RESPONSE TO NSSM NO. 102 A REVIEW OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002400020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
P
Response
to
NSSM No. 102
A Review of Major International Developments During 1970
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
November 1970
No.1483/70
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1. Soviet-American Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Strategic Policy and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
III. General Purpose Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IV. Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
V. Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
VI. East Asia and the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
VII. South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
VIII. Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
IX NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
X. Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
XI. Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
XII. Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
XIII. Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
XIV. Africa South of the Sahara . . . . . . . .. . 32
XV. Africa North of the Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 35
XVI. Foreign Economic and Military Aid . . . . . . . . . 37
XVII. International Monetary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
XVIII. United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
XIX. International Trade Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
XX. New Tasks for Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
XXI. Other: European Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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1. SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
A year ago preliminary talks were concluded on measures to curtail the
strategic arms race. The negotiations that have followed are among the most
momentous conducted by the Soviets and the US since the Second World
War. It is not yet possible to make firm judgments on Soviet intentions but
the atmosphere at the talks and the nature of the dialogue so far suggest that
some kind of agreement on arms limitation can eventually be worked out.
The simultaneous ratification in 1969 by the US and USSR of the nonpro-
liferation treaty (NPT) was further evidence that Moscow intends to pursue
common goals when Soviet and US interests coincide. Moreover, Moscow's
draft treaty banning nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, which it submitted
to the Geneva disarmament conference the same year, marked an important
Soviet move toward an established American negotiating position.
But recent events have increased strains in the relations between the US
and the USSR. In the Middle East, Moscow helped Egypt violate the
cease-fire along the Suez Canal, and the Soviets' ceaseless propaganda barrage
in the area has helped to maintain tensions close to the flash point. Even in
Berlin, one of the more tense focal points in Soviet-American relations, the
Soviets chose the very day of a session of four-power ambassadorial talks to
try to impose restrictions on Allied air traffic to Berlin. Moscow had
previously raised the subject of air traffic in the talks, and the restrictions
were a crude way of probing Western resolve. And, despite the arms talks in
which the Soviets have stressed the need for curbing the arms race and
cutting defense costs, Moscow continues to construct ICBMs, particularly
the large SS-9s that have no counterpart in the US arsenal.
Still, however, there are many areas where the two sides have not only
made formal contact in the past year, but have worked together successfully.
The Soviets agreed in 1970 to join the US in considering changes in last
year's draft treaty banning nuclear weapons on the ocean floor. As a result,
the seabeds treaty was endorsed by the Geneva disarmament conference, a
prerequisite to acceptance by the United Nation's General Assembly
(UNGA). Once accepted, the treaty-along with the NPT, the partial test ban
treaty, the outer space treaty, and the treaty on the peaceful use of the
Antarctic-will testify to the willingness and ability of the US and USSR to
conclude specific agreements when their interests are parallel End also to
take the lead in disarmament matters. Moreover, the seabeds treaty marks
the first time that the Soviets have accepted verification provisions in a
disarmament treaty. Its eventual acceptance by the UNGA would raise
legitimate hopes that the disarmament conference could turn in earnest to
controls in the field of chemical and biological warfare.
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The US and USSR have also agreed on several moves that will improve
their own day-to-day dealings. In July, the two nations held their first formal
civil air negotiations since the signing of the US-USSR civil air agreement in
1966. When completed, the new arrangement will expand air service between
the US and USSR, adding stops in Washington and Leningrad and permitting
up to six flights weekly. Earlier in the year, the two sides extended their
agreement on cultural and scientific exchanges for an additional two years,
and for the first time the USSR has permitted a US television network to
make a documentary series, "Inside Russia," without insisting on editing and
cutting rights over the film. The much-heralded visit to the Soviet Union by
Neil Armstrong raised hopes of closer cooperation in space exploration, and
talks have already been held in Moscow regarding compatible docking
arrangements. The Soviets have also been pressing for contacts with Ameri-
can industrial firms, and were sharply critical of the Ford Company's refusal
to build a truck factory in the USSR. Meanwhile, talks have inched along on
the construction of new embassy buildings in Washington and Moscow and
the establishment of consulates in San Francisco and Leningrad.
On balance, the picture of Soviet-American relations over the past year
is a mixed one. For example, Moscow has given much lip service to strength-
ening the powers of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. But
the Soviets have been reluctant, or slow, to cooperate with the US in
improving the UN's financial position and its peace-keeping responsibilities.
Soviet activities in the Middle East since the cease-fire of 7 August reveal
that Moscow is often more interested in manipulating tensions there than in
overcoming them. And it remains to be seen whether Moscow's apparent
interest in an arms agreement will be matched by a slowdown in Soviet
construction of strategic missiles.
Soviet leaders seem at times compelled to match any sign of accom-
modation toward the US with a countering spirit of resistance that serves to
block any genuine detente. This dichotomy stems in part from Moscow's
genuine fear of the immense power of the US. Soviet articles lauding
coexistence are often offset by warnings against the perils of dealing with the
US; support for trade with the West is matched by condemnation of US
attempts at bridge-building. However desirable it might be to try to nourish
those currents of opinion favorable to accommodation and coexistence,
there are few traces of such currents at the present time. And there is no
indication that the Soviets would compromise any of their vital interests
merely to stabilize the strategic and political relationship with the US.
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II. STRATEGIC POLICY AND FORCES
The answers to this question fall within the competence of State and
DOD, rather than CIA.
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The answers to this question fall within the competence of State and
DOD, rather than CIA.
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The answers to this question fall within the competence of State and
DOD, rather than CIA.
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The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
The NPT entered into force on 1 March with the completion of
ratifications by the nuclear cosponsors-the US, the UK, and the USSR-and
by the requisite 40 nonnuclear states. By 22 October, 61 countries, including
East Germany, had ratified the treaty and nearly 40 others had signed it.
Among the nuclear threshold nations-those likely to possess a near-term
nuclear weapon capability-only Israel and India have failed to sign the NPT.
Nuclear powers France and Communist China maintained their position as
treaty holdouts during 1970.
Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Under Article 3 of the NPT, nonnuclear states adhering to the treaty
were required by 1 September to start negotiations on safeguards agreements
to prevent the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful uses. By
October, however, only 20 countries, including East Germany, had declared
their readiness to begin negotiations. The IAEA itself was still lacking a firm
negotiating position, although it may adopt one before the end of the year.
The EURATOM states continued to insist that they would not ratify the
NPT until their regional agency had worked out an inspection arrangement
with the IAEA that would respect EURATOM's jurisdiction and pose no
obstacle to the development of West European nuclear technology in the
area of peaceful uses.
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT)
Nearly all comments on SALT at the opening of the UN General
Assembly were favorable; the business-like atmosphere of the Helsinki and
Vienna sessions had unquestionably created a general feeling that serious
disarmament negotiations are being pursued. It remains unclear whether
Mexico will again offer at the Assembly the draft resolution passed last
year-with the superpowers abstaining-that called on the US and the USSR
to negotiate "as an urgent preliminary measure" a moratorium on further
testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic weapons
systems.
The Draft Seabeds Treaty
By far the outstanding achievement at the 1970 sessions of the 25-
nation Geneva arms control talks was the virtually unanimous endorsement
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given the US-USSR draft treaty limiting use of the seabeds for military
purposes. Revisions designed to avoid contentious claims of territorial waters
and to firm up the verification provisions won for the treaty the solid
backing that had been lacking in 1969 and the early part of this year. The
UN General Assembly is now expected to endorse the treaty, permitting it to
be opened for signature early in 1971.
Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW)
No progress was made during 1970 at either the UN or the Geneva talks
in resolving the East-West dispute over the merits of the Soviet CBW draft
convention, which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of
CBW agents and requiring the destruction of existing stocks,. and the similar
UK draft treaty confined to BW materials. Most nonaligned nations con-
tinued to favor comprehensive action on CBW, but disliked the verification
provision-appeal to the UN Security Council for investigation of a com-
plaint-that the Soviets added to their draft this year. Many nations com-
mented favorably on President Nixon's referral of the Geneva Protocol of
1925 to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.
Interest in a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and Related Matters
The already keen interest of the nonnuclear nations in a CTB was
apparently further whetted by the SALT negotiations. The US continued to
insist, however, on adequate verification of compliance with a CTB, in-
cluding on-site inspection, which Moscow rejects. This impasse led several
nations to propose a ban on nuclear tests above a certain seismic magnitude
threshold, usually 4.75 on the Richter scale. Canada proposed a world-wide
guaranteed exchange of seismic data that would be helpful in identifying
underground nuclear explosions.
General and Complete Disarmament (GCD)
This topic received more attention during 1970 than at any time since
the early 1960s. Several delegates to the UN General Assembly urged that
GCD be pursued actively as a real, non-Utopian goal, Italy organized a
working group on GCD at the Geneva talks, and by the end of the summer
three nonaligned nations represented there-Mexico, Sweden, and Yugo-
slavia-had submitted a draft program on the subject. Both of the super-
powers continued to maintain, however, that progress on specific disarma-
ment measures, e.g. SALT, must take precedence over any action on GCD.
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Status of the Geneva Disarmament Talks
During 1970, France continued to decline to take its seat at the arms
control conference, and Communist China showed no inclination to mod-
erate its bellicose posture regarding the Geneva talks. The addition in 1969
of eight new members to the committee and its successful consideration of
the seabeds treaty during 1970 blunted much of the earlier criticism that the
Geneva forum is ineffective and is dominated by the superpowers.
Conclusion
Substantive progress in SALT remains the critical factor in influencing
attitudes toward the superpowers. Forward movement in the talks would go
far toward deflecting the resistance of smaller countries to arms control
measures that do not also affect the big powers. A warming of the climate of
opinion in the wake of progress in SALT would encourage greater attention
to both CTB prospects and procedures aimed at the full implementation of
general and complete disarmament. In the area of CBW, the Soviets are likely
to insist on integrated action on CW and BW as long as they can allege that a
BW ban alone avoids the issue of US use of CW in Indochina.
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Vl[. EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
The Lon Nol government thus far has been able to survive the Vietnam-
ese Communist military pressure directed against it, although it has lost
roughly half of the country to the enemy in six months' time. Hanoi is
probably capable of bringing greater force to bear on the Cambodian
Government, however, and the coming dry season should provide clearer
insights into its short-term objectives in Cambodia. At a minimum, the
Communists will continue to concentrate on keeping the inexperienced
Cambodian Army tied down in defensive positions in and close to major
urban centers and on cutting Phnom Penh's key lines of communication to
outlying provinces. They can also be expected to intensify their effort to
organize a political base among ethnic Cambodians in rural areas. This
program is likely to achieve some success, although ethnic differences and
the absence of trained and dedicated Cambodian cadre will be a severe
handicap. Politically the Lon Nol regime probably will retain the support of
post of its major backers in Phnom Penh and other key population centers,
despite the prospects of increasing geographical isolation, sustained fighting,
and worsening economic conditions. Nascent political forces are likely to
submerge whatever oppositionist tendencies they may hold, at least for the
short run, in the interest of preserving national unity during the present
emergency. Sihanouk's dependence on the Chinese and Vietnamese Commu-
nists appears to have destroyed his influence over almost all important
segments of Cambodian society, but he probably does still enjoy some
standing among the peasantry. If the Communists do not significantly
increase their attacks throughout the country, and if the government con-
tinues to receive adequate allied military support, the Cambodians' demon-
strated determination and zeal should enable them to hold their own against
Communist aggression.
Communist China remains relatively calm as the regime focuses atten-
tion on the reconstruction of party and government machinery, shattered
during the three years of Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution. On balance,
the Communists have made only fitful progress in their efforts to repair the
extensive social and political damage wrought by those years of turmoil.
Local government remains in the hands of the military, and, after a hiatus of
more than four years, only a few universities have resumed classwork even
on a limited basis. Sorely needed economic planning and development
programs remain for the most part in abeyance; most importantly, there
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appears to have been little improvement in the atmosphere of distrust and
hostility that prevails between many leaders at all levels of government. As
long as Mao Tse-tung remains alive, domestic political reconstruction in
Communist China is apt to proceed at a slow pace, impeded by the need to
tailor programs and policies that dovetail with Mao's vision of a new
Communist society. Nevertheless, there are signs that at least some Chinese
leaders seem to retain a more practical outlook and favor a rational approach
to difficult issues.
In foreign affairs Peking's greatest preoccupation in 1970 remained the
Sino-Soviet dispute. Partly as a means of acquiring greater leverage in the
quarrel, China continued-and, as the year progressed, accelerated-the trend
toward greater diplomatic flexibility in its international posture that had
begun in late 1969. To this end Peking encouraged a warming current in
relations with a wide variety of states, both Communist and non-Communist.
The Chinese showed particular interest in the states of Eastern and Western
Europe, but also became more active in the Middle East and in Africa. At the
same time Peking worked assiduously and with considerable success to
improve relations with its Communist neighbors, North Korea and North
Vietnam. Sino-US talks in Warsaw were resumed in January but were again
suspended following US action in Cambodia. Peking has not closed the door
to a further resumption of the talks "at a mutually convenient date,"
however.
Japan
The continued expansion of the economy in 1970 lent further impetus
to the growth of national pride and a concomitant increase in Japanese
awareness of the need to take a more active part in world affairs. Prime
Minister Sato, who decided to retain the reins of government for an unpre-
cedented fourth term, emphasized that Japan's international role would be
based on economic cooperation and assistance in pursuit of world peace. In
this connection, Japan pledged to provide for foreign aid the equivalent of 1
percent of its GNP by 1975. At the same time, strengthening of the
conventionally armed Japanese Self-Defense Forces went on, spurred in part
by the need to provide protection for Okinawa when it reverts to Japan in
1972. During 1970, Japan hosted the highly successful EXPO 70, signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and became the first Asian nation to orbit
a satellite intended for scientific research. In June, the ten year old Mutual
Security Pact with the US was extended indefinitely, despite counterefforts
by flagging leftist elements. Complicated trade and investment differences
with the US surfaced during 1970, but the Japanese Government made it
clear that such problems must be resolved in a spirit of give-and-take so as to
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preserve the over-all fruitful relationships of the two nations. The well-es-
tablished sense of cooperation between Japan and the US was highlighted by
the decision to work together to combat the world-wide problem of environ-
mental pollution.
Korea (South/North)
Nineteen-seventy saw continued economic progress and political stabil-
ity in South Korea. The trend of recent years toward better relations with
neighboring Japan was maintained, abetted by growing economic coopera-
tion between the two countries and awareness of mutual security interests.
South Korea re-established diplomatic relations with Cambodia which had
been broken in 1966. The scheduled reduction of US forces in Korea by
some 20,000 men preoccupied the Seoul government; strong misgivings were
slowly being overcome through mutual discussions on US plans to help
modernize the South Korean forces. North Korean harassment remained at
low ebb, as in 1969, although sporadic agent penetration efforts were made
and there were scattered incidents along the demilitarized zone. The princi-
pal development in North Korea, where the economy remains stifled by
top-heavy military expenditures, was the restoration of the friendlier rela-
tions with Communist China that had existed before the onset of the
Cultural Revolution. It nonetheless seems clear that Pyongyang is intent on
maintaining its independent stance between Peking and Moscow.
With the dry season imminent, the now traditional upsurge in Commu-
nist military activity can be expected. The months immediately ahead may
be ones in which the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao supporters will
be particularly aggressive-at least in southern Laos. With a new war to fight
in Cambodia and the loss of supply lines through the Cambodian port of
Sihanoukville, the Ho Chi Minh trail system through the Laotian panhandle
has become more vital to the Communists than ever before. They may even
attempt to take new territory in an effort to expand their logistical system.
The main hope for a lower level of fighting in Laos in the coming months is
the possibility of peace talks between Vientiane and the Communists. So far
these negotiations have made little headway, but the war weariness of the
government and the need for the North Vietnamese to devote their energies
elsewhere may yet bring the two sides to an accommodation.
Philippines
The Philippines has been preoccupied this year with domestic problems,
principally the sometimes violent student challenge to President Marcos.
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Tainted by dirty presidential campaign tactics last fall, Marcos has seen a
sharp diminution in his stature. The growing popular disillusionment is
reflected in the widely held suspicion that Marcos will attempt to manipulate
next year's constitutional convention into extending his term of office
beyond present limits. Discontent will sharpen in the likely event that the
constitutional convention deliberations fail to come up with remedies for
prevailing injustice and corruption.
Bangkok's primary concern is over the possibility of a weakening in
Washington's commitment to Southeast Asia, particularly in view of US
domestic political pressures and the quickened pace of troop withdrawals
from Vietnam. Within Thailand, Communist insurgents in the underdevel-
oped north, northeast, and southern peninsula regions have stepped up their
activities somewhat during the past six months and may increase them
further during the coming dry season. Although Bangkok is still lethargic in
taking the steps necessary to liquidate the problem, the government has in
the past contained the insurgents, and the insurgents give no indication of
posing a significant challenge to the government in the foreseeable future.
Externally, Bangkok is worried about Communist advances in Cambodia and
Laos and the threat these pose to the security of its own borders.
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VII. SOUTH ASIA
During 1970 foreign relations were less important than domestic issues
throughout South Asia. There were no breakthroughs in resolving the prob-
lems besetting Indo-Pakistani relations, although modest progress appeared
to have been made toward an eventual accord on distribution of waters from
the Ganges. Mrs. Gandhi and the newly installed prime minister of Ceylon,
Mrs. Bandaranaike, were prominent participants at the nonaligned confer-
ence at Lusaka in September. Relations between Nepal and India were under
occasional strains during the year as a result both of difficult negotiations for
a new trade agreement and of Kathmandu's continuing effort to reduce
India's dominant presence. Pakistan, meanwhile, continued to balance its
relations among the great powers, with President Yahya slating visits during
1970 to the Soviet Union, the United States, and Communist China.
Political instability continued to plague India during 1970. Mrs. Gandhi
executed a major cabinet shift in June, but she could not eliminate the
inherent problems of any minority government. She successfully weathered
several votes of confidence, relying on the support of the pro-Moscow Indian
Communist Party, a small Socialist party, a south Indian regional party, and
numerous independents in parliament, in addition to the votes of her own
Ruling Congress Party. Repeated efforts by the right-of-center opposition
parties to merge failed, but they usually voted as a bloc against the gov-
ernment.
The Ruling Congress Party enjoyed considerable success at the polls in
several by-elections for the lower house of parliament during 1970, although
it failed to live up to expectations in elections for the relatively powerless
upper house. The most resounding victory for Mrs. Gandhi and her party was
scored in September. By means of a pre-electoral agreement with a bloc of
parties that included the pro-Moscow Communist Party-most conservative
of India's Communist parties-and the Muslim League, the Ruling Congress
Party won a slim majority of seats in the state legislature of the south Indian
state of Kerala. In this traditionally leftist state, the party defeated both a
left-wing alliance led by the popular and militant Communist Party/Marxist
and another coalition on the right.
The state of West Bengal and its largest city, Calcutta, suffered repeated
demonstrations and occasional violence, particularly in the first half of the
year. A left-wing coalition government-led by the Communist Party/Marx-
ist-collapsed in March, and direct rule from New Delhi was imposed on the
state. Near the close of the year there were no indications as to when new
elections for the state legislature would be held. Economically, West Bengal
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continued to stagnate, and businessmen continued to try to transfer their
investments elsewhere.
Violence wracked India as a result of both political and communal
issues. On the extreme left of the political spectrum, the Naxalites-self-pro-
claimed Maoists-attacked government installations, universities, less extreme
Communists, and, in some areas of India, landlords with large or medium
land holdings. The Naxalite cause exercised considerable attraction-par-
ticularly to youths in the two larger and older Communist Parties. At least
indirectly, the Naxalites were also responsible for a movement launched by
the pro-Moscow Communist Party in which landless peasants were urged to
occupy unused or excess land held by absentee landlords. Several hundred
arrests were made by the authorities, and the "landgrab" program appeared
to accomplish little either for its sponsors or for the landless poor. Com-
munal violence that broke out in western India in May resulted in several
hundred. deaths-mostly Muslims-before the authorities brought the dis-
turbances under control.
On the agricultural front, India enjoyed the largest harvest of food-
grains in its history during the crop year ending 30 June 1970, with
production totaling approximately 100 million tons. Unfortunately, the
continuing high rate of population growth absorbed much of the advance in
agricultural production.
During 1970, Pakistan remained under martial law, although normal
political activity was again permitted. National elections to choose a con-
stituent assembly were scheduled for 7 December, and tension began to
increase as that date approached. Occasional clashes occurred during the year
between supporters of the several different parties covering the political
spectrum from conservative, religion-oriented groupings to supporters of the
Maoist Communism. The new assembly will be given four months to produce
a constitution, which must be approved in its final form by President Yahya
Khan. Failure to meet this schedule will result in the dismissal of that
assembly and the election of a new constituent body. Much will depend on
the willingness and ability of the politicians from East and West Pakistan to
work together. On the international front, Pakistan continued its balancing
act among the great powers, maintaining good relations with Communist
China, the Soviet Union, and the US. Relations with Washilgton were
probably closer in late October 1970 than at any time in recent years as a
result of a partial lifting by the US of the five-year-old embargo on the sale
of lethal weapons to Pakistan.
On 27 May 1970 a left-wing coalition of parties in Ceylon, led by Mrs.
Bandaranaike, was swept into office in a surprise electoral victory over the
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government of moderate rightist Dudley Senanayake that had been in power
for five years. Foreign policy was not a major issue in the campaign; the
voters apparently were responding primarily to the attacks of the left-wing
coalition on unemployment, the rising cost of living, corruption, and its
promise to double the subsidized rice ration. Shortly after taking office, the
new government empowered the lower house to act as a constituent as-
sembly to write a new constitution that would transform Ceylon from a
dominion into a republic. As of mid-October 1970 it was still not clear
whether or not Ceylon would remain in the Commonwealth.
Within weeks after its installation, the Bandaranaike government had
fulfilled several of its campaign promises in the foreign policy field: recogni-
tion of East Germany, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam; suspension of relations with Israel;
and the ouster of the Peace Corps and the Asia Foundation from Ceylon.
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The past year in Vietnam has been a time of testing for both the North
and South; each has had new problems and new opportunities as a result of
the US Vietnamization program and the turnabout in Cambodia last spring.
Military trends in South Vietnam have continued to run heavily in favor of
the allies, and the Communists are not in a position to reverse them soon.
Hanoi is playing for time, however, and is betting that its forces will be able
to exploit future opportunities in South Vietnam. The tests to come,
therefore, are likely to be more difficult and more decisive than any so far.
In the year since Ho Chi Minh's death, continuity has been the watch-
word in North Vietnam. Ho's successors seem to operate reasonably success-
fully as a collective, with party first secretary Le Duan the first among
equals. Although the leadership doubtless misses Ho as an arbitrator within
the ruling circle and as a source of inspiration to the populace, to all
appearances the North Vietnamese have managed to maintain their cohesion
and the country's commitments without him.
Meeting he requirements of a wider war in Indochina has meant some
additional tightening of the screws on the population of North Vietnam.
Hanoi began working hard after the bombing stopped in 1968 to correct
chronic problems of morale, discipline, leadership, and production. These
efforts continued in 1970, but the evidence suggests the regime responded to
the Cambodian situation with renewed determination to make whatever
sacrifices were necessary to carry on the war, and this may well have entailed
some diluting of plans for development of North Vietnam.
Prior to the Cambodian crisis last spring, the policies followed by Hanoi
were generally those that had been blocked out before Ho's death: a
long-haul rebuilding effort in the struggle for South Vietnam and an in-
creased emphasis on developing a strong and stable regime in North Vietnam.
In neither area were striking results being achieved; but the regime held
firmly to the course of carefully balancing the demands of the war and the
needs of North Vietnam.
This balance was threatened in the aftermath of Sihanouk's ouster from
Cambodia. Hanoi immediately saw a grave threat to its ability to carry on
the war in South Vietnam because of the loss of the supply and base area
arrangements Communist forces had enjoyed there in the past. But there was
also a new opportunity to expand the scope of Communist insurgency in
Indochina. The situation forced Hanoi to take a hard look at its policies for
South Vietnam and for the area as a whole.
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Some basic decisions were reached rapidly. One was to push hard into
Cambodia with Vietnamese Communist forces and to launch a long-term
campaign to build a Cambodian-manned insurgency apparatus targeted
against the new regime in Phnom Penh. These moves cushioned the adverse
impact of the new Cambodian situation on the Vietnamese Communists, but
they also triggered large-scale allied cross-border operations in May and June
and thus complicated the disruption and supply problems faced by Commu-
nist forces in the southern part of South Vietnam. Since then the Commu-
nists have put much of their effort into maintaining and expanding supply
and infiltration routes through southern Laos, Cambodia, and on down into
the southern part of South Vietnam. They are likely to be preoccupied with
this task for some time to come.
As for the war in South Vietnam, the Communists have been carrying
on with the same low-key mix of military and subversive tactics they have
been relying on for more than a year. Brief periods of coordinated shellings
have occurred from time to time, but the enemy has not attempted to
launch and sustain large-scale offensive military operations this year. For the
most part, conventional military operations have given way to reliance on
light shellings, sapper attacks, and terrorism, while the main thrust of the
Communist effort is devoted to preserving and rebuilding a military and
political apparatus for the long haul.
During 1970 the enemy had some successes with these tactics in
blunting government progress in the countryside and, in some cases, in
bringing about reversals in the relatively good security situation that pre-
vailed during the latter half of 1969. Setbacks have been localized and most
of them temporary, but they underscore the fragility of some of the progress
that has been achieved and the degree to which the situation in much of the
countryside is vulnerable to determined Communist pressures.
There has been further slow but perceptible improvement in the South
Vietnamese armed forces and security apparatus during the past year. Regu-
lar South Vietnamese troops have been carrying the brunt of the combat
burden and taking the bulk of casualties in almost all the crucial areas.
Similarly, the government's militia and local forces, despite chronic problems
of leadership, motivation, and the like, have carried an increasing share of
the day-to-day load of the war. They are responsible in large part for a
degree of security unknown by the rural population in South Vietnam since
the early 1960s.
The government's confidence in its staying power has grown during the
past year because of the lack of effective enemy offensive action, because of
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the setbacks Communist forces targeted against South Vietnam have suffered
in Cambodia, and because of the progress that South Vietnamese forces have
made in taking over more responsibility for the war. Almost all observers
agree, however, that only time and stronger Communist challenges will tell
whether the South Vietnamese are up to the task of carrying on the war
successfully as more and more US forces depart. To a greater extent than
ever, the answers will depend on which side has the greater motivation and
tenacity to stay the course.
President Thieu has successfully ridden out several waves of domestic
unrest during the past year, and his government has seemed to gain confi-
dence and stature in the process. Antigovernment agitators have periodically
been able to whip up demonstrations pegged to economic and social griev-
ances, but in each case the authorities have succeeded in keeping a lid on the
situation and in preventing sustained protest activities. A deep current of
economic unrest persists, however, and it is likely to be one of the main
issues that the opposition will use against the government during the 1971
presidential election campaign.
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The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization entered the
decade of the '70s committed to the maintenance of a strong defense while
pursuing detente, but uncertain how these duel objectives could be achieved.
The rapid tempo of detente politics and the declining support on both sides
of the Atlantic for military expenditures posed serious problems. The di-
lemma was not new, but the need to assess the implications for the Alliance
appeared increasingly urgent.
Early in the year, acting on the suggestion made in President Nixon's
foreign policy message to Congress in 1969, Secretary General Brosio pro-
posed that NATO conduct a thorough review of the military and strategic
problems it will face in the next ten years. Brosio recommended that the
study give particularly close attention to the enemy threat, the Allied
strategy, the level of forces, the relationship between different weapons
systems, the nature and effectiveness of deterrence, and the allocation of the
defense burden among the member states. As the study has progressed
during the past year, burden-sharing has assumed particular significance, with
the Europeans becoming acutely aware that they will have to assume a
greater part of the NATO burden.
West Germany, at a meeting of the NATO defense ministers in June,
took the lead in confronting the burden-sharing question. It urged the other
European members of NATO's military structure (the so-called Eurogroup)
to join in a multilateral offer to the US of an annual lump-sum contribution
to ward off significant reductions of US forces in Europe. The reaction of
the Europeans to the principle of burden-sharing was generally favorable, but
noncommittal to any specific approach. Faced with financial constraints and
reluctant to cope with the problem of selling a burden-sharing scheme to
their publics, the other nations were hesitant to take action on the West
German proposal.
In October, the Eurogroup members pledged in principle to contribute
more to the common defense, through both multilateral monetary contribu-
tions to the US and increased national efforts. But given public and par-
liamentary interest in detente, most Europeans seemed to find it more
difficult to attempt increases, either quantitatively or qualitatively, in their
*This report should be considered as only a tentative review of NATO affairs, because
the December ministerial meeting will be the culmination of the second half of the year's
activity.
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own national defense efforts than to lend increased support to the US. Thus
the solution of the over-all burden-sharing problem remained in doubt.
The principal topic of concern at the spring ministerial meeting in
Rome was the pursuit of detente. Although the members felt that they
should preserve a strong Alliance as a base from which to negotiate with the
East, some were more anxious than others to move toward multilateral
negotiations. The ministers did not endorse the idea advanced by the Soviet
Union that a conference on European security be convened. But they did
agree to pursue present contacts with the East and to expand exploratory
conversations with Warsaw Pact countries. Assuming progress was made on
concrete problems, such as Berlin, the Allies would move to multilateral
talks with the East to determine when one or a series of conferences on
European security and cooperation would be fruitful.
The Allies, excluding France, also renewed their bid for talks with the
Warsaw Pact on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.
The ministers issued the call for force reductions-once a popular Soviet
proposal-as a separate declaration to underline the importance the Allies
attached to their initiative. Mutual and balanced force reductions continue
to be viewed by the Alliance as a potentially important part of any East-West
settlement in Europe.
The past year also has seen NATO's new "dimensions"-the Committee
on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)-emerge through clouds of
initial Allied skepticism and move toward active engagement of the Alliance
membership. A plenary meeting in October recorded the progress that had
been made in organizing CCMS activities along a broad front, including
projects on disaster assistance, ocean and inland water pollution, air pollu-
tion, and road safety. The enthusiasm of some Allies, however, is restrained
by the low level of European public awareness of environmental problems
and by the limited personnel available to many Allied governments to deal
with international environmental efforts.
For NATO, 1970 has been a year to look ahead, both to the prospects
for East-West detente and to the continuing need for a strong Allied defense.
Only by working toward both objectives, in the view of most Allied govern-
ments, will NATO remain the solid rock on which Western security has
rested for over twenty years.
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During 1970, President Pompidou dealt effectively with a variety of
domestic and foreign policy problems and in so doing brought a large
measure of stability to a country that had faced a violent and divisive crisis
in mid-1968. Pompidou has firmly put his own stamp on the presidency and
no longer has to defer to hard-line Gaullists in the government and the
parliament. The opposition parties, rendered powerless by the massive Gaul-
list majority in the National Assembly and rent by divisions among them-
selves, remain in a state of disarray. Opposition ranks have been further
thinned by the defection of centrists and some leftists tempted by Premier
Chaban-Delmas' policy of "overture"-the invitation to non-Gaullists to join
the ranks of the majority.
At year's end, the economy was in good shape and the franc was
healthy, in large part because of the success of the stabilization plan and
franc devaluation. Moreover, the government pursued an imaginative policy
of consultations with major labor unions and effected several far-reaching
social and economic reforms that kept labor unrest to a minimum.
Although the government failed to complete the sweeping changes still
necessary to bring French education into the 20th century, students were far
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less militant in 1970 than in 1968-69. There was a brief flareup at Nanterre
this spring, but student activists seemed to lack the burning issues necessary
to mobilize dissent and there were no outbursts on a national scale. Because
student and labor agitation had sparked the 1968 crisis, the relative stability
and serenity on these fronts were of critical importance to the government.
In most areas, Pompidou continued to pursue the general lines of
Gaullist foreign policy. The notable exception was his more positive attitude
toward British accession to the European Communities. The continuity with
Gaullist policy was most apparent in his October trip to the USSR, where
both he and his hosts strove mightily to create the impression that the
"special relationship" carved out by De Gaulle in 1966 still existed. In Black
Africa, too, the Pompidou government continued to weave the economic,
fiscal, cultural, and political ties that still bind France's former colonies
tightly to her. The Middle East and the Mediterranean area became prime
foreign policy targets in 1970, but, despite arms sales and friendly diplo-
matic exchanges, Pompidou was unable greatly to magnify France's role in
the Arab world.
In the UK, the Conservative Party won an upset victory over the Labor
Party in a general election, and Edward Heath was installed as prime
minister. His government entered into negotiations for British entry in the
European Communities and is studying the prickly problems of proceeding
with arms sales to South Africa and maintaining a British presence east of
Suez.
Italy
In Italy a four-party center-left coalition replaced a minority Christian
Democratic government in March, but its tenure was brief. A second center-
left government under Prime Minister Emilio Colombo, which took office in
August, stressed economic stability and social reforms. Sporadic outbreaks
of labor unrest in both spring and fall failed to halt the country's strong
economic growth.
Spain
In Spain, the new cabinet installed in October 1969 sought to identify
Spain more closely with European and world affairs. The government
reached agreement with the European Communities on a preferential trade
arrangement and signed a new five-year Agreement of Friendship and
Cooperation with the US.
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During the past year the Nordic countries have been deeply occupied
with shoring up their international economic position in the face of the
resurgent European Communities (EC). Following their hair's-breadth failure
to create a Nordic Economic Union (NORDEC)-once the Soviet Union
decided to veto Finland's entry-Norway and Denmark are now pursuing
unqualified membership applications to the EC; Sweden is attempting to
find a way to fit an EC relationship into the framework of Swedish
neutrality; and Finland is trying to devise an arrangement with the EC
consonant with its special relationship with the USSR.
Internally, Finnish and Swedish voters moved a step to the right in
parliamentary elections, but their governments did not follow suit. In
Sweden, Palme's Social Democrats are relying on tacit Communist support
to continue in office, while in Finland the Soviet veto of right-wing partici-
pation in the government, combined with an insistence that the Communists
be included, has resulted in the continuance of the center-left coalitions. In
Norway and Denmark, inflation and a weakening of the economy have
undermined the popularity of the respective center-right coalitions. Condi-
tions in Norway are especially shaky because of the government's paper-thin
parliamentary majority.
In the low countries, the Belgian Government's program to ease ten-
sions between the country's two major linguistic groups failed to receive
legislative approval this spring, and communal elections in the fall marked a
further growth for those parties favoring an end to the unitary state. In the
Netherlands, beset by serious economic problems, political activity began to
pick up, with all eyes focused on national elections next spring.
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The Soviets' Eastern European allies have willingly backed Moscow's
moves toward a European detente. They share the Soviets' motives, but, in
addition, to varying degrees they are seeking to advance their individual
national interests. For these reasons, they are, for example, vigorous pro-
moters of the eventual convocation of a conference on European security,
the extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to other states, the
study of means to freeze or reduce armaments in Europe, and the normaliza-
tion of relations with West Germany. Yugoslavia also favors such develop-
ments, although it worries that its interests might not be adequately recog-
nized by the two opposing power blocs in Europe. Only Albania is opposed
to the Soviet-sponsored intiatives, and even here there have been moves to
end the country's isolation and to re-establish economic and political ties in
Europe and around the Mediterranean basin.
In the economic sphere, the Soviets have persuaded their Eastern
European allies to collaborate more closely on investment, production, and
trade. Moscow is promising to accept the Eastern Europeans as junior
partners exploiting new technology. In return, its allies have agreed to help
defray more of the rapidly rising cost of production of the Soviet raw
materials on which they depend and to follow common economic policies in
dealing with Western Europe. Much of this development is still in the talking
stage, and the deep conflicts of interest and national emotions that have
stood in the way of economic cooperation remain. Nevertheless, all parties--
even the Romanians-have undertaken to adopt a more positive approach.
From both the economic and political point of view, the Eastern
Europeans, minus the East Germans and the Albanians, generally view the
Soviet - West German nonaggression pact as the most promising development
of 1970. Except for East Germany, the Eastern European states have been
pleased to respond positively to the West German Government's efforts to
settle differences with the Communist states and establish normal relations.
The Soviets and their allies see this development as an opportunity to have
the legitimacy of Communist rule in Eastern Europe officially recognized in
the West and a chance to nail down the status quo of the frontiers that had
evolved in the area after World War II.
The Eastern Europeans have Moscow's consent to settle their bilateral
differences with West Germany. In November, the Poles are expected to
reach an agreement under which the Federal Republic will in effect recog-
nize the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line and by implication give up
claims to East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia, which were lost after the war.
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Czechoslovakia has begun preliminary talks with West Germany, primarily
over the issue of legal procedures for declaring invalid the Munich Pact of
1938. Hungary has indicated it will follow the Czechs in settling its problems
with the Federal Republic. All of these negotiations are intended ultimately
to lead to diplomatic relations between Bonn and its Eastern European
negotiating partner. (Romania established such relations in defiance of its
allies in 1967.) Bulgaria, which has no serious bilateral problems with West
Germany because of its unimportance to Bonn, probably will be the last to
upgrade its relations with the Federal Republic. As its relations with the
USSR cooled-and those with East Germany deteriorated-Yugoslavia made
an intensive effort to improve its relationships with West Germany, for the
first time establishing personal contacts with West German leaders, especially
the socialists. The Eastern Europeans unabashedly proclaimed that a new
rapport with West Germany could be the foundation of a general European
settlement and that they now look forward to the day when they might
again be accepted in the family of Europe, even though they remain in the
Soviet sphere of influence.
Unlike its neighbors, East Germany sees more of a threat than a boon in
any future rapprochement with West Germany. The East German leaders
apparently fear that they could not survive if normal ties were established
with West Germany. They also fear that they will be isolated in central
Europe should all of their neighbors settle their differences with Bonn.
Therefore, they have posed unacceptable demands on the West Germans.
So far, East Germany's allies have supported their minimum demands,
but without conviction and without giving any feeling of permanence. Even
the Soviet negotiators in the ambassadorial talks over Berlin have cynically
said in effect that the East Germans will be brought around to.accepting
whatever Berlin agreement is satisfactory to the four powers. Despite two
meetings at the summit with West German leaders, the East Germans will
probably negotiate desultorily in the immediate future, but at the same time
will do their best to impede progress toward a German settlement.
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XII. MIDDLE EAST
Developments in the Middle East were dominated by the continuing
crisis involving the Arab states, the Palestinians, and Israel. Prospects for any
settlement were dimmed by Israel's refusal to accept infringements on the
stand-still aspects of the cease-fire, the Palestinians' opposition to any
settlement with Israel, and President Nasir's sudden death in the midst of his
peace-making exertions. Moreover, without Nasir's moderating influence, the
Arab world's centrifugal tendencies seemed certain to accelerate.
Early in 1970, Egypt's effort to redress its deterioriating military
position vis-a-vis Israel brought the Soviet Union into the center of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The more aggressive activities of Egypt in 1969 had
only heightened the Israeli response; Egyptian casualties along the canal
increased, and there were mortifying air raids on Cairo itself. Nasir's answer
was to commission the Soviet Union to rebuild his shattered air defense
system and to bolster it with Soviet-manned SA-3 missiles and Soviet-piloted
aircraft. Over the short term, the Soviet build-up in Egypt threatened Israel's
air capability; in the longer term the build-up represented a threat to the US
presence in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean.
The US initiative to restore the post-1967 cease-fire and restart the
process of seeking a political settlement successfully halted the aerial and
artillery duels across the canal. Violations of the standstill aspect of the
cease-fire, however, brought Israeli threats of retaliation and stalled political
negotiations almost at their starting point.
The increasing militancy of elements of the Palestinian liberation move-
ment loomed ever larger, particularly after Nasir's unpopular acceptance of
the US peace initiative. After a fedayeen build-up in southern Lebanon early
in the year had resulted in Israeli punitive raids and another near-crisis in
Lebanese-fedayeen relations, Beirut accepted in relative silence Israel's polic-
ing of its border areas with ground and air patrols. Later in the year, King
Husayn of Jordan was again pushed into a confrontation with the fedayeen.
His efforts to work with Yasir Arafat to restore a modus vivendi were
frustrated by extremist actions. Jordan's tinderbox finally exploded in the
wake of the fedayeen's multiple hijackings of Western aircraft, which
focused world attention on the Palestinian guerrillas' disregard for the rule of
law. Husayn's strong military moves against entrenched fedayeen positions in
Amman and northern Jordan provoked an unsuccessful Syrian incursion
across the border, and at least temporarily alienated him from most of the
Arab leaders.
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The other Arab states continued generally along their previous courses.
The Libyan revolutionary regime, after extended negotiations with foreign
oil companies, succeeded in winning major price increases. Although the US,
along with the UK, met Libyan demands for withdrawal from military bases,
Libya remained the most likely of the Arab regimes to break off relations
with the US. In the Yemen Arab Republic, a reconciliation between Repub-
lican and Royalist factions was achieved, ending the country's eight-year civil
war. With the lessening of Soviet influence, the government allowed the US
to open an interests section.
The Cyprus problem remained relatively dormant, but the unsuccessful
attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Makarios and the subsequent murder
of the former minister of the interior pointed up the island's unresolved
tensions.
Iran maintained its political stability and enjoyed rapid economic
growth in spite of a nagging foreign-exchange deficit. Although the Shah
retained his pro-Western outlook, he continued his rapprochement with the
Communist world and also strengthened his relations with moderate Arab
governments in an attempt to forge a nonradical alliance in the Middle East.
To meet what he sees as Iran's military needs, the Shah has been seeking
more military hardware and has placed ever-heavier pressure on the Western
oil consortium for increased revenues.
The Greek regime remains in complete control, but there are some signs
of increasing tensions within the hierarchy. With the economy continuing to
grow, the Greek populace appears to be accepting the regime, albeit not
enthusiastically. Sporadic bombings still occur, but the resistance organiza-
tions have failed to unite the opposition. Although Athens suffered some
embarrassment in its relations with international organizations, it felt that it
had regained face by emerging creditably from the NATO Defense Planning
Committee meeting in September 1970.
Nineteen-seventy in Turkey saw considerable political and economic
uncertainty, reflected in intermittent leftist student and labor unrest. It was
also a year of increasing government firmness, highlighted in June when
martial law was declared in Istanbul for three months. Devaluation and other
economic stabilization measures at least temporarily eased Turkey's balance-
of-payments problem, but domestic inflationary pressures persisted. Turkish
officials, increasingly aware of the growing seriousness of the world-wide
narcotics problem, were taking steps to tighten control over domestic opium
production. In foreign relations, Turkey continued its program of high-level
exchange visits, especially with the countries of Europe and the Middle East.
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During 1970, Latin American leaders and pressure groups remained
preoccupied with the complex task of modernizing their societies and coping
with the tensions and violence that inevitably accompany basic social
change. Some governments, like the Frei administration in Chile and the
military government in Peru, consciously risked some economic disruption
and political unrest in their efforts to achieve a relatively fast redistribution
of the wealth and power in their national societies. Others, like the govern-
ments in Brazil and Argentina, gave priority to economic development and
the maintenance of internal security.
Economic growth in the hemisphere as a whole continued in 1970,
perhaps at about the 6 1/2 percent rate achieved in 1969. This rate compares
favorably with the 5-percent average annual rate of the 1960s. But economic
gains were not evenly distributed within the individual countries. The gap
between the wealthy and the poor was probably not appreciably narrowed,
and in some countries it may even have widened. Moreover, the rapid
population growth, particularly in the burgeoning cities, diluted much of the
over-all gain.
Small groups of extremists continued their efforts to exploit urban
unrest by engaging in sporadic acts of terrorism in the cities. The kidnaping
and holding of foreign diplomats and government officials as hostages for the
release of imprisoned extremists became a particularly serious problem
during the year. Ten successful kidnapings occurred-in Guatemala, the
Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. A West German ambas-
sador, a US public safety officer, and an ex-president of Argentina were
murdered by their captors.
Other trends that had become apparent in the latter 1960s were
reinforced in 1970. The movement toward statism was further evidenced as
governments seeking solutions to their growing economic and social prob-
lems moved more and more into areas hitherto reserved for the private
sector. In 1970, too, the military establishments still played a dominant
political role in several countries-Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Panama,
Paraguay and Peru-and a less direct but nevertheless pivotal role in a
number of others. Military leaders who control some of these governments
often act as they do in the conviction that civilian politicians have failed,
leaving only the military to reshape politics and develop viable political
institutions-a task they admit will take a long time.
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Militants in the Roman Catholic priesthood were still important pres-
sure groups on behalf of the most disadvantaged elements in Latin American
society. In some countries, such as Brazil, Bolivia, and Argentina, their
activities bordered on the revolutionary and brought government sanctions.
Although radicals form a small minority of the priesthood in most countries,
occasionally their influence is considerable. The church leaders in most
countries continued publicly to endorse the progressive social pronounce-
ments issued by recent Latin American bishops' conferences.
Nationalism, an increasingly dynamic force in the hemisphere, was
evident among Latin Americans across the political spectrum. Its effects in
1970, as in earlier years, included pressures against foreign (principally US)
investments, as well as efforts to develop "independent" foreign policies.
During 1970, the manifestations of nationalism spread to the countries of
the Caribbean, particularly Guyana and Trinidad, where sometimes they
took the form of an amorphous and ill-defined "black power" movement.
"Black power" leaders in the Caribbean made some headway in exploiting
the grievances of low income groups by accusing government leaders, even
though themselves black, of having compromised with the still largely white,
often foreign-dominated economic power structures in the area-the
"remnants of colonialism."
Presidential elections were held in six Latin American countries during
the year. Dominican President Balaguer was re-elected to a new four-year
term. In Colombia, Misael Pastrana, candidate of the National Front coali-
tion, won a narrow victory. Mexico's unique political system produced Luis
Echeverria as the country's next president. In Costa Rica, Guatemala, and
Chile candidates of opposition political parties or coalitions won the presi-
dency. The victory of Marxist Salvador Allende in Chile probably presages a
further reduction in US influence and new frictions within the inter-Ameri-
can system.
Irregular changes in government took place in three countries during
the year. In Ecuador, President Velasco Ibarra, with the backing of the
armed forces, closed Congress and assumed dictatorial powers. In Argentina,
General Ongania's penchant for acting on his own authority led to his
replacement as president by General Levingston, a man evidently more
willing to operate as a member of the team of leading military commanders.
In Bolivia, several days of pulling and hauling among rival military factions in
early October ended when General Juan Jose Torres assumed the presidency
that had earlier been vacated by General Ovando.
It was an historic year for the Organization of American States (OAS).
The amendments to the OAS charter, designed to strengthen the
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organization and make it more effective and efficient, went into effect early
in the year. The first annual OAS General Assembly opened in Washington in
June. The Assembly was obliged to concentrate on precedent-making organi-
zational and procedural matters, but it also tackled the problem of terrorist
attacks against foreign diplomats in Latin America. After condemning such
actions as "common crimes," the Assembly tasked its juridical committee
with finding the means to enforce a hemisphere-wide legal offensive against
them.
The year also saw the intensification of the concerted Latin American
drive to obtain liberalized treatment of exports, particularly to the US. The
special OAS committee created last year to serve as a continuing instrument
for consultation and negotiation between the US and the Latin Americans
on trade arrangements held a series of meetings during the year. The positive
US response to a number of Latin American wishes has not, however,
satisfied their extensive and often unrealistic aspirations.
The disruptive political and economic effects of the mid-1969 war
between El Salvador and Honduras were eased somewhat during 1970,
thanks in large part to the efforts of the special OAS mechanism established
for the purpose. It will still be some time, however, before the effects of this
unfortunate conflict disappear. The long-standing border dispute between
Venezuela and Guyana was apparently shelved for a period of 12 years as the
result of an unprecedented agreement between the two principals.
Cuba remained largely isolated from hemisphere affairs during 1970.
The Castro regime was still firmly in power, though its failure to achieve the
highly touted goal of a ten-million-ton sugar harvest and the perennial
hardships being suffered by the Cuban people further undermined Castro's
image in Latin America. The regime, still completely dependent on the
Soviet Union for its economic and military underpinnings, kept up its efforts
to break out of the economic sanctions imposed by the OAS six years ago.
At the same time, Castro continued his policy of "exporting the revolution,"
though on a more selective basis than in past years. The election of Salvador
Allende in Chile is likely to cause at least some cracks in the wall of isolation
surrounding the island.
One effect of the growing sense of nationalism and "independence" in
Latin America as a whole has been the expansion of the Soviet presence in
the area. Early in the year, Venezuela became the eleventh Latin American
nation to establish formal and active diplomatic relations with Moscow.
Costa Rica and Guyana followed later in the year. Paraguay now remains the
only South American nation without such ties.
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By and large, 1970 has been a tranquil and relatively uneventful year in
the vast expanse of Africa south of the Sahara.
Although about half of the host of new states completed their first
decade of independence, they remained fragile creations struggling in
poverty to achieve rudimentary national cohesion and modernization. A few
favored ones again recorded fairly high growth rates, but most grew, if at all,
only at about the same rate as their populations. Throughout the area a basic
conditioning factor was the continuation of the elemental social and psycho-
logical dislocation that has long resulted from the migrations of little
educated tribesmen from rural homelands to Africa's burgeoning towns and
cities. Under increasing pressure to speed development, most African leaders
were more than ever preoccupied with urgent domestic concerns. More than
ever, too, pragmatism determined the policy even of the small minority of
regimes that still espoused some variety of radical ideology. With nationalism
still very much in the ascendancy everywhere, there was little progress
toward meaningful regional cooperation.
At least superficially, sub-Saharan Africa seemed to have a greater
degree of political stability than at any time since the transition to inde-
pendence began in 1957. Although fairly serious rebellions by Muslim
elements continued to trouble Chad and Ethiopia and a new conspiracy
against the radical regime in Congo (Brazzaville) reached the stage of an
actual coup attempt before being crushed, there were no new major up-
heavals in 1970. The serious threat to the stability of Nigeria, Africa's most
populous country, ended early in the year, and the federal victory strength-
ened the African state system that has developed over the past decade on the
basis of the artificial boundaries inherited by each member.
The war's end gave impetus to a general trend toward intra-African
detente by removing a strongly divisive issue. Nigeria achieved formal recon-
ciliation with the four states that had recognized "Biafra." Also publicly
reconciled in 1970, at least for a while, were the two Congos, which have
been feuding most of the time since their independence in 1960. In West
Africa, long-estranged Guinea and Ivory Coast ceased their customary
polemics and began a cautious rapprochement. Meanwhile, the much more
important detente between Ethiopia and Somalia survived into its third year,
despite the persistence of tensions and suspicions.
At the same time, however, nationalistic feelings grew stronger, result-
ing in a near-universal determination to achieve greater national control over
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all internal economic activities. One specific aim was to reduce the role of
foreigners as much as possible and thereby open new opportunities for local
citizens. Thus, the large community of relatively prosperous alien Asians
resident in east and central Africa felt new pressures aimed at squeezing
them out of their traditional dominant role in retail and service businesses.
Even more striking, perhaps, was the outright expulsion of large numbers of
alien blacks from some other African countries. Ghana, for example, con-
tinued a program begun the year before by expelling additional thousands of
nationals of neighboring countries, while Uganda began evicting Kenyan
workers.
This nationalistic drive was encouraged by the success of Uganda and
Sierra Leone in negotiating a controlling interest in major foreign-financed
local enterprises. Kenya also continued to acquire important interests in
major domestic industries, and the Nigerian military government served clear
notice that it intended to participate directly in petroleum production. In
September, the government of Congo (Brazzaville), threatened with the
shutdown of an ailing sugar industry, abruptly nationalized the French-
owned companies.
Developments in southern Africa provided scant encouragement for
black African hopes of eventually ending white rule there. The African
guerrilla movements in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique-the only
white-controlled areas where any significant insurgency exists-remained
bogged down and, indeed, were seriously set back in Mozambique as a more
energetic Portuguese commander began to carry the war to the guerrillas.
The white regime in Rhodesia continued to weather international op-
probrium and economic sanctions. Last March, Salisbury implemented a new
republican constitution that institutionalized white minority rule, and-
despite problems resulting from sanctions-the economy achieved substantial
growth that seems likely to continue.
In South Africa, the ultimate bastion of the "White Redoubt," Prime
Minister Vorster's National Party easily won the national elections in April,
crushing a challenge from ultraconservatives who had split from the party in
late 1969. Vorster interpreted the result as an endorsement of his "Outward
Policy" under which he is seeking, so far without great success, to defuse
African hostility by cultivating relations with neighboring black states. In
mid-year the Vorster government received a psychological boost from the
electoral victory in the UK of the Conservatives, who had campaigned on a
platform that included resumption of selective arms sales to South Africa.
The independent black Africans, for their part, appeared increasingly
resigned to their own inability to effect change in southern Africa. Militant
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states such as Zambia and Tanzania reacted by pushing, at the UN and
elsewhere, ever more strongly worded resolutions against the white regimes.
Among states farther removed from the confrontation, however, support for
an accommodation of some sort with South Africa seemed to be growing.
Prime Minister Busia of Ghana went so far as to state publicly that the door
for dialogue with Pretoria should be left open.
The presence and influence of foreign powers in sub-Saharan Africa
remained largely unchanged. The metropoles continued to have close ties
with most of the ex-European colonies, particularly with all of France's 15
former dependencies except Guinea. Communist countries continued to be
active in parts of black Africa, but experienced no dramatic gains or losses
during the year. The mainland Chinese did strengthen and extend their role
as the primary foreign advisers to Tanzania's growing defense establishment.
In addition, the number of Chinese in Tanzania and neighboring Zambia
grew by several thousand as construction began on the Tan-Zam railroad,
financed by a $400-million, interest-free Chinese loan. The Soviets increased
their presence in Somalia, a strategic link between their expanding interest in
the Red Sea basin and the Indian Ocean; Western influence has been on the
decline there since last year's revolution brought a left-leaning military
regime to power.
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XV. AFRICA NORTH OF THE SAHARA
The governments of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia remain stable, each
proceeding at its own pace to tackle the problems of rapid population
growth, unemployment and underemployment, shortages of trained and
technical personnel, low agricultural productivity, illiteracy, and poverty.
There was no basic change in the authoritarian nature of their regimes.
Algerian Premier Boumediene, still firmly in control, has promised
parliamentary elections in 1971. By October, after nearly a year's delay,
massive personnel changes at the ambassadorial and prefectural level were
finally well under way. A four-year plan with heavy emphasis on industrial
development was launched in January. Last spring, allegedly at Soviet
insistence, Algeria established diplomatic relations with East Germany. The
only important new delivery of Soviet military equipment to Algeria was an
initial shipment of SU-7 fighter-bombers, probably under a contract reached
in 1968. Negotiations on outstanding problems in French-Algerian relations
began in the fall; these talks, which include a review of the accords that
govern most of Algeria's crude petroleum production, will probably be
protracted.
King Hassan of Morocco promulgated a new constitution in mid-1970.
It was overwhelmingly endorsed in a popular referendum, despite the vigor-
ous opposition of the two major political parties, which formed a National
Front in an effort to shore up their badly eroded political position. The
constitution provides for a semblance of democracy in the form of a
unicameral parliament with very circumscribed powers. The King remains
the final and nearly absolute authority, depending on the military and
security forces to maintain his regime.
President Bourguiba returned to Tunisia on 1 June after nearly seven
months of convalescence in France. Although he still needs to pace his
activities, Bourguiba reorganized the government in mid-year; he also ap-
pointed a high commission to recommend institutional changes, particularly
to provide for a smooth presidential succession. As of early October, Bour-
guiba seemed intent on replacing Prime Minister Bahi Ladgham-who has
been the government's and party's second-ranking official ever since inde-
pendence in 1956-with another long-time associate, the conservative minis-
ter of state for economy and head of Tunisia's Central Bank, Hedi Nouira.
There was some further improvement in Moroccan-Algerian relations,
featured by the establishment of a commission to demarcate Morocco's
southern border. The Moroccan-Mauritanian rapprochement was also
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strengthened when King Hassan went to Mauritania to attend a brief summit
of Moroccan, Mauritanian, and Algerian chiefs of state, a meeting designed
primarily to exert pressure on Spain to hold. a UN-sponsored referendum in
Spanish Sahara. On the other hand, efforts toward integrating the economies
of the Maghrebian states faltered when Algeria objected to a proposed
economic pact.
Algeria opposed the US Middle East peace plan and withdrew the
brigade that had been stationed in Egypt since the Arab-Israeli war in 1967.
The Maghreb's support for the Palestinians was stepped up, particularly by
Tunisia, which took the lead in calling for a halt to the Palestinian-Jordanian
fighting. Under a new foreign minister, Tunisia is moving away from its
self-imposed isolation from Middle East problems.
Relations between the US and Morocco and Tunisia remain close and
cordial, although both countries are pressing for additional assistance. In an
effort to embarrass the Moroccan regime, the right-wing nationalist opposi-
tion press has been harping on the issue of US "bases" in Morocco. These
installations-a Voice of America relay station in Tangier and two communi-
cations facilities-continue to be operated under a verbal agreement reached
in 1963 between King Hassan and President Kennedy, a commitment reaf-
firmed during the King's visit to the US in 1967. Algeria, which broke
relations with the US in 1967, has subsequently warmed somewhat as it has
turned increasingly to American business and industry for needed expertise;
it has yet to find a face-saving formula for restoring relations, however.
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XVI. FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
The answers to this question fall within the competence of State and
DOD, rather than CIA.
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XVII. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY
The international financial scene in 1970 was relatively stable. Al-
though world-wide inflation remained a major problem during the year, the
increases in rates of inflation within industrialized countries were not severe
enough to bring about the type of disruptions that characterized the inter-
national monetary system in earlier years.
The first allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was made in
January. Acceptance of the new instrument was favorable, and thus far no
major problems have been encountered in its operations. Because of the large
and continuing US payments deficits, a number of foreign officials believe
present SDR allocations are too large, but reduction of these deficits will
ensure a growing role for SDRs within the international financial system.
In contrast to recent years, the money and foreign exchange markets
were quiet. With the exception of the Canadian dollar, allowed to float in
late May, there were no major currency parity changes during the year.
France's balance of payments has been strong in the wake of last year's
devaluation. The German mark also remains strong, but the British pound,
after making some improvement last year, has weakened over the course of
1970, largely as a result of the effects of inflationary wage settlements on
Britain's trade position.
The two-tier gold market, reinforced by the December 1969 agreement
between the International Monetary Fund and South Africa, continued to
work relatively well, with the official market for gold effectively insulated
from the free market. The premium over the official price has generally been
small, indicating that most newly mined gold has gone to the free market.
The already large Eurodollar market-US dollar deposits held outside
the US-continued to grow in 1970, further demonstrating the vital function
of the dollar as an international currency for private transactions. With the
easing of US demand, Eurodollar rates declined from their 1969 highs.
Further monetary reform was a frequent topic of discussion during the
year. There is general agreement that the international financial system that
has developed in the past 25 years has served well and is basically sound. But
changing conditions may require improvements, especially the provision of
means for ensuring that exchange rate adjustments will be smoother and less
upsetting. A number of complex Qchemes are being studied and discussed.
The nations of the European Communities, for example, hope to move
toward eventual monetary union by reaching exchange rate and other
financial agreements.
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The role of the UN in the search for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict was overshadowed throughout much of 1970 by the four-power and
two-power talks. Last summer's US peace initiative envisaged reactivation of
talks under the auspices of Gunnar Jarring, Secretary General Thant's per-
sonal representative in the search for a settlement, but charges and counter-
charges over violations of the cease-fire standstill agreement blocked any
progress. At Egypt's urging, the General Assembly agreed to debate the
Middle East situation despite widespread apprehensions that this might
undercut the 1967 Security Council resolution, the basic document outlining
objectives to attain a peaceful solution. The financial situation of the UN
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which was much criticized for allegedly
allowing the fedayeen to use the UNRWA-run refugee camps of Lebanon and
Jordan to support their cause, remained serious.
Peacekeeping Machinery
In early 1970 there was considerable hope that at least some com-
promise could soon be reached on the vexing issue of how the UN should
authorize, organize, and finance its peacekeeping mission, a topic of po-
tential relevance to a Middle East settlement. The Assembly's Committee of
33 on Peacekeeping Operations made no decisive progress during the year,
however.
Chinese Representation and Korea
Canadian recognition of Peking-and the strong possibility that Italy
would follow suit-heightened interest in the annual Assembly vote on
Chinese representation. Although the Important Question ruling, requiring a
two-thirds affirmative vote for admission, remained a major obstacle to
Peking's aspirations, many observers concluded that Communist China could
not be excluded much longer. There was considerably less movement during
1970 on the Korean question than on the issue of Chinese representation.
The Communists again pressed, with no expectation of success, for Assembly
passage of a resolution calling for withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea
and dissolution of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilita-
tion of Korea (UNCURK).
Unlike 1969, 1970 was a contentious year on questions of colonialism
and racial discrimination, with the Africans particularly incensed over the
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Heath government's disposition to sell arms to South Africa. South-West
Africa remained a key concern. The Council referred the problems relating
to Pretoria's continuing control over the area in defiance of UN resolutions
to the nearly dormant International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.
During 1970 a melange of maritime issues-fishing rights, claims of
territorial waters, and peaceful uses of the seabeds-consumed a surprising
amount of the UN's attention, and this involvement will increase in the near
future. The highlight of the year was the US proposal that national sover-
eignty over the ocean floor cease at a water depth of 200 meters, with
exploitation of the area beyond to be regulated by internationally agreed
procedures. The response to the US initiative was generally favorable, but
the West Coast Latin American states with narrow continental margins are
offering strong opposition.
Financial Questions
An intensive, lengthy struggle between the developed and less de-
veloped countries over guidelines for the Second UN Development Decade,
the 1970s, resulted in a document so hedged with interpretations and
reservations that it is of dubious value. The major powers, however, did have
a certain amount of success in curbing the escalating UN budget and in
increasing the efficiency of the UN Development Program, the primary
dispenser of technical assistance on a multilateral basis. Congressional action
cutting off the US contribution to the UN-related International Labor
Organization aroused much international criticism, with many observers
bemoaning the pressures applied to an international agency when a major
donor country refuses to pay its assessment.
Membership Issue
Fiji became the 127th UN member during the year, and the US
encountered considerable opposition when it attempted to refer the mem-
bership application to a Council committee-the proper procedure, but one
that has not been used since 1949. The Council committee has not yet
reached a decision on the US proposal that a small colonial territory
obtaining sovereignty be accorded "associate member" status, exempt from
payment of assessments but enjoying all benefits and privileges except the
right to vote.
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Ceremonies commemorating the UN's 25th anniversary directed public
attention to the organization, but the year on the whole seemed one of
missed opportunities. The UN's central problems-persuading powers big and
small to define and accept the specific role they wish the UN to play,
improving its decision-making machinery, and establishing more effective
enforcement machinery-remained unsolved.
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The answers to this question fall within the competence of State,
Commerce, and other agencies, rather than the CIA.
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Nineteen-seventy saw the launching of a major innovation in US foreign
policy, reflecting the Administration's great concern over the serious impact
on American society of rapidly increasing drug abuse and related crime.
Convinced that controlling illegal importation and distribution of narcotic
drugs was vastly more than a domestic problem, the US initiated a series of
moves designed to secure the cooperation of a number of countries involved
in or concerned with the production and distribution of opium and its
derivative heroin.
US goals are to eliminate to the extent possible illegal opium produc-
tion, its conversion to heroin overseas, and its subsequent illicit entry into
the US. In pursuing these goals, the US proposed and secured the co-
operation of Turkey, estimated to produce the opium from which about 80
percent of the heroin entering the US is derived, in reducing and ultimately
eliminating opium poppy cultivation and in enhancing controls over illegal
movement of opium-based drugs to the US via France and Western Europe.
The active collaboration of French authorities was obtained in tackling the
difficult problem of rooting out the clandestine laboratories there that
convert Turkish opium into heroin for the drug traffickers supplying the US
market. The Ordaz administration is working closely with US agencies to
control the flow of narcotics from Mexico, the source of some 15 percent of
the US market for opium derivatives.
In order to heighten international awareness and concern over the
world-wide nature of this serious problem and to encourage the greatest
possible cooperation of both producer and importing countries, the US
pressed its case in major international forums-the UN and NATO. In June, a
special meeting of the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society (CCMS) was convened at the request of the US to discuss the drug
problem. The Allies agreed that instead of taking action in the CCMS
context, they should use NATO as a springboard for an initiative in the
United Nations and call for a special meeting of the UN Commission on
Narcotic Drugs (CND). The CND was convened in Geneva in special session
in late September on the basis of a resolution unanimously approv-d by the
*The answers to the other parts of this question fall within the competence of State,
NASA, and other agencies, rather than CIA.
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UN Economic and Social Council in July. The CND members reached
agreement on a report to the current UN General Assembly, outlining a
number of short- and long-term policy recommendations for international
action against drug abuse. The highlight among these proposals was the US
initiative that a special UN fund for drug control be created to enhance
prospects for an integrated international action program.
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European Communities
The guidelines for community activity in 1970 were set at a conference
of heads of government of the Six in December 1969 at The Hague. At this
summit meeting, the Six decided to open membership negotiations with
Britain, Norway, Ireland, and Denmark and to strive for an economic and
monetary union by 1980. Work on these fronts has highlighted develop-
ments in the Common Market during the past year and has provided a
positive, if partial, answer to the question of how much of a spirit of revival
would be evident during the first full year following De Gaulle's departure
from the European political scene.
The study on economic and monetary union prepared for the EC
Council outlines an ambitious three-stage plan that would leave the com-
munity at the end of a decade with rigid exchange rates between member-
state currencies-and possibly even a single currency; a common policy on
international monetary problems; and centralized decision-making for
various other economic policies, including budgetary policy. The suggested
program foresees the need for changes in the community treaties to accom-
modate new institutions of economic management, but, because this is a
controversial matter, it remains uncertain how far the Six are ready to go
now in committing themselves to the 1980 goals.
The Commission this year also took another important step toward
internal development of the EC by proposing a common industrial policy.
Although opinions within the community differ as to how much "direction"
there should be from Brussels, it is generally agreed that a common policy in
such areas as investment, corporate taxation, regional development, and
public procurement will be necessary in order to promote efficiency and
consolidation in the industrial sector. On the labor front, meanwhile, steps
were taken to strengthen the operations of the Social Fund, which among
other functions has a role in encouraging labor mobility through retraining
programs. Despite decreased agricultural surpluses in certain key products,
the cost of the community's agricultural policy continued to be high, and
the Commission remained determined to press for structural reforms de-
signed to bring the policy into better balance. The Commission also clearly
hoped that renewed protests from overseas on the protectionist con-
sequences of the CAP would give it further leverage against domestic pres-
sures in the member states for high support levels.
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Developments in the community's external relations were dominated
by the negotiations with the candidates for membership. As the year closed,
the principal issues were becoming better defined, but serious bargaining had
scarcely begun. Initial talks were also held with the three European neutral
countries that are seeking "arrangements" with the community. It was
evident that the predominant sentiment within the community was doubt
that these countires could be accommodated as members without endanger-
ing the basic political goals of the EC.
As the community moved toward expansion and consolidation in the
West, some elements in the Common Market-prompted by the Soviet-Ger-
man treaty, renewed French-Soviet discussions, and other attempts to im-
prove bilateral relations with the East-were also becoming increasingly
aware that delay in the application of the common commercial policy to
"state-trading countries" until 1973 was unfortunate. Meanwhile, however,
talks were begun with Japan to consolidate the various member-state ar-
rangements into a bilateral commercial agreement between the community
and Japan.
The community devoted increasing attention in 1970 to its relations
with the US as concern mounted over the possible consequences of pro-
tectionist legislation under consideration in Washington. For the first time,
the Commission received a mandate from the Council for bilateral discus-
sions on a wide range of trade topics-discussions that the Commission hopes
will be continued on a periodic basis. The community's preferential trading
arrangements in the Mediterranean area, which were further extended in
1970, were also an issue of contention with the US-and in the GATT forum
as a whole. In general, the EC was increasingly conscious of the difficulty it
will have of making sure that the measures it takes toward consolidation and
enlargement are compatible with its responsibilities as an internationally
influential economic power.
The new Commission, which took office early in the year, showed
awareness that a strong executive was necessary to ensure community
progress. Commission president Malfatti missed no occasion during the year
to explain the political role he sees for the Commission within the Common
Market. The year also saw a modest step toward greater control by the
European Parliament over funds that belong to the community itself-funds
largely derived from agricultural levies, but also including a portion of
revenues collected by the member states for value-added taxes. In general,
1970 seemed to confirm the opinion that political consolidation of the
community, if it is to come at all, will be a gradual process growing out of
the progressive reinforcement of the existing community institutions-the
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Commission, Council, and Parliament. When it came to the Six agreeing on a
new mechanism for encouraging political unification as such, they arrived at
a somewhat loose procedure for mutual consultations that belies the real
integration going on in the process of community policy making.
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