RESPONSE TO NSSM NO.9 VOLUME VII: DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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39 aj&
No Foreign Dissem
Response
to
NSSM No.9
Volume VII : Disarmament and Miscellaneous
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VOLUME VI_._L
DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS
Questions
Section Answered
Nuclear Proliferation
I
9
Strategic Arms Talks
II
1
Other Disarmament Matters
III
3
AID/MAP
IV
1
Foreign Economic Policy
V
1
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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
1. Describe the state of the capabilities of
the nations which could build a nuclear weapon in
the next five years.
a. Which nations have a "stand-by" capa-
bility and how many months are they away from a
bomb?
b. Are any nations actively pursuing con-
struction of the bomb--rather than acquisition of
a stand-by capability?
c. What are the sources of our information?
Identify the "hard" and "soft" areas.
Political rather than economic and technical
factors restrain most of the nations which are capa-
ble of developing nuclear weapons from doing so.
Beyond the present five nuclear powers, we believe
that at least nine nations could--from the stand-
point of capabilities alone--build a nuclear weapon
in the next five years:
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Could produce a first nuclear device within
six to twelve months after a decision to do so.
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1. (continued)
India's only reactor capable of producing sufficient
plutonium for weapons (one or two a year) was built
under an agreement with Canada which stipulated that
it would be used for peaceful purposes only. Canada
has no right of inspection, however, and there are
no safeguards. Nuclear power stations to be built
under safeguards in India in the next several years
could provide more plutonium for weapons, if India
were willing to violate the safeguards.
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Two to three years from a first device, if
it undertook a crash program. The limiting factor
is lack of a plutonium extraction plant. Swedish
nuclear facilities are not under safeguards.
Italy
Also about two to three years from a first
device, if it undertook a crash program and disre-
garded safeguard commitments.
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Holland for some years has also been develop-
ing the centrifuge process for commercial purposes.
We include the Netherlands in this list only because
it could build centrifuge facilities, and conceivably
design and manufacture a nuclear device within five
years.
Most of the nations listed above would have
to import some nonnuclear materials and equipment
for a weapons program, but they could obtain what
they needed on the open market. Other countries
could acquire nuclear weapons in the next five years
only if given large scale aid from outside. Such
aid probably would be available only if one or an-
other of the advanced states took a conscious deci-
sion to help another nation obtain nuclear weapons.
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Active weapons programs versus"stand-by" capabilities
Of the nine nations listed, Allllllllllllllllll
Only
India has what we would call a "stand-by" capa ility;
i.e., possession as of now of all facilities needed to
produce nuclear weapons.
Sources and quality of our information
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We have a large quantity of overt information
on the peaceful nuclear programs of nations
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C.I.A./OSI. Nuclear Proliferation--Uranium Avail-
ability. STIR 41-68. December 1968. (S/NFD)
C.I.A./OSI. Nuclear Proliferation--Fissionable Ma-
terials Production: Capabilities of Nth Coun-
tries. STIR 69-6. (to be published in March or
April 1969) (S/NFD)
C.I.A./OER. Economic Capability of Selected Free
World Countries to Produce Nuclear Weapons. IR
69-2. (to be published in March 1969) (S/NFD)
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I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
2. Identify scarce materials required for a
stand-by capability, and for moving from a stand-by
capability to a weapon.
a. How effectively can the acquisition of
these materials be monitored?
b. How effectively can the acquisition of
these materials be controlled?
C. How effective at detecting evasions are
the inspection provisions of the NPT?
For relatively simple fission weapons, the
only materials which could still be called scarce
are the fissionable materials themselves--plutonium
or enriched U-235.* Some of the nations we are con-
sidering--Japan, Italy, the Netherlands--do not have
domestic reserves of natural uranium, from which
both plutonium and enriched U-235 are derived. But
over the years it has not been very difficult for
nations to buy uranium without submitting to controls
against military use. Nations have also been able to
purchase heavy water, another material often used in
a weapons program, or to obtain equipment with which
to produce their own heavy water. In the design and
final assembly of a weapon, no particularly scarce
materials or equipment are required, although a na-
tion does need an advanced technology in high explo-
sives and shaped charges. Once a nation reached the
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2. (continued)
stand-by stage, therefore, it could probably move
on to building a weapon without encountering any
further material bottlenecks.
assistance.
Even fissionable materials are likely to
become less scarce in coming years. An increasing
number of nuclear power reactors are being built
throughout the world which could produce weapons-
grade plutonium as a by-product. And the ability to
produce enriched U-235 will probably spread beyond
the present five nuclear powers as the gas centri-
fuge and perhaps other new processes are introduced.
At the same time, at least partially effec-
tive international safeguards have been established
in the past 15 years over the movement and use of
fissionable materials. The safeguard systems which
have been set up (principally by the IAEA, EURATOM,
the US, and the UK) do not cover all nuclear facil-
ities throughout the world. India
has a plutonium-producing reactor which is not ef-
fectively safeguarded, and Sweden has one under no
safeguards at all since it was built without foreign
In most
he other nations with which we are concerned--
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the safeguard systems are now quite ettective. AS
the nuclear power programs of these countries expand,
however, the unauthorized diversion of enough fis-
sionable material for one or two weapons would be-
come more difficult to detect.
Whether safeguards can control violations as well
as monitor them, however, is problematical. Most
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
2. (continued)
safeguard arrangements contain no automatic penalties
for violations. Nations which originally supplied
safeguarded material or equipment would presumably
refuse to ship further nuclear material to the of-
fending state. If the situation were publicized,
the offender presumably would be subjected to inter-
national criticism. Whether actual sanctions were
imposed would depend on political decisions of gov-
ernments at the time, made in the light of their own
national interests and feelings. The reactions could
be different in different cases. Many countries, for
instance, might react more harshly to a deliberate
West German violation of safeguards than to one by
another nation.
The*.insection provisions associated with the
NPT still have to be worked out in agreements between
tie signatories and the IAEA. If the agreements in-
clude all the provisions now proposed by the IAEA,
they should be quite effective--but not fool-proof--
in detecting evasions. As with existing safeguard
systems, the detection of evasions will not neces-
sarily be followed by punitive action. Sanctions will
depend ultimately on political decisions of the inter-
ested states.
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
3. What testing facilities are available to
each nation that could produce a bomb within the
next five years? What facilities would be required
for safe tests up to what yields?
(NOTE: For nations seeking a modest nu-
clear capability based on fission weapons, the
testing of nuclear devices is no longer as es-
sential as it was thought to be several years
ago.)
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None of the nations we are considering has
nuclear test facilities in being. Normal armaments
plants could easily be adapted for the required high
explosive, fuzing, and firing tests. All the nations
except the Netherlands have domestic areas where un-
derground tests could be held. Underground tests
in tens of kilotons could easily be conducted, and
tests of several hundred kilotons could be carried
out safely if the country concerned were willing2*6
Y ~d the funds and effort necessary for test p
t~'ons (i.e., greater depth of burial, etc.).
of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests would
be no greater than those which the present nuclear
powers have accepted at some stage of their own pro-
grams.
a equa e or atmospneric sts as well. The dangers
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I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
4. What is the state of the delivery capability
of each nation that could produce a weapon within
the next five years?
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We discuss below each of the nine nations
to whom we ascribe a potential nuclear capability
within the next five years:
India
The only delivery system which India presently has
is a force of obsolescent Canberra light bombers.
It has tried, so far without success, to purchase
TU-16 medium jet bombers from the Soviet Union. It
is not developing a strategic missile system, though
the government may feel increasing pressure to do so
as Communist China's nuclear and missile programs ad-
vance. In contrast to its fairly advanced nuclear
status, however, India does not possess the resources
to sustain a strategic missile development program.
It would have to import a considerable amount of for-
eign technology and would have to hire qualified tech-
nical personnel from abroad. Even so, unless India
could buy a complete system, a missile development
program would almost certainly take longer than five
years.
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4. (continued)
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*BaZZistic missiles are arbitrarily designated In-
tercontinental (ICBMs) if their range is greater than
3,000 n.m. IRBMs (intermediate range) have ranges
from 1,500 to 3,000 n.m.; MRBMs (medium range) have
ranges from 500 n.m. to 1,500 n.m.; and SRBMs (short
range) have ranges Less than 500 n.m.
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4. (continued)
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Sweden has little capability to develop bal-
listic missiles. When Swedish military leaders have
considered nuclear weapons, they have deliberately
eschewed--as being provocative--delivery systems
able to reach Soviet population centers. They have
regarded nuclear weapons mainly as a means of deter-
ring an invasion, or stopping one offshore. If the
Swedes ever should go for nuclear weapons, they prob-
ably would limit the means of delivery to tactical
aircraft, and possibly pre-position some devices off-
shore in the most likely invasion areas.
Italy
Italy would probably need at least ten years
to develop a missile system of IRBM or ICBM range,
without large-scale outside assistance. Even then,
it would have to make arrangements with some other
nation or nations for a suitable test range. Italy
already has tactical aircraft capable of carrying
nuclear weapons.
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
4. (continued)
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Netherlands
Development of a ballistic missile system by
the Dutch is almost inconceivable, and is in any case
beyond their capacity for many years to come. If
they should develop nuclear weapons--which is also
almost inconceivable--they could use their present
tactical aircraft for delivery, or might seek other
means of delivery from their allies.
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
5. How effectively can the source of an in-
comin missile be identified? For example, if an
fell on Soviet territory, could
it be anonymous.
At present, the USSR and the US could iden-
tify missiles coming from fixed launching sites in
each other's homeland. Soviet long-range warning
radars, however, do not provide coverage of the multi-
directional threat from US Polaris submarines. Nor
do they adequately cover areas from which future
French or Chinese land-based missiles might be launched.
But the USSR could install radar facilities to cover 25X6
these areas, and to track missiles launched
The So-
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viets are already building six additional rge ra-
dars, but at their present early stage of construc-
tion we cannot make a confident estimate of their
purpose. In the future, if missiles are deployed
which are designed to evade early warning radar--for
example. depressed trajectory or fractional orbit
ICBMs
Identifying the nationality of missiles fired
from submarines would be extremely difficult if a
number of nations possessed such submarines. Since
only the US, the UK, and the USSR now have them,
each would be fairly certain of the origin of a
missile attack launched from the high seas. The
USSR might not be able to distinguish between the
US and the UK, but would probably consider an at-
tack from one as an attack from both. France is the
only other country seriously working on missile sub-
marines at present; she will have one, and possibly
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I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
5. (continued)
two, such submarines in operation--and possibly three
more under construction--five years hence. The Com-
munist Chinese in five years conceivably could have
missiles which they could launch from their conven-
tionally-powered G-class submarine, but there is no
good evidence that they are actively pursuing the
early development of a submarine missile force.
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
6, Do programs for the peaceful use of nuclear
weapons, such as the US Project PLOWSHARE, hinder
or aid the proliferation of nuclear weapons?
Project PLOWSHARE, or any program to use
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, probably
will encourage nations to seek the prerequisites
for nuclear weapons. If experience shows that nu-
clear explosions can be safely and profitably used
in large construction or earth-moving projects,
some nations will not long be satisfied to contract
such tasks out to the present nuclear powers. Where
possible, they will want to do the work themselves.
The US can mute, but not eliminate these desires,
by carrying out PLOWSHARE explosions for other
nations on very generous terms.
Those nonnuclear nations which sign and
ratify the NPT, of course, will be foreclosed from
developing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful
purposes as well as for weapons. Under the treaty's
terms, PLOWSHARE-type devices can be made available
to nonnuclear states, but only if they remain in the
control of the nuclear power which provides them.
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1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
7. Have any of the present powers (or nations
which could produce a weapon within five years) ex-
hibited an interest in unconventional delivery capa-
bilities, such as a bomb in a suitcase or a bomb in
a freighter in New York harbor? How effectively can
such activity be monitored?
To our knowledge, none of the present or
potential nuclear powers has shown interest in such
unconventional means of delivery. But we probably
would not know if they had. Any government which
considered such schemes would keep security on the
project as tight as possible. If a nation actually
used these or similar delivery methods, the chances
are good that it could place the weapons in position
without being detected.
Of the present and potential nuclear powers,
we believe that for the foreseeable future only the
USSR and Communist China would consider clandestinely
introducing nuclear weapons into the US. The Soviets
clearly have a capability to do so, and might do so
if they planned a surprise attack on the US. On the
other hand, with the large numbers of strategic
weapons now in their arsenal, the Soviets would
probably consider marginal the contribution of a
clandestine emplacement effort. They probably would
consider any advantages it offered as outweighed by
the risks of jeopardizing surprise and of precipi-
tating a US preemptive attack.
Because the Chinese presently have no other
means of attacking the US with nuclear weapons,
they might consider undertaking a clandestine em-
placement effort with the object of deterring the
US from attack on Communist China. Their capabili-
ties to carry out such an effort, however, are much
less than those of the USSR. Moreover, they could
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7. (continued)
not be sure that the US would be deterred and they
would have to consider that detection might result
in, rather than stave off, a devastating US strike.
For these reasons, we think it unlikely that Commu-
nist China will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons
clandestinely into the US.
It is possible that a third country (e.g.
Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandes-
tine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US.
We consider this highly unlikely. We doubt that
either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to
enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive
undertaking. If they should, that nation's leaders
would almost certainly react unfavorably to a pro-
posal that could jeopardize their national survival
merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.
Additional References
NIE 4-68: The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons
of Mass Destruction into the US. 13 June 1968
(TS/RD)
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I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
8. Which nations are unlikely to sign the NPT?
a. What levers are available to whom (to
persuade a particular nation to sign)?
b. How strong is the Soviet interest in
having each of these nations sign?
c. If these nations are coerced into sign-
ing, how likely is their signature to prevent their
acquisition of nuclear weapons within the next five
years?
The NPT has been signed by 88 countries, ratified
by nine (including the U.K.), but will not come into
effect until it is ratified by the US and USSR, and
32 additional states. We list below those nations
which have not yet signed, and then consider which
of them will continue to withhold their signatures.
Non-signers who alreadypossess nuclear weapons
France Communist China
Non-signers capable of developing nuclear weapons in
Five years
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India
Other non-signers
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Brazil
Burma
Burundi
Cambodia
Central
African Rep
Chile
Congo-Brazz.
Cuba
Gabon
Guinea
Guyana
Indonesia
Jamaica
Malawi
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Niger
Pakistan
Portugal
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Swaziland
Tanzania
Thailand
Uganda
Zambia
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8. (ccn:inued)
Communist China will almost certainly con-
tinue to reject the NPT, and it is unlikely that
France will sign at least while de Gaulle is in
power.
Among the states which could develop nu-
clear weapons within five years, we see little pos-
sibility that Israel would sign unless intense pres-
sure were brought to bear (and major inducement of-
fered) by the US. India is also unlikely to change
its position. New Delhi wants to keep its options
open in the face of the nuclear threat from Commu-
nist China, and it also regards the NPT as a dero-
gation of its claim to great power status.
In West Germany, the NPT has become a major
and highly divisive, political issue. Most SPD lead-
ers in the Grand Coalition, and some moderate CDU
figures, support the treaty. They would hope by
signing it to improve the prospects of Bonn's east-
ern policies. The majority of CDU/CSU leaders, how-
ever, oppose the NPT, basically on the ground that
it would relegate Bonn to permanent inferior status.
Both political parties wish that the whole issue of
the NPT did not exist, and Bonn is unlikely to sign
the NPT at least until after the national elections
next October. Whether the West Germans will sign
thereafter is uncertain. It will depend on such
things as the outcome of the October elections, de-
velopments in West German - Soviet relations, and
the amount of pressure brought to bear by the US
and other states.
Some uncertainties also attend the NPT's pros-
pects in Japan and Australia. Japanese leaders
basically support it, but conservative opposition
has increased during the past year. The Japanese
government probably will move to sign after US
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ratification, but can be expected to wait a dig-
nified period to avoid appearing overly responsive
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As for Australia, some
evidence suggests that t e government may now be
favorably inclined toward the treaty, but Prime Min-
ister Gorton indicated last October that he would
not sign it. Many Australians foresee a long-term
Chinese threat in their part of the world. While
continuing to pin their security on close alliance
with the US, they are unwilling to renounce nuclear
weapons permanently. In any case, Gorton probably
will take no immediate action.
Some comment should be made on a few of the
other nations which have not signed the NPT. Pakis-
tan will not sign unless India does. South-Africa,
an important uranium producer, could eventually pro-
duce nuclear weapons, though not within five years.
It probably wants to keep the option open, though
for the foreseeable future the military value of
nuclear weapons in the African context would be
small. Semi-isolated in world councils and facing
a hostile black Africa, South Africa might seek a
nuclear capability more for its political impact
than for its military usefulness.
Spain and Portugal will both probably try
to use the NPT to get political concessions on
other issues. Spain already has linked its sig-
nature to the Gibraltar dispute with Great Britain
and to the renegotiation of US base rights. Por-
tugal will probably use the NPT in seeking support
for its African policies and a favorable agreement
on US bases in the Azores. The Portuguese have also
argued that more effective security guarantees should
be given non-nuclear states before they sign the
treaty.
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In Latin America, Brazil will probably con-
tinue to reject the NPT. The government argues
that the treaty, over the long run, would impede
Brazil's progress toward great-power status. It
also refuses to renounce the right to develop nu-
clear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.
Finally, like some other states, Brazil alleges that
the security guarantees associated with the treaty
are inadequate, and that the US and USSR have not
committed themselves sufficiently to limit and re-
duce their own nuclear arsenals. Argentina, for
reasons of prestige, probably will not sign the NPT
unless Brazil does, and Chile will also follow Brazil's
lead.
Most of the other states which have not
signed are insignificant. Collectively, however,
their ratifications could be important in bringing
the treaty into effect. Some have followed Peking's
lead in rejecting the NPT (Albania and probably
Tanzania). A number of states in Africa with close
ties to Paris have followed the French lead. Some
former colonial areas have not signed simply to show
their independence of all great powers. Some prob-
ably have just not gotten around to signing.
Levers which might be used: The principal levers
available to persuade nations to sign the NPT are
diplomatic pressure and the weight of world opinion,
together with the inherent leverage of the treaty
as more nations accede to it. World opinion itself
would not decisively influence any government's de-
cision on the NPT, but it could contribute to the
isolation of foot-draggers if all but a few nations
had ratified. The effectiveness of diplomatic pres-
sure from the USSR or US would depend on their over-
all political influence in a given country. Of the
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8., (continued)
five major, holdouts against the NPT, the US has a 25X6
lmr"gl de ree of influence in four
25X6 Both the US and
the USSR have a mo est amount of political influ-
ence with the other holdout, India.
Neither the US nor the USSR, however, could
dictate a decision on the NPT to these nations.
Even if the major powers were willing to employ
drastic sanctions, the results might be counter-
productive. Ending economic aid to India, for
example, or cutting off monetary remittances from
US citizens to Israel, could conceivably bring these
nations to heel on the NPT, though we doubt it.
There are potential inducements which might
be effective in various countries. In the long run,
the treaty itself offers some internal leverage.
If all major suppliers of uranium and nuclear equip-
ment accepted the NPT, holdouts would face a drying
up of their foreign sources of supply, since signa-
tories are obliged to refrain from supplying mater-
ials except under safeguards. Both West Germany and
Japan are anxious to gain admission to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee. In addition, the Ger-
mans would like to have the US intercede on their
behalf to gain Moscow's renunciation of its claim
to intervention rights, and to achieve progress to-
ward a West German - Soviet Non-Use of Force agree-
ment. Aggressive US sponsorship of these causes
probably would improve German and Japanese attitudes
toward the treaty. But heavy US pressure--as op-
posed to inducements--would be regarded as interfer-
ence in internal affairs, and would probably strengthen
political forces which are less well disposed to
the US than the present governments.
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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
8. (continued)
How Strong Is Soviet Interest? Soviet in-
terest is greatest in having West Germany sign the
treaty, and in assuring that Germany never again
becomes a major military power. When the USSR be-
gan negotiating the NPT, it probably was not seri-
ously concerned about other potential nuclear pow-
ers. The Soviets now do show more concern about
these others, and at the least probably believe that
West Germany will be under more pressure to accept
the NPT if other near-nuclear powers sign it.
25X6
If Nations Are Coerced Into Signing...?
25X6 As indicated above, In is probably could
not be coerced into signing the NPT. In effect, the
US probably has no-.feasible means of preventing
these nations from acquiring nuclear weapons if they
decide that vital national interest require them to
do so.
25X6
25X6
25X6
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25X6
Among the technically advanced countries
that sign, as well as the less advanced states,
there will be great interest in any progress among
the nuclear powers toward the limitation or reduc-
tion of existing nuclear arsenals. Any progress in
these areas would strengthen the commitments of NPT
signatories to remain non-nuclear. Over a five-
year period, it might substantially enhance the
prospects for gaining broader adherence to the treaty.
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9. Would the Soviet Union sign /the NPT/
first or simultaneously?
The Soviet Union is not likely to ratify
the NPT before the US does, but probably will do
so shortly thereafter. The most recent authori-
tative statement by Moscow--issued on 20 January
--said that the USSR "fully shares" the view of
those who favor the "most rapid entry into force"
of the NPT. Some Soviet officials have intimated
that Soviet ratification is linked to movement by
West Germany on the treaty, but it is doubtful that
Moscow will wish to be seen lagging behind the US.
The ratification process will pose no problem in
the USSR; it can be accomplished by the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet without a meeting of the
full body. Whenever the Soviet leadership decides
to ratify, it can do so without delay.
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STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS
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II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS
1. Why, and how strongly, does the Soviet lead-
ership want strategic arms limitations talks with
the US? What are the sources within the Soviet
leadership and society of support for and opposi-
tion to meaningful talks?
We judge that the Soviet government has made
a serious decision to enter strategic arms limita-
tions talks with the United States, but that there
is much internal opposition to such talks.
The chief reason why the Soviet leaders de-
cided to support such negotiations probably is their
assessment of the present strategic relationship be-
tween the US and the USSR. The Soviets are now en-
gaged in the final stages of an ICBM buildup which
by mid-1969 will give them rough numerical equality
with the US ICBM force. They also have well under-
way a program to build improved missle launching sub-
marines similar to Polaris. We think that the So-
viets probably were unwilling to countenance arms
control negotiations before they achieved a rough
balance with the US in strategic offensive missiles.
The Soviets may doubt their ability to match
the US over the whole range of technological develop-
ment for advanced systems--MIRV, ABM, etc.--if they
do choose to compete. They might also believe that
continued delays in initiating the negotiations--while
the US weapons testing is continuing--could impair
their ability to negotiate effectively on future
levels of deployment of advanced systems.
Economic considerations undoubtedly are an-
other major reason for Soviet interest in arms con-
trol talks. Some Soviet leaders have expressed deep
concern over the adverse effects of high levels of
defense spending. The rate of growth of the Soviet
economy has declined in the 1960's.
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II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS
.1. (continued)
An arms control agreement that would allow
the Soviets to hold military expenditures near pre-
sent levels would allow a continuation of the re-
cent emphasis on improving the lot of the consumer
and an acceleration of investment in industry.
The cost of new strategic weapons programs
to offset the effects of the planned improvements in
US strategic forces could easily raise the level of
total Soviet defense spending by one-fourth or more
by the mid-1970's. This increase in spending would
not provide the USSR with a strategic gain over the
US and would not allow for major improvements in the
general purpose forces. If future increases in mili-
tary expenditures come mainly at the expense of
in-
vestment programs, prospects for future Soviet
growth
would be reduced. On the other hand, given the
re-
cent
expansion. of consumer programs, the Soviet
lead-
ers
may view the political cost of cutting back
on
the
consumer as greater now then it has been in
the
past.
While the Soviets have cogent incentives to
arrive at an arms control agreement with the United
States, they are certain to reject any solution which
they believe might jeopardize their deterrent or one
which would conflict with their claim to equality
with the United States in strategic power. The So-
viet leadership is interested not only in being as-
sured of the USSR's security, but also in convincing
the world that the Soviet Union is a global power
in the same class as the United States. Soviet sen-
sitivity on this point was reflected in Premier
Kosygin's conversation with Senators Gore and Pell
in November 1968. Kosygin denied the implication,
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II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS
1. (continued)
allegedly attributed to Secretary Rusk in a press
account, that the USSR was more in need of arms
control measures than the United States, and insisted
that this subject was equally important to both sides.
There are signs that the decision to discuss
arms control was the product of a shaky consensus,
and that misgivings remain on the part of some Soviet
interest groups--especially certain elements within
the military-industrial complex and the ideological
apparatus--which do not agree with the decision, or
at least have reservations about some aspect of the
scope of the negotiations. Those individuals and
agencies whose primary interests and responsibilities
center on the state of the economy and consumer wel-
fare probably form the backbone of support for arms.
talks. This group may see in arms limitations re-
lief from pressing economic problems as well as
benefits to be derived from reduced tensions and
better relations with the US.
Regarding signs of opposition-, articles in
the military press have shown a marked aversion to
strategic arms talks. References to the subject have
been handled differently than in the civilian media,
to the point of editing selectively--and tenden-
tiously--official Soviet statements on strategic
arms talks. In addition, some military writers have
implied that they are dissatisfied with this aspect
of Soviet policy. These tendencies are no doubt due
in large measure to professional interest, but since
the regime is receptive to the military point of view,
they cannot be discounted as influences on Soviet
policy.
There may be conflicts of interest even among
those who favor arms control agreements with the
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II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS
1. (continued)
United States. At stake are the considerable re-
sources that could be shifted into other uses by
such agreements. Investment and consumer interests
are the main civilian competitors, and on the mili-
tary side, research and development and general
purpose forces also would like a share of these re-
sources.
Underlying the implied unity of the Soviet
announcements to commence negotiations, therefore,
are a variety of points of view, some incompatible.
This suggests that future positions taken by the So-
viets will be the product of compromises arrived at
with difficulty.
Additional References
CIA/OSR, Soviet Initiatives on Arms Talks Since the
Czechoslovak Crisis. IM 68-26, December '68
(S/NFD)
SNIE 11-16-68, The Soviet Approach to Arms Control.
November '68, (S/CD)
CIA/OSR, Military and Economic Considerations Behind
the Soviet Interest in Strategic Arms Talks,
IM 68-20, July '68 (S/NFD)
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OTHER DISARMAMENT MATTERS
III
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III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS
1. What is the status of the US-Soviet exchanges
on "technical" violations of the test ban treaty?
How significant and frequent have such violations
been?
US-Soviet exchanges which have taken place
following "technical" violations of the limited
test ban treaty have adhered to no firmly estab-
lished pattern. (Such a violation occurs when an
underground nuclear test vents and radioactive
debris is carried beyond the borders of the testing
nation.) Some of the diplomatic exchanges have
been oral and others written. Some, but not all,
have been publicized. Some violations have been
officially ignored, probably for reasons related
to the overall political climate, the relative
magnitude of the violation, or the time elapsed
between a test and the confirmation of data indi-
cating a violation.
In general, the US-Soviet exchanges on
alleged violations appear to have been designed
mainly to let the other side know that its activity
had been monitored. For propaganda purposes, the
Soviets have also labeled as "violations" nuclear
accidents such as occurred in 1966 when a US mili-
tary aircraft lost three nuclear bombs over the
coast of Spain.
The US officially requested information
from the Soviets on possible Soviet violations
resulting from one test in 1965 and two tests in
1966, and made these inquiries public. The US has
also indicated informally to the Soviets that
debris from other Soviet tests has been detected,
even though official representations were not made. 25X1B
25X1 B
The Soviets have conducted a total of
underground nuclear tests--
since the 1963 treaty. They
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III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS
25X1 B
25X1 B
25X1 B
25X6
VAW
25X6
Since the Limited
Test Ban treaty entered into force in 1963, the US
has detected radioactive debris definitely associ-
ated with the venting of six Soviet underground
tests. Moreover, debris has been detected that
probably came from four other Soviet tests, and
possibly from 18 others. The USSR has admitted
that some of its tests vented, but has denied that
the quantity of debris that leaked into the atmo-
sphere was significant enough to cause fallout
beyond the territorial limits of the Soviet Union.
The USSR, in an aide-memoire of 21 January
1969, accused the US of a violation resulting from
a nuclear explosion of 8 December 1968. Moscow's
news media noted the test at the time,
sequent press
reatment suggests they do not intend to make a
major issue of it. The US responded orally upon
receipt of the demarche by disclaiming a violation,
and observing that the US has not complained about
some Soviet nuclear events from which radioactivity
was detected. A written reply was promised.
In general, US-Soviet diplomatic communi-
cations on such incidents have been predicated on
the assumption that reasonable precautions were
taken and that, a violation was not intended. Some
Soviet nuclear devices have been detonated inten-
tionally at relatively shallow depths in connection
with research on peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.
With the present state of the art, it is very diffi-
cult, despite rigorous preventive measures and care-
ful planning and execution, to conduct these tests
without releasing some radioactive debris into the
atmosphere. There is no evidence, however, of a
Soviet intention to flout the treaty or to seek to
loosen its terms.
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III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS
2. What is the status of US contacts with the
USSR on problems of space, including matters pend-
ing before the UN?
In recent years, the USSR has shown grow-
ing awareness of the advantages of cooperation with
the US on some space matters. Agreement on joint
projects has been hampered, however, by inhibitions
against joint efforts with the US in any field, by
the Soviet penchant for secrecy in areas where mili-
tary and civilian affairs overlap, and in some cases
by Soviet embarrassment over the relative inferior-
ity of their own capabilities.
Cooperation between the two states, however,
was instrumental in achieving in 1967 the treaty on
exploration and use of outer space, which among other
things prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass
destruction in outer space. Soviet-US collaboration
also paved the way for an international agreement
in 1968 on rescue and return of astronauts. This
most recent accord, which grew out of the Outer Space
Treaty, also established legal procedures for return-
ing fallen space objects to the launching authority.
Moscow showed sudden interest in negotiating
in earnest on the assistance and return agreement in
the early fall of 1967--about the same time that it
made demarches to several states asking their assist-
ance, if needed, to recover a Soviet space vehicle
in the Indian Ocean area. Bilateral negotiations
with the US subsequently went smoothly and at a rel-
atively brisk pace. The Soviets offered a compro-
mise to provide an article that would acknowledge
the interests of regional organizations, thus help-
ing to overcome objections raised by the European
Space Research Organization. Remaining language dif-
ficulties were resolved, and concerted US-Soviet
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efforts at the UN resulted in approval of the agree-
ment in December 1967.
Bilateral agreements on the exchange of
weather satellite data date back to 1962. The first
Soviet meteorological satellite to operate satis-
factorily was not launched until June 1966, however,
one year after the date date set for the actual ex-
change of information. Moscow sent no data at all
until September 1966, and transmitted only limited
amounts to the US in 1967.
In July of 1968, the USSR showed new inter-
est in exchanging weather data, and an understanding
was reached at talks between US and Soviet special-
ists in Moscow for undertaking improvements on the
Washington-Moscow high-speed weather link. The two
sides recommended that each government increase the
exchange of satellite and conventional weather data,
and study the possibility of simultaneous facsimile/
teletype transmission pending installation of high-
speed terminal equipment. The discussions were con-
ducted in a friendly, cooperative atmosphere, and
included briefings and tours of Soviet computer, com-
munications and analysis centers and the terminal
of the US-Soviet bilateral link. The quality of So-
viet data still is less than satisfactory, although
this is apparently for technical rather than politi-
cal reasons.
The Soviets have shown new signs of interest
in the International Telecommunications Satellite
Consortium (INTELSAT), and are sending an observer
delegation to a conference of the 63-member organi-
zation to be held in Washington in late February 1969.
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III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS
In August of 1968, Moscow proposed a rival organi-
zation, Intersputnik, whose members have equal
voting power in contrast to the weighed voting
system which assures US control of INTELSAT. Al-
though a number of nations are critical of aspects
of the INTELSAT agreement, particularly the voting
provisions, Intersputnik does not offer serious
competition for INTELSAT as a world-wide system be-
cause of serious technical and economic disadvan-
tages. To date only eight Communist states have
joined Intersputnik and the enlistment of a signifi-
cant number of non-Communist states is highly un-
likely. The Soviets may try, however, to influence
the forthcoming INTELSAT discussions in favor of a
voting system more to their liking and a general
loosening of US control. Whether or not Moscow will
seriously seek to negotiate terms for membership
in INTELSAT remains to be seen.
Leading Soviet scientists have on occasion
expressed interest in US-Soviet cooperation in the
exploration of space. At a news conference follow-
ing the January 1969 Soyuz-4 and Soyuz-5 space flights,
the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences said
that the USSR has no objection to the idea. In 1967,
a Soviet cosmonaut publicly plugged US-Soviet coopera-
tive space ventures, and quoted Leonid Sedov--the
dean of Soviet space scientists--who on three occa-
sions that same year had publicly alluded to the bene-
fits of joint efforts in manned space exploration.
These sentiments are compatible with the of-
ficial Soviet positions that the USSR does not op-
pose space cooperation in principle. The scientists
and cosmonauts are not policy-makers, however, and
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III, OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS
2m (contznued)
there is significant opposition--especially in mili-
tary circles--to space cooperation with the US.
The scientists are probably more aware of the high
cost of space programs and the technical benefits
to be derived from US space research. The prospect
of gaining access to sophisticated Western technology
is one of the reasons for Soviet collaboration with
France in the space field.
The imaginative idea of joint ventures into
distant space has naturally commanded attention in
the Western press, but there still is no indication
that the Soviets have any answers to the long-intract-
able problem of how to organize such cooperation.
Those in the Soviet space community who have ex-
pressed interest in the notion have made no specific
proposals. In fact, they seem to regard prospects
for agreement as remote, and have said that a "new
international climate" would first have to be created.
The Soviets nevertheless may believe that such hints
about grand but distant perspectives may open the
way for less ambitious efforts at international co-
operation.
NIE 11-1-67: The Soviet Space Program. 4 April 1968.
(TS)
CIA/OER, IM 69-12, Soviet International COMSAT Initia-
tives and their Meaning for INTELSAT. 31 January
1969. (S/NFD)
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V
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
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V. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
A. Balance of Payments
The questions are not within CIA's responsi-
bility.
B. International Monetary System
Questions I thru 5: not within CIA's respon-
sibility.
6. What is the likelihood of renewed specu-
lative attacks against the French franc, pound ster-
ling, and/or other currencies and/or in favor of the
Deutschemark, lira and/or other currencies?
Sterling
The end of sterling's extreme vulnerability
to speculative attack is nowhere in sight. As in
the recent past, it will be one of the first cur-
rencies affected by strong disturbances anywhere
in the foreign exchanges, whatever the proximate
cause. Speculation against the pound might resume
with almost any adverse economic news from Britain--
poor monthly trade figures, large-scale strikes,
substantial wage settlements in key industries,
sharp increases in price levels.
There will be danger of a sterling crisis
in the fall when statutory authority for much of
the government's austerity program lapses. A san-
guine outlook for the balance of payments depends
upon continuation of the full austerity program.
The present government, however, lacks the power to
push an extension through parliament and is unlikely
even to try. Thus, the balance of payments is un-
likely to improve enough in the next year or two to
remove the danger of a new crisis. In the face of
heavy selling pressure, we believe the present gov-
ernment would be inclined to let the pound float.
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V. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
B. 6. (continued)
French Franc
Present exchange controls make it more diffi-
cult for Frenchmen to speculate against the franc.
But speculative attacks by others will resume if
widespread social unrest in France develops or if
the present austerity program demonstrably fails.
Thus far the austerity program has been reasonably
effective. Its future success, however, will hinge
to an important extent on the outcome of wage nego-
tiations in key industries that begin in March.
The mark remains undervalued. The firm
position and indirect measures adopted by German
authorities last November merely postponed the day
of reckoning. Speculation in favor of the mark al-
most certainly will resume at the first sign of
serious weakness in the French franc, the pound, or
the dollar. But German authorities are likely to
resist strongly any pressure to revalue before fall
elections. Once elections are over they may be less
adamant, especially if inflationary pressures in the
domestic economy are present when a wave of specu-
lation hits the foreign exchanges.
Italian Lira
Heavy speculation in favor of the lira is
not likely to develop in the near future. Although
Italy has run substantial. payments surpluses since
1965, Italian monetary authorities are not apt to
consider revaluation seriously in present domestic
political circumstances. If speculation in favor of
the lira should develop, it is not likely to last.
long or significantly to affect the prices of other
major currencies.
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C. Trade
The questions are not within CIA's respon-
sibility.
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