document or material acquisition).
(4) [~olerances (average capability to accurately locate, pinpoint
time of occurrence, identify numbers of things or events, and determine direction and
speed of movement).
(5) Timeliness (time required to task, collect, process, analyze and
disseminate).
(6) Validity of information or intelligence when disseminated.
(7) Customers.
2. lI) Some modifications to these criteria were necessary. The study group
approved the following modifications:
a. Tolerances would be meaningful only if specifics for accuracy were
stated in, or could reasonably be deduced from, information needs. For this reason,
tolerances for capabilities would be stated in working group analyses only when a
need to consider them could be derived from the sample EEI.
b. Credibility needed to act, and validity of information or intelligence,
concern values that cannot be assigned independent of the actual tactical situation at
the time a decision is required. For this reason, credibility and validity were not
considered.
F. 'COPE
1. EPJ) In addition to the considerations discussed above, other factors affected
the scope of the study. These factors included:
a. OThe complexity of tactical-national intelligence relationships.
b. The lack of detailed information regarding worldwide command
information needs for contingency and combat operations.
c. b Uncertainty regarding the date for operational capability and
deployment of intelligence systems under development, and the availability of
supporting processing and dissemination systems,
d. The lack of a comprehensive, worldwide inventory of theater and
subordinate command collection and reporting capabilities.
e. Y__I The wide variety and great number of situations worldwide, for which
contingency and war plans have been developed, that affect relationships and support
between the intelligence assets controlled by the forces, and the assets controlled at
the national and departmental levels.
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Geographic area or location accessed.
Subject matter coverage.
Type of output (specific sensor output, such as photography,
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1. +^'I'he lack of a proven methodology for dealing with tactical-national
intelligence relationships.
0 The need to make a start within reasonable time toward
understanding tactical-national intelligence relationships and the possibilities for
mutual support.
'. ^1'hcsc considerations were beyond the control of the study group. They
led to deliberate decisions to limit the scope of the pilot study:
a ;cographic: The pilot study is limited to a contingency situation in
the Mid Fast and a continuing threat to central Europe.
1 Theater forces: 'T'heater intelligence forces are limited to those
a%ailable to "C:I\CELR for the specific contingency situation.
( . lM Collection and reporting assets: Intelligence capabilities are limited
to the systems, units and activities that had achieved operational capability by 31
I )ecembcr 1974.
d. ^) Political: The political situation is limited to that which obtained
during the Octohcr I9'3 Mid East war. no additional political factors that could have
significantly altered the then existing situation were considered in the pilot study.
r. 0 Methodological: Because sample EE.I could not saturate asset
capabilities, assessments were not quantitative and were limited to only a partial test
of capabilities to meet principal command intelligence needs at both theater and
national levels.
3. n I*he limitations for the pilot study are not assumed for the overall tactical-
nationa intelligence interface. They are merely a means of creating a manageable
situation for a first, in-depth effort to understand the complexities of the relationships
inolved and to permit logical decisions on further actions concerning the tactical-
national intelligence interface, hence the designation "Pilot Study."
4. 0 Definitions and abbreviations are at Annex 11.
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